COMMUNISM, RELIGION AND REVOLT IN BANTEN

IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

by

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Abstract

Twice in this century popular revolts against colonial rule have occurred in the Banten district of West Java. These revolts, conducted largely under an Islamic leadership, also proclaimed themselves Communist. They sought to overturn the status quo in the name of revolution, but also looked back to the pre-colonial era for inspiration.

Bantenese society in the early twentieth century possessed strong local characteristics which distinguished it from the rest of Java. Although there had been some spread of cash crops, its economy was extremely vulnerable due to infertility of the soil and poor irrigation. Migration, both temporary and permanent, provided the region with a lifeline and an opportunity for economic advancement for some. Village society was dominated by three powerful groups: the religious leaders, local strongmen or bandits and nobles who were descendants of the former sultans. Great resentment was felt towards both the Dutch and the local Indonesian administration, many of whom were non-Bantenese. These two groups were the targets of local hostility. The primary division that ran through Bantenese society was therefore not between peasant and landlord but between peasant and agent of government.

Advantage was taken of this division by the Sarekat Islam in the 1910s and by the Communist Party (PKI) in the 1920s. The Communist Party succeeded in mobilizing a large part of Bantenese society under its wings and this political mobilization culminated in the revolt of November 1926. Whilst the revolt was Communist in

name, however, its leadership was in the hands of the traditional power holders of rural Bantenese society, especially the religious leaders. The revolt was followed by a period of sharp colonial repression and enforced political quiescence. The collapse of the wartime Japanese occupation administration in September 1945 was followed by a popular uprising in Banten led by the same groups who had spearheaded the 1926 revolt.

CONTENTS

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Finally, I should like to thank Isobelle M. Jaques who shepherded this thesis through its final typing and for the boundless patience which she displayed whilst doing it.

In spite of all the assistance I received from many sources, this work is, of course, my own responsibility and the errors contained herein are mine.

The Indonesian and Dutch languages have undergone spelling reforms since the period covered by this thesis. Place names and terms in both languages have been rendered into contemporary spelling, as have all Indonesian words and sentences quoted in the text, with the following exceptions:

1. the spelling of Dutch and Indonesian personal names has not been altered;

2. bibliographical items retain the original spelling;

3. where the name of a person interviewed appears in a footnote, it is spelled, as far as possible, according to the known wishes of that person;

4. I have used the name Batavia for Jakarta throughout the colonial period and adopted Jakarta only for the post-1942 period.

BB, Binnenlands Bestuur	Interior Administration, European Civil Service
BKR, Badan Keamanan Rakyat	People's Security Organization
BU, Budi Utomo	an early Javanese political association
DIA	Department of Interior Administration
DO, Dubbel Organisatie or Dictatoriaal Organisatie	Double or Dictatorial Organization
ELS, Europeesche lagere school	European elementary school
HBS, Hoogere burgerschool	Citizens High School, Dutch secondary school
HIS, Hollandsch-inlandsch school	Dutch Native School
ISDV, Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging	Indies Social Democratic Association
MvO, Memorie van Overgave	Transfer Memorandum, written on a resident's resignation
OSVIA, Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren	Training School for Native Officials
PEB, Politiek Economische Bond	Political Economic Association
PERSI, Persatuan Sopir Indonesia	Indonesian Drivers' Union
PETA, Pembela Tanah Air	Defenders of the Homeland
PID, Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst	Political Intelligence Service
PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia	Indonesian Communist Party
PNI, Partai Nasional Indonesia	Indonesian National Party
R, Raden	a title
RA, Raden Adipati	a title
RM, Raden Mas	a title
RT, Raden Tumenggung	a title

SI, Sarekat Islam	Islamic Association
TKR, Tentara Keamanan Rakyat	People's Security Army
TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia	Indonesian National Army
VOC, Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie	United East India Company

GLOSSARY

Note: Bantenese words are marked *

afdeling	an administrative territorial unit, administered by an assistant resident; section, division
amprak*	pupil, follower; name of well-known jawara gang in the 1930s
Assistant Wedana	lower level native official between wedana and village head
bales*	reprisal
Chudancho	company commander in PETA
Controleur	Dutch official below assistant resident
Daidancho	battalion commander in PETA
dalil	quotations from the Koran
desa	village
Dewan Rakyat	People's Council
dikir (dhikr)	the glorification of Allah, the repetition of certain fixed phrases in ritual order
dukun	village healer, medicine man
Entol*	Bantenese title originally given to a nobleman who did not belong to the sultan's family
Ethici	proponent of the 'Ethical Policy'
firman	Allah's commandment
gaga	dry rice fields
golok	a kind of dagger
guru	teacher
guru ngaji	village religious teacher
haj	the pilgrimage to Mecca
hajat	religious feast
haji	one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca

haram	forbidden by Islam
harbi	those who want to destroy Islam
Heiho	auxiliary troops
herendiensten	compulsory labour on public works
hoofd	chief
hoofdgeld	capitation tax
huma	field where swidden, or slash and burn rice farming is practised
ikram	white cloth worn by prospective pilgrims and used to dress the body of a haji
ilmu	knowledge, skill
jagakersa*	village policeman
jago	'cock', tough, local village leader similar to jawara
jakat	the alms tax, one of the principal obligations in Islam
jaksa	public prosecutor in regional courts
Jamiatul Nasihin	anti-Sarekat Islam society in Lebak
jaro*	village head
jawara*	village strongman, bandit
jihad	holy war
jimat	amulet
jurutulis	village clerk
Kabupaten	the regency as an administrative unit; the regent's house
kafir	infidel
kampong	village, urban settlement
kedaulatan rakyat	people's sovereignty
Keibodan	Auxiliary Police
Kempeitai	Japanese Security Police

Kewedanaan	district administered by a wedana
Kiyai	title given to religious teachers of standing
kiyamat	day of judgement
kleweng	sword
kolot	old-fashioned, conservative
komeng*	older pupil in a pesantren
kraton	palace
landrente	landrent, land tax
langgar	a small, private prayer house
lasykar	popular militia
magang	candidate official in the pangreh praja; unpaid clerk
magrib (maghrib)	the salat-magrib, ie, the daily prayer at sunset
mandahé jawara*	prince of thieves
mantri	low level native official of pangreh praja
Mas*	Bantenese title, originally given to noblemen who did not belong to the sultan's family
Maulud	month of prophet Mohammed's birth
mukena	white garment worn by women during prayers
murid	pupil, disciple
Muhammadiyah	modernist Islamic educational and welfare organization
Nahdatul Ulama	Association of Islamic Scholars
orok lanjang*	unattached young men; jawara band
paceklik	scarce season before harvest
pancendiensten	occasional labour owed by villagers to native officials
pangiwa*	bearer of orders issued by the village head or higher authorities

Pangreh Praja	'Rulers of the Realm', Java's colonial native civil service
parang	short sword or knife
pasisir	coastal strip
pati geni	fasting
Patih	high native official next in rank to the regent
pemimpin	leader
pemuda	youth
pendopo	large front verandah of traditional residence of priyayi
penghubung	official, term used by PKI in 1920s
penghulu	head of mosque functionaries
perang sabil	holy war
pergerakan	movement
Persatuan Perjuangan	Struggle Union
perintis kemerdekaan	pioneers of the independence struggle
pesantren	Islamic seminary
Pirukun	an early association of Banten priyayi
pitrah (fitrah)	kind of head tax, to be paid before the end of the period of fasting
pokrol bambu	bush lawyer
pondok	hut, Muslim boarding school
priyayi	Javanese aristocratic elite
rakyat	people
Ramadan	fasting month, name of the ninth month of the Muslim calendar
rampok	robber
Ratu*	Bantenese title given to women of high birth
Regent	highest level native official

Resident	senior Dutch official, between Governor and Assistant Resident
romusha	(forced) labourers
Rukun Asli	'Original Harmony', mutual aid society established by PKI in Banten
rust en orde	peace and order
Santewe Arjo	secret society in Banten in the 1920s
santri	student at a pesantren; a category of Muslims who observe their religious duties strictly
Sarekat Hijau	Green Association
Sarekat Rakyat	People's Association
Sasalawatan	morning prayer
sawah	wet rice field
Seinendan	Youth Organization
sembah	a traditional way of paying homage
serba	meeting of resident with his regents
Shodancho	platoon commander in PETA
slametan	religious feast
tabligh	public sermon
tajuban	female dancing group
tarekat	a mystical path; Sufi brotherhood
tegalan	dry fields
tipar	dry rice cultivation
Tubagus (Tb.)*	Bantenese title given to noblemen who belonged to the sultan's family
ulama	Islamic teachers, lit. those who possess knowledge
uler endas loro*	snake with two heads, official in the pay of jawara

Veldpolitie	field-police
volkshoofden	traditional chiefs
Volksraad	People's Council
warung	stall, small shop
wayang	puppet theatre
Wedana	district official

MAP 1: West Java



MAP 2: Residency of Banten in 1930



Source: Volkstelling 1930, Vol. 1. Native Population in West Java (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1933). The original spelling has been retained.

MAP 3: Labuan-Menes area



Serang Regency

Districts: Serang
Cilegon
Anyer
Ciomas
Pontang
Ciruas
Pamarayan

Pandeglang Regency

Districts: Pandeglang
Caringin
Menes
Cibaliung

Lebak Regency

Districts: Rangkasbitung
Parungkujang
Lebak
Cilangkahan

INTRODUCTION

Historians and political scientists who have studied the history of twentieth century Indonesia have quite naturally focussed for the most part on the unfolding of events at a national level. This perspective is common in the study of the national revolutions of most Third World countries. It is primarily, therefore, from the perspective of the actors at the centre that the histories of the independence struggles have been written, looking outward to the country's regions as well as to the international world. In attempting to reconstruct the histories of these complex societies, it is natural that a national perspective should take precedence. This approach has been especially marked in looking at the struggle for independence in Indonesia, because of the vast size of the country and its diverse ethnic, religious and cultural groups. Moreover, the absence in many areas of adequate sources of information on the political evolution of Indonesia at a regional level has seriously hampered research.

This thesis attempts to examine the history of one region of Indonesia, Banten, in the early twentieth century. I have chosen Banten because of its long history of rebellion against Dutch colonial rule and more specifically because of the quite unique combination of Communism, religion and revolt in its political history in the twentieth century. This study is intended to help redress the balance in our knowledge of the revolutionary process in Indonesia by focussing on the detailed history of a particular region. Moreover, because of the combination of Communism and Islam which featured in both the revolt of 1926 in Banten and the

social revolution of 1945, I hope that this study will provide both for the Indonesianist and the comparative reader a more detailed insight into the complex relationship between the two.

The importance of developing a regional perspective to our knowledge of Southeast Asian societies has been recognized in recent years.[1] Important studies have been made of Java in the nineteenth century and a milestone in this respect was Sartono Kartodirdjo's study of the Cilegon revolt of 1888.[2] Some years later, Onghokham added greatly to our knowledge of the social history of nineteenth century Java with his study of the residency of Madiun.[3] More recently, a number of significant studies have appeared focussing on different regions of Indonesia during the revolution of 1945-46.[4] These studies, concentrating primarily on the 'social revolutions' that swept many regions in 1945-46, have considerably broadened our knowledge of the depth of the revolutionary experience in Indonesia. An important gap remains, however, in the absence of regional studies for the early part of the twentieth century, which was precisely the period of the birth of the nationalist movement.

The present study confines itself for the most part to the history of Banten in the early twentieth century. I look at events in the nineteenth century only inasmuch as they shed light on social and political developments in the region in the twentieth century. I have attempted to reconstruct a detailed social and political history of the region in the first three decades, focussing in particular on the impact of first the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) and then the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI -

Indonesian Communist Party). This political development culminated in the revolt of 1926, the most important insurrection in Indonesian history in the twentieth century prior to the revolution of 1945. Finally, I look at the social revolution of 1945 which, like the revolt of 1926, united the sickle and crescent once more. I have briefly extended the study to 1945 both because of the intrinsic importance of that revolt and what it adds to our knowledge of the 1945 independence struggle and to stress the deep historical roots which the 1945 social revolution had in earlier rebellious movements in Banten.

The long tradition of rural resistance to Dutch colonial rule can be seen in many ways as 'primitive' or 'archaic' political protests and as predecessors to the nationalist movement which flourished in the 1920s and whose struggle came to final fruition with the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 and the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic.[5] It was, however, much more than this. While Banten provides us with fascinating insights into political development at a local level, rebellion in Banten can be seen as one aspect of the continuing historical 'autonomy' of the region which survived Dutch colonial repression, particularly marked after the 1926 revolt, and the years of Japanese occupation, to emerge again with the social revolution of 1945.[6]

It has been the object of the present study to demonstrate the continuity of protest movements in Banten over the early twentieth century and to examine the relationship between national political developments and their regional manifestations. I have

sought to relate the overt demonstrations of political activity in Banten to underlying economic, administrative or social changes. It must be noted, however, that it is often difficult to collect economic data at a regional level and figures anything below the regency level are almost wholly lacking.

Although to become known latterly as a byword, at least in Dutch colonial circles, for rebelliousness, Banten was ironically the first point of contact between Holland and what was to become Indonesia. Significantly, the first contacts between the Netherlands East India Company and the Sultanate of Banten were to be on more or less equal footing, a fact which greatly coloured Bantenese perception of the Dutch and which never left local imaginations.[7]

Moreover, when these first contacts occurred, Banten was a powerful Islamic trading state. Islam had come to Banten through conquest and, strikingly, unlike the other Islamic trading ports in seventeenth century Java - Demak, Giri and Surabaya - Banten was never to be conquered by the central Javanese Kingdom of Mataram. This was to have profound significance for the later development of the region, endowing Islam with an undisputed historical and cultural 'hegemony' denied it in many other regions of Java. Islam in Banten was untarnished and not married, as elsewhere in Java, with Hindu and animist elements. This undiluted Islam was to hold its own against the Dutch well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and to thrive in an atmosphere of colonial repression.

Whilst the first Dutch contact with Banten occurred in 1596, and the Sultanate itself was forced to accept the status of a protectorate in 1684, it was not until 1832 that the Dutch finally abolished the last vestiges of the Sultanate and the last sultan was unceremoniously removed from office.[8] The demise of the Sultanate enabled it to survive as an important ideological centre for the Bantenese. The physical destruction of the former Bantenese royal kraton (palace) by the Dutch and the removal of the stones to the new administrative capital of Serang provided a final humiliation for the Bantenese. That the stones of the old kraton were to be used later to build a new prison in Serang and one which in the future would count among its detainees many descendants of the sultan was the final insult to a region profoundly conscious of its own history and traditions.

The history of Banten prior to the abolition of the Sultanate in 1832 left the region with strong local traditions which in many ways separated it from the rest of Java. Time and time again, this strong sense of regional identity combined with radicalism and anti-colonialism in an explosive mixture which manifested itself in periodic outbursts against the colonial order. In a real sense, the history of peasant struggles in Banten are a history of opposition not between peasant and lord, but peasant and agent of outside government. From the imposition of direct colonial rule in 1810 until 1870, Banten witnessed no fewer than 19 revolts. The Dutch administration was seen as something imposed from the outside, a perception made all the more real because many of those who served in the native administration came from outside Banten. Very little

was left of the old and as time went by the alienation of significant and powerful sections of Bantenese society seems to have grown, often producing the most extraordinary political alliances.

Generally speaking, throughout the nineteenth century the Dutch had sought to estrange the priyayi, the Javanese governing elite, from strict Islam. This was a special problem in Banten, a region renowned for its Islamic orthodoxy. The movement of the priyayi away from Islam paradoxically only served to reinforce the image of Islam as defender of the people and the only force able to offer serious resistance to the Dutch. The tendency to see the priyayi as instruments of an oppressive colonial rule was reinforced in Banten by the fact that many priyayi were drawn from outside the region, displacing older local elites. Most of the nobility of the former Bantenese Sultanate was dispossessed and effectively reduced to peasant status and provided, together with local Islamic leaders, a ready source of dissident leadership at times of social and economic unrest. Because of these relationships, Islam and political authority in Banten generally looked upon each other from entrenched and hostile positions. The hostility towards the colonial regime crystallized in the Cilegon revolt of 1888, perhaps the most important rising against the Dutch on Java since the Diponegoro rebellion of 1825. The uprising, a forerunner in many ways of the twentieth century revolts, was as much a rejection of the priyayi as it was of the infidel Dutch.

The defeat of the revolt of 1888 did not significantly change this situation. Banten remained a stronghold of traditionalist and unambiguous Islam. Modernism had made little or no impact by the 1920s. Indeed, modernism was seen as seeking to purge Islam of its local traditions and as accommodating to the modern, ie. Dutch, world. This development was viewed with the greatest hostility in Banten, where much of the strength of Islam lay precisely in its close connections with local traditions, passions and hierarchies. When, for example, after 1920 the Sarekat Islam - the first modern political organization in Indonesia which attracted mass support - eschewed political radicalism and became associated with modernist ideas, the organization rapidly lost support in Banten. For exactly this reason, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which did not seek to disturb local sensitivities but on the contrary embraced them, found it easier than the Islamic modernists in the 1920s to gain a following in Banten.

Since the appearance of Ruth McVey's study of the Indonesian Communist Party up to its first major defeat in 1926-27,[9] little has been added to our knowledge of the party's early period despite the availability now of previously closed archives.[10] In particular, we have little knowledge of the development and growth of the PKI at a regional level during its formative period in the 1920s. The present study endeavours to deepen our understanding of the PKI in this period and also to throw some light on the complex relationship between Islam and Communism in Banten. Given the bitterly opposed positions that both were to take against each

other in the post-independence period and especially in the 1960s, this is particularly significant. A better understanding of the relationship between the two in the 1920s will give us not only a wider historical perspective, but also perhaps equip us better to examine their later antagonism.

Twice in this century Banten has been the scene of popular revolts that at the same time that they challenged the status quo in the name of revolution sought also to reinstate elements of the pre-colonial past. The revolts encapsulated a unique combination of radicalism, regionalism and anti-colonialism. On both occasions, the leadership of the revolts was largely Islamic and yet, at the same time, announced to all that it was Communist. In 1926 and again in 1945 revolt was to be the harbinger of freedom from colonial rule and the dawn of a new era of social justice and prosperity. These are familiar themes of Communist-inspired revolt, but the Bantenese revolutionaries were also for the most part devout Muslims.

The possibility of Communist movements taking root in strongly Islamic areas such as Banten was enhanced by the nature and character of the PKI in the 1920s. Although the party was a section of the Comintern, it had by and large studiously ignored the Third International's censorious strictures on Pan-Islam and Islamic movements generally. Indeed, many of the PKI's leaders set great store on the need for the party to harness the revolutionary potential of militant Islam. In a telling phrase, Tan Malaka, one of the most important PKI leaders of the 1920s,

once stated that revolution in Indonesia would only be possible when the star of the soviets stood alongside the (Islamic) crescent as the great battle emblem of revolt.[11] At the very least, all PKI leaders adhered to a policy of neutrality in religious affairs, local leaders being permitted to take into consideration conditions in their regions. Moreover, from late 1924, organizationally the PKI had effectively abandoned democratic centralism, as a result of growing colonial repression, in favour of a looser federative centralism. This gave considerable scope to local leaders of the party to adjust to the realities of regional traditions and peculiarities.

The 1926 revolt in Banten, together with another related uprising which took place six weeks later in West Sumatra, was the most important insurrection in Indonesian history prior to the 1945 war of independence. As such, the revolt has the same significance in Indonesian history as the only comparable revolutionary experience involving a Communist Party of the same period in Southeast Asia, the Nghe Tinh revolts of 1930 in Vietnamese history.[12]

The 1926-27 Indonesian revolts followed a remarkable period of 12 years of Marxist political development beginning with the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging (ISDV - the Indies Social Democratic Association) formed in 1914, the first Marxist party in colonial Asia, and then from 1920 transformed into the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The revolt itself was to be not so much the climax of this political development but to signal decisively the end of the first phase of Indonesian Communism.

For that reason alone the revolt merits our attention. At the same time, it is striking that the 1926-27 revolt took place in two fervently Islamic areas, Banten and West Sumatra. This is perhaps all the more remarkable given the later history of the relationship between Communism and Islam in Indonesia. It is clear from the revolts, however, that in the 1920s Communism, or more precisely the perception of the PKI, did not hold out the same symbolism and fear for Indonesian Islam, or at least for significant sections of the Islamic community, that it was to assume in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, traces of this Islamic radicalism persisted even later in the region. Even today, the revolt is seen by many Bantenese in a romantic and even nostalgic light with people being keen to separate the PKI of the 1920s from its 1950s reincarnation. The veterans of the revolt are rightly seen, and indeed even officially acknowledged, as perintis kemerdekaan (pioneers of the independence struggle).

Islamic Communism is seemingly a paradox. This is especially the case when one considers that probably no religion has proved more resistant to the ideology of Communism than Islam. One common feature of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China today is the persistence of strong Islamic minorities and traditions despite decades of socialist rule. Yet at the same time we have to account for the fact that in certain historical periods and in certain countries a social movement has flourished which can aptly be called 'Islamic Communism'. This was palpably the case in Indonesia in the 1920s and was also true of several of the local communist movements that appeared in the aftermath of the Japanese collapse in 1945.

Many early Indonesian Communist leaders such as Tan Malaka believed that Islam could be harnessed to the revolutionary cause.[13] Others, such as Haji Misbach and the Bantenese leader Haji Achmad Chatib, went even further and argued that there was no fundamental incompatibility between Islam and Communism.[14] It was, of course, somewhat easier to adopt such a position in a colonised Indonesia than it was in the post-colonial Republic. In the early twentieth century, hostility towards Communism was not so marked in Indonesian society and, more importantly, foreign rule and capitalism were seen as one and the same thing. Moreover, at least in the 1920s, Islam and Indonesian nationalism were seen in many eyes to be almost synonymous.

The spectacular development of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the 1920s was due in no small measure to the fact that it did not reject Indonesia's Islamic traditions. The uncompromising insistence on modernity that was to be a hallmark of the PKI after 1951 was certainly not a prominent feature of the movement in the 1920s or in 1945. The PKI of the 1950s and 1960s made a rejection of the past a key part of its revolutionary image. This was not the case in an earlier era.[15]

The Banten region illustrates strikingly that the movement from 'archaic' to modern forms of political protest is not lineal but dialectical. As Clifford Geertz has perceptively remarked, "there is in such matters no simple progression from 'traditional' to 'modern', but a twisting, spasmodic, unmethodical movement which turns as often toward repossessing the emotions of the past as disowning them."[16] This dialectical connection between future,

present and past was evident not only in the ideology of the two main revolts, but also in the social composition of the revolutionary leadership, which combined dispossessed nobles and religious leaders with artisans and intellectuals.

The development of new political forces led, at least for a limited period, to a more adequate articulation of rural discontent, although this was not a clearcut movement towards modern secular politics. Rather it was a process whereby those modern political forces which had arrived on the scene adapted themselves to the concrete realities of the local situation. The normal assumption in analyzing the relationship between the community and the nation state is that the community, the repository of the 'Little Tradition', eventually succumbs to the 'Great Tradition' of the nation state.[17] The process of political mobilization is said to be typified by the mobilization of local leaders by national leaders and state institutions.[18] However, it is possible that the process is reversible to some degree, as some writers have suggested.[19] In other words, new emerging political forces, in order to gain acceptance in peripheral areas, are often forced to make considerable concessions and adaptations to the 'Little Tradition' in order to gain the acceptance of the community.

Certain regions lend themselves particularly well to this resistance to state encroachment and the emergence of new political movements. The latter are only accepted if they are willing to come to terms with the realities of local power. Modern history is replete with examples of regions with a long history of

autonomy organizing themselves politically to resist intrusion on their territory, resources and people. In the Mediterranean, Berbers, Kabyles and Sicilians pursued this strategy successfully for centuries.[20] Tactical mobility and the skilled use of violence, together with a sparsely populated terrain, assist in this resistance. In Indonesia, the Bantenese were among its most practised exponents.

* * * * *

The sources for this study are varied. Because of the time period I have dealt with, I have been able to use a combination of archival materials, newspapers and interviews. I have thus benefitted enormously as opposed to studies of the nineteenth century which are overly dependent on Dutch archival material and where newspapers, or at least Indonesian newspapers, and the possibilities of conducting interviews are deficient or totally absent. Again the researcher looking at the 1945-49 period has to contend with the absence in many cases of regional newspapers and archival documents for that period.

For the period leading up to the 1926 revolt, I have made much use of the archives of the former Netherlands Ministry of Colonies, now deposited at the sub-depot of the State Archives at Leeghwaterstraat in The Hague. The documents I used can broadly be grouped into three categories: Memorie van Overgave, Mailrapporten and Verbalen. The Memorie van Overgave written by each resident at the end of his term of office provided an invaluable and rich source of information on the region. Pre-war

despatches (Mailrapporten or Verbalen) from Batavia to The Hague enclose a great variety of local reports and correspondence. Since the Banten revolt of 1926 was of major concern to the government in The Hague, considerable numbers of documents were sent back to the colonial ministry. Where a document was particularly useful and might be of benefit to future researchers, I have often given the title in full in the text as well as the appropriate archival code. Other archival sources that proved useful were the papers of R.A. Kern, the former Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs to the Netherlands Indies Government, deposited in the Royal Institute for Linguistics, Geography and Ethnology (KITLV) in Leiden and some documents for the early part of the twentieth century from the National Archives, Jakarta. These latter documents are usually grouped under decisions taken by the government (Ost-Indische-Besluiten). For the period of the 1945 revolution, I have made use of the Netherlands General State Archives, and in particular the archives of the General Secretary at Batavia and of the Attorney-General's archive. I also consulted the archives of the Headquarters, General Staff, Netherlands East Indies at the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defence, The Hague.

Newspapers were an extremely valuable source for this study. Batavia and Bandung newspapers often included much information on Banten. Regional newspapers from Banten itself and especially Mimbar, the journal of the Banten section of Sarekat Islam, and De Banten Bode were particularly informative. I have also made frequent use of Batavia Sarekat Islam and PKI newspapers, in particular Neratja and Njala.

Interviews with participants of the events described in this study provided me with a wealth of information, opinions and views. These individuals came from a wide background and included former government officials, policemen, religious leaders and members of political parties. I have listed in the bibliography 124 individuals I interviewed. A small number of people asked that their names not be divulged and I have respected that request.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Ruth T. McVey, "Introduction: local voices, central power", in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches through Social History, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 1-31.

2. Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888. Its Causes, Conditions and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia, Verhandelingen KITLV, No. 50, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.

3. Onghokham, The Residency of Madiun. Priyayi and Peasant in the Nineteenth Century, Yale University Ph.D. thesis, 1975.

4. Audrey Kahin, Struggle for Independence: West Sumatra in the Indonesian National Revolution, Cornell University Ph.D. thesis, 1979; Anton Lucas, The Bamboo Spear pierces the Payung: The Revolution against the Bureaucratic Elite in North Central Java in 1945, Australian National University Ph.D. thesis, 1981; Anthony J.S. Reid, The Blood of the People. Revolution and the end of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979; Robert Bridson Cribb, Jakarta in the Indonesian Revolution, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1984. See also Audrey Kahin, ed., Roots of the Revolution: Indonesia's Regions 1945-1950, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, forthcoming.

5. E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959.

6. John R.W. Smail, "On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 1, no. 2, 1961, pp. 72-102; see also his Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946. A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1964.

7. On the first contacts between the Dutch East India Company and Banten, see B. Schrieke, "The Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part One, The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve and Sumur, 1960, pp. 1-82; Bernard H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of Indonesia, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1965, pp. 129-211; E.B. Kielstra, "Het Bantamsch Sultanaat", Onze Eeuw, Vol. 16, no. 10, 1916, pp. 92-105.

8. On the treaty of 1684 between Banten and the Dutch East India Company, see Kielstra, op. cit., pp. 96-97; Vlekke, op. cit., p. 211. On the last years of the Sultanate, see Anon, "Bantam, vijftig jaren geleden", Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie, Third Series, Vol. 4, no. 2, 1870, pp. 321-323. Although the Sultanate was annexed by the Netherlands in 1808, the Dutch retained the sultan as nominal ruler until 1832.

9. Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965.

10. There are some exceptions to this, see Harry Poeze, Tan Malaka. Levensloop van 1897 tot 1945: Strijder voor Indonesie's

Vrijheid, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 and John Ingleson "'Bound hand and foot': railway workers and the 1923 strike in Java", Indonesia, No. 31, April 1981, pp. 53-87.

11. Tan Malaka, "De Islam en het Bolsjewisme", De Tribune, 21 September 1922, cited in Ruth T. McVey, Rise, p. 161.

12. On the Nghe Tinh revolts, see Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism 1925-1945, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982, pp. 151-170; William J. Duiker, "The Red Soviets of Nghe Tinh: An Early Communist Rebellion in Vietnam", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 4, no. 2, 1973, pp. 186-198.

13. On Tan Malaka's views on the need for an alliance between Islam and Communism, see Poeze, op. cit., pp. 138, 149, 225-226; McVey, Rise, pp. 161-162; J.Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie, Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1928, pp. 65ff.

14. On Haji Misbach's views, see his series of articles "Islam dan Communisme", Medan Moeslimin, 1925-1926, (text in my possession). See also McVey, Rise, pp. 172-194; Blumberger, op. cit., pp. 38ff.

15. The PKI's stress on the theme of modernity in the 1950s and 1960s has been pointed out by Ruth McVey in "Enchantment of the Revolution", in Perceptions of the Past, David Marr and Anthony Reid, eds., Singapore: Heinemann, 1980, pp. 340-358.

Informants in Banten, particularly those who had been active in the PKI in 1925-26, often drew a distinction between the Communist Party of that period and the post-1951 PKI led by D.N. Aidit. The differences that informants pointed out related not only to the attitude Communists should adopt towards Islam, but also that the PKI of the 1920s was far more tolerant of local traditions, hierarchies and customs than its latter-day counterpart.

16. Clifford Geertz, "Afterword: The Politics of Meaning", in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, Claire Holt et al., eds., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972, p. 328.

17. Robert Redfield has made the classic statement on this in his The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965, passim.

18. Peter Nettl, Political Mobilization, London: Faber & Faber, 1963, passim.

19. Peter Schneider, Jane Schneider and Edward Hansen, "Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 14, 1972, pp. 328-350.

20. See E.R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, London: Faber & Faber, 1969, pp. 238-239 for comments on the Berbers; on Sicily, see especially Anton Blok, Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860-1960. A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974.

CHAPTER 1

THE SETTING

Introduction

Banten is the westernmost district of Java. It covers a land area of approximately 114 square miles. Until recent times, the only communication to the region, other than by sea, was by the northern coastal road from Batavia (now Jakarta) west via Tanggerang and then on to Serang, a distance of 90 km. It was only in 1925 that a second road into the region was built, running west from Bogor (formerly Buitenzorg) via Jasinga to Rangkasbitung. Since its establishment by the Dutch in the 1820s, Serang has served as the administrative capital of the region and was the seat of the Dutch Resident. It remains the only sizeable town in Banten, although even in 1930 the population of the town was only 10,000.[1] North of Serang lie the ruins of the old town of Banten, the capital of the former Sultanate. The mosque and the outline of an old fort are all that remain of one of the most important Islamic trading states in Southeast Asia in the seventeenth century.

The northern part of the region consists of a flat coastal strip which rises already in the southern part of Serang regency into a hilly terrain in the Baros-Ciomas district. Pandeglang and Rangkasbitung, the other two main towns and both regency capitals, form together with Serang a triangle with no more than 50 km separating them. The southern part of Banten is a largely remote, mountainous region and very thinly populated. The area of the northern plains is inhabited by Javanese speakers, whereas the south is inhabited by Sundanese speakers often referred

to as orang gunung (mountain people). Approximately one-third of Bantenese are Javanese speaking and two-thirds Sundanese speaking. Interestingly, there appears to be no history or record of friction between the two language groups, their regional identity as Bantenese being the stronger factor.[2]

From north to south, the area can be divided physically into four quite distinct zones - a coastal belt of wet rice fields (pasawahan), a belt of dry field agriculture (pategalan), a fertile mountainous zone (pagunungan) and the far south (pakidulan). The coastal sawah strip consists of the Pontang and Ciruas districts (kewedanaan) and the northern parts of the Serang and Cilegon districts, all lying within the regency of Serang. This area is characterized by poor irrigation, a relatively high incidence of crop failure and the almost complete absence of crops other than rice. The pategalan covers the southern parts of the regency of Serang and a small northern part of the regency of Pandeglang. Here rice as well as some secondary crops are cultivated. The mountainous zone covers most of the Pandeglang regency and the Ciomas district of Serang regency. It is here that the most fertile parts of Banten and the best sawah are to be found. The pakidulan - the southern district - encompasses practically all of the regency of Lebak as well as the Cibaliung district of Pandeglang regency. This area is typified economically by slash and burn rice cultivation and by extremely low population densities.

Banten in the early part of the twentieth century was an overwhelmingly rural society. The population of the region of Banten in 1900 was estimated at 812,170 and in 1920 at 892,370.

In 1930, when the most rigorous census held so far was conducted by the Dutch authorities throughout Indonesia, the population of Banten was 1,028,628.[3] The population was overwhelmingly rural even as late as 1930. Apart from Serang, the administrative capital, there were only four other towns worthy of mention in Banten - Pandeglang and Rangkasbitung, both the seats of regents, the senior native official, Cilegon and Labuan.

Because there were no large industrial, commercial or railway centres in Banten, the vast majority of the population drew their living from the land. The 1930 census found that whilst 57.7% of those in work in West Java as a whole were categorized as farmers or peasants, in Banten the figure was much higher, and the highest for any residency in West Java. For the regency of Serang, the figure was 74.9%; for the two other Bantenese regencies, Pandeglang and Lebak, the figures were 80% and 88% respectively.[4]

Colonial Economic Development

The Sultanate of Banten lost its status of protectorate in 1808 and the region was finally absorbed into Dutch-ruled Java when it became a residency, the largest administrative unit at that time. Sultans remained as nominal rulers until 1832.[5] Banten had little economic attraction for the Dutch and economic and social development there was to take a completely different path from the rest of Java. There was no development of commercial or industrial centres or of plantation agriculture. In part this was because geography and poor soil conditions worked against Banten. The main arteries of communication in Java by road, and later by rail, flowed east from Batavia. As late as 1900, there was only one road into Banten.

There were other ecological factors that limited the economic development of Banten. The soil of the area is markedly deficient in phosphates, magnesium, iron and lime.[6] The concentration of plant food stuff in the soil is very scanty, so that despite a fairly heavy rainfall agricultural results are generally poor because of the porous nature of the soil. The impact of rainfall on such soil leads to leaching and early exhaustion. Nor does the soil receive much sustenance from the rivers of the area. The most important of Banten's rivers, the Ciujung, is one of the poorest irrigation rivers in Java, rising in south Banten and providing little in the way of mineral enrichment for the soil. The infertility of Banten is strikingly illustrated by the dismal failure of every effort by the Dutch colonial authorities to encourage either plantation agriculture or commodity production by the peasantry themselves.

In 1830 the Dutch had introduced on Java the Cultuurstelsel or Cultivation System in an effort to finance the Netherlands Indies administration and provide capital for further economic growth.[7] The essence of the system consisted in the remission of the peasants' land taxes, the landrente, in favour of his undertaking to cultivate government-owned crops on one-fifth of his fields, or, alternatively, to work 66 days of the year on government estates or other projects.

The degree of involvement of the peasantry in the Cultivation System varied from district to district. In 1845, the percentage of the Bantenese peasantry involved was 48% (Java average 52%) but by 1850 it was the lowest figure for the whole island, 16%, against

a Java average of 46%.[8] In Banten, the major crop of the Cultivation System was coffee and if we take away the figures for the percentage of the peasantry engaged in cultivating this crop, we arrive at the following figures:

Table I

Percentage of the peasantry engaged in Cultivation System, excluding coffee

	1840	1845	1850
Banten	20	25	2
Java	25	25	19

Source: Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel en Koloniale Baten, pp. 16-17

The percentage of land set aside for cultivating government crops other than coffee in Banten was 4% in 1840 (Java 6%), 7% in 1845 (Java 6%) and less than 1% in 1850 (Java 4%).

All three main crops of the Cultivation System, sugar, indigo and coffee, were introduced in Banten in the 1830s. With sugar and indigo, however, the government had no success. The sawah (wet rice fields) in Banten were the least productive in Java and suffered from a chronic lack of irrigation. The sugar harvests obtained in Banten were the lowest in Java. In the years 1839-45 they averaged no more than 5.25 piculs per bau (1 bau = 0.7 hectares or 1.75 acres). The Java average in 1840 was 14.5 piculs.[9] The failure of sugar as a government crop was ascribed to the unsuitability of the land, unfavourable weather and the resistance of the peasantry.[10] Another factor was the low crop payments made to peasants in Banten for sugar and indigo. These were significantly lower than in other residencies. For indigo

they were the lowest in Java and for sugar the second lowest.[11] Indigo, a crop which quickly exhausts the soil, was also thoroughly unsuitable for Bantenese conditions. Indigo and sugar were withdrawn by the government in Banten in 1846. An amount of 600,000 guilders, which had already been given as advances, had to be written off. In order to compensate for this, the landrente for Banten in 1848-51 was the highest for West Java.[12]

The most important crop of the Cultivation System generally, and certainly in Banten, was coffee. This was in fact the most profitable single crop throughout the life of the system.[13] In Banten, it was grown in almost every district, but above all in Pandeglang, Cimanuk, Ciomas and Menes. Tegalan (dry fields), fruit gardens and waste land were used. Coffee cultivation in Banten reached its peak in the years 1863-65, but was not finally abolished until 1890. Although coffee was not unsuited to Banten, its cultivation was greatly resented by the peasantry. According to an inquiry in 1871, the peasant earned more per bau from growing rice than from growing coffee, 44 guilders per annum, compared with 37.50 for coffee.[14]

Tobacco was also introduced in 1844, but was withdrawn in 1848. Cinammon was grown in a number of districts from 1836 to 1865 on tegalan, but met with little success. Pepper was also grown as a government crop from 1844 to 1864. But, despite Banten's traditional association with this crop, the results were meagre and the harvests poor. The coincidence that the planting time for pepper fell at the same time as that for padi gaga (dry field rice) made it difficult to coordinate the two. Plagues of pests and very

low crop payments were no incentive to the peasant.[15] By 1860 the extent of the Cultivation System had fallen dramatically. Only 21% of the peasantry were engaged in cultivating government crops (compared with 32% for Java as a whole) and if coffee is excluded from these figures only 1½% of the population was involved (Java 22½%).[16]

By the year 1870 most of the government crops in Java, with the exception of coffee, had been withdrawn and a new period in Dutch colonial domination of the Indonesian archipelago was beginning. The substantial difference that marked this period was a gradual but decisive shift from forced commodity production by the peasantry to the domination of the countryside by plantation production. The Minister for the Colonies, James London, had already suggested in 1860 the opening up of waste areas such as Banten by private capital, but widespread encouragement to private capital came only after 1870.[17]

Like the Cultivation System, this new period in the Dutch exploitation of Indonesia had a limited impact on Banten. The change from the management of labour to the management of capital ran into serious problems in Banten. Right up to the Second World War Dutch private capital evinced little interest in the region. Sugar, which increasingly dominated the Javanese economy from 1870 to the depression of the 1930s, was singularly ill-suited to Bantenese conditions. Grown on a vast scale on the fertile, well-irrigated sawah of Central and East Java, it was, after its withdrawal as a government crop in 1846, never again cultivated in Banten. Coffee, the one crop that achieved any success in Banten

during the Cultuurstelsel, was also withdrawn in 1890, having exhausted the soil in many areas. It was never again grown on any commercial scale. The only commodity crop that European capital did successfully introduce into the region was rubber. However, this did not occur until the 1920s and even then did not make any great social or economic impact on Banten.

Experiments were made with government encouragement at the beginning of the century with several other plantation crops. Quinine, tea, tobacco and cacao were all tried between 1891 and 1913. Results, however, were very poor. The climate was suitable for all except tobacco (too damp), and the cause for their failure must largely be attributed to the infertility of the Bantenese soil. With rubber, however, there was more success. By 1927 there were some 22 rubber plantations in Banten, all in the regency of Lebak. In that year, some 12,000 bau of agricultural land were occupied by rubber. Of this total, 11,225 bau were in the hands of plantations, all Dutch owned with the exception of one British company, and only 775 bau were farmed by local interests. Not all the plantation rubber lands were in production. Indeed, in the period 1925-30, only 7,000 bau were. This figure was to drop even further in the depression. Rubber needs a good porous soil, which need not be very fertile, and a damp climate. The soil in Lebak satisfied these demands but often not without a fairly heavy manuring of the ground.[18] Rubber was to remain, however, almost entirely a plantation crop and was never to become a peasant commodity crop as it did in West Sumatra.[19]

The Peasant Economy of Banten

Agriculture in Java is often seen as synonymous with sawah (wet rice) cultivation. Heavy population densities, particularly in the central part of the island, brought about the early development of sawah in Java and coincided with the growth of states such as Mataram. In the more sparsely populated areas of Banten, situated in the western corner of the island, this development was far slower. Sawah cultivation was first introduced to Banten by Javanese colonists in the early sixteenth century. Several of Banten's sultans, and notably Maulana Jusuf (1570-1580) and Sultan Agung (1651-1683), made concerted efforts to promote the growth of wet rice cultivation. However, European demand for pepper, coupled with the lack of political control exercised by the sultan's administration over anything but the environs of the town of Banten, meant that this policy met with little success. The rise of Banten as a trading entrepot in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries afforded the sultanate the luxury of importing rice rather than meeting its own requirements. Indeed, Sultan Agung's advocacy of sawah cultivation was dictated more by strategic (the fear of Dutch blockade) than economic factors.[20] Moreover, the absence of the sort of population pressure on the land that characterized central Java enabled the peasantry to satisfy their subsistence requirements from swidden (slash and burn) and dry field rice cultivation.

The poor nature of the soil circumscribed the development not only of commercial crops but also of wet rice agriculture. Thus Banten remains the only area of Java where all three techniques of rice farming - shifting or swidden cultivation (slash and burn), dry fields and sawah - coexist to the present day. Shifting

cultivation, or huma, as it is known in Banten, prevails in the southern part of the residency. Sawah predominates along the north coast from the eastern border with Tanggerang to Serang and also in the more hilly Ciomas-Cimanuk-Pandeglang area. The rest of the area is given over to dry fields, largely occupied by rice or coconuts. Most sawah in Banten are dependent on rain for their water supply rather than technical irrigation. This completely rules out the possibility of a second crop of rice in the dry season. Schematically, the types of rice cultivation and their modes of use are presented below:

	wet season	dry season
Irrigated sawah	paddy	second crop, rarely rice in Banten
Rain-dependent sawah	paddy	largely fallow
Dry fields	paddy, some other crops	fallow, some second crops
Swidden	paddy	largely fallow

The oldest, and still widespread, form of rice-farming in Banten is huma, or swidden cultivation.[21] It is found in the Cibaliung district of Pandeglang regency and throughout the southern districts of Lebak regency - Rangkasbitung, Parungkujang, Lebak and Cilangkahan - where it was widespread in the early twentieth century. The extent of huma cultivation in Lebak regency is illustrated by the following table for the year 1925, which shows that the huma fields occupied more than twice the area of sawah and dry rice fields combined:

Table II

Rice-farming in Lebak regency, 1925

Sawah	Dry fields	Huma fields
31,962 bau	31,233 bau	144,485 bau

1 bau (Dutch - bouw) equals 0.70965 hectares or 1.7537 acres.

Source: Memorie van Overgave, Putman-Cramer, 1931

Hanks has estimated that swidden rice cultivation will support a population density of not more than 60 per square mile.[22] This form of agriculture is widespread on the sparsely populated outer islands of Indonesia, where it is known as ladang. Huma, or swidden, involves the clearing of fields by slashing and burning the forest cover, planting seeds at the bottom of a hole stabbed into the earth with a stick and, after a harvest or two, moving on to a new location. Vegetables are usually grown between the rows of rice. Sometimes in Banten the whole village moves on to a different spot, hence the huma cultivators are known to the inhabitants of the north as jelema manuk (bird men). Vegetation is felled in the dry season and allowed to dessicate in the sun until it is tinder dry, whereupon it is set alight. An enormous amount of time that would otherwise have to be spent clearing is thus saved. Other seeds that might compete with rice are destroyed and in the ashes left behind are to be found phosphates and potassium. The rice seeds have to be planted before the start of the rainy season. Yields from slash and burn fields can be quite high, and are certainly as good, if not better, than those from dry fields.[23]

In south Banten almost any sort of land, even the steepest of hills, is judged suitable for huma rice cultivation. The colonial administration strongly disapproved of huma because of the dangers of deforestation and premature exhaustion of the soil. Strenuous efforts were made to suppress it between 1896 and 1906, but these were largely to no avail.[24] Clandestine reclamation of forest was banned and some 4,000 bau of sawah were opened up. However, the peasantry of south Banten were more adept at swidden farming and reluctant to take to wet rice farming, for which no irrigation was readily available. Sawah were also considered to involve too much work, and perhaps most important, were more rigorously taxed. As late as 1931, it was calculated that huma supported an estimated population of 120,000, or 12% of the population of Banten.[25]

Besides swidden cultivation, there is extensive dry field rice cultivation in Banten. Generally in Indonesia this is known as tipar or tegalan and in Banten as padi gaga (from Javanese gogo). In 1922, dry field rice occupied 18% of all agricultural land in the residency.[26] Padi gaga, or rice grown on dry fields, is generally a feature of less densely populated areas. As population increases, it is gradually replaced by sawah. Yields for dry fields are roughly half of those for sawah, although it must be borne in mind that yield from dry fields are less susceptible to the vagaries of the weather than, say, rain-dependent sawah and can even provide higher yields for inputs. The lack of technical irrigation in Banten acted as a brake in the switch from dry fields to sawah, which would normally have occurred as population increases. Peasants were reluctant to run the high risk of crop failure that rain-dependent sawah entailed.

Dry field rice (padi gaga) had a greater importance in Banten than possibly any other residency of Java. In 1926, it accounted for more than 24% of the rice crop in 14 of the residency's 19 districts; in nine districts it was above 40%. In the whole residency, it occupied 64,865 bau of agricultural land or 38.3% of the rice crop. In the neighbouring residency of the Priangan, some 109,355 bau were occupied by dry rice farming, yet the percentage of the total rice crop was only 16%.[27]

As opposed to sawah where the seed is generally transplanted, with dry field rice the seed is broadcast. Planting takes place in October and the crop is harvested in March-April. Thereafter a second crop was sometimes planted, which was harvested in September. In Banten this second crop was usually peanuts, sweet potatoes or red peppers. Many fields, however, were left fallow after the rice harvest because of the infertility of the soil or because peasants migrated to Batavia (Jakarta) or Lampung in search of seasonal work. Furthermore, dry fields require more work than sawah. If there is no second crop, the land has to be ploughed and fertilized in order to forestall a decrease in its fertility.[28]

Of all the residencies of Java, Banten was the poorest in sawah. Whilst it produced some 12% of the island's total dry field rice (padi gogo), it produced only 3% of Java's sawah padi. For 1922 we find 165,982 bau of sawah fields (approximately 80% of which were used for rice cultivation) and 175,096 bau of dry fields (approximately 35% of which were used for rice cultivation) supporting a total population of approximately one million. The amount of land planted with second crops was only 36,500 bau.

The average yield per bau of sawah was one of the lowest on Java - 22.36 piculs per bau compared with a Java average of 24.94.[29] The dominance of rice in the economy of Banten, and the importance of padi gogo, is revealed in the following table:

Table III

Harvested crops in 1922 in percentages

	Sawah padi	Padi gogo	Maize	Cassava	Other
Banten	55	28	3	3	4
Batavia	80	9	1	2	8
Ceribon	63	10	2	5	20
Priangan	60	9	3	11	17
West Java	66	10	2	6	16
Java	42	5	55	10	21

Source: Statistische Gegevens 1916-22, p. 32

Banten had the highest percentage of padi gogo of any residency in Java. If sawah and gogo are taken together, in Banten they account for 83% of harvested crops. This figure was exceeded on the whole island only by Batavia's 89%, but this reflected a far more favourable ratio of sawah to dry rice fields. If we look at the relative importance of sawah and gogo in another way, ie in percentage of all agricultural land, we arrive at the following figures:

Table IV

Ratio of sawah and dry fields as percentage of total agricultural land in 1922

	Sawah	Dry fields
Banten	47	53
Batavia	66	34
Ceribon	68	32
Priangan	37	63
West Java	52	48
Java	45	55

Source: Statistische Gegevens 1916-22, p. 100

The most important point to remember here is that whereas for other residencies the figures for dry lands include many other crops besides rice, in Banten dry fields, if they were not fallow, were largely padi gogo.

Sawah cultivation entails a far more intensive system of fixed field farming and, where possible, short-term crop rotation. The sequence of the monsoons determines the agricultural year. Besides the main rice crop, harvested at the end of the wet season, there is also in most areas of Java a second subsidiary crop (known as palawijo), which may be another sort of grain, sugar or often a second rice crop. Palawijo, however, was the exception rather than the rule in Banten because of the infertility of the soil and the almost complete absence of irrigation in the dry season. A second rice crop in one year is impossible in Banten except in the

small area around Cipanas in Lebak regency, on the borders of Buitenzorg (Bogor).

Generally speaking rice-farming in Banten was largely for subsistence. The cultivation of subsidiary crops, usually coconuts and fruit, and seasonal migration, served the purpose of finding money to pay taxes and buy essential goods. Thus secondary crops were often known in the area as tanaman pajeg - taxation crops. The need for such subsidiary income became more important towards the end of the nineteenth century as the Javanese peasantry were subjugated to increasing taxation and as population increased, producing a greater burden on the land.[30] Despite the heavy loss of life the region suffered during the smallpox epidemic of 1881 and the Krakatau explosion of 1883, the population of Banten rose from 590,000 in 1880 to 1,028,628 in 1930.[31] As the burden of both population and taxation increased, there was evidence of a shift to greater use of sawah cultivation as one response. Thus according to Scheltema the area of sawah in Banten increased from 64,000 hectares in 1888 to 115,000 hectares in 1928.[32] However, if we examine the more detailed figures compiled for the years 1916-22, we find that, for Banten at least, this expansion of sawah lands seems to have reached its limits:

Table V

Extent of sawah and dry fields in West Java in 1916 and 1922 in thousands of bau

	Sawah			Dry fields		
	1916	1922	%	1916	1922	%
Banten	156.1	157.2	101	148.8	175.0	118
Batavia	453.6	481.2	111	246.8	247.2	100
Ceribon	295.6	327.0	110	79.1	153.5	195
Priangan	405.0	415.4	102	611.5	697.5	114
West Java	1,290.5	1,380.6	107	1,085.6	1,273.3	117
Java	4,059.8	4,420.9	109	3,883.9	5,396.7	139

Source: Statistische Gegevens, p. 5

Although there was quite a considerable expansion of dry fields under cultivation in Banten in these years, the expansion of sawah was negligible and below the West Java and Javanese averages. The evidence would indicate that lands suitable for sawah cultivation were apparently becoming exhausted by the early 1910s. Nor was there the fallback of secondary crops on sawah to cushion the peasants of the region. Not only was palawijo (secondary crops) on sawah of minor importance in Banten, but the percentage of sawah having such crops was actually decreasing. Thus whereas in 1888 4% of sawah in the region had a second crop after the harvest, by 1928 this had shrunk to a mere 1%. In both these years the figures for Banten were the lowest of any residency in Java.[33]

The reasons why this were so were twofold. In the first place, other employment opportunities were increasingly available in the dry season and secondly irrigation systems in Banten were so inadequate. An essential prerequisite to wet rice cultivation is control of water and here the technique depends on whether the water source is rainfall or an irrigation system. Most sawah in Banten were dependent on rainfall for their water supply. This is clear from the figures for Serang regency in 1917. At that time the regency was divided into two divisions or afdelingen. In Serang afdeling 6,145 bau of sawah were irrigated whilst 16,134 were rain dependent. In Anyer afdeling the ratio was even more unfavourable; only 2,260 bau were irrigated and 14,404 were rain dependent. Even those sawah which were irrigated generally possessed irrigation of a primitive and unsatisfactory type.[34] In Java as a whole rain-dependent sawah accounted for about 20% of all sawah.[35] The weakness of rain-dependent sawah was not only the danger of crop failure because of late or early rains, but also the fact that productivity was far lower than for irrigated sawah:

Table VI

Productivity of sawah in Banten in 1907

	Yield in piculs per bau	
	Rain-dependent sawah	Irrigated sawah
Serang	25.5	35
Anyer	24	34
Pandeglang	34 - 35	40 - 50
Caringin*	30	35 - 45
Lebak	35	45

*Caringin was a separate regency until 1906, when it was incorporated in Pandeglang

Source: Schat, Bantam's Individualiteit, p. 111

The first alternative to natural flooding is the simple dyking of a field with a basin where dependable rains can be held for the period of growth. Thereafter intermittent rains can be guided to sustain the rice without damage of flood or dryness. Its particular disadvantage lies in the relative sterility of its rice-growing brew if unenriched by the accumulation of rivers in passage. The nutrients which the rice needs must then perforce come from the soil itself, but, as we have noted, the soil of Banten was markedly deficient in this regard. Moreover, the water held in the dykes sours when the rains are not sufficient to dilute and drain away injurious by-products. These rudimentary irrigation dykes were easily destroyed in floods, the dams were

not adequately water tight and drainage was insufficient. Irrigation in Banten was usually of this primitive sort and consequently the sawah were not as productive as those elsewhere. A continuous source of flowing water, which can be sluiced into any dyked field and then shut off, offers greater control and is, of course, infinitely preferable. The quantity of water available and, above all, the duration of time it is available is crucial for the sort of rice that is planted.[36]

As a general rule there is no question of broadcasting the seed with sawah; germination would take too long. The young plants are reared in a nursery, where they grow extremely closely together on richly fertilized soil, and are then thinned out to eight to twelve centimeters apart. The nursery, abundantly manured with human excrement or refuse, plays a crucial part, saving time and making the young plants stronger. Working of the sawah took place as soon as there was water available and lasted around two months. In the districts where rain-dependent sawah predominate - Cikandi, the whole flat northern coastal strip of Banten and parts of the south - we see a clear concentration of the planting time in the months of January and February, while in the dry season (May - October) nothing was planted. In the districts with rudimentary irrigation - Ciruas, Ciomas, Pandeglang, Menes, Caringin and in lesser measure Rangkasbitung and Lebak - there was some planting in the dry season. Rain-dependent sawah, however, are invariably fallow in the dry season. The latter type of sawah also demand more work than irrigated sawah and being subject to the weather are prone to crop failure. In Banten crop failures of 20% on such fields were common in the early 1920s.

Sawah production in Banten in 1926 averaged 3.31 piculs per head compared with 3.38 for West Java and 2.89 for Java as a whole.[37]. It must be remembered, however, that other areas had substantial second crops such as maize, cassava and sugar which were almost wholly absent in Banten. The same source judged that only two of Banten's 19 districts produced rice surpluses (ie over 4 piculs per head), 14 were self-sufficient (2-4 piculs) and three were minus districts. However, these figures are somewhat deceptive because of the frequent occurrence in Banten of crop failures caused by the late (or early) arrival of the rains, rivers bursting their banks and by numerous crop pests and diseases. Sawah often remained unplanted in the region as a result of flooding and bad drainage. During the rainy season the sawah were sometimes too deep under water to be planted, while in the dry season the water supply was too scanty. The percentage of unplanted sawah was highest in the districts of Serang, Pontang, Ciruas and Ciomas and to a lesser degree in Menes, Caringin, Pandeglang and Pamarayan. The extent of the problem is revealed by the following figures:

Table VII

Harvest occupation figures, ie percentage of fields which were harvested in one year

	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922
Banten	80.9	72.8	75.8	71.4	63.6	62.6	63.3
Batavia	76.8	76.4	73.8	81.8	87.7	76.8	77.6
Ceribon	101.2	95.2	105.1	101.7	91.5	68.8	87.7
Priangan	75.1	74.2	83.3	89.7	80.1	66.2	69.2
West Java	80.4	78.1	83.1	87.2	82.1	69.1	74.1
Java	110.4	107.6	108.9	112.5	109.2	95.9	100.9

Source: Statistische Gegevens, p. 101

In all these years, with the exception of 1918 (when it was second lowest) and 1916 (when it was third lowest), the figure for Banten was the lowest of any of Java's 19 residencies. These figures refer to both unplanted and failed sawah and dry fields. However, even if we look at sawah separately we find that in 1922 only 73% of sawah fields in Banten were harvested, the lowest percentage of any residency in Java.[38] In no year between 1916 and 1922 did less than 10% of the sawah harvest in Banten fail. In 1922 the figure rose to 20%, compared with a Java failure rate of only 5.2%.[39]

These crop failures exacerbated the problem of unplanted fields. The expectation and risk of crop failure undoubtedly

caused some peasants and landowners either to leave fields fallow, and only concentrate on the best, or to go over to commercial crops such as coconuts. The harvested area of sawah in Banten seems to have peaked in the year 1913, as can be seen below:

Table VIII

Harvested surface of sawah in Banten in 1913-1924
in bau

1913	145,234
1914	137,708
1920	117,104
1921	118,889
1922	115,070
1923	113,928
1924	99,259

Source: Verslag Economischen Toestand 1924, Vol. I, p. 33

These figures, reflecting successfully harvested sawah, record a decrease of almost 33% in the period 1913-24. In the same period, only two other residencies in Java showed a decrease: Ceribon, where the fall was from 307,871 bau to 273,590 bau and Kedu in Central Java, where a fall was registered from 303,871 bau to 255,361. In neither case was the fall proportionately so serious as that in Banten.[40] The idea of agricultural land, especially sawah, lying fallow was almost unheard of elsewhere in Java. Its causes had already been investigated in a government report of 1905. This had found that the major reasons for this phenomenon

in Banten were the infertility of the soil, lack of irrigation and water supply, inadequate drainage, erosion of the top soil and change in the pattern of cultivating the land.[41] Pests such as field mice and mantek (an insect pest) were also prevalent in those areas where irrigation was inadequate and the ground of inferior quality.[42] To this list may be added a critical shortage of water buffalo (kerbau) to work and plough the fields. This was a result of the cattle plague of 1878-80 in West Java, whose effects were most marked in Banten.[43] In 1878 there were 190,000 cattle in Banten. By 1880 this number had been decimated to 55,000. Over 20 years later in 1903 it had still only risen to 143,306. By 1913 it had reached 160,000, but by 1924 it had slumped again to 129,037, an indication perhaps of declining economic circumstances forcing peasants to sell their livestock.[44]

Changing Economic Patterns: Cash Crops and Migration

Banten's essentially monocrop economy meant that in times of stress there was little room to spare for the peasant. Already in 1866 an investigation of 56 villages in the region found that land was sufficient in 27, provided, and this was a big proviso given the ecology of Banten, the harvest was satisfactory. In 12 villages the position was more than favourable, but in 17 villages the situation was insufficient even at this date.[45] Natural factors made sawah significantly less productive, and it constituted a smaller proportion of total agricultural land than in other residencies of Java. Nor was there available to the peasantry of Banten the fallback of secondary cash crops, wage labour on sugar plantations and village handicraft industries

that existed elsewhere on Java. Indeed, as far as the latter were concerned, the evidence indicated a contraction of local industries in the nineteenth century.[46] But population pressure and a growing burden of taxation forced peasants to look elsewhere to supplement incomes.

Already by 1900 farming land in some parts of north Banten was occupying most of the land area. An indication of how serious the problem was can already be seen from the following table indicating population density in 1892:

Table IX

Population density per square mile in 1892

Java	Banten	Serang regency	Cilegon
9,589	4,991	11,472	15,691

Source: Eindresume, Vol. I, Part II, p. 29

Thus, although Banten as a whole had a population density half that of Java, the Serang regency and even more so the Cilegon district, had population densities far exceeding the Java average. Nor was the Cilegon district unique in this respect in Banten. The village of Cening, near Caringin, had a population density of 17,000 per square mile by 1892. It is interesting to note that both districts were centres of social unrest in the 1920s.[47]

The seriousness of the land problem is further demonstrated by the percentage of total land area devoted to agricultural use:

Table X

Agricultural land as percentage of total land in 1892

Java	Banten	Serang regency
22	15.8	35

Source: Eindresume, Vol. I, Part II, p. 31

Some 30 years later in 1926 the percentage of agricultural land in Banten had almost doubled from 15.8% to 29.69%.[48] Whilst the West Java figure was much higher at 39.29%, the Banten average disguised the critical problem in certain districts of the region. Between 55% - 70% of total land area in Cilegon, for example, was agricultural land. In four districts - Serang, Kramatwatu, Kolelet and Pandeglang - over 80% of total land area was used for agricultural purposes by 1926 and in one district, Ciruas, the figure was a staggering 96%.[49] These were exceptional figures and amongst the highest in West Java and indicate the growing population pressure on the land.

Despite the hardships of rice-farming in Banten, new areas of economic activity developed in the late nineteenth century. These can principally be discussed under two headings: firstly, the spread of commercial crops, mainly coconuts, and secondly, migration.

Dependence on the rice harvest was seemingly extreme in Banten. In 1922 rice accounted for 83% of harvested crops in Banten, compared with 76% for West Java and only 47% for the island of Java as a whole.[50] Secondary crops were of lesser importance in West Java than in the central and eastern parts of the island, but nowhere was this more true than in the residency of Banten. Table XI, for instance, gives some idea of the unimportance of maize and cassava, crops which were generally considered vital to the diet of the Javanese peasant in the hard months before harvest (paceklik).

Table XI

Harvested quantities of rice, maize and cassava in thousands of piculs

		Banten	Batavia	Ceribon	Priangan
	Rice	3,309	11,274	5,798	11,899
1920	Maize	36	69	53	341
	Cassava	875	1,860	2,398	14,409
	Rice	3,240	10,542	4,022	11,626
1921	Maize	34	54	21	206
	Cassava	689	1,780	2,160	2,795
	Rice	3,294	11,302	7,412	13,007
1922	Maize	31	58	195	36
	Cassava	537	1,388	1,644	9,580

Source: Statistische Gegevens, p. 101

In all these years, Banten's rice production was the lowest of any residency in Java, with the exception of Yogyakarta (where sugar was so important) and Madura (where maize and cassava were more important than rice). Banten had the lowest maize production in every year, with the exception of 1921. Cassava production, too, was lower in Banten than in any other residency in Java. Indeed, it was the only residency where production was below one million piculs per year.

The picture was not any different regarding other secondary crops. Whilst cassava accounted for 7,615 bau of agricultural land in 1927 and maize for 6,886 bau, only two other crops occupied more than 1,000 bau. These were potatoes, which took up 5,805 bau, and groundnuts, with 3,121 bau. There were only 232 bau of soya beans and pepper, for which Banten had formerly been so famous, accounted for only 4 bau![51] Maize accounted for less than 5% of agricultural land in all districts of Banten, except for Cilangkahan and Kolelet. Cassava occupied less than 5% everywhere except Cilangkahan and Sajira, whilst potatoes accounted for less than 2% of agricultural land in all districts except Cilegon and Ciruas. Maize and cassava, which accounted for 31% of agricultural land on Java, occupied a mere 9% in Banten.[52]

Palawijo or secondary crops in Banten are grown on sawah as second crop, as the main crop on dry fields (tegalan), as the second crop on dry fields and on swidden (huma) fields. In 1916 it was estimated that 25% of second crops in Banten fell into the first category, 40% into the second, 26% into the third and 9% into the fourth.[53] The relative unimportance of second crops in

Banten was an indication of the arduous nature of farming in the region. A government inquiry in 1907 even noted there was some regression in the cultivation of second crops. Whilst cultivation of second crops was showing signs of increase in most areas of Java, only small increases were recorded in Banten.[54] In Serang the cultivation of peanuts, which had previously been of some significance, was declining. In the former regency of Caringin, the cultivation of cotton and indigo had been destroyed by the import of cheap cotton materials.[55] Likewise small scale sugar and peanut cultivation for local consumption in the Cilegon area, which had been quite strong in the 1880s, had by the beginning of the century all but disappeared. In the wider context two processes, besides ecological factors, worked against the cultivation of second crops. The first was the inability of local second crops to compete with other areas, where ecological factors were far more favourable, once the isolation of Banten had been decisively broken. The second process at work was that as population pressure increased it is probable that peasant families decided that their first priority must be production for their own subsistence needs rather than for the market.

The absence of second crops, insufficient irrigation, sawah dependent on rain, a high rate of crop failure - all this made the peasant economy of Banten precarious and unstable. This was never more true than in the dry season when most agricultural land was unworkable:

> "The population of this area is often described as lazy because it is usual here to leave the fields fallow after the rice harvest. One only needs to visit north Banten during the dry season to see that the most industrious population could find no work here. The outstretched sawah lie bare, dried out. The earth is cracked open and stone hard. No wonder that the peasants have to look to other areas and find work as coolies."[56]

At the end of the nineteenth century, however, a new important source of income began to develop in Banten - the cultivation of coconuts. This rapidly became the most important crop in Banten, after rice. Coconuts had been grown in Banten prior to the end of the nineteenth century largely for local consumption. After 1890, however, there was a prodigious expansion of their cultivation. The impetus for this came from a growing demand for copra and coconut oil in Europe. This was aided by the opening of the railway from Batavia to Anyer in 1900 and to Labuan in 1906. From an early stage, Chinese played an important part in the development of the trade. They were often in charge of the buying up of the coconuts and of their processing into copra and transporting to Batavia. It became the only crop of which it can be said that there was serious commodity production by the peasantry in Banten. By 1905, some 300,704 kg were being exported from the regency of Serang.[57]

Coconuts were grown all along the coastal strip of west Banten from Cilegon to Labuan, spreading later to Rangkasbitung and to

south Banten. Coconuts were well suited for the coastal strip, in which much of the land was very bad even by Bantenese standards. An economist writing in the 1930s, Soekasno, noted of the Anyer-Caringin area for instance, "that the cultivation of dry rice (padi gogo) in this area, because of the infertility of the soil, only takes place once every three to five years whilst palawijo on dry ground is of little significance."[58] He estimated that 70% of dry fields in the area were occupied by coconut cultivation.

The coconut palm demands a damp and continuously warm climate. It also needs a light porous soil so that Bantenese conditions satisfy its needs easily. However, as the fertility of the soil leaves much to be desired, the coconut palms have to be heavily manured, especially in the north-west of Banten. Two types of coconut are grown in Banten. The kelapa domba which, provided it is planted on reasonable ground, produces fruit in four to five years, and, secondly, the kelapa biasa, which takes longer to bear fruit, around seven to eight years. As a rule, plots of coconuts on the coastal plain (pasisir) are in full flower after seven to eight years. Where they are grown on dry fields (tegalan) it usually takes 10 to 15 years before the plot is in full bloom. Kelapa pasisir (coastal coconut plots) produce an average of 50 to 80 nuts a year per tree. Kelapa tegalan (dry field plots) are less productive averaging 20 to 40 nuts a year per tree.[59] Compared with productivity in other residencies of Java, however, Banten fared unfavourably. This was largely to be attributed to a tendency on the part of Bantenese peasants to grow the coconuts too closely together in an effort to increase income.[60]

Given that in the main coconut growing region of Banten, the Anyer-Caringin area, some 70% of dry fields were occupied by the crop in 1935, we can see the great importance of coconut cultivation in Banten. There is evidence even at the beginning of the century that dry fields that had been used for rice cultivation were now being utilized for coconut growing.[61] As a result of rising copra prices in the period 1900-1920, this trend to conversion of dry rice fields into coconut plots may have caused actual rice shortages in the Caringin, Anyer and Rangkasbitung districts, but above all in the Cilegon area, which were made up by rice imports.[62]

Although there may well have been some risk involved initially in switching to coconuts, a long period of rising prices meant that dividends were soon paid for those prepared to make the gamble. In the lean period before the trees bore fruit, peasants could tide themselves over by seeking temporary employment elsewhere, usually in Batavia or Lampung. The evidence would suggest that many peasants did take the risk involved, especially as coconuts grew better than subsistence crops on the soil. Despite the fact that the trees themselves took a long time to mature, they required relatively little upkeep or labour. Once they started to bear fruit, the trees produced a steady income for their owners.

With the spread of increasing burdens on the peasantry in the nineteenth century in the form of compulsory services (heerendiensten) and, above all, taxation, the need for extra

income became pressing. For the first time, the peasants of Banten had to face the hard reality of the state as claimant to part of their income. This was even more oppressive when a major part of the taxation they had to pay was the so-called hoofdgeld (capitation tax), introduced in 1882, a tax that was levied regardless of income or the outcome of the harvest. In regions where the rice crop was prone to ecological disasters, this tax weighed especially heavily. It is not surprising, then, that we find taxation reported as a major cause of nearly every uprising in Banten in the nineteenth century.[63]

But revolt was an act of desperation and was exceptional, although more common in Banten than other areas of Java. In more normal times, the peasantry looked for other means to meet the demands of the state and this they found in seasonal or semi-permanent migration. This mechanism, which Scott has aptly termed "raiding the cash economy", compensated for the insufficient availability of subsidiary means of income in Banten.[64] It also provided an attractive economic option for many peasants. At the same time as the state was becoming ever more important as a claimant to the peasant's income, population was rising rapidly and the extension of agricultural lands barely kept pace with this increase.[65] This added to the need for subsidiary means of income. That the latter were plainly insufficient is indicated by the growing tide of peasants who left Banten each year in search of temporary employment. Multatuli (Douwes Dekker) in his famous novel Max Havelaar noted in the 1850s that the big landlords of the private estates of

Batavia and Bogor (Buitenzorg) were delighted with the backward state of affairs that prevailed in Banten for it provided them with cheap seasonal labour for their estates.[66] An indication of the growing importance of migration in the peasant economy of Banten is given by the surfeit of women over men met in all censuses conducted in the nineteenth century. Thus, whereas in 1815 there were 1,042 women to every 1,000 men in the population, by 1845 this had grown to 1,052 and by 1877 to 1,098.[67]

The migrants were drawn from all areas of Banten with the exception of the isolated southern districts of Lebak. The districts from which there was significant migration were Cilegon, Pandeglang, Pamarayan, Ciruas, Serang and, in lesser measure, Rangkasbitung and Pontang. The expanding city of Batavia and its harbour, Tanjung Priok, were the biggest magnet for the Bantenese. Here they worked as coolies and dockers in order to save enough money to pay the capitation tax and the landrent on their return to Banten. In many cases, Bantenese settled there for several years before returning home. Whole kampung in the capital became Bantenese areas such as Kebun Jeruk, Cempaka Putih, Jembatan Lima and Bukit Duri.[68] The attractions of Batavia were obvious. It was only 90 km from Serang, wages were much higher than elsewhere and work opportunities were numerous. An indication of the great disparity that existed in wage levels between Banten and Batavia is given by the following table, based on the wages of labourers employed by the Public Works Department (Burgelijk Openbare Werken) in the period 1913-1924.

Table XII

Wages of labourers 1913-1924 per day in cents

	Serang	Batavia	Tanjung Priok	Telukbetung (Lampung)
1913	30	50	60	60
1920	37½	75	90	60
1921	40	90	100	60
1922	40	80	85	60
1923	40	60	75	55
1924	37½	60	65	55

Source: Verslag Economischen Toestand 1924, Vol. I, pp. 218 and 224

Even given that the cost of living was greater outside Banten, wages which were on average double the rates that existed there more than compensated for this. Bantenese frequently worked as labourers on building projects, such as the construction of lighthouses, of which there were many in the early years of the century.[69]

The Lampung region too was an important source of work for peasants from Banten. After 1870, pepper assumed a new significance as a crop in international trading. Pepper production in Lampung which, in 1802, had stood at 6,514 piculs had reached 50,000 piculs per annum by 1889 and by 1914 217,904 piculs.[70] The crop was largely grown by local farmers as a cash crop. During the pepper-picking season from April to August, thousands of labourers were

needed and this labour was largely provided by peasants from Banten. The number of Bantenese who crossed annually to Lampung for this purpose in the 1910s was estimated at 30,000, while another source noted that the steamer that crossed from Merak to Telukbetung carried 900 peasants on each of its twice weekly crossings between March and August, not counting the thousands who crossed the Sunda Straits in proa and small motor boats.[71]

The extent of migration from Banten can be partially gauged from the 1930 census, which showed that 7.5% of the population of Banten was outside the residency on the night of the census (10 October 1930). The figure for Banten was the highest of any residency in West Java and in the whole of the island was exceeded only by the densely populated residencies of Kedu, Yogyakarta, Kediri, Madiun and Madura. Sixty percent of the migrants from Banten were in Sumatra, whilst the number of Bantenese in Batavia was 12,424.[72] Even more revealing are the surfeit of women in certain districts per 1,000 men; for Cilegon the figure was 1,093, for Ciruas 1,094, for Pamarayan 1,110 and for Pandeglang 1,116.[73] If these figures are further broken down by dividing the population into three age groups - Group I below 18 months, Group II 18 months to 14 years and Group III over 14 years - the following picture emerges of the number of women per 1,000 men:

Table XIII

Number of women per 1,000 men in the regencies of Banten

	I	II	III
Pandeglang	1,001	826	1,251
Serang	996	827	1,285
Lebak	998	836	1,241
West Java	996	875	1,178

Source: Volkstelling 1930, Vol. 8, p. 39

Even allowing for natural factors such as the earlier death of men, the differences in Group III are striking and must be attributed largely to migration.[74] Confirmation of this can be found in the official statistical survey for 1925 which showed that whereas 46.2% of all females were below the age of 14 years, 54% of all men were below this age.[75] But even more revealing of the extent of seasonal migration from Banten is the fact that the 1930 census, the most thorough and exhaustive census undertaken by the colonial government in Indonesia, took place on 10 October when many, if not most, of the seasonal migrants from Banten would have returned home already to work on the fields. The pepper plucking season in Lampung was traditionally between April and August, whilst the rainy season started in September, thus making possible the preparation of the rice fields in Banten. Thus the full scope of seasonal migration from Banten was undoubtedly missed.

Of all the subsidiary sources of income available to the peasantry of Banten, seasonal migration was by far the most important, precisely because the geographical proximity of Batavia and Lampung to Banten made it the most readily available and probably more economically rewarding than the alternative of cash crops.

Although the spread of cash crop agriculture, in the case of Banten coconut cultivation, and migration were in many ways forced on the peasants because of the state's growing demand for taxable income, it must also be recognized that these were perceived as new opportunities too. This seems especially to have been the case between 1890 and 1920 when copra prices were rising and demands for wage labour in Batavia and Lampung high. Given Banten's proximity to Batavia and the very precarious nature of its subsistence agriculture, Bantenese were impelled rather earlier than others, including peasants of Batavia residency itself, to seek work in the city. Moreover, in a time when Batavia was expanding rapidly and when construction was also going on elsewhere under government and private auspices, Bantenese were in a good position to be recruited for it.

The peasants of Banten were overwhelmingly smallholders. In 1903, the number of tenants in the region was estimated at 10.6%,[76] seemingly not an unusually high figure. Given that at least in north Banten population density was quite high, it was perhaps surprising that there was not a higher degree of tenancy. Nor does there seem to have been a major shift towards landlessness amongst peasants. The conclusion would seem to

indicate therefore that the Bantenese had attained a leeway which allowed them, even in densely populated areas, to maintain a certain independence. An indication that this was the case is given by the high degree of landownership in the region.

In 1903 Banten had the highest ratio of landowners to landless peasants in all Java - 157,518 landowners to 25,851 landless peasants - giving a ratio of 6.1:1. Only two other residencies in Java, Besuki (4:1) and Semarang (5.8:1) had a ratio better than 3:1.

Table XIV

Number of landowners and landless peasants in West Java in 1903

Residency	(a) landowners	(b) landless peasants	ratio of (a) to (b)
Banten	157,518	25,851	6.1:1
Batavia	48,121	23,810	2.0:1
Priangan	367,479	303,850	1.2:1
Ceribon	252,466	109,154	2.3:1

Source: Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement, p. 256

If the figures are further broken down to reveal the size of average landholdings, they establish that the average landholdings in Banten were amongst the smallest in Java.

Table XV

Percentage distribution of the number of holdings, according to size, in 1903

	Banten	Batavia	Ceribon	Priangan	Java average
Less than 0.18 ha	33.2	15.8	12.9	18.1	15.8
0.18 to 0.349 ha	23.3	11.9	18.3	12.9	17.0
0.35 to 0.529 ha	15.0	8.1	17.5	11.1	14.4
0.53 to 0.709 ha	13.2	42.5	27.4	15.5	23.7
0.71 to 1.419 ha	11.2	24.8	17.6	18.1	18.2
1.42 to 2.839 ha	3.2	8.1	4.0	12.8	7.0
2.84 ha or more	0.9	6.8	2.3	11.3	3.9
Less than 0.71 ha	84.7	60.3	76.1	57.8	70.9

Source: Regelink, Bevolkingvraagstuk op Java, p. 120 and Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement, p. 255

Thus, despite a seemingly favourable population density, some 84.7% of landholdings in Banten were below 0.71 hectares. This was the highest percentage below this level of any residency in Java. Furthermore, 33.2% of all landholdings in Banten were below 0.18 hectares - a figure twice as high as that of any other residency in Java. Even allowing for a degree of inaccuracy, it it is clear that landholdings were small in Banten, and far below the Java average.[77] It is also evident from the statistics in Table XV that economic differentiation was not so marked as in

other residencies. One contemporary observer noted,

> "Because the Bantenese prefers to be independent, nearly all peasants own some land. If a peasant does not own some land, he works as a sharecropper but still regards himself as independent. Economic differentiation is therefore not very marked. The sharp class differentiation that is typical of mid-Java is unknown here."[78]

Banten combined, therefore, a high degree of landownership, a relative equality of holdings and a small average size of these holdings. This does not necessarily indicate that the peasants were especially poor unless there was very little market penetration of the economy, which was not the case, except perhaps in the isolated south. It would rather indicate that farming was highly efficient, which it was not, or that peasants had found other ways of supporting themselves. This they largely did through the safety valve of migrant labour. It was nevertheless a finely tuned economic system. It meant that with rising population pressure, the situation of the peasants would grow increasingly precarious unless new solutions were found and a depression might provide a deep shock to such a delicately balanced system.

FOOTNOTES

1. Netherlands Indies, Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, Volkstelling 1930, Vol. I, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1933, p. 28. The population was 9,237. Of this number, the census noted that over 1,000 were actually born outside the province of West Java.

2. On language dialects in Banten, see Mas Mangundikaria, Bantensch-Javaansch Dialect, Batavia: Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten in Wetenschappen, 1914, passim; H. Djajadiningrat, "Iets over Banten en de Banteners", Handelingen van het Eerste Congress voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Java, Weltevreden: Albrecht & Co., 1921, pp. 309-324.

3. Memorie van Overgave (hereafter MvO) van den afgetreden Resident van Bantam, F.K. Overduyn, May 1911, p. 2; MvO, J.C. Bedding, March 1925, p. 28; Volkstelling 1930, Vol. I, pp. 27-28.

4. Volkstelling 1930, p. 86.

5. On the history of Banten in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see especially Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888. Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia, Verhandelingen, KITLV, no. 50, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 70-82.

6. See E.C.J. Mohr, The Soils of Equatorial Regions with Special Reference to the Netherlands East Indies, trans. by Robert L. Pendleton and J.W. Edwards, Ann Arbour: University

of Michigan Press, 1944, pp. 23, 573-576; _____, "The Relation between Soil and Population Density" in Science and Scientists in the Netherlands Indies, ed. by Pieter Honig and Frans Verdoorn, New York: Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao, 1945, pp. 254-263; _____, De Grond van Java en Sumatra, Amsterdam: J.H. de Bussy, 1922, p. 121; see also A.J.C. Krafft, "Bantam", Tijdschrift voor Economische Geographie, Vol. 19, no. 12, 1928, pp. 391-405.

7. On the Cultuurstelsel, see Clifford C. Gertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 47-82; C. Gonggrijp, Schets eener Economische Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie, Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn N.V., 1938, pp. 101-147; Robert van Niel, "Measurement of Change under the Cultivation System in Java, 1837-1851", Indonesia, 14, October 1972, pp. 89-110; Cornelis Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel en Koloniale Baten: De Nederlandse Exploitatie van Java 1840-1860, Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1975, passim; Onghokham, The Residency of Madiun: Prijaji and Peasant in the Nineteenth Century, Yale University Ph.D. thesis, 1975, pp. 119-128.

8. Fasseur, op. cit., p. 217, n. 1; see also Het Onderzoek naar de Rechten van den Inlander op den Grond in de Residentie Bantam, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1871, also published in Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie (hereafter TNI), October 1872, pp. 272-301.

9. Gonggrijp, op. cit., p. 149. One picul equals 100 cati or 61.76 kg; 20 piculs equal approximately 1,200 kg.

10. "Onderzoek", TNI, October 1872, p. 277.

11. Fasseur, op. cit., p. 19.

12. Ibid., pp. 66-67.

13. van Niel, op. cit., p. 91.

14. "Onderzoek", TNI, October 1872, p. 299.

15. Ibid., p. 289.

16. Fasseur, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

17. Fasseur, op. cit., p. 194. On the post-1870 changes, see Gonggrijp, op. cit., pp. 147-172; Geertz, op. cit., pp. 82ff; W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1956, passim; J.J.M. Pieters, "Land Policy in the Netherlands East Indies Before the Second World War", Land Tenure Symposium Amsterdam 1950, Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1951, pp. 118-135; The Siauw Giap, "Het verzet van de bevolking tegen Nederlandse bestuursmaatregelen, 1870-1914", Bijdragen en Mededeelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanders, (BMGN), Vol. 86, no. 1, 1971, pp. 70-78; W.F. Wertheim, "De Indonesische samenleving aan de vooravond van de imperialistische expansie: configuraties en stroomingen", BMGN, Vol. 86, no. 1, 1971, pp. 20-25; Bernard H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of Indonesia, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955, pp. 299ff.

18. Krafft, op. cit., p. 397; P.A. Schat, Bantam's Individualiteit: Aspecten van een Achtergebleven Gebied, Utrecht University, doctorandus thesis, 1960, p. 135.

19. For a discussion of the social and economic effects of this, see B. Schrieke, "The Causes and Effects of Communism on Sumatra's West Coast", Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part One, The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955, pp. 83-166.

20. Hosein Djajadiningrat, Critische Beschouwing van de Sadjarah Banten: Bijdragen ter kenschetsing van de Javaansche geschiedschrijving, Leiden University dissertation, 1913, p. 146; B. Schrieke, "The Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part One, pp. 49-65.

21. On the characteristics of swidden agriculture, see Karl J. Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945, pp. 14-16; Lucien M. Hanks, Rice and Man: Agricultural Ecology in Southeast Asia, Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1972, pp. 28-32; Clifford Geertz, op. cit., pp. 19-23; J. van Gelderen, "The Economics of the Tropical Colony", J.H. Boeke, Indonesian Economics: The Concept of Dualism in Theory and Practice, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1966, pp. 124-255. On the historical sociology of rice cultivation, see Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800, trans. by Mirian Kochan, Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1974

pp. 97-108. Specifically on swidden in Banten see J.F. Kools, Hoemas, Hoemablokken en Boschreserven in de Residentie Bantam, Wageningen: H. Veerman & Zonen, 1935, passim; H.Th. Kal, "Iets over Irrigatie, Landbouw en Visscherij in Bantam", De Indische Gids, Vol. 37, no. 1, 1915, pp. 511-514.

22. Hanks, op. cit., p. 32.

23. Ibid., p. 56 estimates 0.645 short tons of rice for shifting (swidden) cultivation, 0.594 short tons for dry field and 0.975 for wet rice cultivation.

24. MvO, J.A. Hardeman, April 1906, pp. 67-69; MvO, Overduyn, 1911, pp. 90-95.

25. MvO, F.G. Putman-Cramer, March 1931, pp. 155-156.

26. Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, Statistische Gegevens nopens de Geoogste en Beplante Uitgestrektheden der Voornaamste Inlandsche Landbouwproducten Over de Jaren 1916 en met 1922, Weltevreden: Mededeelingen van het Statistisch Kantoor, 1924, p. 66. This excellent report was written by the economist Bagchus.

27. Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, Landbouwatlas van Java en Madoera, Weltevreden: Mededeelingen van het Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, 1926, pp. 101ff.

28. Onderzoek naar de Mindere Welvaart der Inlandsche Bevolking op Java en Madoera, 13 Volumes, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij,

1905-1914, Vol. 5, "Overzicht vanden Landbouw en Daaruit Gemaakte Gevolgtrekkingen", p. 86. Hereafter referred to as Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart, followed by the volume number, then the name of the report. The page number refers to the report and not to the volume.

29. Statistische Gegevens, pp. 5-6, 31, 59; Landbouwatlas, p. 103; L. van Vuuren, Het Wereld Rythme in Oost-Azie en het Aangrijpingspung van het Communisme, Utrecht: A. Oosthoek, 1927, pp. 39-40.

30. On population increase in Java in the nineteenth century, see Bram Peper, Groote en Groei van Java's Inheemsche Bevolking in de Negentiende Eeuw, Universiteit van Amsterdam: Anthropologische-Sociologisch Centrum, Afdeling Zuid-en Zuidoost-Azie, Publikatie No. 11, 1967, p. 3. For the growing burden of taxation, see W. Huender, Overzicht van den Economischen Toestand der Inheemsche Bevolking van Java en Madoera, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1921, pp. 143-203.

31. MvO, Hardeman, 1906, p. 1; Volkstelling 1930, Vol. I, p. 142; on the smallpox epidemic and the Krakatau disaster, see R.A. van Sandick, Leed en Lief uit Bantam, Zutphen: W.J. Thieme, 1892, pp. 87-142.

32. A.M.P.A. Scheltema, De Sawahoccupatie op Java en Madoera in 1928 en in 1888, Buitenzorg: Archipel Drukkerij, Korte Mededeelingen van het Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek No. 1, 1930, p. 10.

33. Ibid., p. 8.

34. R. Broersma, "Een Weldaad voor Bantam", Koloniale Studien, Vol. I, no. 9, December 1917, p. 16.

35. Pelzer, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

36. Late (padi dalem), middle (padi tengah) and early (padi gendah) rice all give different yields. In 1907 the following production figures per bau were estimated for the Anyer division (afdeling) of Serang regency:

	Irrigated sawah	Rain-dependent sawah
Padi dalem (late)	40 piculs	30 piculs
Padi tengah (middle)	32 piculs	22 piculs
Padi gendah (early)	25 piculs	16 piculs

It should be borne in mind that the soil in the Anyer region is generally considered the worst in Banten. This area bore the brunt of the Krakatau disaster. Schat, op. cit., p. 114.

37. Landbouwatlas, pp. 76-79; see also J. van Gelderen, Bevolkingsdichtheid en Landbouw op Java, Batavia: Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, Mededeelingen van het Statistisch Kantoor No. 8, 1922, p. 14.

38. Statistische Gegevens, p. 56.

39. Ibid., p. 130

40. In the same period the total area of successfully harvested sawah in Java increased from 3,674,936 bau in 1913 to 4,220,530 bau in 1924. In West Java the figures remained almost

stagnant - 1,220,162 in 1913, 1,298,990 in 1924. See Verslag van den Economischen Toestand der Inlandsche Bevolking 1924, Vol. I, Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1926, pp. 33-34.

41. Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart, Vol. 4, "Samentrekking van den Afdeelingsverslagen over den Uitkomsten der Onderzoekingen naar de Veeteelt in de Residentie Bantam", p. 4.

42. Statistische Gegevens, pp. 43-44; Hanks, op. cit., pp. 38-39, 148-149.

43. van Sandick, op. cit., pp. 29-60.

44. Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart, Vol. I, "Overzicht van den Uitkomsten der Gewestelijke Onderzoekingen naar de Veeteelt", p. 18; Verslag Economischen Toestand 1924, Vol. I, p. 124.

45. "Onderzoek Rechten van den Inlander", TNI, April 1872, pp. 242-243.

46. So severe was this that it prompted a government inquiry, see Rapport van den Direktur van Onderwijs, Eeredienst, en Nijverheid betreffende de Maatregelen in het Belang van de Inlandsche Nijverheid op Java en Madoera, two volumes, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1904. On Banten, see especially Vol. II, pp. 281-306.

47. F. Fokkens, Eindresume van het bij Gouverneur-General van Nederlandsch-Indie van 24 Juli 1888 no 8 bevolen Onderzoek naar de Verplichte Diensten der Inlandsche Bevolking op Java

en Madoera, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1901-1930, Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 29-31.

48. Landbouwatlas, p. 11, Table I.

49. Ibid., p. 111.

50. Krafft, op. cit., p. 396.

51. Statistische Gegevens, p. 32.

52. Landbouwatlas, p. 117.

53. MvO, Putman-Cramer, 1931, pp. 217ff; Schat, op. cit., pp. 122-123.

54. Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart, Vol. 5, "Overzicht van den Uitkomsten der Gewestelijke Onderzoekingen naar den Landbouw en Daaruit Gemaakte Gevolgtrekkingen", p. 147.

55. Rapport Inlandsche Nijverheid, Vol. II, pp. 198-199.

56. Speech of Achmad Djajadiningrat in the Volksraad, 18 June 1924, Handelingen Volksraad 7^{e} Vergadering, 18 Juni 1924, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1924, pp. 135-139.

57. Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart, Vol. 5, "Overzicht van den Uitkomsten der Gewestelijke Onderzoekingen naar den Landbouw en Daaruit Gemaakte Gevolgtrekkingen", p. 161.

58. Soekasno, "Het particuliere crediet in den Klapper en Coprahandel in Bantam", Volkscredietwezen, Vol. 24, July-August 1936, pp. 393-446.

59. MvO, Putman-Cramer, 1931, p. 211.

60. In 1917 Banten was the tenth most important copra producing residency in Java, after Bagelen, Priangan, Semarang, Kediri, Madiun, Banjumas, Rembang, Surabaya and Yogyakarta. The first six residencies alone accounted for 60% of Java's crop. See Verslag Economischen Toestand 1924, Vol. I, p. 74. Before the 1930s depression, a bau of coconuts could yield an annual income of f. 70, compared with f. 80 for a dry rice field, according to Schat, op. cit., pp. 131-132. The former, of course, did not require as much labour as the latter. At the beginning of the century when copra prices were higher, coconut cultivation would have been marginally more profitable.

61. Soekasno, op. cit., p. 403; Schat, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

62. Schat, op. cit., p. 135.

63. Sartono Kartodirdjo, op. cit., pp. 105-107. Taxation was a major cause of revolts in 1822, 1825, 1836, 1845 and 1888.

64. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976, pp. 212-213.

65. Bram Peper, op. cit., passim; see also J. van Gelderen, "The Numerical Evolution of Population with particular reference to the Population of Java", Proceedings of the International Congress for Studies on Population, Rome 1931, Rome: 1933, Vol. I, pp. 265-278.

66. Multatuli (Eduard Douwes Dekker), Max Havelaar; or, The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company, ed. and trans. by Roy Edwards, London: Heinemann, 1967, p. 196.

67. Schat, op. cit., p. 55.

68. Republik Indonesia Propinsi Djawa Barat, Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953, p. 57.

69. Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indie, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917, Vol. I, p. 165.

70. R. Broersma, De Lampongsche Districten, Batavia: Javaasche Boekhandel Drukkerij, 1916, pp. 171, 188.

71. Ibid., p. 243; Verslag Economischen Toestand 1924, Vol.II, p. 4.

72. Volkstelling 1930, Vol. I, p. 29; Pelzer, op. cit., p. 259.

73. Volkstelling 1930, Vol. I, p. 5.

74. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 56. The census also revealed the surprising figure that 30% of women in the Cilegon area were divorced or widowed.

75. Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie, 1925, Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1926, p. 22.

76. Pelzer, op. cit., p. 257.

77. MvO, A.M. van der Elst, August 1937, estimates the average landholding in Banten in 1935 at 0.74 hectare compared with 0.90 for Java. Z. Regelink, Bijdrage tot de Kennis van het

Bevolkingvraagstuk op Java en Madoera, Enschade:
M.J. van der Loef, 1931, p. 121 suggests that average sawah holdings in Banten were far smaller than in other residencies. Soekasno, op. cit., p. 396 estimates the average sawah holding in the Anyer-Caringin area in 1935 at 0.40 hectare.

78. Krafft, op. cit., p. 400.

CHAPTER 2

BANTENESE SOCIETY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The Village

To the newcomer, whether Dutch or Indonesian, Bantenese villages made a less than favourable impression. For the most part, they lacked the geographical and social cohesion that seemed typical of villages elsewhere in Java. The poverty and infertility of the region added to the impression of shabbiness and neglect. A newly-arrived Dutch Resident commented in 1920 "almost nowhere (in Java) does one see more disorderly villages, dirtier houses and more neglected fields".[1] Villages had no definite boundaries and were often situated in fields rather than along the roads. In the north of Banten, peasant houses were made from mud mixed with lime, with roofs of thatched palm; in the south, as elsewhere on Java, peasant dwellings were made of bamboo.[2]

The majority of Bantenese peasants were landholders in the early twentieth century. It is probably true that their hold on their land was tenuous, but the readily available escape valve of migrant labour enabled most to continue as landowners longer than might have been the case elsewhere. The size of the landholdings was small, but there was nevertheless no large group of landless agricultural labourers in the region. At the same time, the evidence does not indicate any class of large landowners. The villages, however, had their own system of social differentiation, with three groups in particular dominating rural life - religious teachers or *ulama*, village strongmen or *jawara* and local notables.

In theory, the centre of village life was the headman or jaro. Elected by the villagers themselves and responsible for village administration to the district officer or wedana, the influence of the headman in Banten was often eclipsed by other powerful groups or individuals such as the ulama or jawara. The headman was both the representative of central government and spokesman of the village. He had to perform the difficult task of mediating between rulers and ruled and, on the whole, there was a marked reluctance on the part of villagers to step forward for this task. As instruments of the colonial government and, above all, as supervisors of tax collection, they were often the object of rural wrath and discontent. Where a village headman did command prestige and influence in Banten, this was more often than not due to other factors. Some headmen were in fact also jawara, others were descendants of the old Bantenese nobility. Alternatively, headmen bolstered their position by allying themselves to an influential local figure such as a prominent religious teacher or kiyai, or with a powerful jawara. Where this did not happen, the headman was often reduced to an ineffectual figure with little influence or power.

The headman was assisted in his duties by a number of other officials, chief of whom was the penghulu or pangiwa. Besides carrying out religious functions in conjunction with the village mosque, the penghulu also acted as a deputy to the headman. In addition, there was also a village official known as the jagakersa, charged with certain police functions such as escorting a criminal from the village to the district or regency capital and who acted

as a messenger for the headman. Finally, there was a village clerk or jurutulis, who was particularly important in Banten as most headmen were illiterate.[3]

It was a common judgement of Dutch colonial officials that the standard of village heads in Banten was low and that of other members of the village administration even worse.[4] Resignations from the post were common; the most frequently stated reasons being old age, sickness or the desire to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. But in many cases a more compelling reason for leaving the position was the hostility it engendered amongst the peasantry through the headman's tax collecting role or disputes with other prominent local figures. Sometimes the post of headman would lie vacant for months and the local wedana (district officer) would be forced to amalgamate the village with a neighbouring one for want of a suitable candidate.

A striking indication of the difficulties the colonial administration faced in finding suitable candidates for the post of headman is given by an account of the election process in the village of Cileles, Parungkujang district, in Lebak regency.[5] In September 1929, the village head resigned because of old age. A new election was called and the wedana, the assistant wedana and the Assistant Resident of Lebak, van Beusekom, were present for the occasion. The wedana opened the meeting by explaining to the peasants who were gathered the purpose and role of the village head, the duties, financial rewards and the method of voting. Possibly because the villagers were fully aware of the duties involved, no

candidates were forthcoming for the post, much to the embarassment of the assembled officials. The wedana was forced to speak again and this time promised that he would look at the possibility of giving the new incumbent additional apanage fields, "only the presence of the resigned headman tempered the wedana's flights of imagination".[6] When the wedana had spoken for a second time, the assistant wedana, not wishing to be left behind, joined his chief in singing the praises of the post.

The meeting, which had started at 8 am, lasted until 3 pm before a candidate for the post stepped forth. But the man reckoned without his wife making an intervention and delivering an ultimatum to the officials, which is revealing of the peasants' perception of the post. This forthright woman declared that she would only allow her husband to become village headman if it was agreed he would not have to partake of alcoholic drink at civil ceremonies; that he would not participate in tajuban (dancing) parties that were frequently a cover for prostitution and gambling and that when it came to the collection of taxes, the village elders and ulama would promise their support. The wedana, keen to bring the meeting to a successful conclusion, agreed to the woman's request. The village of Cileles had elected a new headman.

The reasons for the poor standard of village headmen in Banten lay in the fact that often the most unsuitable persons found themselves in the job. Villagers would sometimes decide that the election of someone with no influence in the village and who was not too intelligent would cause them no bother. When he was assistant wedana of Bojonegara in Serang regency in 1900, Achmad Djajadiningrat

calculated that only 18% of headmen were literate. All measures to improve the standard of headmen failed "because in all villages the most stupid and the poorest of the community were chosen. Such heads would, so villagers reasoned, cause them least trouble."[7] In other instances, the headman was chosen simply as a 'front man' for the real powerholders in the village.

To the more unscrupulous holder of the post, being headman allowed plenty of opportunity for self-enrichment. The headman was not paid formally, but was entitled to 8% of the taxes he collected. In addition, he received one guilder for each cattle sale; one to 2.5 guilders each time an animal was slain; 1% from the sale of any land in the village; 1% of any sum granted by the Volkscredietbank (People's Credit Bank) and 25 cents for every marriage, divorce or death. Until 1928 the village head was also entitled to five days labour per year from every peasant, the so-called gawe lima hari. The village head would also expect a gift or an invitation whenever there was a religious feast. In practice, though, most headmen encountered serious difficulties in collecting all these sums. Abuses by village headmen were commonplace; in one 20-month period in 1932-33, no fewer than 29 village headmen were dismissed in Banten for financial misdemeanours.[8]

Much of the difficulty that village headmen faced was caused by the powerful influence exercised in Bantenese villages by jawara or strongmen. The jawara were peasants, usually unattached young men, who led a semi-outlaw existence and whose influence and prestige was often far greater than the headmen.[9] In earlier times,

the word jawara merely indicated a person with no fixed occupation. Gradually, however, it assumed other connotations. Already in the early nineteenth century Banten was renowned as a region dominated by banditry. Daendels, who became Governor-General of the Indies in 1808, spoke of Bantenese bands "who annually after the rice harvest teem into the Batavian hinterland and marauded to the very gate of the capital."[10] Raffles, who succeeded Daendels in 1811, was also troubled by the "hordes of banditti, formidable for their numbers and audacity" that infested the Banten region.[11]

Many jawara started off as landless or poor peasants who drifted back and forth from the countryside to the towns. Others were simply young men who saw in petty crime an easier source of income, or in times of hardship, a necessary addition, to tilling the soil. Their relationship with the rural population was ambiguous; they were both feared and admired. Some exercised a virtual reign of terror in their regions, but others were seen as champions of peasant rights against the Dutch and the priyayi, the native ruling elite.[12] The latter was likely to be the case if the jawara carried out their criminal activities outside the area of their own villages.[13] Because of their skills at fighting and their position as marginal men in local society, they were often in the forefront of rural protest.

The jawara dominated many villages, sometimes holding the headmen firmly in their grasp or being used by the headman to maintain his control in the village. The following conversation between the village head of Cikaso in north Banten and the jawara leader Djahal, from an account of rural life published during the Japanese occupation, is most revealing,

"I hope everything went okay today, Djahal?"
"There was no trouble, headman. Wardi has started to pay his arrears because I threatened him with eviction from the village otherwise. Hamdani has started to pay his taxes, too."
"Djahal, Sarbini came here yesterday and promised to pay off his debt."
"Good, I'll make sure it's paid off."
"If he has the money next month is soon enough."
"But headman, we don't want it spoiled again, better if he pays it now."
"Okay. You deal with it your way."
"Alright, I'll manage it. I've asked Idi for the water buffalo back because he's broken his agreement."
"True, but better if we make an example of him. The agreement was that he should pay monthly instalments."[14]

But not all jawara were like Djahal, working with the headman and operating within the existing political and social structure. Many were engaged in overtly illegal activities such as gambling, prostitution, cattle stealing and even highway robbery.[15] They were rarely brought to trial by the authorities because of the hold they had over village life which made peasants loath to give evidence against them. If one of their number was arrested, the jawara might well reply with threats and the killing or maiming of the official's horses.[16] Although, like Djahal, jawara were contemptuous of the poor and weak, they nevertheless guarded against betrayal by a judicious use of intimidation and by conducting many of their operations in distant villages. This is strikingly illustrated in an interview with a former leading jawara in the period 1930-55, who had taken to the hills after being discovered guilty of numerous tax evasions when he was a village headman,

> "My group was the defender of the people. If we stole, it was only from the better off and outside my own village. Because of that, the peasants were proud of us and always supported me."[17]

Jawara groups were often characterized by oath-taking and strict obedience to the leader. Together, the leader and members formed a group united by inner ties and possessing its own customs, ceremonies, code of honour and even language. Dressed usually in black, the groups had a strong romantic and even supernatural element, often expressed in the individual leader's possession of an ilmu, the charm with which it was possible to work magic. This ilmu may consist of a word, an adage or an amulet, but sometimes merely in the conviction, the inner certainty of its possession. Frequently group leaders claimed the ilmu of invulnerability or invisibility.[18]

For the most part, Bantenese jawara operated in groups. A few, however, operated as individuals evading capture for many years. In the 1880s, the most famous bandit in Banten was Sakam.[19] In the 1920s, he found a comparable figure in Samoen of Gunungsari.[20] He worked at first with another jawara, Moesa, a former coalminer in Sawahlunto in West Sumatra. Samoen was widely believed to have supernatural powers because of his evasion of the police for many years, and was held to be guilty of numerous robberies, murders and rapes. In 1922, he was captured by the police, but was freed because of lack of evidence. Two days later, two peasants who had helped police in their inquiries were found dead.

Samoen's prestige amongst the population of Banten increased further after this incident. He was popular amongst the peasantry since, reputedly, like Robin Hood, he robbed only from the well-off and was said to have helped many poor people. Although Samoen operated largely on his own, he maintained a network of spies throughout the region. In 1925, he robbed and killed a wealthy landowner in Ciomas and was arrested and sentenced to 15 years' for this crime. But soon after his trial, Samoen escaped from prison in Serang and resumed his former activities. Unfortunately for Samoen, the PKI revolt of 1926 brought a large influx of troops into Banten, who, after suppressing the revolt, joined the police in combing the hills of Gunungsari for him. Betrayed once again by a spy, the cave in which he had hidden for months was surrounded, but Samoen had already slipped away. Some time later, however, exhausted from his many years on the run, Samoen surrendered to the authorities on condition that he would not be ill-treated.

Like the mafioso of nineteenth century Sicily, the jawara of Banten exploited the gaps in communication between the peasant village and the larger society.[21] They thrived on these gaps and reinforced their position by systematic threats and use of violence. The jawara often dominated the markets and auctions of the region, and they alone were able to offer effective protection in the countryside. The spread of coconut cultivation and migration provided jawara with new opportunities. Cash crops needed to be protected and labourers had to be recruited, and these tasks were soon in the hands of jawara.

Another focus of leadership in villages was provided by local notables who were descendants of the former Bantenese nobility. The widespread practice of polygamy and the proliferation of titles had led to a large noble class under the sultanate. Mostly these were people whose primary relationship was to a local following and not to the court. Generally speaking, this group of people was distrusted by the Dutch colonial authorities, in part because of their prominence in leading many of the peasant revolts which punctuated Bantenese history in the nineteenth century.[22] Very few of the former nobility were therefore co-opted into the colonial administration. In the villages, however, the former notables exercised great influence. Their number was such that one Dutch commentator wrote in 1859 that "One meets in Banten something for which I can think of no other example on Java, namely that descendants of prominent families have settled in the villages and live as ordinary peasants."[23]

The old Banten nobility consisted of four categories. Firstly, descendants of the sultans; these were known as Tubagus. This title was bestowed on daughters as well as sons, but was only hereditary through the male line. Holders of this title were treated with great reverence by the population. Secondly, persons who had been given the title Raden by the sultans as a reward for services. This title was also hereditary and was particularly common in the Caringin area. The third category bore the title Mas and were alleged to be descendants of two legendary figures, Ki Djong and Ki Djon, who, according to tradition, were among the first converts to Islam in Banten. Another title, common in the

Menes region, was Entol. Holders of this title were said to be descendants of Raden Gugur Pagandjur, who, according to tradition, was a prince of Majapahit who fled to Banten. His grandson, Raden Andong, was converted to Islam by the first ruler of Banten, Maulana Hasanuddin, and helped spread the religion in south Banten.[24] The persons holding such titles were numerous in Banten and enjoyed considerable local prestige, despite the fact that they were often no more than ordinary peasants or small traders by the nineteenth century. These local notables were conscious of their lost position, of their prestige with the peasantry but also of their lack of influence in the new colonial order. Together with the ulama, they were to become a focus of resistance to colonial rule.

The third group of influential people in the villages were the ulama or religious teachers. Within this group, several distinctions can be made. On the lower level, there were haji, persons who had carried out the pilgrimage to Mecca. On the whole, these tended to be the better off members of the village. On their return, some haji engaged in religious teaching and were known as guru ngaji. Their influence was, however, confined to their own village. On the higher level were the kiyai, who had a wider base of influence extending outside the village and, in some cases, outside of Banten. Most kiyai had studied for several years in Mecca and on their return to Banten established pesantren or Islamic schools where young men came to receive religious instruction. Whilst many haji engaged in trade, the kiyai were

far more interested in investing in people rather than capital. A major part of their income came from donations, although many kiyai were also substantial landowners. But above all the ulama were identified with the countryside and few, if any, lived in the towns of the region.

The influence of the religious elite was exceptionally strong in Bantenese society. Islam had been brought to Banten in the sixteenth century by Javanese migrants and had soon established a firm hold on the region. Moreover, unlike many other parts of Java, there was in Banten no Hindu or Buddhist legacy to dilute Islam. Generally speaking, Islam was far more orthodox in West Java, but this was especially the case in Banten where an Islamic trading state was established and thrived for almost two centuries until the establishment of a Dutch protectorate in 1684. During the period of the sultanate, the ulama exercised considerable influence over government and certainly the religious elite in the early twentieth century were still left with an abiding perception of the past as one where they held great influence over the political affairs of the region, unlike the period of direct colonial rule which followed.[25] It must be remembered too that direct colonial rule was instituted in Banten only in 1808 with the sultanate's formal annexation by the Dutch.

During the late nineteenth century, travel between Mecca and Indonesia became easier and cheaper with the advent of the steamship.[26] This led to more people undertaking the haj (pilgrimage) to Mecca and to a reinforcement and strengthening of the position of the religious elite in village society. The

obligation on every adult Muslim who had sufficient funds and who was fit to undertake the journey was closely observed in Banten and the number of pilgrims was proportionately higher than for any other residency in Java. In 1887, the number of haji in Banten totalled 4,074 or 0.72% of the region's population, the highest percentage in Java.[27] By the 1920s the proportion was higher, with Bantenese generally accounting for 20% of the total number of Javanese pilgrims in any year. It has been estimated that for the years 1926-35 there were on average 105 pilgrims from Banten per 100,000 population compared with 45 for West Java as a whole and 14 for East and Central Java.[28]

The experience of the haj had a profound effect on most pilgrims. They stepped foot for the first time in a country ruled by Muslims and came into contact with co-religionists from many lands.[29] Undoubtedly, some were fired too by Pan-Islamic aspirations that were current in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Mecca made its greatest impact on those pilgrims who stayed there some years, but even on the ordinary pilgrims its impression was indelible. The returned haji often had a great pride in everything Arab, leading even Indonesian observers to speak of a '<u>vermekkaniseering</u>' of Banten society. Arab songs and dances were said to be replacing Javanese ones in the early twentieth century and there was an increased desire to speak Arabic.[30] Symbolically, many Bantenese also adopted Arab names when they were in the Holy City.

Sometimes the pilgrimage was undertaken with great economic sacrifices and many pilgrims found themselves hopelessly indebted

as a result. In theory, every pilgrim had to demonstrate to the authorities that he was in possession of 500 guilders and that he was able to provide for his family in his absence. In practice, there was no way for the government to establish if the money was borrowed. Frequently, land was pawned or sold to raise the necessary money.[31] Others worked for some years in Malaya or Singapore to gain extra income.[32] Indeed, such was the passion with which the obligation to carry out the haj was conducted in Banten that it may even have had an economic levelling effect on the district.[33]

It was not only the well-off who went on the pilgrimage. Sometimes an old or sick person who was too unwell to go on the haj would nominate somebody to go for him. This was known as bedel haj. Another method whereby poorer people were enabled to go on the haj in Banten was taijan. A prospective pilgrim who did not have enough money to go on the haj would slay a buffalo or goat and sell the meat in his village. His fellow villagers, knowing for what purpose he had done this, would not shrink from paying exorbitant prices for the meat. This practice persisted until the 1930s.[34] Others less scrupulous borrowed money in the expectation that on their return they could make a handsome profit by selling amulets, Arabic books and scent from Mecca.[35]

On their return to Banten, haji enjoyed great prestige and influence in the villages. This was even more so in the cases where the individuals also bore old noble titles such as tubagus, descendant of the sultan. Some haji became mosque officials. Those who became village religious teachers (guru ngaji) taught

the elementary principles of Islam in the village prayer house, the langgar. Often these haji assumed a leading role in their villages, giving the blessing and saying the prayers at marriages, circumcisions and burials. However, unlike the kiyai, the influence of the guru ngaji seldom extended beyond the boundaries of their own villages.

Whilst most Bantenese kiyai resided in or near villages, their influence extended out over a much wider area. Their influence in the villages was paramount and far eclipsed that of guru ngaji, jawara or other local notables. The local administration, whether Dutch or Indonesian, saw the influence of the kiyai as a negative force restricting the social development of the people. Even Hasan Djajadiningrat, founder of the Sarekat Islam in Banten, railed against their hold over the people,

> "The kiyai is consulted about everything - marriages, circumcisions and other celebrations, the planting of sawah, etc. The election of the village head and other administrative matters can often not be expiated without the consultation of the kiyai by the priyayi. Everything the kiyai says, even if it is the greatest nonsense, is accepted by the people as truth."[36]

Most Bantenese kiyai found the acceptance of the colonial government as contrary to their understanding of Islam. At best, they displayed an outward indifference and an inward hatred towards the infidel Dutch and those Indonesians who cooperated with the colonial administration. Indeed, it was often remarked that pesantren in Banten were marked by a distinctly anti-colonial ethos.[37]

Most ulama had usually spent several years studying in Mecca. Amongst the many Indonesians who had lived in Mecca in the late nineteenth century, the Bantenese were renowned for the enthusiasm with which they pursued their religious studies. They were one of the largest groups in the Holy City from Indonesia, and, according to Snouck Hurgronje, "so far as concerns the Dutch Indies, divines from Banten take the leading place."[38] In 1930, for example, of the 4,829 Indonesians resident in Mecca, some 439 or 9% were Bantenese, the highest number for any Java residency.[39] Those who spent many years there studying would establish pesantren or religious schools of their own on their return to Banten.

The pesantren drew pupils from outside the village, who boarded with the kiyai.[40] These pupils were known as santri. Most santri would be local boys, but on occasion pupils would also come from outside Banten to study with a particularly well-respected teacher. Many pesantren were well-established and had built up reputations over the years, with leadership of the pesantren sometimes being passed on from a kiyai to the eldest son. Other pesantren appear to have been more short-lived. In 1925, the resident of Banten estimated there were 691 pesantren with 11,784 students, whilst six years later another government report estimated the number of pesantren at 387 with 9,751 students.[41] Whilst part of the discrepancy was explained by tighter government definition of what constituted pesantren, it was also clear that a number of pesantren had closed in these years. Because so much depended on personality, it was unusual for pesantren to outlast the lifespan

of the kiyai who built it up. The kiyai, therefore, had to be a leader of men which the Dutch, and later the Islamic modernist movement, disliked, because he led them in a direction which they considered narrow and conservative.

Most santri entered pesantren at about eight years of age, when they already knew something of the Koran and the Nuschat, the biography of Mohammed's life, usually gained from a guru ngaji. The atmsophere in the pesantren was severe and austere. The pupils (santri) lived a hard and rather egalitarian existence which has not changed much to the present day.[42] The heads of pupils were usually shaved on entry and they would dress in a simple sarong and a white blouse top. Each santri got a sack of rice, some salt, dried fish and a pot to cook the rice in. The kiyai themselves shared this simple and austere life. The new pupil was usually assigned to an older santri, who was himself taking lessons from the kiyai. Most pesantren consisted of no more than a small stone mosque and adjoining huts where the pupils lived. In each hut there were usually ten boys. This was where they slept, studied and cooked.

Life in the pesantren was characterized by a strict obedience to the kiyai and by equality and camaraderie amongst the students. Students of noble birth often found themselves tutored by the sons of simple peasants.[43] The first years at the pesantren were absorbed by learning how to recite the Koran with correct Arabic pronunciation. The day started at half past four in the morning, when the santri awoke and went to the mosque to wait for the kiyai

who led the first of the five prayers of the day - subuh. People from the village would also attend these prayers.[44] An hour later, formal teaching began in the mosque. The kiyai then gave the lesson from the Koran or from some other holy scripture. He would read in Arabic, translating later into Javanese. It was then repeated by the santri and learnt by rote. Mastering the Arabic of the Koran was an arduous and long process for the santri. The older santri were taught directly by the kiyai himself. Lessons generally finished around ten o'clock and the santri were then free to prepare the midday meal.

After the midday meal, the santri devoted themselves to self-study until the one o'clock prayer - dlohor. In their free time, the santri would often beg for alms in the villages nearby or in the nearest market town. If the kiyai possessed rice fields, the santri might work on them to earn their keep. Aside from the morning lessons in the mosque, or at prayer time, the santri would have little contact with the kiyai. His commands would be relayed to them by an older santri, known in Banten as the komeng. The santri would not formally pay for their education in the pesantren, but the kiyai would receive gifts and presents from santri returning from a religious feast or visiting their parents and also fitrah - the obligatory gift at the end of the fasting month.[45]

To a great extent, the income of a kiyai would be dependent on his own charisma and personality. Although he would expect the santri to work his land, the kiyai would not himself demand payment for services, but was dependent on gifts. If he had a large and wealthy clientele, he would be rich; if not, he could be quite poor.

In some cases, a kiyai would settle his followers on land he had bought from which he would not exact formal rent but he would expect regular gifts. Furthermore, the kiyai could gain loyalty by being a source of aid in hard times, but could not lend money for interest.

Government

The first 20 years of this century witnessed a prodigious expansion of government activity in Indonesia and especially in Java. This highly significant change of direction in government policy led to increased intervention into local society and is usually referred to as the 'Ethical Policy'.[46] Village schools mushroomed at a tremendous rate; rural credit banks were established and rice granaries constructed. Villages were amalgamated and greatly increased in population, size and geographical area.[47] Efforts were made to improve order and neatness within the villages and great strides were made towards a more efficient system of tax collection.[48] Hundreds of new regulations appeared on the statute book dealing with everything from the thickness and height of fences to travel passes. Bookkeeping for all village affairs became regularized and registration of the inhabitants, births, deaths, livestock and so forth became institutionalized. More and more the village found its remaining autonomy encroached upon by the central government. As Furnivall sardonically noted, "no villager in Java could scratch his head unless a district officer gave him permission and an expert showed him how to do it."[49]

This plethora of measures took little account of local circumstances. In Banten, the relationship between rural society and the colonial administration had been marked throughout the nineteenth century by considerable tension, giving rise at times to outbreaks of violence and even open revolt. As recently as 1888, Cilegon had been the scene of one of the most significant revolts in modern Javanese history.[50] The fundamental division which ran through Banten was between peasant and government, not peasant and lord.

The colonial government of Java comprised a close Dutch supervision of an indigenous Javanese administrative corps or pangreh praja (lit. 'rulers of the realm'), sometimes known more loosely as the priyayi.[51] The highest Dutch official was the Resident, based in Serang. He was supported by three Assistant Residents, based in the three regency capitals - Serang, Pandeglang and Rangkasbitung.[52] At least until the early years of this century, there was also a lower rung of Dutch officials known as Controleur. These posts were part of the Dutch colonial service, the Binnenlands Bestuur (BB - Interior Administration). In addition to this, there were Dutch police officials based in each residency.

Banten was regarded by most Dutch colonial civil servants as one of the most difficult postings in Java, if not in Indonesia. Whilst political conditions in the region necessitated the highest quality civil servants, the economic unimportance of the region made the Dutch loath to do this. But it was not only the quality

of the Dutch administration that gave cause for concern, but also the frequency of their turnover. Between 1906 and 1911, there were three assistant residents in Lebak regency, three in Serang and three in Pandeglang. In Menes there were no fewer than four controleurs in the same period and in Pandeglang there were five controleurs. In Lebak and Serang, no European served longer than 20 months, in Menes 15 and in Pandeglang less than 12. In 1911, the Resident, F.K. Overduyn, judged four of the 19 controleurs and two of the seven assistant residents who had served under him as thoroughly unsuitable for service in the region.[53] But despite Overduyn's appeals to the Director of the Binnenlands Bestuur to take greater care in appointments to Banten, there was no immediate change. In 1916, another Resident, H.L.C.B. van Vleuten, was making the same complaint.[54] Between April 1913 and May 1916, there were no fewer than three assistant residents in Pandeglang, three controleurs in Caringin and three controleurs in Lebak. European clerks at the residency office in Serang came and went so fast in this period that van Vleuten said he lost count of their number, and complained that "civil servants who are judged unusable and unsuitable for service anywhere else are sent to Banten."[55]

Residents, as a whole, occupied their post for far longer periods. The first Resident after the revolt of 1888 was J. Velders (1888-1895), a man of seemingly mediocre abilities who spent a full year of his office on home leave in Holland. He was followed by two able Residents of the old school, J.A. Hardeman (1895-1906) and F.K. Overduyn (1906-1911). Both ruled Banten with a firm hand and cultivated a good working relationship with the priyayi and

especially with Achmad Djajadiningrat, Regent of Serang (1901-1924), something the lower ranks of the Dutch civil service were apparently unable to do.[56] Hardeman had a deep sense of loyalty to the Dutch Government and saw it as his duty to restore peace to Banten after the uprising of 1888. In 1899 he turned down an offer of a seat on the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) - the highest consultative body in Indonesia at the time - in order to fulfil his mission in Banten.[57] Hardeman was Resident of Banten for 11 years, but in the next 12 (1906-1918) there were five residents; the last three occupying the position for only two, three and one and a half years respectively.

The highest official of the native administration was the Regent or Bupati. The regents were regarded as the 'first people' in their regency, but they were directly under the command of the Dutch resident and in matters concerning the indigenous population they were the assistant resident's 'trusted advisers' and were to be treated as a 'younger brother'. Often, however, particularly in the nineteenth century, the Dutch administrators regarded the regents as nominal figureheads preferring to rely on the lower-level officials, the Wedana.[58] Directly below the regent and above the wedana was an official known as a Patih, who acted as a sort of chief minister or deputy to the regent. Occasionally, where a regency was large, a so-called independent patih (zelfstandig patih) was nominated to look after a certain area. This was the case for instance with the Anyer region of Serang regency in the nineteenth century. The wedana were in control of districts. They were in charge of the police, agriculture, tax collection, the maintenance

of roads and bridges and irrigation. In each regency there were usually between four and eight districts. Below the wedana were the sub-district chiefs, known as Assistant Wedana. These were the two levels of administration most in contact with village society. Patih, wedana and assistant wedana served on average between two to five years in any one post. Regents were in most cases appointed for life and it was largely a hereditary post. Dutch officials were appointed for shorter periods and were moved throughout Java.

Attached to the offices of the regents and wedana were several officials known as mantri, who carried out the commands of their superiors. With the development in the nineteenth century of specific branches of government, new appointments arose such as mantri politie (police mantri) and mantri irrigatie (irrigation mantri). At the regency level, there were also religious and legal officials known respectively as penghulu and jaksa. The former were not strictly speaking civil servants but were ulama absorbed into the colonial government.

Dutch mistrust of the old Banten nobility was strongly reflected in their recruitment policy in the nineteenth century to the native administrative corps, the pangreh praja. Wherever possible, and especially with senior appointments, officials from outside Banten were selected, or commoners were brought into the ranks of the priyayi. At the lower levels, appointments were sometimes made of persons of commoner origin who had great influence in a particular area. Thus, in 1816, a famous bandit, Sahab, was

appointed Wedana of Gunungkencana in Lebak regency, in an effort to pacify that area.[59] Twelve years later, in 1828, a certain Mas Malan of the village of Lopang near Serang, and who had previously been employed as a works foreman, was appointed Wedana of Serang district.[60] Such appointments were deeply resented by the old nobility of Banten, but even more so was the Dutch policy regarding the regents of Banten. This was a difficult problem for the Dutch in Banten as, unlike other areas of Java, the institution of regents was virtually unknown. As Achmad Djajadiningrat notes, "Regents, such as one found elsewhere in Java, who are descended from families who have ruled there sometimes for centuries . . . were unknown in Banten."[61]

Many of the Dutch appointees to the position of regent in Banten were indeed from local noble families such as Pangeran Mulapar, the first Regent of Banten-Lor (the forerunner of Serang regency) from 1816 to 1827, or Pangeran Senadjaja, the first Regent of Banten-Kidul (the forerunner of Lebak regency) from 1816 to 1830.[62] But as the Dutch position in Banten, and in Java as a whole, strengthened, so they instituted a far more radical policy of appointing outsiders as regents in Banten. The first such appointment was Senadjaja's successor as Regent of Lebak in 1830, R. Karta Natanegara, who had previously been a wedana in the Bogor area. Karta Natanegara's father, Raden Haji Mohammed Moesa, was the penghulu of Garut in the east Priangan, and had worked closely with the Dutch in establishing their rule in that area. Throughout his long period as Regent of Lebak (1830-1865), Karta Natanegara

was to be known as 'Dalem Wetan' - the Regent from the East'. He aroused much hostility as is evident from the description of him in Multatuli's famous novel, Max Havelaar.[63] Another early appointment from outside the region was R.A. Tjondronegoro, the first Regent of Pandeglang (1848-1849) and later Regent of Serang (1849-1874). Tjondronegoro had been brought to Banten in the late 1820s by the Dutch Resident Smulders. He had previously served with Smulders in Semarang in Central Java as a magang (an unpaid apprentice civil servant). Despite the fact that Tjondronegoro married a prominent local woman, Ratu Siti Aminah, a cousin of the last Sultan Safiudin (1816-1832), he remained distrusted by the Bantenese.[64] An even more startling appointment was that of R. Wiriadidjaja as the second Regent of Caringin in 1840. He had previously been chief jaksa (magistrate) in Bogor. Wiriadidjaja was from Tasikmalaya in the Priangan. According to local Banten histories, Wiriadidjaja was a poor widow's son, whose job was to gather grass for horses belonging to the regent of Cianjur. Later he obtained a job as a servant at the house of the local Dutch resident, where he learnt to read and write. On the retirement of the resident, Wiriadidjaja returned to the regent and was appointed a clerk (jurutulis). Three years later, he was appointed a mantri in Tasikmalaya. There he married a woman from priyayi circles and four years later was appointed Regent of Caringin in Banten. The story continues that when he was regent, his aged mother came to visit him one day but Wiriadidjaja, ashamed of his humble origins, refused to recognize her. She died soon after and Wiriadidjaja, realizing the error of his ways, died himself of a broken heart.[65]

These appointments were a drastic break with the usual Dutch practices in Java of either appointing the son of a regent as his successor or at least a member of the immediate family. Thus, by 1850, three of Banten's four regencies were ruled by non-Bantenese families. Furthermore, these families entrenched themselves in Banten and later adherence by the Dutch to the hereditary principle ensured they stayed there. A fourth Banten regent family was from commoner, if local, origins, namely that of R. Suta Angunangun, Regent of Lebak (1877-1881) and his son, R. Surawinangun, Regent of Pandeglang (1888-1897).[66] If vacancies did arise, however, more often than not they were filled by outsiders. Thus, even in 1881 when the regency of Lebak again fell vacant, an outsider, R. Suria Nataningrat, the former patih of Mangunreja (Tasikmalaya) in the Priangan, was appointed.[67]

Pangreh praja appointed from outside Banten were often ill at ease in their new surroundings. Not only was there the hostility or indifference of the local populace to contend with, but there were grave disparities in the income of the priyayi in Banten compared with their peers elsewhere. During the period of the Cultivation System (1830-1870), both the Dutch and native administrations enjoyed bonuses in proportion to the success of commodity crop production in their regions. For reasons to do largely with the infertility of the soil and the passive resistance of the peasantry, the system was a dismal failure in Banten. Because of this, the bonuses enjoyed by the Dutch administration, the so-called Binnenlands Bestuur (Interior Administration) or BB,

and the priyayi were much smaller than those enjoyed by their counterparts in the neighbouring Priangan. Thus, during the years 1858-60, the resident of Banten received an annual bonus of 1,300 guilders; only two other residents, those of Pekalongan and Rembang, received bonuses of less than 4,000 guilders. In the same years, the four regents of Banten shared between them an annual bonus of 2,500 guilders, whilst their peers in the Priangan shared the princely sum of 90,000 guilders, or 36 times as much.[68] The concern and alarm shown by the Regent of Lebak, Karta Natanegara, in one famous episode of Max Havelaar, at the impending visit of his nephew, a Priangan regent, accompanied by a large retinue, is now more understandable.[69]

The bonus system extended down from the regents to the village heads, and all along the line the priyayi of Banten received far less than their compatriots elsewhere in Java. This was to have an important and long-term demoralising effect on the priyayi of Banten. Although the Cultivation System ended officially in 1870, percentages from coffee production still gave the Priangan priyayi, and especially the regents, high incomes in the late nineteenth century. Incomes as high as 120,000 guilders a year were not uncommon for Priangan regents. Regents, such as those of Bogor and Cianjur, owned large estates guaranteeing them high private incomes.[70] Whilst the high incomes of the Priangan priyayi greatly reinforced their social position and enabled them to enjoy grand life-styles, Banten priyayi were able to do so only at the expense of getting hopelessly into debt or of squeezing the peasantry. In the Priangan, where membership of the administrative elite was far more stable, priyayi dominance of local society was strengthened, whereas in

Banten it remained chronically weak.[71] The priyayi, and especially the regents, had heavy social commitments and before the introduction of standardized salaries at the end of the nineteenth century, this social burden was onerous.

Appointments of outsiders to positions in the native civil service in Banten was to remain common into the twentieth century. The majority of the nouveaux arrivés were Sundanese from the Priangan, who frequently found it difficult to adjust to their new posting. Often, and particularly if they were in the lower ranks of the priyayi, they regarded their appointment to Banten as a signal that something had gone wrong for them and that they were not regarded highly in Batavia. Banten was known in priyayi circles in the Priangan as the 'Buitengewesten op Java' - the Outer Islands of Java. Its profoundly Islamic atmosphere and the lack of formal respect shown the priyayi in Banten was both shocking and disturbing to outsiders. Not for nothing did the Priangan priyayi coin the proverb 'Banten bantahan' (recalcitrant or obstinate Banten).

Most striking to the outsider arriving in Banten for the first time are the differences in language and culture and, above all, the intensity of Islamic religious practice there compared even with the rest of West Java. The outsider was never fully accepted. Thus Suria Nataningrat, despite the fact that he served as Regent of Lebak for 26 years (1881-1907), was nevertheless still a 'Dalam Wetan' - Regent from the East. This feeling of isolation and alienation in Banten was reciprocated by the outsiders themselves.

One of the most noticeable features that priyayi from outside Banten found difficult was the difference in language. Unlike West Java, which is Sundanese speaking, Banten is both Sundanese and Javanese speaking. The inhabitants of the northern coastal strip of Serang regency are Javanese speaking, whilst those of the southern part of the regency and of the regencies of Lebak and Pandeglang are Sundanese speaking. Both the Sundanese and Javanese dialects of Banten are noted for their roughness and directness of communication. This is especially the case regarding the Javanese dialect of north Banten.[72] The Javanese spoken in north Banten sounded to outsiders not only strange but, in the words of one observer,

> "like the idiom of barbarians. Forms, which in classical Javanese, can only be used in addressing the lowest social groups, the peasant of north Banten uses without shame in addressing his superiors."[73]

It was this latter aspect that outsiders found particularly disturbing. It reinforced in the eyes of both the Dutch and non-Bantenese priyayi the impression that the region's inhabitants were uncouth, fanatical and outspoken. For their part, Bantenese viewed the arrivals from the Priangan as accomplices of the Dutch and referred to them contemptuously as 'wong gunung' (mountain men) and 'wong wetan' (men from the east).

The hallmarks of priyayi culture in Java - the gamelan (Javanese orchestra), the wayang (shadow play) and topeng (mask play) - were regarded in Banten with disdain, and even in some quarters as haram (forbidden by Islam).[74] Whilst each kabupaten

(the residence of a regent) had its own gamelan orchestra, there were strict rules about when it could be played. It was forbidden on the Muslim holy day - Friday, during the first 15 days of Maulud - the month of Mohammed's birth, and throughout the fasting month, Ramadan. Many kiyai, however, particularly in the Menes-Labuan area, forbade the gamelan altogether. But plays and poems which mocked the priyayi were popular in the villages and even amongst the ulama. Musical troupes or angklung groups toured the villages dressed as Europeans or priyayi and ridiculed their ways and customs.[75] These were symbolic protests against the status quo of the colonial order and as such a useful indicator of the distance between ruler and ruled.[76]

In the course of the nineteenth century, the Dutch sought to transform Java's traditional aristocracy, the priyayi, into an administrative corps along western European lines. This was an undertaking that was never successfully completed and the priyayi remained a hybrid formation combining features of a modern bureaucracy and an aristocratic class keen not to lose past privileges.[77] There was anyway an inherent contradiction in all such colonial attempts to use native ruling classes as a colonial bureaucracy. As Eisenstadt remarks,

> "On the one hand, attempts were made to establish broad, modern administration, political and economic settings, while on the other hand these changes were to be based on relatively unchanged sub-groups and on traditional attitudes and loyalties."[78]

In practice, the Dutch were hampered, after some initial experimentation, by an intense concern not to disturb Javanese society to the extent of

interfering with the extraction of a sizeable surplus from that island. The native population and the existing social structure should, in theory, be left relatively undisturbed in accordance with ancestral traditions and customs. Thus, Dutch policy in the Priangan has been described as having continuity as its leitmotif, "both in the patterns of settlement which underlay old towns and colonial regencies and in the history of the bupati (regent) families."[79]

However, the implementation of this policy ran into difficulties in Banten. Under the sultanate, the evidence seems to indicate that there was no sharp separation between the administration and the religious elite. In Banten, the nobility could draw on Islamic symbols, so that Islam reinforced rather than weakened their position. The Dutch, having formally annexed the territory, moved quickly to reject this tradition. Appointments from outside the old nobility were common, if not the norm. Even the new regency towns were Dutch creations; Pandeglang, built in the 1810s, Lebak and Serang, in the 1820s, and later Rangkasbitung, built in 1865; only Caringin was a settlement before the Dutch annexation. Ironically, this regency was abolished by the Dutch in 1906. The old town of Banten itself was systematically gutted in 1832 never to rise again to any importance, except for a brief episode in the revolution of 1945.

The most important aspect of the transformation of Java's indigenous ruling class in the nineteenth century was undoubtedly its gradual secularization. This, more than anything, divorced it from not only the religious elite, but also from the peasantry.

As Harry Benda has written, the priyayi's alliance with the Dutch "deprived it of real sovereignty yet strengthened its autocratic hold over the tani (peasantry), thus increasing the stature of the ulama in the eyes of the harassed peasantry."[80] This was even more the case in Banten, for the religious elite were augmented by a considerable section of the local nobility who had not been coopted into the colonial administration. Nevertheless, the secularization of the priyayi was a slow process, especially concerning those priyayi who originated from the region. Thus R.A. Sutadiningrat, Regent of Pandeglang (1870-1888) and Regent of Serang (1888-1893) was well-known as a devout and pious Muslim. His nephew, Achmad Djajadiningrat, described him as,

> "extraordinarily religious. To my mind, he lived more as a kiyai than as a civil servant. Every month he recited the whole Koran and almost every morning at eight o'clock he could be seen speaking with one or more kiyai over religious affairs."[81]

But priyayi such as Sutadiningrat were fast disappearing by the late nineteenth century and indeed this process was accelerated by the results of the Cilegon uprising.

Village and State

The secularization of the priyayi coincided with an increasing encroachment by the government on village life. This took many forms: the establishment of village schools, more effective policing, the expansion of administrative regulations affecting rural life and, above all, a more onerous and efficient system of tax collection.

The peasantry, already affected by the growing intrusion of the money economy, now found themselves taxed for a body of legislation whose purpose they neither understood nor accepted.[82]

Not only were taxes increased, but new taxes were introduced to substitute for the previously compulsory services the peasants had to render to local government, the so-called heerendiensten and pancendiensten.[83] Already, before the Ethical Policy, the government had introduced a new tax, the hoofdgeld or capitation tax in 1882, which contributed greatly to the rural discontent that preceded the Cilegon rebellion of 1888.[84] The capitation tax had been introduced to replace services formerly accorded to the priyayi. The introduction of such new taxes hastened the need for money in the countryside for, in essence, the new policies meant that 'cheap' services were replaced by 'expensive' taxes.[85] This is clearly illustrated in a report of the Regent of Pandeglang on guard duty in the villages at night. In the past, only the poor in the village had actually undertaken this duty, but when this 'compulsory service' was replaced by a tax, it hit all the villagers.[86]

The new taxes came at a time when agricultural resources generally in Java were becoming stretched. In the period 1871-1887, the total rice harvest on the island averaged 60,400,000 piculs (one picul = 137 lbs). By the decade 1914-1923, it had increased 32% to 78,880,000 piculs, but in the same period population had increased 80%. Average harvest per bau actually decreased from 25.1 piculs to 23.6 piculs, whilst average annual percentage of failed fields rose from 4.53% to 7.23%.[87] In a poor district like Banten, resources were even more

strained with average harvests amongst the lowest in West Java. By the 1920s, farming land in some parts of north Banten was rapidly occupying most of the land area. Moreover, many districts in the region - Serang, Pontang, Ciruas, Pamarayan, Cilegon, Anyer and Caringin - had become dependent on imports of foreign rice during the scarce season (paceklik) before harvest.[88] This economic deterioration coincided with greater demands by the colonial government on the peasantry.

The Ethical Policy heralded the power of the colonial state as a growing claimant on peasant resources. To the colonial government, fixed head taxes and fixed land taxes were preferable to a tax on actual income. Indeed, in times of economic crisis and depression, these taxes were more valuable to government than ones related to income.[89] By the turn of the century, the new capitation tax and the landrent were collected with a rigour and efficiency that was not possible in earlier times. The landrent was, it is true, tied to the annual harvest, but the capitation tax was fixed.[90] For an area like Banten, where harvests were subject to wide fluctuations, taxes could in certain years break the peasant household, falling as they did indifferently on rich and poor, in good years and bad. Their actual burden therefore fluctuated widely from one year to another.

The landrent, which was partly a land tax and partly a harvest tax, had been collected in Java since the time of Raffles.[91] It was based on per hectare assessments according to what was thought to be the average yield. Thus, the rich peasant paid the same proportion of the crop as the poor one, thereby threatening the livelihood of

the poor peasant far more than the rich one. Moreover, with few exceptions, the tax ignored the large variations in annual yield throughout Banten. Such variations might not be a disaster for the rich peasant, but the poor peasant might find that all his profits were absorbed in paying taxes. In principle, peasants were entitled to remission of the landrent if the harvest failed, but in practice they often lost this through the corruption of village heads or the neglect of the colonial administration.[92] If the harvest was merely mediocre, there was anyway no exemption and a peasant might find himself paying tax that was in effect twice the burden it would have been in a good season.

In Banten, government had been notoriously inefficient in the nineteenth century. Tax collection had been haphazard and village records, particularly in the south, were almost non-existent. But even in the Cilegon district of Serang regency, considerable areas of previously untaxed land were being uncovered by local officials as late as 1930.[93] But these days were passing and the early years of the century saw a dramatic rise both in the lands being assessed for taxes and in tax receipts from the landrent.[94] Gross landrent receipts in Banten amounted to 570,000 guilders in 1890 and had risen to 620,000 guilders by 1905, but in the same period the net landrent rose from 430,000 guilders to 585,000 guilders, an increase of 36%.[95] By 1911, the Dutch colonial administration had introduced a competent and exacting landrent assessment in the residency.

In addition to the landrent and capitation tax, the peasants were faced with a number of other onerous levies. Slaughter tax had to be paid on all animals killed. In the 1890s in Banten this had averaged 28,812 guilders per annum, but by 1905, as a result of

more efficient collection, this had risen to 51,823 guilders per annum.[96] By 1909, from this tax alone, the colonial administration received 59,825 guilders. From a tax on fishing, a further 44,471 guilders was netted.[97] There was also a tax on trading, the so-called bedrijfsbelasting.

Most of the former obligatory services had by the early twentieth century been replaced by new taxes. Some, however, remained, such as the repair of irrigation works which in 1919 still amounted to 20,000 work days in Banten.[98] The abolition of many others, such as the obligation to do road repairs and village guard duties at night, did not, however, directly benefit the peasantry. The obligation to repair roads had been replaced by a tax of 1.50 guilder per annum, which, by 1911, was bringing in 164,160 guilders in Banten, or a quarter of the total landrent in that year.[99] The Dutch saw the substitution of taxes for compulsory services as a progressive measure that would contribute to the 'defeudalization' of Javanese society. In reality, in a region like Banten, which had been poorly governed in the nineteenth century, the services were probably less of a burden than finding the money to pay new taxes.

Another burden the peasantry were forced to bear was the cost of the new village schools that began to develop after 1900 and which were to cause great resentment in the countryside. In many cases, valuable land had to be ceded, not only for the school building itself, but also for the maintenance of the teachers. But besides the economic cost of the schools, much disquiet arose in a profoundly Islamic area like Banten over the very idea of any sort

of education outside the traditional Muslim school the pesantren. Because of this, the teachers in the schools were for many years largely non-Bantenese.[100] Absenteeism was as high as 75% in many villages, for most peasants viewed the schools as at best an irrelevant expense and at worst something that was likely to incur the wrath of Allah.

These new taxes were particularly burdensome for the peasantry of a region like Banten, subject to wide fluctuations in the annual harvest. If half a crop was lost, taxes were in effect twice the burden they would have been in a good season. Moreover, the landrent - the main form of taxation borne by the peasantry - was administratively blind to the large variations in annual yield throughout the area. Remissions were not always easy to obtain and were only proportionate to the loss at best.[101] They took no account of the much reduced capacity to pay. The government was interested, above all, in constant, easily-administered revenue.

The spread of commercialization exemplified in Banten by coconut cultivation and labour migration, coupled with the increasing pressure of taxation, placed considerable strains on village life. Moreover, the fact that agricultural production was in general not keeping pace with population growth further added to the stress being felt in rural society. In time of relative economic prosperity, when copra prices were high and opportunities for work elsewhere plentiful, the situation was bearable and indeed profitable for many peasants. A slight economic down-turn, however, could throw the whole system out of balance.

FOOTNOTES

1. Memorie van Overgave (hereafter MvO) van den afgetreden Resident van Bantam, W.G. Thieme, June 1920, p. 1.

2. MvO, J.C. Bedding, March 1925, p. 22; Netherlands Indies, Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, Volkstelling 1930, Vol. I, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1933, pp. 60-63.

3. L.W.C. van den Berg, "Het Inlandsche Gemeentewezen op Java en Madoera", Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. LII, 1901, pp. 53, 60-61.

4. MvO, H.L.C.B. van Vleuten, May 1916, pp. 16-20; MvO, F.G. Putman-Cramer, March 1931, pp. 79-103.

5. MvO, J.S. de Kanter, May 1934, pp. 150-153.

6. Ibid., p. 151.

7. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, Batavia and Amsterdam: G. Kolff, 1936, p. 183.

8. Adatrechtbundels, Vol. XIX, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 17-19; MvO, de Kanter, 1934, pp. 53-54. On excessive demands of village heads, see Mimbar, 5 January 1920, and Pengharapan Banten, 1 December 1923.

9. Interview with Jaro Kamid, Serang, 9 June 1976. On such groups elsewhere in Java, see Onghokham, The Residency of Madiun: Priyayi and Peasant in the Nineteenth Century, Yale University

Ph.D. thesis, 1975, pp. 63-69 and his "The Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation into the Sources of the Brotodiningrat Affair", Ruth T. McVey, Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches through Local History, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 118-119; Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1968, pp. 85-86.

10. E.B. Kielstra, "Het Bantamsch Sultanaat", Onze Eeuw, Vol. 16, no. 10, 1916, p. 102.

11. T.S. Raffles, The History of Java, with an introduction by John Bastin, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 251.

12. Th.H.M. Loze, "Iets over eenige typisch Bantamsche Instituten", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, Vol. 23, no. 2, 1934, pp. 171-173; Anon, Djasa jang ta' diloepakan, Djakarta: Gunseikanbu Kokumin Tosyokyoku, 2604 (1944), passim.

13. R.A. van Sandick, Leed en Lief uit Bantam, Zutphen: W.J. Thieme, 1892, pp. 161-167; interview with Jaro Kamid, Serang, 5 June 1976.

14. Djasa jang ta' diloepakan, pp. 24-25.

15. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 113-142 is an account of Achmad Djajadiningrat's experiences as assistant wedana of Bojonegara, Serang regency, an area notorious for jawara. On

prostitution, see ibid., pp. 126-128 and Djasa, p. 10ff. Banten was known for its ronggeng troupes, groups of young women that toured villages with a small orchestra, dancing and offering their services.

16. MvO, Putman-Cramer, 1931, p. 54.

17. Interview with Jaro Kamid, Serang, 21 June 1976.

18. See P.M. van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian Problem, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949, passim and his Over het Bendewezen op Java, Amsterdam: N.V.F. van Rossen, 1949. For similar phenomena elsewhere, see E.J. Hobsbawm, Bandits, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, pp. 18, 24. For the participation of bandits in millenarian and revolutionary movements, see inter alia James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976, p. 124; Euclides da Cunha, Rebellion in the Backlands, trans. by Samuel Putnam, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944, pp. 149-152.

19. van Sandick, op. cit., p. 161ff.

20. De Courant, 4 March 1927.

21. Anton Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860-1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974, passim.

22. Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888. Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia, Verhandelingen, KITLV, No. 50, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 51-52, 61, 74-77, 111-134.

23. Anon, "De opstand en moord van Tjikandi-Oediek in 1845", Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie, Vol. 21, no. 3, 1859, p. 166.

24. L.W.C. van den Berg, De Inlandsche Rangen en Titels op Java en Madoera, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1902, pp. 17-21.

25. For the role of the ulama during the sultanate, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 92-94. In a speech in Serang in 1946, Kiyai Tubagus Haji Achmad Chatib, at the time Republican resident of Banten, referred to the priyayi as the "father of the people" and the ulama as "their mother". In the days of the sultanate the two were, he said, happily married but once the region had been colonized priyayi and ulama were divorced, thus causing the social unrest that plagued Banten in the colonial period, see Nasihat P.T. Kiai Residen dalam rapat Madjelis Oelama di ketjamatam Walantaka (Tjiroeas) tg. 7 Djuli 1946, (document in my possession).

26. W.R. Roff, "Southeast Asian Islam in the Nineteenth Century", eds. P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, The Cambridge History of Islam, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, Vol. II, pp. 171-172; Robert Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963,

p. 125; W.F. Wertheim, "De Indonesische Samenleving aan de vooravond van de Imperialistische Expansie: Configuraties en Stroomingen", Bijdragen en Mededeelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanders, Vol. 86, no. 1, 1971, pp. 21-25. Anon, "De Mohammedaansche Bedevaart", Orgaan van der Nederlands-Indie Politiek Economische Bond, 12, 19 and 26 July 1922. For the injunction to go on the pilgrimage, see The Koran, trans. with notes by N.J. Dawood, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1974, p. 416 (III, 93). "The first temple ever to be built for men was at Becah (Mecca), a blessed place, a beacon for the nations. In it there are veritable signs and the spot where Abraham stood. Whoever enters it is safe. Pilgrimage to the House is a duty to Allah for all who can make the journey." The pilgrimage is the fifth rukun or pillar of Islam; the others being the sjahdat, or declaration that there is no god other than Allah and Mohammed is his messenger, praying five times a day, fasting during the month of Ramadan and the payment of jakat - alms for the poor.

27. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, p. 152.

28. The high percentage of pilgrims from Banten continued in the twentieth century. Thus, in the years 1926-35, there was an annual average of 1,067 pilgrims from Banten out of a Java total of 4,990 per annum. The figure for Banten averaged 105 per 100,000 of population compared with 45 for West Java and 14 for East and Central Java. See Jacob Vredenbregt, "The Haddj", Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 118, no. 1, 1962, pp. 152-153.

29. See A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 157-158; R.A. Kern, De Islam in Indonesie, 's-Gravenhage: W. van Hoeve, 1947, pp. 51-60; C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the latter part of the 19th century: Daily life, customs and learning. The Muslims of the East-Indian Archipelago, Leiden and London: Brill and Luzac, 1931, pp. 219-292; see also the section on "Indonesia" in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. by H.A.R. Gibb, J.H. Kramers, E. Levi-Provencal, J. Schat and others, Leiden and London: Brill and Luzac, 1960, in progress, Vol. III, pp. 1227ff, and the section of the "Haddj" in Vol. III, pp. 31-38.

30. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen in Bantam", De Taak, 28 January 1922; R.A. Kern, "Advies inzake voorgenomen Bestuursreorganisatie van de Residentie Bantam", 24 August 1921, Mailrapport 2544/1921, Kern Collection H797, no. 55, KITLV, Leiden.

31. Vredenbregt, op. cit., p. 134; Soekasno, "Het particuliere crediet in den klapper en coprahandel in Bantam", Volkscredietwezen, Vol. 24, July-August 1936, pp. 406-407.

32. Vredenbregt, op. cit., pp. 127-129.

33. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 177; MvO, F.K. Overduyn, May 1911, p. 5.

34. Interviews with Kiyai Haji Tubagus Suhari Chatib, Serang, 27 November 1975 and Kiyai Haji Mohammed Rafiuddin, Pandeglang, 13 March 1976, who both described taijan as peculiar to Banten.

See also Vredenbregt, op. cit., p. 137; MvO, A.M. van der Elst, August 1937, p. 60; A.J.C. Krafft, "Bantam", Tijdschrift voor Economische Geographie, Vol. XIX, no. 12, 1928, p. 401. As Michael Lipton has noted, "Many superficially old village practices make sense as disguised forms of insurance", see his "The Theory of the Optimising Peasant", Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 4, 1969, p. 341.

35. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka, p. 222.

36. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 4 February 1922.

37. A. Djajadiningrat, "Het Leven in een Pesantren", Tijdschrift voor Binnenlands Bestuur, Vol. XXXIV, 1908, pp. 15-17; interview with G.F. Pijper, Amsterdam, 10 September 1974.

38. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka, pp. 289-290. On the expansion of contacts between Indonesia and Arabia in the late nineteenth century, see ibid., pp. 264-283.

39. See report of the Dutch vice-consul, unnumbered, 8 December 1931, "De Djawa-kolonie te Mekka" in the Gobée Collection H795, no. 23, KITLV, Leiden. This source estimates the total number of Indonesians resident in Mecca in 1930 at 4,829. Of these, 439 were Bantenese - 252 from Serang regency, 124 from Pandeglang and 63 from Lebak. No other residency on Java had more than 100 residents in the holy city with the exception of Bogor (109).

40. A. Djajadiningrat, "Het Leven in een Pesantren", pp. 1-23.

41. MvO, Bedding, 1925, p. 57; MvO, Putman-Cramer, 1931, p. 245.

42. On pesantren life generally, see K.A. Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Recente ontwekkelingen in Indonesisch Islamonderricht, Nijmegen University dissertation, Krips Repro Meppel, 1974, pp. 6-23, 99-218; Lance Castles, "Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor", Indonesia, No.1, April 1966, pp. 30-45; Kern, op. cit., 's-Gravenhage: W. van Hoeve, 1947, pp. 88-92. These remarks are also based on observations of life at the Al-Khairiyah pesantren, Citangkil, Cilegon.

43. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 20-24;
C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Brieven van een Wedono-Pensioen", Verspreide Geschriften, Bonn and Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder, 1924-26, Vol. IV, pp. 157-159.

44. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 22 and his "Het Leven in een Pesantren", pp. 7-8 where Djajadiningrat notes that in the subuh prayers at the mosque, praise was often said for the old sultanate, such as the following prayer, "Sultan of Banten, come, let us return to Kanari (a former residence of the sultans), Sultan of Banten, come, let us return to Kanari, return again to the alun-alun . . ."

45. A. Djajadiningrat, "Het Leven in een Pesantren", pp. 15-17.

46. On the 'Ethical Policy', see, inter alia, Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-45, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958, p. 34ff; Robert van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1960, p. 31ff;

George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952, pp. 15-22; Heather A. Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja: Java's Indigenous Administrative Corps and its Role in the Last Decades of Dutch Colonial Rule, Yale University Ph.D. thesis, 1973, p. 176ff; G. Gonggrijp, Schets eener Economische Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie, Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn, 1938, pp. 172-188.

47. In 1882 the number of villages in Java was 30,000; by 1902 this had declined to 27,000, by 1912 to 26,000 and by 1922 to 22,000. See J.W.M.R. (Meyer Ranneft), "Het Inlandsch Gemeentewezen op Java", Gedenkboek voor Nederlandsch Indie 1898-1923, Batavia: G. Kolff, 1923, pp. 77-80; W. Huender, Overzicht van den Economischen Toestand der Inheemsche Bevolking van Java en Madoera, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1921, p. 7.

48. Onghokham, Priyayi and Peasant, p. 292ff; MvO, J.A. Hardeman, April 1906, pp. 31-48.

49. J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957, p. 273.

50. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 104-138, 176-236.

51. On the evolution of the pangreh praja, see especially Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial Transformation of Javanese Priyayi, Singapore: Heinemann, 1979, passim.

52. There was a fourth regency, Caringin, absorbed into Pandeglang regency in 1906.

53. MvO, Overduyn, 1911, pp. 50-54.

54. MvO, van Vleuten, 1916, pp. 26-27.

55. Ibid., p. 58; MvO, B.L. van Bijlevelt, March 1918, pp. 5-10. Heather Sutherland, "Notes on Java's Regent Families", Part I, Indonesia, No. 16, October 1973, remarks that Banten "became a dumping ground for inadequate European officials and those who could pull no strings to avoid assignment there." p. 122.

56. MvO, van Bijlevelt, 1918, pp. 5-10.

57. Sutherland, "Java's Regent Families", p. 122; MvO, van Bijlevelt, p. 7, who calls Hardeman "a unique figure in the history of the Binnenlands Bestuur". On Achmad Djajadiningrat's relationship with Hardeman and Overduyn, see his Herinneringen, pp. 198, 249-251, 277.

58. Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja, pp. 45-47, 60-61.

59. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 4; Tubagus Roesjan, Sedjarah Banten, Djakarta: Arief, 1954, p. 44.

60. Roesjan, Sedjarah Banten, p. 45.

61. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 110.

62. Roesjan, Sedjarah Banten, p. 44.

63. Multatuli (Eduard Douwes Dekker), Max Havelaar; or The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company, ed. and trans. by Roy Edwards, London: Heinemann, 1967, passim.

64. MvO, Overduyn, 1911, Appendix I, p. 3.

65. Roesjan, Sedjarah Banten, p. 45; A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 111; Ikhtisar Keadaan politik Hindia Belanda Tahun 1839-48, Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1973, p. xv.

66. van Sandick, op. cit., pp. 14-15; Roesjan, Sedjarah Banten, pp. 48, 52; Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, p. 86.

67. Roesjan, Sedjarah Banten, p. 49.

68. Cornelis Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel en Kolonie Baten: De Nederlandse Exploitatie van Java 1840-1860, Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1975, pp. 29-31.

69. Multatuli, op. cit., p. 238.

70. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Bureaucracy and Aristocracy: The Indonesian Experience in the XIXth Century", Archipel, no. 7, 1974, p. 164.

71. Sutherland, "Java's Regent Families", p. 126.

72. See Tubagus Roesjan, "Dialek Djawa Banten", Medan Bahasa, 1956, pp. 14-19; Mas Mangundikaria, Bantensch-Javaansch Dialect, Batavia: Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wettenschappen, 1914, passim; H. Djajadiningrat,

"Iets over Banten en de Banteners", Handelingen van het Eerste Congress voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Java, Weltevreden: Albrecht & Co., 1921, pp. 320-322.

73. van Sandick, op. cit., p. 13.

74. MvO, Hardeman, 1906, p. 6; see also C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Mededeeling over Komedie Djawa in Banten", Notulen van de Algemene en Bestuursvergadering van het Koninklijke Bataviaasch Genootschap voor Kunsten en Wetenschappen, Vol. 31, 1893, pp. 46-48.

75. Th. Pigeaud, Javaanse Volksvertoningen: Bijdrage tot de Beschrijving van Land en Volk, Batavia: Volkslectuur, 1938, pp. 124-126, 247-248; A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 127-129.

76. James C. Scott, op. cit., pp. 233-237.

77. Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja, passim; Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Bureaucracy and Aristocracy", pp. 151-168; D.H. Burger, Structural Changes in Javanese Society: The Supra-Village Sphere, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1956, passim; Sutherland, "Java's Regent Families", pp. 113-148; B. Schrieke, "The Native Rulers", Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part One, The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, pp. 167-200; see also his "Excursus: The Position of the Regents from the days of the Dutch East India Company to the Constitutional Regulation of 1854", in ibid., pp. 201-224.

78. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Sociological Aspects of Political Development in Underdeveloped Countries", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. V, no. 4, 1955-56, p. 16.

79. Sutherland, "Java's Regent Families", p. 125.

80. Harry J. Benda, "The Structure of Southeast Asian History: Some Preliminary Observations", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 3, no. 1, March 1962, p. 126.

81. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 25. Until late in the nineteenth century, it was still common for at least some of the sons of priyayi to attend pesantren. Thus, Achmad Djajadiningrat and his cousin, Mohammad Isa, attended pesantren. Mohammad Isa went on to become penghulu of Serang and first President of the Court for Islamic Affairs (Mahkamah Islam Tinggi). This pattern was fast disappearing, however.

82. As Meyer Ranneft noted, "A great difficulty lies in the striking but important fact that from the population itself not the slightest initiative was forthcoming", op. cit., p. 80.

83. On the development of taxation in Indonesia, see Huender, op. cit., pp. 143-203. For some of the reactions this provoked amongst the peasantry, see The Siauw Giap, "Het verzet van de Bevolking tegen het Nederlandse Bestuursmaatregelen 1870-1914", Bijdragen en Mededeelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis van de Nederlanders,Vol. 86, no. 1, 1971, pp. 70-78; also his "The Samin and Samat Movements in Java: Two Examples of Peasant Resistance", Revue du Sud-Est Asiatique, 1967, 67:2,

pp. 303-310 and 1968, 68:1, pp. 107-113 and "The Samin Movement in Java: Some Complementary Remarks", Revue du Sud-Est Asiatique, 1969, 69:1, pp. 63-77.

84. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 62-63; F. Fokkens, Eindrésumé van het bij Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indie van 24 Juli 1888 no. 8 bevolen Onderzoek naar de Verplichte Diensten der Inlandsche Bevolking op Java en Madoera, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1901-1903, 3 Vols., 5 parts, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 17-30. When it was introduced, the hoofdgeld was one guilder per able-bodied man aged between 15 and 50. By 1914, however, it had risen to 2.50 guilders, MvO, van Vleuten, 1916, p. 9.

85. The Siauw Giap, "Het Verzet", p. 72.

86. MvO, Putman-Cramer, 1931, pp. 100-103.

87. D.M.G. Koch, Om de Vrijheid: De Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesie, Djakarta: Yayasan Pembangunan, 1950, p. 9.

88. P.A. Schat, Bantam's Individualiteit: Aspecten van een Achtergebleven Gebied, University of Utrecht doctorandus thesis, 1960, p. 189.

89. See the discussion in James C. Scott, op . cit., pp. 8, 92-111. For the influence of land taxes on the Saya San revolt in Burma in 1930, see ibid., pp. 99-101 and on the Vietnamese Communist revolt of the same year, pp. 132-136.

90. Eindrésumé, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 17-20.

91. On the collection of landrent in the nineteenth century, see Anon., "Belastingen, leveringen en verplichte diensten", Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie, November 1872, II, pp. 350-373. This article formed part of a series published separately in 1871 as Het Onderzoek naar de Rechten van den Inlander op den Grond in de Residentie Bantam, Batavia, 1871.

92. For examples in Banten, see Neratja, 1 July 1920.

93. MvO, de Kanter, 1934, p. 27.

94. MvO, Hardeman, 1906, p. 38.

95. Ibid., p. 80.

96. Ibid., p. 38.

97. MvO, Overduyn, 1911, p. 76.

98. Huender, op. cit., p. 158.

99. MvO, Overduyn, 1911, p. 78.

100. MvO, Hardeman, 1906, p. 54; MvO, Overduyn, 1911, pp. 100-102; MvO, van Bijlevelt, 1918, p. 12; see also "Verslag over het bezoek aan volks en vervolgschoolen in de Residentie Bantam", Appendix to MvO, Thieme, 1920.

101. See Algemeen Verslag over het jaar 1889 and Residentie Bantam-Algemeen Verslag van het jaar 1896, National Archives , Jakarta 13/19 and 590/19; MvO, Hardeman, 1906, pp. 34-36.

CHAPTER 3

RELIGION AND POLITICS

Aftermath of the Cilegon Revolt of 1888

During the nineteenth century, Banten was one of the most restless areas of Dutch-ruled Java. In the period 1810-1870 alone, no fewer than 19 uprisings are recorded to have taken place, making rebellion "not sporadic but general, endemic and symptomatic for its society."[1] These uprisings were, for the most part, short-lived and localised affairs. Some, however, such as the Cilegon uprising of 1888, had a wider regional base. As social movements, all the uprisings lacked what some writers have termed 'modern' features, such as organization or nationwide or even regional agitation.[2] The peasants did not know what they were fighting for other than a vague desire to overthrow the government and rid themselves of the infidel.

The leadership of these rural revolts was in nearly all cases in the hands of dispossessed nobility and the religious leaders. Local strongmen, bandits or jawara also played prominent roles. The tension between the traditional powerholders in the villages - former nobles, the religious elite and the jawara - and the Indonesian administration, the pangreh praja, was especially acute. The latter were regarded as 'nouveaux arrivés' in two senses. Firstly, they had not been the traditional rulers under the sultanate prior to its annexation in 1808 and, secondly, very many of them were strangers to Banten, having been brought there by the Dutch colonial administration. That they served an infidel government, a government regarded with an attitude of disrespect, contempt and even defiance, further undermined the legitimacy of the native administration. In

the last resort, one of the few means open for reacting against the colonial order was to mobilize the peasantry and rise in revolt.

The Banten nobility kept the memory of the sultanate alive after the Dutch annexation in 1808. A figurehead sultan, Mohammad Rafiudin, was allowed to remain as nominal ruler until 1832 when the Dutch finally abolished the post. As a final humiliation for the nobility, the stones of the old kraton in Banten were removed and used for building the prison in Serang. Despite this, the nobility was still thought worthy of the political loyalty of the Bantenese. In fact, the Banten nobility was of higher standing than the pangreh praja, who did not enjoy the high regard of the population. One of the chief sources of discontent and resentment was the deprivation of the old Banten aristocracy, whose memory of past glory was still vivid. The sultanate remained an important symbolic beacon for every revolt in Banten well into the twentieth century.

The enduring social and political unrest which plagued Banten revealed the painful fact that the civil servants were not in any way the real leaders of the people. The popular hatred for the Bantenese civil servants was almost as intense as the hostility to the foreign rulers. Ironically, those priyayi who were nearest the people and the ulama were regarded with deep suspicion by the Dutch for displaying too great a religious zeal. Dutch suspicions were deepened by the involvement of some serving or former officials, always Bantenese, in the conspiracies and revolts which were so endemic in Banten's nineteenth century history. In the Haji Wachia revolt of 1850, the chief instigator was Raden Bagus Djajakarta, the

Patih of Serang. A native Bantenese with a strong local background, Raden Djajakarta had been twice passed over in appointments of regents and felt particularly aggrieved that on the death of his father, R.A.A. Mandura Radja Djajanegara, Regent of Serang from 1840 to 1849, an outsider, Tjondronegoro, was appointed Regent. In the same year, another non-Bantenese, R.T. Kusumanegara, was appointed Regent of Caringin in succession to his father, R.T.A. Wiriadidjaja.[3] The revolt that followed lasted three months and was only suppressed by the authorities taking stern measures, and by the exiling of Raden Bagus Djajakarta to Menado. In the Kolelet conspiracy of 1866 a former Wedana of Baros in Serang regency, Mas Sutadiwiria, was involved in an attempted revolt, in which the former Regent of Pandeglang, R.A.A. Natadiningrat was also implicated.[4] In 1869, the retired Patih of Lebak, Tubagus Djajakusuma, and the Wedana of Tanara, Serang regency, Mas Sadik, also planned a revolt against the Dutch authorities.[5]

Several officials were involved in the revolt in Cilegon in July 1888, including a number of religious officials or penghulu such as Haji Tubagus Mohammed Arsad, the chief penghulu of Serang regency, Haji Tubagus Kusen, penghulu of Cilegon and Haji Achmad, penghulu of Tanara. Moreover, a number of other priyayi knew of the revolt beforehand but allegedly made no effort to inform the Dutch authorities.[6] As the government itself recognized in its report on the 1888 revolt, one of the factors contributing to it was the presence and behaviour of outsiders appointed to positions in the Banten administration. In particular, Raden Penna, the Patih of Anyer, was singled out for mention. He had been born and brought up in Batavia and by all accounts was a thoroughly Westernized

Indonesian who made no attempt to conceal his contempt for what he considered the fanatical Bantenese. As a result of the revolt, he was retired early.[7] At the same time, the government also retired the Regent of Serang, R.A.P. Gondokusumo, because he was alleged to have been forewarned of the revolt and to have entertained too close relations with members of the old nobility and with the ulama.[8]

The Cilegon revolt of 1888 was by far the most serious uprising in Banten in the second half of the nineteenth century. The revolt itself was the culmination of a rebellious movement which for many years had been working above and below the surface. Much of the religious elite in the Anyer division (afdeling) of Serang regency was involved, together with many former nobles. The uprising was marked by attacks on civil servants, Dutch and Indonesian, and by the destruction of official documents and premises. In the course of the insurrection, which broke out on 9 July 1888, 17 government officials and members of their families, including the Assistant Resident of Anyer, J.H.H. Gubbels, were killed.

The revolt was suppressed by the government over the following three weeks and its leaders arrested or killed. According to official reports, 204 men were arrested, of whom 94 were later released; 89 were condemned to forced labour for between five and 20 years, and 11 were sentenced to death.[9] A further 30 rebels were killed in the course of the fighting.[10] In addition, another 94 men were exiled to Christian areas of the Dutch East Indies, such as Ambon, West Timor and Menado. Of this group, 43 were haji, whilst 19 of the exiles were religious teachers.[11]

The Cilegon uprising of July 1888 was a watershed both for the Dutch colonial administration and for the priyayi in Banten. It was to lead to a significant hardening of Dutch attitudes towards the religious elite and also introduced an air of suspicion in Dutch policy vis-a-vis the Banten pangreh praja. This was fuelled by the fact that there was evidence that some native Bantenese officials had foreknowledge of the revolt.[12] The priyayi increasingly found themselves caught between two fires, on the one side the Dutch administration saw in every civil servant who paid too much attention to religious practices a sign of fanaticism and disloyalty, and on the other the peasantry and the ulama and the old nobles regarded the priyayi more and more as servants of the infidel.

After the Cilegon affair, the priyayi feared nothing so much as being identified as '<u>fanatiek</u>' so that the status of civil servant seemed to many to be incompatible with being a good Muslim. The hunt for 'fanatics' in the post-rebellion period led to the development of an attitude amongst most officials of subservience and lip-service to their Dutch superior officers and to a general air of distrust in the relationship between the priyayi and the Dutch. The frequent lack of cooperation and rapport between the Dutch and the pangreh praja after 1888 was gravely to impair the proper functioning of the administration.[13] Within the ranks of the pangreh praja, things were little better with a marked division between Bantenese and non-Bantenese, which was to grow in the coming years.

The slaughter of 17 persons during the 1888 uprising, eight of them Dutch, was to have a profound impact on the Dutch community throughout Java. For decades to come, Banten for the Dutch was a

byword for religious fanaticism.[14] It was regarded as one of the most difficult postings in Java and was frequently seen by both Dutch and Indonesians sent to serve there as a signal that the higher echelons of the Binnenlands Bestuur in Batavia did not regard them highly, or even as a punishment. Despite the enormous expansion in government at the turn of the century, the European community in Banten remained small; in 1913, it numbered 537.[15] Frequently wives refused to accompany their husbands to postings in the region, preferring to live in the comfort of Batavia. Because of the economic backwardness of the region, there were few planters or traders there such as those in nearly every other residency of Java. Social life for Dutchmen in Banten was therefore remarkably bleak and contributed to the bitter antipathy many of them felt towards the region and its inhabitants. Banten induced in many Dutchmen a feeling of profound alienation that was unparalleled in their previous experience in Indonesia. The isolation of the district from the rest of Java increased this anomie. The bitterness of the average Dutch civil servant towards the Bantenese was tempered, however, for many years by a more astute Islamic policy on the part of the government.

This policy has largely been associated with the arrival in Indonesia in 1889 of Christian Snouck Hurgronje as Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs.[16] Snouck tried to introduce some rationality into the Dutch government's policy towards Islam and argued that the enemy of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia was not Islam per se, but Islam as a political doctrine. A distinction had to be made, Snouck contended, between religion and politics. However, for the less tutored colonial officers in charge of the day

to day running of affairs, this was often a distinction they failed to make. Moreover, to most Bantenese ulama too it was an unacceptable distinction, for they saw their faith as universalistic and did not recognize the existence of independent secular realms of life.

Snouck believed the future of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia rested on the pursuit of an assimilationist policy through which the native elite would be coopted into seeing its own future as irretrievably entwined with that of the Dutch. He was therefore a firm believer in the spread of the Dutch language and of Western education generally. Young priyayi should be removed at an early age from what he perceived as their stultifying Javanese background, sent to a Dutch family and receive European education. One of the first examples of this was the 'adoption' of the young Achmad Djajadiningrat. After his early education in a pesantren, Achmad was sent by Snouck Hurgronje to lodge with a Dutch family in Batavia. Here he attended first the Dutch primary school, where he was known as 'Willem van Banten', and then the Hoogere Burgerschool (HBS - Dutch High School). He would have proceeded to a university in the Netherlands had it not been for the death of his father, R.T. Djajadiningrat, Regent of Serang (1893-1899) in 1899. His younger brothers, Hasan, Hoesein and Lukman were also to receive a similar education. Hoesein Djajadiningrat was to be the first Indonesian to receive a doctorate from Leiden University in 1913.[17]

The policy that Snouck Hurgronje and the Office for Native and Islamic Affairs (Kantoor voor Inlandsche en Mohammedaansche Zaken) pursued from 1889 was one of seeking a modus vivendi with a section

of the religious elite, in return for governmental non-interference in religious matters, obtaining from them acquiescence in Dutch rule of Indonesia. At the same time, they sought to draw the priyayi even closer to the Dutch in a common identity of interests. This policy was regarded by the more conservative members of the European Civil Service (Binnenlands Bestuur) as not only 'progressive' but as undermining their own position, and the two frequently came into conflict.

The years following 1888 were marked nevertheless by a sharp deterioration between the ulama on the one hand and the priyayi and Dutch colonial administration on the other. Government supervision of the ulama and, in particular, the pesantren and the haj increased.[18] Pesantren were placed under strict observation and all kiyai had henceforth to obtain a permit from the government before being allowed to teach. At the same time, the Dutch were beginning to establish secular schools on Java; a development seen by the ulama as being an attempt to undermine Islam and their own influence in the villages. The spread of railways, telegraph and later telephone networks, the growth of the cities and the development of some industry, were all viewed with the greatest misgivings by the ulama. They sensed that momentous events were taking place in Indonesian society and they had completely lost control of being able to direct this new world. The ulama, at least in Banten, were unreservedly tied to traditional Muslim values and norms, whilst the priyayi were tools of a colonial power that seemed increasingly bent on introducing a secular regime.

Restrictions on the pilgrimage to Mecca were greatly resented. An ordinance requiring the examination of returned haji was withdrawn in 1902, but the stipulation that every would-be pilgrim had to show that he had sufficient funds - a minimum of 500 guilders - was withdrawn only in 1905. Further restrictions followed in the 1920s with measures requiring the possession of a return ticket to Mecca and provisions for the colonial government to refuse a passport to those whom it considered to be journeying to Mecca for the purpose of political agitation.[19] But even more objectionable to the ulama was government interference in Islamic education. Already after 1888 measures were taken to tighten up supervision of the pesantren. Religious education was further restricted by the promulgation of a decree in 1905 which stated that the written permission of a regent or wedana was needed before an ulama could start teaching. Furthermore, every religious teacher had to specify exactly the nature of the education taught in his school and supply the authorities with a list of the pupils.[20] Periodic inspection of the pesantren by officials also took place. Many pesantren, however, did not keep written lists of pupils, whilst the vast majority of ulama did not know Roman script. Leaving the execution of the decree to the native administrative corps meant too that in many cases for personal reasons the latter might refuse to grant permission. It was to be a grievance for many years, and one which both the Sarekat Islam and the Indonesian Communist Party were later to exploit. The ulama were particularly incensed that the inspection of the pesantren was carried out by an increasingly Westernized priyayi.[21]

The revolt of 1888 in Cilegon accelerated the process of secularization of the native civil service corps and their growing

alienation from the Muslim community in Banten. The pangreh praja were losing touch with the peasantry and the ulama alike. In an effort to allay Dutch suspicions of religious zeal and fanaticism in their ranks, they had become more and more Westernized in language, clothes, custom and life style. To most Dutchmen, this was symbolic of the 'progress' and 'modernization' of native Indonesian society, but to the more observant it was symptomatic of the growing rift between religious and secular elites which was to have portentous consequences for the future. This was clearly seen by Snouck Hurgronje who in the 1890s made frequent visits to Banten. He recorded his observations in a series of articles which appeared in the Semarang newspaper, De Locomotief, in 1891-92 and were later published as "Brieven van een wedono-pensioen" (Letters from a retired wedana).[22]

Carefully not mentioning Banten by name in the articles, Snouck noted that the knowledge of most priyayi on religious matters was already remarkably deficient, and warned that fairly soon their knowledge would hardly be better than their Dutch counterparts.[23] Not that this concerned the average Dutch colonial civil servant; indeed, he was more concerned when his Indonesian 'younger brother' said his prayers too regularly or abstained from alcoholic drink, for such were surely signs of religious fanaticism.[24] The priyayi for their part were keenly aware that if they were deemed to be 'fanatiek', their chances of promotion and advancement were minimal. The numbers of priyayi who neglected their religious duties was growing. Snouck's retired wedana lamented,

> "As priyayi we are all forced to adopt European ways, independent of our own desires; if our advice is asked, then we know only too well that this is only out of custom and politeness . . . The native heads have become mere civil servants; secular education, the many ordinances and regulations, which we must know and the adoption of a European life style has meant that we are more and more removed from the life of the ordinary Indonesian."[25]

In secret reports to the government, Snouck was even blunter.[26] In 1892, he complained to the Governor-General, C. Pijnacker-Hordijk, that the standard of Dutch and Indonesian administration in Banten was far below that in other regions of Java.[27] The distrust of Dutch civil servants towards the priyayi was so great that the latter judged it of cardinal importance for their careers to eschew any evidence of frankness or indepedent thinking. This position existed elsewhere on Java, but in Banten where it should be better, it was worse. The Bantenese were far more critical and independent of their officials precisely because "they are not blinded by centuries-old traditions of deference".[28] Many lower priyayi had become particularly insensitive to traditional Muslim values. Those priyayi who still kept to the religious obligations of Islam did so often in an almost secretive manner. Such was the state of affairs that when J.A. Hardeman arrived in Banten in 1895 to take up his post as Resident, he was asked by the Regent of Serang, R. Djajadiningrat, if it was alright for him to attend the Friday service in the mosque.[29]

The gap between priyayi and ulama was widening throughout Java, but it was especially great in traditionally orthodox regions like Banten.[30] At the pesantren in which he received his religious education in the 1880s, Achmad Djajadiningrat experienced much of the popular hostility towards the priyayi. One santri told him that he

would never be able to learn anything as his stomach was full of rice purchased with impure (haram) money. Both the Dutch and the priyayi were the subjects of jests and jokes by the santri and were frequently compared with comic figures from the classical wayang.[31] On another occasion, Achmad asked an older santri the meaning of Perang Sabil (the Holy War), only to receive the answer "try to get your father and the rest of your family out of the service of the infidel, if you succeed then you will have already carried out a Perang Sabil".[32] It is not surprising in such an atmosphere that the young priyayi was much shaken and disturbed. When he returned home, he felt ashamed that his parents belonged to the kaum menak (the aristocracy) that was ridiculed so freely by the other santri.

Despite the failure of the 1888 revolt, the years following saw no diminution of the religious zeal of the Bantenese or of the wide gulf between the Dutch and the priyayi on one side and the religious elite and the peasantry on the other. Reports in 1890 and 1891 detected an increased religious ardour and noted,

> "The extraordinary zeal with which the population fulfilled their religious obligations . . . their bearing with regard to the government, is marked above all by passive resistance and sullen mistrust."[33]

The number of Bantenese undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca increased greatly in the 1890s, as is clear from the following table:

Table XVI

Number of pilgrims from Banten 1885-1896

1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896
98	94	59	165	135	588	392	747	603	579	931	827

Source: Algemeen Verslag Residentie Bantam (National Archives, Jakarta), 1888, 1889, 1890, 1891 and 1896

Both the Dutch and priyayi viewed this increase with alarm and feared that it portended another uprising. The government, Achmad Djajadiningrat noted "saw in every Muslim scholar (kiyai) an enemy."[34]

In this atmosphere, the smallest incident often caused the Dutch to panic and take hasty action. Thus in 1894 a Haji Moechamad Saleh of the village of Mantere near Rangkasbitung was exiled by the government to the island of Ambon in Eastern Indonesia. Haji Saleh, who had a great following in the village, made a living from selling jimat (amulets) and was alleged to have supernatural powers. He had told his followers that an uprising was imminent, that the Dutch would be driven out and that he would be proclaimed Sultan of Banten.[35] Three years later, in 1897, a further arrest and exiling took place in the Rangkasbitung area when a certain Kiyai Abdoelhamid was banned, "since he propounded the pernicious and inflammatory idea that the payment of taxes was haram."[36] In 1901, letters were discovered circulating in the regency of Serang proclaiming that the day of judgement, the kiyamat, was at hand. These letters were alleged to have been written by the Sharif of Mecca. Extraordinary

happenings such as war, heresy and the repression of the people were predicted. The situation would only be rectified by the arrival of the Mahdi, who would form the Islamic state.[37] The letter went on to condemn the practices of money-lending, drinking and gambling. A quick intervention, however, by the newly-appointed Regent of Serang, Achmad Djajadiningrat, prevented the incident from developing into anything more serious.

Writing on his retirement in April 1906, the Resident of Banten, J.A. Hardeman, voiced the fear that contempt for Dutch authority was on the increase and the possibility of open resistance to the government could not be ruled out.[38] One saving grace in the situation, however, Hardeman felt, was the incorporation of a section of the religious elite into the government, the penghulu or religious functionaries.[39] These were usually haji appointed to maintain the mosques in every district, to perform ceremonies such as marriages and burials and act as general religious advisers to the administration. Many penghulu were said to charge exorbitant fees for their services and as such were disliked by the peasantry. Peasants would sometimes take common law wives rather than formally marry because of this.[40] The penghulu were closely identified with the colonial regime and the majority of Bantenese ulama viewed them with suspicion and hostility.[41] An indication of this hostility is given by Achmad Djajadiningrat in his memoirs. A young kiyai had placed a notice over the local mosque, "Cabah alqoeroed wala cabah, aloedjroed" - better the morning greeting of an ape than the morning greeting of a beardless man - a reference to the adoption by the penghulu of the Westernized ways of the priyayi. For so doing, the young kiyai nearly earned himself an exile on some remote Christian island.[42]

Many of the penghulu were in fact from distinctly priyayi backgrounds. Amongst the most famous was Raden Mohammed Isa, a cousin of Achmad Djajadiningrat and grandson of R. Natadiningrat, Regent of Pandeglang (1849-1870).[43] He had attended the same pesantren as Achmad, and had later been sent to Mecca, where he studied for many years under the supervision of his uncle, Raden Aboebakar. The latter was an official (drogman) at the Netherlands consulate in Jeddah. After seven years' study, he returned to Banten in 1896 and was appointed penghulu for the politically sensitive district of Cilegon, a post he held for a quarter of a century. His knowledge of Islam was said to be second to none and he was the only penghulu in Banten to be called kiyai, an appelation never usually bestowed on a penghulu in the region.

Mohammed Isa was very close to Achmad Djajadiningrat and Snouck Hurgronje and was therefore a vital link between the ulama of Banten and the government. He was thought by some to be responsible for the fact that for many years there was no serious uprising that could be compared with 1888. He spent much of his time in debate with the ulama of the region, trying to persuade them that the Dutch government had the best interests of the inhabitants at heart and was strictly neutral in religious matters. Isa argued that the actions of Haji Wasid, leader of the 1888 revolt, should be considered as haram as it was equivalent to suicide. In 1908, Kiyai Tubagus Suhari of Cibeber, near Cilegon, organized a meeting which lasted for four days and to which some 25 Bantenese kiyai were invited to discuss with Mohammed Isa the question of the government's position towards Islam and the doctrine of the Jihad or Perang Sabil (Holy War).[44] Mohammed Isa argued that the holy war was only justified if it was

waged against the harbi, ie. those who wanted to destroy Islam; the forces of Islam must be strong enough to win the battle; the appropriate weapons must be available and there must be suitable finance. He contended that none of these conditions were present in 1888 and that "the greatest holy war is that against the bad inclinations in ourselves."[45]

Despite Isa's work on the government's behalf, however, Haji Wasid remained a hero in the eyes of the population of Cilegon and Banten generally, as Hasan Djajadiningrat, the younger brother of Achmad, observed,

> "outwardly they may disapprove of Haji Wasid's rebellion, yet inwardly they still regard him, years after the 1888 affair, as having fallen in the cause of Islam . . ."[46]

The ulama remained a rallying point for all forces of discontent and the idealization of revolutionaries such as Haji Wasid became a popular tradition. Nevertheless, the actions and advice of Mohammed Isa, Achmad Djajadiningrat and Snouck Hurgronje did reduce political tension in Banten. Often, however, Achmad Djajadiningrat and Mohammed Isa found themselves in direct conflict with local Dutch officials. In June 1909 an article appeared in the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, probably written by Achmad Djajadiningrat himself, in which the writer warned that a new Assistant-Resident in Anyer, D. Heyting, was fanatically anti-Muslim and was undoing Isa's work.[47] The episode was to reveal something that was to become clearer in later years, namely the growing opposition felt by the Dutch colonial civil service (the Binnenlands Bestuur) towards the Office for Native and Islamic Affairs and their Indonesian protégés.

The Haji Jasin Affair of 1911

The political situation in Banten was greatly disturbed in 1910 by the return from Mecca of Haji Jasin, the son of Haji Wasid, the rebel leader of 1888. Haji Jasin had been taken to Mecca in 1890 as a child by his elder sister. He grew up in the Holy City and eventually became a religious scholar of some standing. Pilgrims from Banten inevitably visited him and many young men came to study with him, amongst them Kiyai Sjamaun, who was later to play a leading role in the revolution of 1945. Haji Jasin lived in the Jabal Qubeis quarter of the city and taught sometimes at the Masjid al-Haram. He was held in high regard by Bantenese pilgrims and many considered him as possessing supernatural powers. It was alleged that he would only return to Banten once he had mastered the art of invulnerability. He was also supposed to have told his students and visitors that the Dutch language, the Roman alphabet and trousers were all haram to true believers. Furthermore, no true believer would consider working for an infidel government.

Haji Jasin arrived at Tanjung Priok on 25 February 1910 with his two wives and 10 children. He stayed first with his elder sister, but then returned to his father's native village of Beji, in Bojonegara sub-district, near Cilegon. A large hajat (religious feast) was given in his honour by local kiyai and the Resident, F.K. Overduyn, was sufficiently alarmed to order a close watch to be kept on his movements. Overduyn and the Assistant-Resident of Anyer, Heyting, were further concerned that the Regent of Serang, Achmad Djajadiningrat, did not share their alarm and in December 1910 Overduyn wrote to the Governor-General, A.W.F. Idenburg, complaining

about the Regent's attitude. Achmad Djajadiningrat had told Overduyn that he did not consider Haji Jasin dangerous or harmful to public order. According to the Resident's informants, Haji Jasin had sought the advice in Mecca of Raden Aboebakar, Achmad Djajadiningrat's uncle, on whether he would be allowed to return to Banten. Overduyn strongly inferred in his report to the Governor-General that permission for Haji Jasin's return had been granted by Achmad Djajadiningrat through Raden Aboebakar.[48] Overduyn was further disturbed to learn that many hajat were being given for Haji Jasin, from which the penghulu were being deliberately excluded. At these feasts, many descendants of the 1888 rebels were present and spies reported a growing 'Arabic' influence in the villages. Haji Jasin was said to have spoken at great length about the battles the prophet Mohammed had fought before Islam had established itself in Arabia. Overduyn clearly felt that Achmad Djajadiningrat and Mohammed Isa had been guilty of minimizing the dangers presented by the return of Haji Jasin and suggested that Banten priyayi were still too afraid of the ulama.

Alarmed by what he perceived as a deteriorating security situation, Overduyn requested that the detachment of constabulary (Gewapende Politiedienaren) at Cilegon be increased from 22 men to 50 and that military exercises should take place in the countryside to intimidate the population. At the last hajat held in Haji Jasin's honour, over 60 haji had been present and rumours had already circulated of an imminent uprising. Moreover, Overduyn was worried because the government was at this time introducing a reassessment of the landrent which meant that far more people in the Cilegon

area would be taxed than was the case hitherto. The establishment of new government schools in the region was also causing grave disquiet amongst the ulama of Banten. Finally, most disturbing to Overduyn was the fact that Haji Jasin had made a trip to Labuan on a number of occasions to see the most influential Banten ulama of this period, Kiyai Haji Asnawi of Caringin.

An element of panic now descended on the Dutch administration of Banten. Overduyn was shortly to retire in May 1911 and he had no wish to see his last months in Banten blotted by major unrest. The armed police detachment at Cilegon was raised to 60 men and a telephone line hastily laid from Serang to Cilegon. Trains running through Cilegon on their way to Merak for the steamer to Sumatra were ordered to proceed at a faster rate for fear of ambush, and Overduyn asked permission to deal directly with the Indies Army Commander, van Daalen, in case of emergency. He wrote again to the Governor-General on 1 February 1911 warning of the danger of a "pan-Islamic upsurge and of a revival of the Oriental psyche" (sic) in Banten; this danger he saw as even more marked with the return of another Banten kiyai from a long exile in Mecca, Haji Achmad bin Abdoelkarim, the son of Kiyai Abdoelkarim, who had also played an important role as spiritual adviser of the 1888 revolt.[49]

In February 1911, Dr G.A.J. Hazeu, the Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs, who had replaced Snouck Hurgronje in 1907 on his retirement to the Netherlands, arrived in Banten to investigate the whole affair. He submitted a report to the Governor-General on 7 March.[50] Hazeu found that the 'hajiphobia' of the local Dutch administration and some non-Bantenese priyayi had led them greatly

to exaggerate the possibilities of another uprising. Haji Jasin had not done anything illegal despite the fact that "all his comings and goings were persistently and unremittingly observed by spies (so that) . . . he has been in a state of continual unrest".[51] Hazeu thought that much of the trouble had been caused by the Patih of Lebak, Mas Nitidiwiria, who had formerly been wedana of Cilegon, sending reports directly to the resident from his own informants in Cilegon and bypassing the Regent of Serang, Achmad Djajadiningrat. Mas Nitidiwiria was not a Bantenese but Minangkabau from West Sumatra, who, when he had served in Cilegon, pursued a policy of close supervision of the ulama in the area. Hazeu concluded that the affair really had its origins in the personal animosity of Mas Nitidiwiria for Achmad Djajadiningrat. He admitted, however, that Achmad had been negligent in not reporting Haji Jasin's return and its possible political repercussions to the resident earlier.

For his part, Achmad Djajadiningrat tried to put the record straight in a 48-page report in April.[52] In it he pointed out that Mas Nitidiwiria's main informant in the Cilegon area was Haji Mohammed Adra'i, a local penghulu, whose knowledge of Islam was limited and who was unpopular because he made a living as a moneylender. The regent recognized, however, that the notion of haram (areas forbidden by Islam) was far more widespread in Banten than elsewhere in Java;

> "Any right thinking Muslim who has made a serious study of his religion, feels in his heart that he should disapprove (of working for an infidel government). He understands, however, that force of circumstances makes this inevitable."[53]

Some general forms of religious practice, which to Dutchmen and non-Bantenese priyayi would seem to indicate fanaticism, are to Bantenese perfectly normal. The morning prayer, the Sasalawatan, often included prayers calling for a renewal of religious awakening, of hate for all things worldly and the glorifying of Allah. Each Friday the Imam closed his sermon with the prayer, "O Lord, destroy all unbelievers . . . and all who are enemies of the true faith." Finally, Achmad concluded by accusing the Patih of Lebak, Mas Nitidiwiria, of trying to engineer his downfall, just as R.A.P. Gondokusumo, the Regent of Serang, lost his job after the 1888 revolt.

Despite this attack on his position and his actions, Overduyn found consolation and justification in the fact that both Hazeu and Achmad Djajadiningrat admitted that the population of north Banten was still as implacably opposed to the government as ever.[54] In May Overduyn left for Holland on his retirement, but not before giving a prophetic warning that the priyayi of Banten had a dangerous tendency to overestimate their own powers over the peasantry and ulama.[55] Haji Jasin left Banten once again for Mecca in August 1912. He returned to Banten in December 1914, settling with his nephew Kiyai Sjamaun in the village of Citangkil, outside Cilegon. Here he became a kiyai establishing a small pesantren of his own, for which he was given permission by the authorities.[56]

The Haji Jasin affair contributed to a considerable deterioration of the political situation in Banten, despite the fact that little had come of the threatened revolt. There was a growing resentment within the Dutch colonial civil service against the Office for Native

and Islamic Affairs, which was seen as bypassing the European Civil Service and dealing directly with the local priyayi. There was also resentment against what were seen as the local protégés of the Office, Achmad Djajadiningrat and Mohammed Isa. The ulama, for their part, were growing increasingly restless with the tight political and police supervision to which they were subjected. The affair also revealed the deep divisions within the priyayi in the region, between those civil servants from Banten and those from outside, and emphasized the risks priyayi faced in being open and frank in the policy advice they gave. The general political deterioration caused by the affair led to great difficulties in resolving one of the most intractable legacies of the 1888 revolt - the question of political prisoners banned to remote locations in the Indonesian archipelago.

After the Cilegon uprising of 1888, a total of 94 persons were exiled from Banten.[57] Of this number, no fewer than 43 were haji and 19 were religious teachers. The rest (68) were largely peasants. The degree of involvement of many of them in the revolt was peripheral. Already in 1889 Snouck Hurgronje had drawn attention to this fact and pointed out that some peasants or haji had been detained simply because of old grudges borne against them by priyayi and their spies. The administration preferred to ban 10 men too many than one too less. Such measures invariably led to more discontent in the long run. Peasants were banned simply because they had attended one or another meeting organized by Haji Wasid, yet, "social relations of all sorts made it very difficult not to attend such meetings (at the village level) and it would take for an

Indonesian extraordinary courage to report such meetings to the government". Furthermore, Snouck was worried that the exiling of 'troublemakers' made many Bantenese peasants and ulama think the government was weak.[58]

Overduyn was succeeded as Resident of Banten by C.W. van Rinsum (1911-1913), who had started his career in Banten in the late 1880s as controleur in Cilegon.[59] His immediate chief, J.H.H. Gubbels, was killed by the rebels in 1888 and van Rinsum himself had played a considerable role in the suppression of the revolt. By 1912, most of the exiles still alive were already old men, often living in poverty-striken circumstances in the Christian areas of Menado (North Sulawesi), Ambon and West Timor. Cut off from their families, they had no means to support themselves in their old age. In August 1912, Achmad Djajadiningrat pleaded for their immediate repatriation to Banten on humanitarian grounds.[60] But sounding a note of caution over his handling of the Haji Jasin affair, he added, "it is not for me, however, to judge whether the abolition of this political measure will be dangerous or not for the public order in this residency."[61]

Van Rinsum argued against allowing the exiles to return, as after the Haji Jasin episode he did not feel he could guarantee political order in Banten. Most of the rebels were already regarded as heroes; many people had travelled to Kupang in Timor just to visit one of the main rebels, Haji Arsjad, and to allow the rebels to return now would only increase their prestige. The return of such persons would, van Rinsum contended, do no good to the already tense relations between the kiyai and the government.[62]

The 33 exiles still alive, with the exception of the most influential, were eventually allowed to return in batches of five. The first group returned in February 1913, but the others were forced to wait much longer.[63] Thirty years after the revolt, old men in their eighties were still petitioning the Governor-General for their return. The five who remained alive in 1918 were finally allowed to return home by a government decision of 11 February, with Achmad Djajadiningrat taking special responsibility for them.[64]

Both the Haji Jasin affair and the problem of the exiles from the 1888 revolt were purely local matters that nevertheless reveal something of the situation in Banten on the eve of the birth of Indonesian nationalism. The Dutch administration in the region regarded its position as being not unlike a man walking near a precipice. A wrong move could easily rekindle the fires of religious fanaticism. The priyayi saw themselves caught between two fires. On the one side, they sensed the omnipresent watch of their 'elder brother', the Dutch, and on the other they faced the unremitting hostility of the ulama. They were also forced to recognize reluctantly that the ulama's claim on peasant loyalties was already far stronger than their own. Dutch exploitation of factions and intrigues within the priyayi ranks further undermined the cohesion and morale of the corps. For their part, the ulama saw themselves and Islam as a religion as coming under attack in the twentieth century. The spread of secular education and restrictions on Islamic teaching drove large numbers of them into a position of hostility to the government. Fighting a rearguard action against the march of 'progress' and 'modernization', they were

ironically to turn for assistance to other symbols of modernity, the political parties, a development to which we shall now turn.

FOOTNOTES

1. Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888. Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia, Verhandelingen KITLV, No. 50, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, p. 6.

2. E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959, p. 6.

3. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 84-85, 88, 122-134. On social and political unrest in Banten in the nineteenth century, see also Anon., "Bantam vijftig jaren geleden", Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie, Vol. IV, no. 2, 1870, pp. 317-342; Anon., "De Opstand en Moord van Tjikandie Oediek in 1845", Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie, Vol. I, no. 1, 1859, pp. 139-168; Memorie van Overgave (hereafter MvO) van het Bestuur der Residentie Bantam, J.A. Hardeman, April 1906, pp. 6-17; MvO, F.K. Overduyn, May 1911, pp. 10-48; MvO, C.W.A. van Rinsum, April 1913, pp. 9-13; MvO, F.G. Putman-Cramer, March 1931, pp. 107-137.

4. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 129-230; A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, Batavia and Amsterdam: G.A. Kolff, 1936, pp. 111-113.

5. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 131-134, 266; Hamka, "Pemberontakan di Tjilegon (1888)", Dari Perbendaharaan Lama, Medan: Madju, 1963, pp. 84-94.

6. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 111-113.

7. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 88-89, 282; Hamka, op. cit., p. 88.

8. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, p. 290.

9. Ibid., p. 264.

10. For their names, see ibid., Appendix VII, pp. 339-340.

11. Ibid., Appendix VI, p. 332. See also the more detailed list in report of the resident of Banten, 2 January 1918, no. 4, in Besluit, 11 February 1918, 22, Archive of the Algemene Secretarie, National Archives, Jakarta. On the Cilegon revolt, see also Anon., "De wording en het verloop van de Tjilegonsche troebelen in 1888", De Indische Gids, no. 2, 1891, pp. 1137-1207.

12. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 233-235.

13. See especially the report of Snouck Hurgronje of 7 June 1889 in E. Gobée and C. Adriaanse, eds., Ambtelijk Adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje 1889-1936, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, Vol. III, pp. 1980-1986.

14. R.A. van Sandick, Leed en Lief uit Bantam, Zutphen: W.J. Thieme, 1892, pp. 5-10.

15. H.Th. Kal, "Eenige mededeelingen over Bantam", De Indische Gids, Vol. 36, no. 1, 1914, p. 20.

16. See E. Gobée's Introduction to Snouck's Ambtelijk Adviezen, Vol. I, pp. IX-XXI; Harry J. Benda, "Christian Snouck Hurgronje

and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia", Journal of Modern History, Vol. XXX, no. 4, 1958, pp. 338-348; also his The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958, pp. 18-30; Heather Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja: Java's Administrative Corps and its Role in the Last Decades of Dutch Colonial Rule, Yale University Ph.D. thesis, 1973, pp. 150-153; G.F. Pijper, Studien over de Geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia 1900-1950, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977, pp. 7-9; in the late 1930s, Achmad Djajadiningrat was engaged in writing a book, provisionally entitled "Snouck Hurgronje in Indie". Unfortunately, the manuscript was lost after his death in 1943 - interview with G.F. Pijper, 10 September 1974.

17. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, Critische Beschouwing van de Sadjarah Banten: Bijdragen ter Kenschetsing van de Javaansche Geschiedschrijving, Leiden University dissertation, 1913.

18. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, p. 157.

19. See Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, Singapore: Oxford University Press, East Asian Historical Monographs, 1973, p. 26; Jacob Vredenbregt, "The Haddj", Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 118, no. 1, 1962, pp. 98-99, 103; Pijper, Studien over de Geschiedenis van de Islam, p. 77.

20. Noer, op. cit., p. 175; H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen in Banten", De Taak, 18 February 1922; interviews with Kiyai Haji Tubagus Suhari Chatib, Serang, 27 November 1975 and Kiyai Haji Rachmat Sjamaun, Cilegon, 27 May 1976.

21. MvO, Hardeman, 1906, pp. 8-12.

22. C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Brieven van een Wedono-Pensionen", in Verspreide Geschriften, Bonn and Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder, 1924-26, Vol. IV, pp. 111-249; see also his reports on Banten in Gobée and Adriaanse, eds., Ambtelijk Adviezen, Vol. III, pp. 1980-2000.

23. Snouck Hurgronje, "Brieven van een Wedono-Pensioen", pp. 169-170.

24. Ibid., pp. 190-196; see also A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 145 on the spreading use of alcohol by priyayi.

25. Snouck Hurgronje, "Brieven van een Wedono-Pensioen", pp. 247-248.

26. See in particular Snouck Hurgronje's "Nota betreffende Bantensch toestanden", 15 August 1892, Gobée and Adriaanse, eds., Ambtelijk Adviezen, Vol. III, pp. 1986-1999.

27. Ibid., p. 1987.

28. Ibid., p. 1990.

29. MvO, Hardeman, 1906, p. 7.

30. Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja, pp. 120-122; A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 20-24.

31. A. Djajadiningrat, "Het Leven in een Pesantren", Tijdschrift voor Binnenlands Bestuur, Vol.XXXIV, 1908, pp. 16-17.

32. Ibid., p. 15.

33. Algemeen Verslag over het jaar 1890 voor het residentie Bantam and Algemeen Verslag 1891, Bantam 13/20, National Archives, Jakarta.

34. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 216.

35. Onderzoek naar de Mindere Welvaart der Inlandsche Bevolking op Java en Madoera, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1905-1914, Vol. 2, "Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de uitkomsten der onderzoekingen naar het Recht en de Politie", pp. 34-35.

36. MvO, Hardeman, 1906, pp. 13, 26.

37. Snouck Hurgronje, "Brieven van een Wedono-Pensioen", p. 183; A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen,pp. 195-198; Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 147, 167.

38. MvO, Hardeman, 1906, pp. 6-10.

39. See Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja, pp. 119-120; Pijper, Studien over de Geschiedenis van de Islam, pp. 63-96.

40. Snouck Hurgronje, "Brieven van een Wedono-Pensioen", pp. 227-228.

41. Report of the regent of Serang, No. 13/G, 8 April 1911, Mailrapport 1090/1911 in Verbaal 6 December 1911/31, Colonial Archives, The Hague. Documents in the Colonial Archives are gathered either in Mailrapporten or Verbalen. However, in some cases Mailrapporten are gathered inside a Verbaal.

42. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 216.

43. Ibid., pp. 252-253; A. Djajadiningrat, "Kenang-kenangan saja dimasa empat poeloeh tahoen jang laloe", 40 Tahoen Tjokoep Keradjaan Seri Baginda Maharadja Wilhelmina, Batavia: Balai Poestaka, 1938, pp. 16-18; G.F. Pijper, Fragmenta Islamica, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1934, pp. 139-140; see also Studien over de Geschiedenis van de Islam, p. 67; also interview with Mohammed Isa's son, Masduki Natadiningrat, Jakarta, 10 May and 22 May 1976.

44. Interview with Masduki Natadiningrat, Jakarta, 10 May 1976; Tubagus Haji Moesa, "Uit de Bantensche desa: Perang Sabil", Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 12 June 1909.

45. "Perang Sabil", Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 12 June 1909.

46. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 25 February 1922.

47. "Perang Sabil", Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 12 June 1909.

48. Overduyn to Governor-General, 30 December 1910, 324/G, Mailrapport 229/1911 in Verbaal 10 June 1911/5. The documents on the Haji Jasin affair are collected in this verbaal, as well as Verbaal 6 December 1911/31, Verbaal 15 May 1912/31 Verbaal 29 April 1916/83 and Verbaal 25 April 1917/4. See also K.H. Rahkmat Allah Sjamaun, Pahlawan Banten: Ki Syam'un, mimeo, n.p., n.d. and interview with the author, Cilegon, 17-18 May 1976.

49. Overduyn to Governor-General, 1 February 1911, 36/G, ZG, Mailrapport 262/1911 in Verbaal 10 June 1911/5. On the role

of Kiyai Abdoelkarim in the Cilegon revolt, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, p. 201.

50. G.A.J. Hazeu, Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs to Governor-General, No. 24, SG, 7 March 1911, Mailrapport 497/1911 in Verbaal 10 June 1911/5.

51. Ibid.

52. Report of the Regent of Serang, A. Djajadiningrat, No. 13/G, 8 April 1911, Mailrapport 1090/1911 in Verbaal 6 December 1911/31.

53. Ibid.

54. Overduyn to Governor-General, 29 April 1911, 158/G, ZG, Mailrapport 1090/1911 in Verbaal 6 December 1911/31.

55. MvO, Overduyn, 1911, p. 10.

56. Report of the Resident of Banten, van Vleuten, to Governor-General, 28 December 1914, 434/G, ZG, Mailrapport 198/1915 in Verbaal 29 April 1916/83; also report of the Regent of Serang, A. Djajadiningrat, 17 February 1916, 46/G, Mailrapport 672/1916 in Verbaal 25 April 1917/4 and MvO, H.L.C.B. van Vleuten, May 1916, p. 14.

57. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 344-347 and report of the resident of Banten, 2 January 1918, No. 4 in Besluit 11 February 1918, 22, Archive of the Algemene Secretarie, National Archives, Jakarta.

58. Report of 7 June 1889 in Gobée and Adriaanse, Ambtelijk Adviezen, Vol. III, pp. 1980-1986; also report of 14 March 1894, ibid., pp. 1924-1928.

59. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 209n., 244, 251, 268.

60. Report of the Regent of Serang, A. Djajadiningrat, 7 August 1912, 41/G, Besluit 8 February 1913, 11, National Archives, Jakarta.

61. Ibid.

62. Report of the Resident of Banten, van Rinsum 30 August 1912, 41/G, Besluit 8 February 1913, 11; on Haji Arsjad, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 193, 194n., 203, 206, 266, 290. He was chief penghulu for the regency of Serang at the time of the 1888 revolt.

63. MvO, van Rinsum, 1913, pp. 11-12; see also Mailrapport 360/1913 and Mailrapport 848/1914.

64. Besluit 11 February 1918, 22, National Archives, Jakarta.

CHAPTER 4

THE SAREKAT ISLAM

Early Political Movements in Banten

The Dutch government's Ethical Policy assiduously promoted after 1901, led to a rapid mushrooming of the branches of the colonial administration. In the period 1890-1920, services such as railways, post offices, schools, hospitals and rural banks multiplied enormously and with them the number of officials employed. Economic development and the growth of government brought in its wake increased social differentiation and a new class of officialdom who were certainly above the rakyat (people), but who were not quite the equals of the pangreh praja, the Javanese administrative corps. The growth of this new category of priyayi brought for some greatly increased possibilities of social mobility. At the same time, these 'new priyayi', precisely because many of them came from relatively humble backgrounds, were often the victims of discrimination. Many of them were likely to reject, or at least be critical of, established Indies society and were later to be eager recruits to the first political organizations that developed in the early decades of the twentieth century.[1]

In addition to the 'new priyayi', there was also the beginnings of a small Indonesian intelligentsia. Although for the most part this group came from pangreh praja backgrounds, they consciously rejected careers in the administrative service, preferring instead to seek employment in education, the nascent Indonesian press or in commerce. Because of this, they often tended to be more cosmopolitan and to mix freely with Chinese,

Arabs and Eurasian minorities. Even more than the 'new priyayi', they tended to be critical of the established order and its ways.

Banten was not immune from these developments. Although there were no substantial towns or cities in the region, relative to its size it did witness a growth in number of the 'new priyayi' in the early years of the twentieth century. This was especially the case in the three regency towns - Serang, Pandeglang and Rangkasbitung - and also to a lesser extent in the smaller towns of Cilegon, Anyer, Labuan and Menes. It is important to bear in mind, though, that even in 1930 Serang had a population of slightly less than 10,000 and was probably the smallest residency capital in Java. Against this, it also has to be recalled that Banten was less than 90 km from Batavia, the largest city in the Dutch East Indies and seat of the colonial government. Many Bantenese, finding limited opportunities for self-advancement in their own region, were able to move into these new social groups in the colonial capital.

The development of these new social groups was also fostered by the establishment of schools in the region. A 'First Class School", later to be replaced by the Dutch language medium HIS (Hollandsch-Inlandsch School - Dutch Native School), had been established in Serang in 1895 to offer rudimentary education in the vernacular and Malay to well-born children.[2] By 1911, three more 'First Class Schools' had been established at Cilegon, Rangkasbitung and Pandeglang.[3] In addition, two European primary schools (Europeesch Lagere School - ELS) were opened in Serang and Rangkasbitung. These schools were, as their name suggests, primarily intended for European children, Indonesian children only being allowed at the discretion of the local Dutch resident. As a

general rule, Indonesian children had to have a working knowledge of Dutch to enter the ELS and also pay fees, criteria which obviously favoured only the highest priyayi. In Banten, however, because the number of European children was very small, it was somewhat easier for children of priyayi to enter the ELS at Serang or Rangkasbitung than in other parts of Java. Indeed, one resident was to complain later that the ELS schools in Banten were European in name only. By 1930, as many as 76% of their pupils were Indonesian.[4] A further development was the establishment of an Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (OSVIA - Training School for Native Officials) at Serang in 1910, an administrative training school for sons of higher priyayi destined for the pangreh praja. The Serang OSVIA, only the second in West Java, the other being at Bandung,[5] drew its students from the Banten and Batavia residencies as well as Kalimantan.

The development of these new social groups coincided with the new atmosphere of the Ethical Policy which fostered liberal thinking in many areas. Many younger priyayi were greatly encouraged by the Ethical Policy. They saw in it proof that the government would move against the entrenched position of the hereditary regent families of Java. This growing desire of priyayi to advance their own interests was reflected in the founding in 1900 of the journal Pewarta Prijaji.[6] Associations of its readers soon appeared throughout Java, including Banten, where readers' circles were established in Serang and Rangkasbitung.[7] Editorship of the journal after 1901 was in the hands of Wahidin Soedirohoesodo, who was later to play a key role in the founding of Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour), an early political association.

Both Pewarta Prijaji and Budi Utomo, which was founded in 1908, had as their hallmarks the keypoints of Wahidin's political thinking, namely a strong emphasis on traditional Javanese culture at the expense of Islam and the positive acceptance of Western culture and education. Because of this, Budi Utomo was to have little influence on the strongly Islamic areas of Java. As Akira Nagazumi has noted, "The sphere of the Budi Utomo was reminiscent of the core region of the Javanese kingdom."[8] Outside of this sphere, Budi Utomo's influence was limited to the big towns of Java. Moreover, the fact that the organization was an extremely moderate grouping, at least in its early years, and enjoyed the confidence of the colonial government, alienated the more radical and Islamic elements in Indonesian society who were later to find other more appropriate political outlets.

Budi Utomo had few branches in West Java and none at all in Banten. Nevertheless, the Banten priyayi were not immune from the restlessness of their counterparts elsewhere. An association of Banten priyayi, Pirukun, was founded in 1907, a year before Budi Utomo, by Achmad Djajadiningrat, Regent of Serang, with the express purpose of improving communications between higher and lower priyayi and the cohesion of the priyayi in Banten as a whole.[9] Achmad Djajadiningrat was at this time one of the most progressive regents of Java and his standing is illustrated by the fact that he was consulted frequently by the founders of Budi Utomo.[10] Pirukun held social gatherings and lectures at its club in Serang and also had its own library. It established a nursery school for the children of priyayi so that they would learn Dutch an an early

age and thus be able to enter the European Lower School (ELS) and not the first class native school. A cooperative society was set up by Pirukun in Cilegon, although its membership was almost entirely priyayi.

The success of Pirukun had much to do with the same factors that promoted the growth of Budi Utomo. In addition, there were several local factors that aided Pirukun. Essentially, the organization was a grouping of native-born priyayi and few of the many priyayi from the Priangan serving in Banten joined Pirukun. The quarrel between Achmad Djajadiningrat and the Patih of Lebak, Mas Nitidiwiria, over the Haji Jasin affair had its origins in Pirukun, which the Patih refused to join.[11] At the same time, the overbearing attitudes of many officers of the European Civil Service (Binnenlands Bestuur) to their Bantenese counterparts contributed to the organization's success. Indeed Pirukun, like Budi Utomo, concerned itself more with relations between the priyayi and the Dutch rather than between the priyayi and the people.

Achmad Djajadiningrat was aided in founding Pirukun by one of his younger brothers, Hasan, who was to play a leading role in politics in Banten and Java until his death in 1920. Raden Hasan Djajadiningrat was born in 1883 and was the third son of Raden Tumenggung Djajadiningrat, Regent of Serang (1893-1899). After attending a native primary school in Menes, he was sent, like his elder brother Achmad, under the supervision of Snouck Hurgronje, to a Dutch primary school (ELS) in Batavia and then to the Gymnasium Willem III, the best high school in Indonesia at the

time.[12] At high school, Hasan was a fellow pupil and close friend of Eduard Douwes Dekker, later to be founder of the Indische Partij (the Indies Party), the first radical nationalist grouping in Indonesia. From 1904 to 1906, Hasan attended the Intermediate Agricultural School (Middelbare Landbouwschool) in Bogor (Buitenzorg). Returning to Banten, Hasan preferred not to enter government service, but earned his living from farming and journalism.[13] As a student, he had already become active in politics, joining the Islamic educational foundation set up by wealthy Batavia Arabs, Al Jam'iat al Chairiah.[14] This was the first organization in Indonesia run entirely on Western lines with statutes, chairman, secretary and treasurer and it concerned itself with establishing Islamic schools which combined religious education and Western education. In 1906, Hasan also joined the short-lived Sarekat Priyayi (Priyayi Association) founded by R.M. Tirtoadisurjo, the editor of Medan Prijaji.[15]

In March 1912, Hasan's schoolboy friend, Douwes Dekker, started a newspaper in Bandung, De Express, and a few months later established the Indische Partij. This was the first political movement in the Dutch colony that openly challenged the relationship between Holland and Indonesia and attracted great support from the Eurasian community in particular with its slogan of the 'Indies for those born in the Indies'. But the appeal of the Indische Partij was not limited to the Eurasian community in Indonesia, it also found considerable support amongst the emerging professional groups of Indonesian journalists and teachers and the 'new priyayi'.[16] Douwes Dekker embarked on a speaking tour of Java which drew wide attention to the party. As a result of a visit to Banten, branches

of the Indische Partij were established first at Rangkasbitung and then at Serang. Membership of both branches soon ran into the hundreds and included Eurasians, Chinese and many of the 'new priyayi'.[17] The slogan of equal rights for all inhabitants of Indonesia found as ready a response in Banten as elsewhere. Social gatherings and meetings were held to increase social intercourse between the previously distant racial groups.

At the same time, however, that the Indische Partij succeeded in appealing to all racial groups, it found no support in the orthodox Islamic community and membership of the party was confined to the towns in Banten. Hasan Djajadiningrat himself was Vice-President of the Banten branch of the party; the President was a local Eurasian schoolteacher, F.F.C. Cordesius. The commissioners of the party included a Chinese trader, Li Soe Foen, and a mantri kabupaten, Tubagus Kartadiwiria. Another of Hasan's brothers, Raden Mohammed, was a member, as was his brother-in-law, Raden Achmad, the wedana of Pandeglang.[18] Most of the other priyayi who joined were from the lower and newer ranks of government service such as teachers and employees of the landrent office, the irrigation department and the post office. Several of them subscribed to the party's newspapers, De Express and het Tijdschrift.

The growth of the Indische Partij was short-lived, however. In the middle of 1913 the government, alarmed at the party's success and its demand for autonomy for Indonesia, declared it illegal. Douwes Dekker and the two other main leaders of the party, Dr Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo and Soewardi Soeryaningrat, were exiled to the Netherlands. The successor to the Indische Partij,

Insulinde, was a pale shadow of the former organization. Although it did establish a branch in Banten, its membership was confined, almost entirely, to the small and transient Eurasian community.[19]

The Rise of Sarekat Islam

Neither Budi Utomo nor the Indische Partij found any support in the peasantry or with the religious elite of Java, the ulama. The membership of these organizations was recruited essentially from the ranks of the Western-educated elite, and although the Indische Partij tried to move outside these ranks, it did so in the direction of the Chinese and Eurasian communities, thus ensuring its further isolation from the profoundly Islamic character of much of rural Java. The gulf between the priyayi and the ulama had been much exacerbated by Dutch colonial rule while, to the peasantry, Islam came to be seen as their only refuge and consolation from the bewildering and devastating impact of colonialism and especially the great changes brought in the wake of the Ethical Policy.

Already greatly disturbed by the spread of a money economy, the peasantry had after 1900 to face a panopoly of welfare measures, whose desirability was by no means obvious to them. Furthermore, the cost of these measures had to be borne by the peasantry in the form of increased taxation. The peasants' faith in the civil authorities who had traditionally regulated their lives declined as the priyayi were seen not only as being unable to protect the peasantry from the tide of change that was sweeping Indonesia, but as being willing accomplices of the Dutch in implementing it. An opportunity to harness the rural discontent of the peasantry and of the ulama only presented itself, however, with the birth of an

undeniably Muslim party, the Sarekat Islam (SI - Islamic Association). The origins of the Sarekat Islam were distinctly urban and bourgeois, springing from a group of Muslim batik traders in Surakarta (Solo) who had banded together under a certain Haji Samanhudi to resist Chinese competition.[20] Founded in 1912, the Sarekat Islam quickly and spectacularly became a symbol of religious unity in the face of all the forces that were threatening Indonesian Islam - the Dutch colonial government, the Chinese traders, the spread of capitalism and the alienation of the priyayi from those they were supposed to rule. In a few years, the party spread throughout Indonesia, its membership reaching 360,000 by 1916 and two and a half million by 1919.[21] At its first congress in February 1913, the Sarekat Islam had elected as chairman the charismatic Umar Said Tjokroaminoto. Its program sought the promotion of commerce amongst Indonesians, mutual support of members in economic difficulties, the expansion of educational facilities and the protection of the Muslim religion. Despite its rapid growth and real popular appeal, the organization did not claim to be a political party and emphasized its loyalty to the government. But increasingly from 1914 the outwardly religious emphasis of the organization yielded to a political one.

The Dutch colonial government was caught completely unaware by the spectacular rise of the Sarekat Islam. Many of the more liberal thinking, particularly the Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs, Dr D.A. Rinkes, and his staff and even, to some extent, the Governor-General A.W.F. Idenburg (1909-1916), looked on the Sarekat Islam favourably and saw it as part of the national awakening of the Indonesian people. However, most of the Dutch

colonial civil service had reservations about the Sarekat Islam, stemming in part from their deeply felt prejudices against the Muslim religion. These reservations were expressed in the government's decision in March 1914 to confer legal status only on the branches of the Sarekat Islam, refusing such status to the organization as a whole. This was to have serious effects for the Sarekat Islam for it meant that a disciplined national leadership was absent and made the coordination of branch activities extremely difficult.

Because of the absence of a national organization, the Sarekat Islam remained in many ways a coalition of groups, associations and sects varying according to local and regional circumstances. It was, however, the first Indonesian mass organization that sought support actively from the rakyat (people) as a whole. Precisely because of this, its constituency was very different from that of the Indische Partij. It not only by definition excluded the Eurasian and Chinese communities, but many if not most priyayi were wary of becoming associated with the new organization, whose criticism of the pangreh praja and the colonial government they found very disturbing. Nevertheless, some priyayi did become involved in the Sarekat Islam.[22] This was especially the case where an early indication was given by either Dutch officials or senior priyayi that participation in the Sarekat Islam was not regarded as subversive.

With this in mind, in late 1913 Gunawan and Notoatmodjo, leaders of the Batavia Sarekat Islam, visited Banten to see Achmad Djajadiningrat with a view to setting up a section of the

organization there.[23] Already before their visit fantastic stories about the Sarekat Islam had begun to circulate in the region. Secret oath-taking ceremonies were thought to be taking place and it was widely believed that if a member betrayed the organization instant death would be his lot. A virtual secret society had been set up in the village of Pasar, Serang, whereby if a member was in trouble he could summon the help of others by revealing a secret sign. Much of this talk had been spread by two Serang traders, Mas Aboeng Chasboellah and Sjeich Achmad bin Moehammad Bahassan, who had joined the Sarekat Islam whilst working in Batavia and upon their return to Banten enlisted others, a pattern of political involvement which was often to repeat itself later.

Soon after the visit of Gunawan and Notoatmodjo to Serang, a Banten section of the Sarekat Islam was established. Whilst Achmad Djajadiningrat himself did not join the organization, very few regents did, he was broadly sympathetic to its aims.[24] Indeed, many members of the Djajadiningrat family joined the organization including Achmad's younger brother, Hasan, who became chairman of the Banten section. Achmad's cousin and life-long friend, Raden Mohammed Isa, penghulu of Cilegon, was selected as religious adviser of the section.[25] The direction and leadership of the Sarekat Islam in Banten was thus decisively shaped at the beginning. Achmad Djajadiningrat was one of the few Javanese regents who was not opposed to the Sarekat Islam, indeed he believed that provided leadership was in capable and moderate hands it was a useful instrument in struggling for the advancement of the Indonesian people. Later, however, many conservative Dutch officials were to see in Achmad's endorsement of the Sarekat Islam sinister and subversive motives.

Two branches of the section were established at Serang and later at Labuan, but the organization grew slowly at first. Its first members tended to be teachers and employees of the various subsidiary branches of government that had sprung up since 1900, as well as a small number of pangreh praja officials.[26] Moreover, the choice of Hasan Djajadiningrat as chairman of the Banten section of the Sarekat Islam placed definite limits on the early growth of the organization. Western-educated and in appearances and beliefs divorced from many aspects of native life, Hasan Djajadiningrat, whilst sympathizing with the lot of the peasantry, saw them as ignorant and under the spell of the ulama and jawara. His key to the future was education, a topic he was never tired of speaking about at Sarekat Islam congresses. In April 1914, he was elected to the administrative committee (bestuur) of the Central Sarekat Islam and henceforth devoted much of his energies to the organization at a national level. Within the organization itself, Hasan belonged to the moderate wing under Tjokroaminoto and Gunawan, as distinct from the radical Marxist wing under Semaun which began developing from 1916 on.[27]

In his leadership of the Sarekat Islam in Banten, Hasan Djajadiningrat purposely tried to direct it away from what he saw as the entrenched influence of the ulama and the jawara in Bantenese society. Towards the latter his hostility was unremitting and he was firmly opposed to jawara trying to join the organization. In many villages of Banten to this day, the Sarekat Islam is remembered for its uncompromising stance against gambling.[28] Towards the ulama, Hasan Djajadiningrat's attitude was not so different from that of the Dutch or the priyayi. He praised those,

such as Kiyai Haji Asnawi of Caringin, who concerned themselves solely with religious issues and condemned those who viewed any cooperation with the government as haram (forbidden).[29] At the same time, Hasan's opposition to many of the government restrictions on Islam, particularly those pertaining to the pilgrimage and the pesantren, won him the support of some ulama. Nevertheless, the initial reaction of many Bantenese ulama toward the Sarekat Islam was one of suspicion, especially given its close association with the most prominent priyayi family in the region, albeit a family indigenous to the area.[30]

Given that the Sarekat Islam had little organization at a national level, the social composition of the branches differed greatly from one area to another. As we have noted, Hasan Djajadiningrat vigorously sought to exclude jawara from any role in the organization. Persons with a criminal record were refused membership and every candidate member had to be recommended by at least two existing members. If a man was a known gambler, he might be given an exceptionally long probation or alternatively be refused membership altgoether. Members had to swear to observe the laws of the land and to refrain from any unworthy conduct.[31] The leadership of the first branches of the Sarekat Islam in Banten was in the hands of the priyayi or of local intellectuals. The Cilegon branch had been founded by Raden Mohammed Isa and that at Pandeglang by Tubagus Haji Setiakoesoema, a retired mantri kabupaten. In 1917 a branch was set up in Rangkasbitung by Mas Astrawidjaja, a retired Patih of Pandeglang and Haji Kembar, a well-to-do trader.[32] The only branches that did not bear Hasan Djajadiningrat's imprint were those in Labuan and Menes, where small traders, ulama and old noble families were prominent.

Between 1916 and 1919 the Sarekat Islam in Banten expanded rapidly. The Serang branch, which had 3,800 members in April 1914, had grown to 4,359 members in June 1916; at the latter date the Rangkasbitung branch boasted 400 members and the Labuan branch 1,356 members.[33] Meetings with nationally-known figures drew large crowds. In February 1918, at a meeting organized by the Menes Sarekat Islam at which Abdul Moeis spoke, some 5,000 people attended.[34] The early opposition of many ulama had been overcome by the Sarekat Islam's agitation over the abuses of the 'guru ordonnantie' - the teachers' regulations - which placed strict limits on what kiyai could teach.[35] The success of the Sarekat Islam, which was even seen by many peasants as a counter-government, further contributed to a decline in the authority of the colonial government. Many of the Sarekat Islam's activities filled a vacuum which had long been felt by the peasantry. In Cilegon the Sarekat Islam established a burial society and in Menes an association was formed to give help with major expenses such as weddings, circumcisions and even the building of houses. Several branches tried to set up cooperative societies, but most of these were short-lived due to inadequate financing.[36] The extent and support of these activities, however, pointed to a developing political awareness in the region.

The Sarekat Islam in Banten, as elsewhere in Java, was organized along the lines of the colonial administrative divisions. Thus for each residency there was a divisional administration or section (afdeelingsbestuur). This was subdivided into branches (kringen) which corresponded with the district. The section only called meetings when it wanted to pass a motion to be submitted to the

Dutch resident or to the government in Batavia or when support was granted to a request from the Central Sarekat Islam. For each village group of the Sarekat Islam there was a village commissioner (desa commisaris). The village groups of the Sarekat Islam usually revolved around a kiyai, although in the towns of the region officials or intellectuals continued to lead the organization. To some extent, though, as the Sarekat Islam developed in the region, so the 'new priyayi' lost control to the rural powerholders, and especially the ulama. After some initial hesitation, many ulama and kiyai in Banten had been won over to the Sarekat Islam because of its articulation of their own grievances. These village groups of the Sarekat Islam were actually the most unstructured of all in the whole hierarchy, because there was no provision for them in the Central Sarekat Islam by-laws. It was however this level, in Banten as elsewhere, which accounted for the mass membership of the organization. In most areas, but particularly in Banten, it was only the ulama and kiyai who could act as political brokers in the countryside, as the Communist Party (PKI) was also to find out some years later.[37]

Although the leadership at the national level and the section level sought to harness the organization's mass membership to fight for national goals, the membership was largely concerned with local grievances. On 20 July 1918, a meeting of some 2,000 peasants at Menes was addressed by Hasan Djajadiningrat and M. Wangsamihardja, the chairman of the local Sarekat Islam branch. Wangsamihardja addressed the crowd first and reminded them of the aims and purposes of the SI, emphasizing the need for discipline and the law-abiding nature of the organization. Hasan Djajadiningrat spoke

to the crowd about the advances that had been achieved by the SI at a national level, mentioning in particular the establishment of the Volksraad (People's Council) - set up in 1918 - which was proof that it was only the lower levels of the priyayi who were opposed to the SI because they feared its influence on the people. The Sarekat Islam would continue to denounce the latter for not keeping pace with the times and for their many abuses of the peasantry. The last speaker, Raden Ismail, struck a more radical note by calling for the support of striking workers in Semarang and by emphasizing to the audience the struggle between capital and labour. But after all this heady talk, the character of the SI as a vehicle for local grievances was strikingly illustrated by the motions which were passed at the meeting - local irrigation should be improved, a cattle market should be allowed in the district, permission of the government should be given to allow peasants muzzleloaders to shoot squirrel who were damaging the coconut crop and train fares should be reduced.[38] Nor was this meeting atypical; at a meeting at Cadasari, near Pandeglang, on 23 August 1918, the SI asked that permission be granted to slaughter female buffalo, that marriage laws be made easier, local taxes be reduced and that all village schools should have an ulama attached to them.[39]

The Sarekat Islam's articulation of peasant grievances, acting as a broker in dealing with government, inevitably brought it into conflict with the colonial administration, and particularly with the pangreh praja. It was the latter who were in day to day contact with the peasantry and who were charged with the implementation of government policy. There were, it is true, many

leaders of the local Sarekat Islam who came from distinctly priyayi backgrounds. Hasan Djajadiningrat was an obvious case in point. There were even some priyayi in active government service who joined the Sarekat Islam, such as Raden Prawiraatmadja, the Assistant Wedana of Muncang in Lebak regency. Speaking at the Sarekat Islam congress in Bandung in Jule 1916, he made an impassioned plea for the 'defeudalization' of the priyayi,

> "On our adat (customary law) I will make no comment, yet I must say I am completely against some of our (priyayi) customs and traditions, which have not kept pace with the times. Therefore, I say away with the practice of giving presents to regents and other high officials, with receiving them at every feast, all of which have to be paid by the peasant. Let us do away with obligatory services, the giving of feasts by peasants far beyond their means, away with the 'sembah' (traditional greeting on entry before high priyayi) . . . Because as long as the people willingly subject themselves to such slave-like treatment, we cannot speak of progress. This servile subjection is no product of Islam, but is a remnant of Hindu feudalism."[40]

But such sentiments were far from typical and it became increasingly rare as time went by for a serving official to be a member of the Sarekat Islam.

The priyayi in Banten as a whole increasingly viewed the development of the Sarekat Islam with alarm and consternation. Their fears grew after 1916 as the SI assumed larger proportions and increasingly radical overtones with the growing influence within the organization of a small, but vocal, group of Marxists from the ISDV (Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging - Indies Social Democratic Association). In its early period, many younger priyayi who were not from high 'ningrat' (aristocratic) backgrounds became members of the SI as a protest against the domination of the

top posts of the native administrative service by a small number of families who maintained their rule through the hereditary principle and not through ability. But the increasing attacks of the Sarekat Islam on the priyayi and the suspicion of the Dutch administration towards Indonesian civil servants who joined the SI helped to curb this trend.[41]

The priyayi were unaccustomed and even horrified to find their actions being criticized from below. Such a critique jarred badly with Javanese and Sundanese historical and cultural experience and produced a vehement reaction against the Sarekat Islam. Some priyayi became notorious for their hostility towards the SI, such as Mangkudijaja, the Wedana of Menes in Pandeglang regency.[42] In 1917, a peasant by the name of Rangga from the village of Kadusunur had been called before the wedana for questioning and later died in mysterious circumstances whilst still in detention. The Sarekat Islam took up the case demanding an official inquiry and although one did take place, Mangkudijaja was absolved of responsibility for the man's death. The following year, in October 1918, the wedana arrested six members of the SI and accused them of forcing people to join the organization. They were held for a week in detention before the Regent of Pandeglang, R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, intervened on their behalf ordering their release. But in the meantime the area had become so restless that a troop of 40 soldiers had to be sent to Menes. Arrests of SI members on such flimsy excuses was not unusual. In April 1919, more arrests of SI members accused of being in illegal possession of fireworks took place in Menes.[43]

The growth of the Sarekat Islam in Banten presented problems for the small Westernized leadership of the organization in the towns. Growth had meant that many traditional powerholders - ulama and descendants of the dispossessed nobility - had entered the organization and shifted its focus and direction. Hasan Djajadiningrat sought to counter some of these difficulties by strengthening the organization and a meeting to this end was held in April 1919. Representatives attended from branches at Serang, Labuan, Menes, Cimanuk, Cadasari, Petir, Pandeglang and Rangkasbitung. Some of these branches, and notably the rural ones of Cadasari, Petir, Menes and Labuan, were led by prominent local ulama whose perception of the government was marked by hostility and who considered it haram (contrary to Islam) to work for an infidel government. The more moderate leaders of the SI in Banten, on the other hand, whilst seeking substantial reforms of the colonial government, did not share in this fundamentalist attitude of the ulama. Hasan Djajadiningrat argued that the government respected Islam. It honoured Muslim holidays and was starting to give subsidies to Muslim schools, provided these gave some sort of modern education. Furthermore, the establishment of the Volksraad, despite its limitations and shortcomings, was a recognition of the Indonesian people's political awakening.[44]

Hasan Djajadiningrat's political thinking and outlook was in many ways more Westernized than that of his elder brother, Achmad Djajadiningrat.[45] He supported the more moderate wing of the Sarekat Islam led by Tjokroaminoto and Gunawan, rather than the radical Marxist wing under Semaun. He was the strongest advocate within the national Sarekat Islam of village reform, proposals which conformed with those of the ardent Dutch 'Ethical' reformers.

At the third national congress of the SI in Surabaya in October 1918, he spoke again on village reform in terms which scarcely distanced him from lines that the 'Ethici' had been arguing for years. He felt strongly that if the SI did not possess greater cohesion, its rural branches would fall under the influence of the ulama and jawara, a danger especially latent in Banten. In articles in the Batavia SI newspaper, Neratja, he constantly warned of the activities of the jawara in the countryside and how they preyed on the lives of the ignorant peasantry.[46]

In order to strengthen the SI section in Banten, a stronger local administrative committee was formed with Hasan Djajadiningrat himself as chairman, Raden Mohammed Isa as secretary and three district commissioners - Haji Kembar for Rangkasbitung, Wangsamihardja, a retired civil servant for Menes and Entol Ternaja, a young assistant wedana for Serang.[47] There were no representatives of the ulama. A joint meeting of all branches of the SI in Banten was to be held every three months and the section was to produce its own newspaper to improve the political knowledge of members. The need to abide by the law was stressed and oath-taking and secret societies firmly warned against. A propagandist was also appointed to reduce confusion in the branches as to the aims and strategy of the Sarekat Islam.[48]

The first issue of the Banten SI's journal, Mimbar (pulpit, rostrum), appeared on 5 September 1919 with Arga, the SI section propagandist, as editor and Hasan as assistant editor.[49] Arga, the son of an assistant wedana, had left Banten to join the Dutch merchant marine and had converted to Christianity, but apparently

with no serious intentions. After a spell working in the state publishing house, Volkslectuur, in Batavia, he returned to Banten, became a Muslim again and joined the Sarekat Islam. Mimbar appeared fortnightly on the 5th and 20th for six months. In its first issue, it declared its direction as being toward "justice and truth, working for the happiness of the people and opposed to arbitrariness and oppression, for the pursuit of progress in politics." The paper carried articles on abuses of the government at a national and local level. Readers' circles were formed in all the towns of Banten and attempts were also made to disseminate the journal in the villages and several new branches of the SI were formed.

Hasan Djajadiningrat's attempt to restore discipline and order to the Banten section of the Sarekat Islam was tempered by other developments. Popular restlessness amongst the peasantry in Java was marked in 1919, prompted by a series of bad harvests and bitterness over a government regulation of forced rice collections. A regulation introduced during the First World War required peasants to sell part of their harvest to the local administration. In June 1919, a controleur was murdered in Sulawesi and in July a serious incident occurred in the village of Cimareme, near Garut, in the East Priangan in which several people were killed.[50] A certain Haji Hassan had resisted arrest after refusing to surrender part of his rice crop to local officials and in an ensuing battle with the police, Haji Hassan and three members of his family were killed. The 'Garut Affair' soon had wide repercussions when it was revealed that a so-called 'Afdeling B' (Division B) of the Sarekat Islam existed in the area, uniting local ulama with radical

politicians in a secret organization. Several hundred members of the Sarekat Islam were arrested in the wake of the affair and the incident convinced the Dutch authorities that a sterner hand had to be taken towards the nationalist movement.

The 'Garut Affair' was a watershed for the Sarekat Islam. Throughout Java, native officials of the pangreh praja, who had earlier supported the Sarekat Islam, now deserted it as the Dutch administration became openly distrustful of those who were sympathetic to the nationalist movement. The organization lost support, however, not only amongst liberally-inclined priyayi, but also amongst others in government employ such as teachers and clerks.[51] This was especially the case in Banten. Branches that were dominated by teachers and 'new priyayi' such as Serang and Rangkasbitung began losing membership as the Sarekat Islam came under increasing Dutch scrutiny. This exodus was fanned by rumours of the existence of an 'Afdeling B' type organization in Banten. Amongst the papers of one of the members of the Garut 'Afdeling B', Haji Soleiman, were found the names of a number of Bantenese ulama.[52] The authorities in Banten now found a suitable excuse for taking a stronger line against the Sarekat Islam despite the fact that on investigation it was found that there was no proof that anyone in the region was linked to the 'Afdeling B'. Nevertheless, ulama who were active in the Sarekat Islam now found it more difficult to get their teaching permits renewed and sometimes they were even withdrawn.[53]

This increasingly hostile stance against the Sarekat Islam was not uniform throughout the region however. Two of the regents of

Banten at the time Achmad Djajadiningrat and his nephew, R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, the Regent of Pandeglang, still retained some sympathy with the SI, provided its activities were perfectly legal and above board. The Regent of Lebak, however, R. Suriadiputra (1908-1925), was openly antipathetic to the Sarekat Islam. Like Mangkudidjaja, the Wedana of Menes, Suriadiputra was a Priangan regent of the old school, to whom any lessening of respect for the priyayi was reprehensible and unacceptable. Indeed, he strove to see that previously unheard of marks of respect were introduced in Banten. Following the example of the regents in the Priangan, he set up an anti-SI association in Lebak, Jamiatul Nasihin, with the backing of the Politiek-Economische Bond (Political-Economic Association), an arch conservative Dutch political group.[54] Conservative ulama from the Priangan were brought to Lebak to lead the association and the Friday sermon in the mosque was used to propagate its ideas. The statutes of the organization had much in common with the Sarekat Islam, promising to uphold Islam, to give mutual support to members in time of need, whilst at the same time pledging to uphold customary law and tradition. The organization made little impact in Banten, however, an indication perhaps of the lack of support Suriadiputra had amongst local Bantenese ulama.

Peasant unrest in the region continued despite the tougher attitude of the authorities. The onset of a depression after the First World War, bad harvests and the continued government policy of requisitioning rice fuelled social discontent. In October 1919, at a meeting of the Sarekat Islam in Serang, more than 3,000 peasants called for an end to the export of all rice from Banten, revoking

of the ban on taking rice from one district (kewedanaan) to another, the opening of rice granaries to the peasants and a lowering of prices.

Despite the hostile attitude of the authorities, Mimbar continued to mirror the discontent of the peasantry. In a column entitled appropriately, 'Suara dari desa' (Voice from the village), the paper gave full vent to peasant grievances. The arbitrary actions of village heads and lower priyayi were frequently complained of. Much was made of the arrests in November and December 1919 of peasants in the Labuan-Menes area for illegally practising swidden rice cultivation on the slopes of Mount Aseupan. There was also great resentment in the villages over the obligatory work on the irrigation canals, work which only helped those who owned wet rice fields (sawah) and which increased social differentiation in the villages.[55]

In March 1920, more unrest was caused by the heavy-handed arrest by the police of a Sarekat Islam member, Haji Mohammed Rais for non-payment of debts. But the chief cause of peasant discontent remained the forcible sale to the government of part of the rice harvest. For 1920, this was fixed at 10% of the harvest, with refusal to comply with the order punishable by three months' jail plus seizure of the whole harvest.[56] In Serang regency, the purchase of the rice was conducted by a committee in each village and the local Sarekat Islam was allowed to participate in this due to the cooperative attitude of the Regent, Achmad Djajadiningrat. In Lebak, however, there were many abuses over the administration system. With this background of unrest, the Sarekat Islam

continued to be active. In April 1920, more than 3,000 people attended a meeting in Serang addressed by the SI leader, and future leader of the Communist Party, Semaun. Two months later, the resident wrote that in some villages almost the entire population belonged to the Sarekat Islam.[57]

Although Hasan Djajadiningrat had made consistent attempts to prevent the growth of underground organizations or secret societies within the Sarekat Islam in Banten, the local leadership faced continual difficulties from the ulama and others of more radical persuasion. In Labuan, the leadership of the SI had already passed into the hands of the fiery young son-in-law of Kiyai Asnawi of Caringin, Haji Achmad Chatib, a man who was to dominate Bantenese politics for many years.[58] In Cilegon, a greater threat was posed by the setting up within the SI of a mutual assistance association, Santewe Arjo, to assist members in times of death, illness, fire and arrest. The leaders of the group - Ardjo, Taha and Soeb - had established the organization because they were discontented with the conservative leadership of the Sarekat Islam in Cilegon. Hasan Djajadiningrat was greatly concerned that the association carried within it the germs of another 'Afdeling B' affair and he managed to persuade the leadership eventually to disband the organization.[59] In August 1920, Hasan had to make a similar intervention in the affairs of the Menes SI when it was discovered that a number of jawara and professional burglars had joined the organization.[60] Hasan's moderate views, however, invited criticism from others. Increasingly the leadership of the Banten SI found itself under fire for its conservatism and passivity. One writer in the party newspaper Neratja accused the leadership of the Banten

section of being "all mouth and no work" and of leading a movement "which only exists in name".[61] But more difficulties were to beset the section. Allegations of financial mismanagement on Hasan's part appeared in the papers, and in May 1920, to the astonishment of all, Arga, the editor of Mimbar, resigned from the Sarekat Islam and began employment with the police as a detective.[62]

The defection of Arga was followed a few months later by an even greater loss, the death of Hasan Djajadiningrat. On 30 December 1920, Hasan died after a short illness.[63] A vacuum now existed in the leadership of the Sarekat Islam in the region. There was no-one to replace Hasan Djajadiningrat as chairman of the section, although for a while, in desperation, the name of Arga was mooted despite his new position.[64] There were few intellectuals in Banten outside government service and those in government employ had been frightened by the growing influence of the radical Marxist wing of the Sarekat Islam at a national level and by the danger to their own careers if they remained in the SI. Even those few traders who had joined the organization, such as Haji Kembar in Rangkasbitung, began to drift away. Another former district commissioner of the SI, Entol Ternaja, had been appointed to the newly-formed field-police (Veldpolitie).[65] In March 1921, when the fifth congress of the Sarekat Islam opened in Yogyakarta, only one branch from Banten, that of Menes, was represented. Although there had been much criticism and resentment of Hasan Djajadiningrat's handling of the Banten section of the SI, there was no-one of stature to replace him and leadership of the individual branches passed irretrievably into the hands of the ulama.

By the early 1920s, however, the Sarekat Islam nationally was in serious difficulties, meeting with little success at national or local level and proving singularly incapable of ameliorating peasant grievances. With the close of the First World War and the threat of social revolution in Europe receding, the colonial government felt increasingly unwilling to compromise, and in the ensuing crackdown many Sarekat Islam leaders began to turn to religious matters as a basis for the organization, partly to avoid trouble with the Dutch authorities. H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, the most prominent Sarekat Islam leader, supported this line, which found support too from Haji Agus Salim and from Haji Fachruddin, the leader of the modernist Muslim educational and social welfare organization, Muhammadiyah.[66] The modernists advocated the purification of Indonesian Islam from local traditions and its adjustment to the requirements of the time. This development was anathema to the traditionalist or kolot Muslims of Banten and found no response in the region. The Muhammadiyah's careful avoidance of anything that smacked of political radicalism was viewed with open contempt in Bantenese quarters.

But it was not only the Sarekat Islam's growing concern to avoid radicalism[67] which met with disapproval in Banten. The Muhammadiyah, it will be recalled, sought above all to purge Indonesian Islam of its local traditions, a development that was viewed with the greatest hostility in Banten where much of the strength of Islam lay precisely in its close connections with local traditions, passions and hierarchies. The death of Hasan Djajadiningrat merely served to hasten the antipathy felt in the Sarekat Islam in Banten towards the new developments which found no effective advocate in the region.

This disillusionment with the changed direction of the Sarekat Islam led the party's local Bantenese sections to adopt a strictly neutral line in the quarrel which developed within the organization between the conservative leadership based in Yogyakarta and the radicals in Semarang led by Semaun who, in 1920, changed the name of the ISDV to that of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI - Indonesian Communist Party). Indeed, such was Bantenese resentment towards Tjokroaminoto and the rest of the Yogyakarta leaders that, when later the split between Semarang and Yogyakarta became absolute in 1923, the Bantenese ulama urged the replacement of Tjokroaminoto by the PKI leaders Alimin and Musso.[68]

Nationally and in Banten, the early 1920s saw the peasantry drifting away from the Sarekat Islam as quickly as they had joined it at an earlier stage. They had found that the Sarekat Islam was unable to redress their considerable grievances. In Banten the failure of the nationalist organization found peasants turning again to more traditional forms of protest. Where the Sarekat Islam survived, it either adopted a militant stance, as in Labuan and Menes under the leadership of Haji Achmad Chatib, or, as in Cilegon, it became a virtual secret society with distinct criminal overtones.[69] Elsewhere in the region the organization simply withered away and a political vacuum existed which was eventually filled by the Communist Party.

The Haji Nawawi Affair

In the early 1920s, economic conditions in Java deteriorated as the boom of the immediate post-war years came to an end. In Banten, this economic downturn was exacerbated by a series of poor

harvests over the decade 1915-1925. An indication of how serious this was is given by the considerable tax rebates given by the authorities to peasant farmers.

Table XVII

Rebates of Landrent over the years 1915-1925 in guilders

1915	143,895	1919	136,095		
1916	84,158	1920	129,228	1923	211,791
1917	99,838	1921	161,798	1924	264,372
1918	104,809	1922	177,984		

Source: Memorie van Overgave, J.C. Bedding, 1925, p. 65

In this situation, and despite the rebates which were not easily obtained, the burden of taxation became greater. Bitter complaints were heard about taxation at SI meetings and mutual benefit associations began to appear once more.[70] In some areas, there were reports of much selling of land and in Cilegon it was reported that peasants were unable to pay their taxes as a result of a landrent revision. A new road tax applicable to all who owned land near a main road added to existing burdens.[71]

The demise of Sarekat Islam saw the return of traditional forms of rural protest of peasants everywhere - secret societies, oath-taking and mutual benefit societies - forms of association which evaded priyayi control. A classic case of this was the Haji Nawawi affair of 1922. In September of that year the police in Cilegon discovered a secret society known variously as the

Sarekat Ilmu and the Sarekat Agama Islam (the association of the religion of Islam) in the village of Mangkunegara, led by a former leading member of the SI in Cilegon, Haji Nawawi.[72] The aims of this society were allegedly burglary (mencuri dengan bongkar), theft (merampok) and resistance to the demands of authoritarian village heads and police (melawan pada jaro dan polisi yang menjalankan kewadjibannja dengan keras). Jimat, amulets usually handwritten in Arabic, were distributed by Haji Nawawi, who made his living as a dukun, a village medicine man.[73] Such amulets were widely believed to possess magical properties which would protect the wearer from any harm. In the peasant environment of human misery and intense insecurity, where poverty, sickness and disaster were all too common, they were a form of insurance for many.

The wedana of Cilegon reported the discovery of the society to the Regent of Serang, Achmad Djajadiningrat, in September 1922. The latter was initially not inclined to take any action because he felt the stories of the society might well have been exaggerated by police spies. Indeed, since the 'Afdeling B' affair in 1919, there had been a mushrooming of activity by spies who sometimes acted as agents provocateurs in these matters.[74] The affair might have rested there had it not been for the spread of unrest to the villages of Blagendong and Kramatwatu, near Serang, two notoriously restless villages which had supported the Cilegon revolt of 1888.

On 26 September, a Dutch field-police officer, H.V. Janssen, accompanied by the assistant wedana of Kramatwatu, raided the two villages following tip-offs from spies. Acting against the advice of the assistant wedana, Janssen together with a number of other

police agents confiscated mukena (a white garment worn by women during prayers) and ikram (a white cloth worn by prospective pilgrims at the beginning of the haj and used to dress the body of a pilgrim on his/her death). Janssen proceeded in seizing any white cloth in the villages that was not being worn, as he insisted this was evidence of preparation for a jihad (holy war). At the same time, the head of the field-police in Banten, Portier, ordered the arrest of Haji Nawawi and several of his associates, without the knowledge of Achmad Djajadiningrat.

Unrest in the area was now so widespread that Achmad Djajadiningrat toured the villages to try to quell disquiet and prevent any actual outbreak of violence, and began his own inquiries into the affair. There was no doubt that Haji Nawawi had established a secret society but this had been infiltrated by police undercover agents. Haji Nawawi even admitted that one of the aims of the society was resistance to police or priyayi who mishandled members. Peasants joining the society were also initiated in invulnerability rites. The society had 55 members, all sworn to help each other in times of need. Most of the members were poor fishermen and peasants.[75] It seems that many had joined the society because of the constant worries and distress they had suffered as a result of crop failures.

The Resident of Banten, J.C. Bedding, saw in the affair gross negligence on the part of the local Indonesian administration in not bringing it to his attention earlier. Bedding complained about this directly to the Governor-General, D. Fock, and felt that grounds

existed for the dismissal of the assistant wedana of Bojonegoro and the wedana of Cilegon. He also felt that Achmad Djajadiningrat should be severely reprimanded.[76]

None of these proposals was actually carried out, but there were increasing doubts in high government circles of the continued advisability of Achmad Djajadiningrat remaining Regent of Serang and exercising such a powerful influence over Bantenese affairs. Since the founding of the Volksraad in 1918, Achmad had played a considerable role in the new body and as a result had been much criticized by Dutch conservative opinion.[77] He had owed much of his earlier prominence to the special relationship he enjoyed with Snouck Hurgronje and his successors as Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs. But by the early 1920s, the influence of this latter office was already on the wane. In both the Haji Jasin affair of 1911 and the Haji Nawawi affair of 1922, Achmad Djajadiningrat had found himself in bitter conflict with the resident, who was supported by his superiors in Batavia, but fortunately on both occasions he could call on the assistance of the more liberal Advisers for Native and Islamic Affairs.

By the early 1920s, however, the attitude of the Dutch administration to Indonesian political movements was hardening considerably. After some initial hesitation, it found the easiest answer to this threat to colonial domination was to batten the hatches and adopt a far more restrictive and conservative attitude vis-a-vis the newly emergent forces. In this atmosphere, voices such as those of the Advisers for Native and Islamic Affairs and progressive regents like Achmad Djajadiningrat were less likely to be heard.

This was well illustrated by a quarrel which arose in 1921 over a proposal by the then acting Resident of Banten, C. Canne, to abolish the residency and merge it with neighbouring Batavia. Canne, supported by the Director of the Department of Internal Administration (DIA), Schippers, argued that this should be done because Banten was of little economic importance and that it would improve the standard of the native administration in the region.[78] Achmad Djajadiningrat and the Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs, R.A. Kern, were strongly opposed to this idea and argued that Banten by reason of history, religion, culture and language possessed a strong identity of its own and if this was challenged, the area might become more politically volatile. Commenting on Djajadiningrat's and Kern's objections, Schippers showed an unprecedented hostility which was typical of the changed attitude on the part of many senior Dutch administrators. He termed their arguments,

> "Old prejudices, supported by those who do not want to lose their influence in Banten . . . (These views) originate from some regent families, that are too closely related to each other; there exists too much familiarity and closeness in this sense, that some, who occupy leading positions, exert too much influence on the general course of affairs, not only to the good, but also for ill . . . What Banten needs in my opinion is some new blood, independent administrators, a good police and detective force. The latter will be able to get behind affairs and better inform the administration than the lower priyayi who are afraid of the kiyai . . ."[79]

Although the plans for the abolition of the residency of Banten were shelved in late 1921, Achmad Djajadiningrat's relations with Canne's successor, J.C. Bedding, soon deteriorated over the Haji Nawawi affair. By the time Bedding arrived in Banten in 1921,

Achmad Djajadiningrat had been Regent of Serang for 20 years and felt strongly that his opinion should be given due consideration. He was a forceful man and without doubt one of the most progressive regents of his day.[80] Bedding, on the other hand, was a man of markedly conservative views. Rumours of the bad relations between Achmad Djajadiningrat and Bedding appeared in the Batavia press and it was an open secret that they were barely on speaking terms.[81] Moreover, as a result of the Haji Nawawi affair, there were many in high government circles in Batavia who questioned the continued wisdom of Achmad Djajadiningrat remaining in Banten. His political judgement was held to be deficient over this affair and his sympathetic position towards the Sarekat Islam and local ulama was widely suspected, at a time when the colonial authorities were greatly concerned about underground movements and secret societies.

Doubts about Achmad Djajadiningrat's position coincided with a growing feeling in the colonial civil service that it was above all relations with the lower priyayi that were important and regents, as in the past, should revert back to a purely functional role.[82] Djajadiningrat, however, posed a peculiarly difficult problem for the authorities. By the twentieth century, regents were seldom removed from their posts. A solution was eventually found in appointing Achmad Djajadiningrat the first Regent of Batavia. As Batavia was the seat of the colonial government and a largely urban regency, this was really a nominal position; as Djajadiningrat noted, "I had little hope that I would succeed in creating the sort of relationship that existed elsewhere between the regent and the people."[83] The nomination caused a great stir in the political

world of Indonesia at the time and some commentators clearly saw it as an attempt to control Achmad Djajadiningrat rather than as a promotion.[84]

In May 1924 Achmad Djajadiningrat took up his new post as Regent of Batavia. In the ensuing debate that followed his departure over who should succeed him, senior Dutch officials sought to use this occasion to break the rule of 'old fashioned despots' in Banten. Indeed, in the next 20 years, regents in Banten were recruited almost wholly from outside the region. Whilst Kern argued strongly that Achmad Djajadiningrat's nephew, Kartadiningrat, Regent of Pandeglang, was the most suitable candidate for the position and that it was a tradition in Banten that the regent of Pandeglang succeeded to the regency of Serang, when that became vacant, Bedding and his superiors were equally vehement that the position should go to a non-Bantenese.[85] Kern was concerned that the new regent should recognize the importance of a working relationship with the ulama "without which it was impossible to administer Banten",[86] but Bedding did not want a regent who was keen to maintain his own patron-client relationship with local society. Indeed, to Bedding and his superiors it was an advantage if a non-Bantenese was appointed, as without local roots he would be reduced to a purely functionary role and dependent on the Dutch. The final choice was a non-Bantenese, Raden Tummengung Soeriadiningrat, Regent of Cianjur and brother of Soeriadipura, the Regent of Lebak. Thus, by the end of 1924, Banten had two Sundanese regents. The appointment was to cause deep local resentment.

In a real sense, the departure of Achmad Djajadiningrat for Batavia ended an era in Bantenese politics. No regent after him in the final decades of Dutch rule in Indonesia was to possess such a forceful presence and such a broad knowledge of politics generally. The appointment of a second regent from outside the region, to be followed by a third in 1927, seriously weakened the ability of the Banten regents acting as true Volkshoofden (traditional chiefs). At the same time, the absence of regents of real stature played into the hands of the traditional powerholders in rural society and especially the religious elite. At a time of economic discontent and rising political unrest, this was to have profound implications.

FOOTNOTES

1. See especially Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite. The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi, Singapore: Heinemann, 1979, pp. 56-57; Robert van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1960, pp. 113-114.

2. Memorie van Overgave (hereafter MvO) van het Bestuur der Residentie Bantam, J.A. Hardeman, April 1906, pp. 54-55; on expansion of education, see Sutherland, Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, pp. 46-47.

3. MvO, F.K. Overduyn, May 1911, pp. 101-102. By 1916 the four HIS in Banten had the following number of pupils: Serang - 189 boys and 46 girls; Cilegon - 91 boys and 29 girls; Pandeglang - 147 boys and 23 girls and Rangkasbitung - 136 boys and 40 girls, see MvO, H.L.C.B. van Vleuten, May 1916, pp. 43-46.

4. MvO, F.G. Putman-Cramer, March 1931, pp. 238-239.

5. Sutherland, Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, p. 54.

6. Akira Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of Budi Utomo 1908-1918, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1972, p. 26; Sutherland, Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, p. 50.

7. Nagazumi, op. cit., p. 179, n. 2.

8. Ibid., pp. 133-134. On Budi Utomo see also S.L. van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indie, Groningen: J.B. Wolters, Bronnenpublicatie betreffende de Geschiedenis van Nederlands-Indie, 1900-1942, No. 4, 1967, pp. 37-46, 52-66, 502-507; George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952, pp. 64-65.

9. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, Batavia and Amsterdam: G.A. Kolff, 1936, pp. 271-272. Achmad Djajadiningrat knew both Wahidin and Sutomo, the other key figure in Budi Utomo's early growth. See also Hasan Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen in Banten", De Taak, 21 January 1922; this article forms part of a long series written by Hasan and published after his death.

10. Nagazumi, op. cit., p. 41.

11. See report of Achmad Djajadiningrat, 8 April 1911, No. 13/G and report of Overduyn to Governor-General, 29 April 1911, No. 158/G, Mailrapport 1090/1911 in Verbaal 6 December 1911/31.

12. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 220-221.

13. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 21 January 1922. See also Heather A. Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja: Java's Indigenous Administrative Corps and its Role in the Last Decade of Dutch Colonial Rule, Yale University Ph.D. thesis, 1973, pp. 213, n. 46 and 253-254, n. 94.

14. K.A. Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Recente Ontwikkelingen in Indonesisch Islamonderricht, Nijmegen University dissertation, Krips Repro Meppel, 1974, p. 56

15. Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja, p. 213, n. 46; Sutherland, Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, p. 57.

16. On the growth of these groups, see Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja, pp. 207-230; van Niel, op. cit., pp. 40-56; W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study in Social Change, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1964, pp. 133-135 and his essay "Social Changes in Java", W.F. Wertheim, East-West Parallels, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1964, pp. 215-237.

17. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 281-284. On the Indische Partij, see also van der Wal, op. cit., pp. 99-159, 166-168, 234-240, 304-311, 318-340, 353-356; D.M.G. Koch, Om de Vrijheid: De Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesia, Djakarta: Yayasan Pembangunan, 1950, pp. 30-43. The Chinese population of Banten in 1930 was 7,815, or less than 0.8% of the population; in West Java the average was 2.28%, MvO, Putman-Cramer, 1931, pp. 54-56.

18. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 21 January 1922; van der Wal, op. cit., p. 115, n. 1 and p. 129.

19. On Insulinde, see Kahin, op. cit., p. 71.

20. On the Sarekat Islam, see inter alia van der Wal, op. cit., pp. 84-98, 160-165, 169-233, 241-303, 314-317, 341-352, 357-363, 398-458, 492-295; R.C. Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indie, Groningen: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1975, pp. 19-49, 104-120, 198-207; Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, Singapore: Oxford University Press East Asian Historical Monographs, 1973, pp. 101-153; van Niel, op. cit., pp. 85-97;

Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition, pp. 210-221; Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968, pp. 39-58; E. Gobée and C. Adriaanse, eds., Ambtelijke Adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, Vol. III, pp. 2000-2015. Amongst the early leaders of the Sarekat Islam were a number of Bantenese who had lived outside the region for some time. The most prominent of these were A. Wignjadisastra and R. Boerhan Kartadiredja. Both were typical of the newly emergent Indonesian intelligentsia. Born in Pandeglang of priyayi origins, Wignjadisastra had given up a career in government to pursue journalism, working with several Batavia newspapers and also spending some time in Malaya. He wrote pamphlets on the Italian-Turkish War in Libya and on several Islamic topics. For some time he worked with Tirtoadisoerjo on Medan Prijaji and later with Abdul Moeis, one of the most important Sarekat Islam leaders, on the newspaper Kaum Moeda. Wignjadisastra was married to the daughter of the chief penghulu of Bandung, a match which caused much comment at the time, and became secretary of the Sarekat Islam branch in the city. Wignjadisastra and Boerhan Kartadiredja were typical of many of the leaders of Sarekat Islam both in their social origins and in their intellectual formation. See van der Wal, op. cit., pp. 197, 305, n. 1, 383; van Niel, op. cit., pp. 107-109 and Deliar Noer, op. cit., p. 109, n. 28.

21. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

22. Sutherland, Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, pp. 62-63.

23. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 18 February 1922; A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 285-286.

24. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 286-287; H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 4 February 1922. Tjokroaminoto also visited Banten in 1914, see van der Wal, op. cit., p. 412.

25. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 4 February 1922.

26. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, p. 287; on the social background of the SI leadership, see van der Wal, op. cit., pp. 423ff.

27. van der Wal, op. cit., pp. 405, 494, 496.

28. H. Djajasoekanta, Dasar Pertanian Didesa Tjipitjung, Fakultas Pertanian, UI Bogor, n.d., mimeo, p. 86.

29. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 28 January and 11 February 1922.

30. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 284-289; MvO, van Vleuten, 1916, p. 14.

31. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 11 February 1922.

32. Mailrapport 978/1915 in Verbaal 8 March 1916/50 and Besluit 24 September 1917/68.

33. Report of SI Bandung Congress 17-24 June 1916 in report of Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs, 29 September 1916, No. 226 in Mailrapport 244/1916 in Verbaal 1 September 1917/32. By 1918 the Menes branch had 400 members, the Labuan branch 2,600 and that at Rangkasbitung only 30, Mailrapport 339^{x}/1918 in Verbaal 2 January 1919.

34. Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst (PID) report of 26 February 1918, Mailrapport 94^{x}/1918 in Verbaal 7 May 1919.

35. Mimbar, 5 January 1920.

36. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 25 March 1922.

37. Interview with Tubagus Oemaj Martakusumah, Bandung, 21 August 1975, secretary of the Rangkasbitung branch of the Sarekat Islam in 1919-1920.

38. Neratja, 20 July 1918.

39. Neratja, 26 August 1918.

40. Report of the SI Bandung Congress 17-24 June 1916 in report of the Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs, 29 September 1916, No. 226, Mailrapport 244/1916, in Verbaal 1 September 1917/32.

41. See Yong Mun Cheong, Conflicts within the Priyayi World of the Parahyangan in West Java, 1914-1927, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973, pp. 1-2, 7-8.

42. Neratja, 7 November 1918; Kwantes, op. cit., p. 178; interview with Tubagus Martakusumah, Bandung, 25 August 1975.

43. Neratja, 23 April 1919.

44. Neratja, 10 April 1919.

45. van Niel, op. cit., pp. 128, 142-143.

46. Neratja, 1 August 1918.

47. Interview with Tubagus Martakusumah, Bandung, 21 August 1975. Haji Kembar was a well-to-do builder in Rangkasbitung.

48. Neratja, 20 August 1919.

49. A complete run of Mimbar is kept in the library of the National Museum in Jakarta.

50. van Niel, op. cit., pp. 145-149; Yong Mun Cheong, op. cit., pp. 136-197, 209-212; W.A. Oates, "The Afdeling B: An Indonesian Case Study", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 9, no. 1, 1968, pp. 109-116; Noer, op. cit., pp. 195-197; J.Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie, Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1928, pp. 69-70.

51. Interview with Tubagus Martakusumah, Bandung, 25 August 1975; H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 8 April 1922. Martakusumah himself left the SI in 1921 for similar reasons. Many of the teachers joined Hardo Poesoro, a Javanese mystical organization, close to the theosophical movement. In Cianjur in the Priangan, 12,000 members were reported to have left the SI in 1919, Mimbar, 4 October 1919.

52. Report of the Resident of Priangan, L. Stuers, to Governor-General, 17 September 1919 in Kwantes, op. cit., p. 153.

54. H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 25 March and 8 April 1922; Mimbar, 6 December 1919. Anti-Sarekat Islam associations were set up in many other areas, with official backing, but most notably in the Priangan, see Yong Mun Cheong, op. cit., pp- 27-29 and "Oprichting contra-vereenigingen tegen Communisme. Sarekat Hedja in Sumedang en analoge verschijnselen elders i.d. Priangan", report to Governor-General, 15 June 1925, Kern Collection, H 797:82, KITLV, Leiden. Suriadipura was the son of Suriadiningrat, Regent of Lebak, 1881-1907, who was always known to Bantenese as 'dalem wetan' - the regent from the east. See R.A. van Sandick, Leed en Lief uit Bantam, Zutphen: W.G. Thieme, 1892, pp. 9-10 and Tubagus Roesjan, Sedjarah Banten, Djakarta: Arief, 1954, p. 49.

55. Mimbar, 20 February 1920.

56. Mimbar, 5 March 1920; MvO, W.G. Thieme, June 1920, pp. 23-24.

57. MvO, Thieme, 1920, pp. 6-10.

58. Ibid., p. 8.

59. Ibid., p. 9; Mimbar, 20 March 1920.

60. MvO, Thieme, 1920, pp. 8-9; H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 25 February 1922; Neratja, 19 May 1920.

61. Neratja, 4, 10 and 15 May and 1 June 1920.

62. Neratja, 29 April and 29 May 1920.

63. Neratja, 4 January 1921.

64. Neratja, 24 January 1921 and interview with Tubagus Martakusumah, Bandung, 21 August 1975. In June 1921, some members of the SI in desperation again proposed Arga as chairman (Neratja, 2 June 1921). But Arga announced that he intended to leave for Europe to study. He left for Singapore, but returned a few months later when he was arrested on embezzlement charges, Neratja, 27 October 1921.

65. Neratja, 29 January 1921 and interview with Tubagus Martakusumah, Bandung, 21 August 1921. Entol Ternaja was to play a leading role in suppressing the revolts of 1926 and 1945.

66. On the decline of the Sarekat Islam after 1919, see van Niel, op. cit., pp. 157, 199-210; see also the report by J.H. Schrieke, the government spokesman in the Volksraad to the Governor-General, A.C. de Graeff, 12 October 1927, in R.C. Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie, Vol. 2, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1978, pp. 630-634. On the Sarekat Islam in Banten, see A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 285-290; H. Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen", De Taak, 28 January, 4, 11, 18 and 25 February, 25 March and 8 April 1922.

67. On the swing by the Muslim trading class from the Sarekat Islam to Muhammadiyah, Benda notes, "Many people felt attracted to it (the Muhammadiyah) because it did not propagate attacks on others, not even on Christians, or agitate against imperialism."

Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958, pp. 45-46; see also p. 56. On the conservative character of the Muhammadiyah, see Ch. van der Plas, "Neutraliseering en bestrijding van revolutionaire propaganda", in Kwantes, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 712-713.

68. Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965, pp. 302-303; "Kort Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering van de PKI en de SI, 3 Maart 1923", Mailrapport 286[x]/1923.

69. Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, eds., The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960, p. 28. This collection includes (pp. 19-96) the official report of the government inquiry into the uprising in Banten (referred to hereafter as the "Bantam Report"). MvO, Thieme, 1920, pp. 8-9.

70. Dunia Islam, 23 March 1923; Pengharapan Banten, 12 and 19 January 1924. Haji Agus Salim published Dunia Islam in Rangkasbitung from 8 December 1922 to 11 May 1923; nine issues appeared. Interview with his younger brother, I.F.M. Salim, Rijswijk, the Netherlands, 12 September 1974; see also his Vijftien Jaar Boven-Digoel: Bakermat van de Indonesische Onafhankelijkheid, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Contact, 1973, pp. 26-27.

71. Pengharapan Banten, 19 January 1924.

72. See the report by Achmad Djajadiningrat, 11 November 1922, 70/ZG in Mailrapport 252[x]/1923; see also Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java. A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 136-140.

73. On amulets, see A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 163-165 and G.W.J. Drewes, Drie Javaansche Goeroes. Hun Leven, Onderricht en Messiasprediking, Leiden: A. Vros, 1925, pp. 55-62. They were usually handwritten in Arabic, a printed text not being valued highly. Also the ink had to be of a special sort and in no case European made. One made from rose, saffron or orange blossom water was thought to be particularly good. The fact that they were written in Arabic script gave 'meaning' and exercised additional power over the illiterate Javanese peasant. Amulets are of course common in all peasant societies, see for example Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England, Harmondsworth: Penguin University Books, 1973, pp. 33, 328-329, 438, 588.

74. One of the two police spies involved, Djahari, was in fact a brother of Arga. Nawawi treated eye and skin complaints, both of which were endemic in the Cilegon area. He had formerly worked as a guru ngaji, but had given this up because of bad eyesight. He was the first person in his village to join the SI in 1913 and originally lost influence because of this.

75. Many of those who joined were also old and sickly, but there were also some with jawara backgrounds.

76. Bedding to Achmad Djajadiningrat, No. 4/ZG, 11 January 1923, and Bedding to Procureur-General, No. 17/ZG, 10 February 1923 in Mailrapport 252[x]/1923. Haji Nawawi was later sentenced to two years' imprisonment, MvO, J.C. Bedding, March 1925, p. 68. Arga, who had rejoined the SI and held meetings protesting against the arrest of Haji Nawawi, received an 18-month jail sentence for embezzlement, MvO, Bedding, p. 67.

77. Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, 10 November 1922, accused Achmad Djajadiningrat of neglecting his regency by spending too much time in the Volksraad. See also A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 308-317.

78. Neratja, 11 October and 15 November 1921; see also "Advies inzake voorgenomen Bestuursreorganisatie van de Res. Banten", 24 August 1921, No. 560, Kern Collection H 797:55, KITLV, Leiden.

79. "Opheffing Res. Banten", report of Director of Binnenlands Bestuur, 8 November 1921, No. 1133 G, Kern Collection H 797:56, KITLV, Leiden.

80. Sutherland, Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, pp. 76-80.

81. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 317-320. The quarrel between Bedding and Achmad Djajadiningrat came to a head over the celebrations in Serang to mark the 25th jubilee of Queen Wilhelmina's reign, with Bedding pointedly excluding Achmad from the organizing committee, ibid., pp. 320-321. See also J.C. Bedding, "Man en Paard", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, Vol. 26,

1937, pp. 376-384 and the review in the same number of Achmad's memoirs by J.W. Meyer Ranneft, "Herinneringen van Pangeran Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat", pp. 385-388. Bedding noted bitterly, ibid., p. 379, "With 10 other regents with whom I have worked in my 28 years service on Java, I always enjoyed the most excellent working relationship and it must be added there, that they did not enjoy the high protection of Snouck Hurgronje or of any of the Advisers for Native Affairs who followed him."

82. Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja, pp. 161, 184-185.

83. Achmad Djajadiningrat was Regent of Batavia from 1924 to 1929. In December 1929, he was appointed the first Indonesian member of the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies). He died in 1943.

84. An anonymous writer in Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 20 December 1926, noted, "It was called a promotion, but it was in my opinion nothing more than an attempt by the government to control him better"; see also Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, 12 December 1926.

85. Report of Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs to Governor-General, 30 August 1924, F/280, Kern Collection H797:57, KITLV, Leiden.

86. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

PRELUDE TO REVOLT

The Beginnings of Communism in Banten

In March 1925, the Resident of Banten, J.C. Bedding, wrote confidently on his retirement that the Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia - PKI) had no future in the region.[1] Within 20 months of Bedding's statement, however, the paths of Indonesian Communism and of militant Islam had become inextricably entwined and Banten was set to be one of the main scenes of the most important uprising in twentieth century Indonesian history prior to the revolution of 1945. The sudden and, to the Dutch colonial authorities, completely unexpected development whereby Banten became a bastion of the PKI might equally have surprised leading Communists prior to 1925. Certainly there was little to signal this development and although a Marxist movement had existed in Indonesia since 1914, it had made little impact in Banten. Indeed, as late as December 1924, there were only two known members of the PKI in Banten.[2]

The origins of Indonesian Communism can be traced to the founding, in May 1914, of the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging (ISDV - the Indies Social Democratic Association) by the Dutch Marxist, Henk Sneevliet.[3] The ISDV, the first Marxist party in colonial Asia, although at first dominated by Dutch socialists, developed close links with the infant Indonesian labour movement, much of which grew up under the tutelage of the ISDV. In particular, the party worked closely with the strongest and oldest Indonesian trade union, the Vereeniging voor Spoor en Tramweg Personeel (VSTP - the railway and tram workers' union). The VSTP

formed the proletarian core of first the ISDV and later of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), founded in May 1920.

The need, however, to establish bonds with the wider mass of the Indonesian population led the ISDV to pursue from 1916 a 'bloc-within' strategy inside the Sarekat Islam. This strategy, the first concrete example of a Marxist party attempting to infiltrate another party and form cells within it as a means of developing its own propaganda and contacts amongst the masses, was to pay large dividends to the ISDV and later the PKI for several years. The strategy was largely possible because of the decentralized character of the Sarekat Islam, which had resulted from the refusal of the Netherlands East Indies government to sanction a national organization. As a result of the Marxist infiltration of the organization, several local branches of the Sarekat Islam fell wholly under the sway of the Semarang-based ISDV. It was to be several years before a coherent right-wing trend was to emerge in the Sarekat Islam and the PKI was forced to abandon the policy only in 1921, when it was expelled from the Sarekat Islam.

The ISDV itself never established a branch in Banten, although two members of its executive committee did live in the area, Hasan Djajadiningrat and the Dutch Marxist, J.C. Stam. Despite their presence, there is little evidence that either of them made any concerted effort to win the Banten Sarekat Islam to the radical positions propounded by the Marxists in Semarang. Hasan Djajadiningrat's own political views were decidedly moderate and not all that distinct from the liberal Dutch 'Ethical' reformers.

He belonged to the minority reformist wing of the ISDV and in 1919 he resigned, declaring himself a follower of the German reformist socialist Lassalle rather than Marx.[4]

Stam, however, adhered to the revolutionary position proposed by Sneevliet and most of the ISDV leadership. He worked as a schoolteacher in Banten from 1916 to 1919, first in Serang and then in Rangkasbitung.[5] Stam was a prominent member of the ISDV and was frequently visited in Serang by other ISDV leaders such as Sneevliet, Brandstedter and Bergsma. He was a regular contributor to the party journal, Het Vrije Woord and in April 1918 founded the socialist teacher's paper, De Indische Volksschool, with B. Coster and W. Snel. When the ISDV became the PKI in May 1920, Stam was elected a member of its executive committee and was later proposed by the party as its candidate for the Volksraad (People's Council).[6]

From the point of view of his impact on Banten, however, Stam seems to have achieved little. He did occasionally address meetings of the local section of the Sarekat Islam on important national issues, such as the trial of Sneevliet in September 1917.[7] Stam himself was acutely aware of his political isolation in the region and tried to get round this by establishing debating clubs in Serang and Rangkasbitung. The clubs attracted members amongst junior priyayi, schoolteachers and local officials of the railways, pawnhouse and irrigation services. However, there is no evidence of any link between the clubs and the later growth of the PKI in Banten. In November 1919, Stam was transferred to Tuban in Central Java; two years later, he left Indonesia for good.

Stam was not the only important Dutch Communist to have lived in Banten. Some years later, G.J. van Munster was appointed a teacher at the Opleidings School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (OSVIA) in Serang.[8] But van Munster, although a member of the PKI, was even more isolated in Banten than Stam had been. His only real contacts seem to have been with his students, on whom he evidently made a great impression. In October 1924, he was expelled from Indonesia by the authorities, earning the distinction of being the last Dutch Communist to be expelled from the country.[9]

Although the ISDV had not established a branch in Banten, the railway workers' union, the VSTP, had.[10] The VSTP held a public meeting in Labuan in July 1922 at which the main speaker was the PKI leader Semaun. The following year the VSTP launched a railway strike throughout Java in support of a claim for better wages and conditions for its members. Several meetings were held in Banten during the course of the strike, a number of them addressed by the VSTP chairman, Sugono, attracting large audiences.[11]

The failure of the 1923 railway strike led to a wave of victimization by the Dutch authorities and employers against those considered to be activists.[12] Amongst those sacked was a Bantenese clerk working at the Tanah Abang railway station in Batavia, Raden Oesadiningrat. Oesadiningrat, who was a distant relative of Achmad Djajadiningrat, the Regent of Serang, returned to his native Pandeglang where he found employment with the VSTP as a full-time official.

Although there was no PKI branch, or even membership, in Banten, Oesadiningrat did organize three public meetings in 1924 at which

prominent PKI leaders spoke. Ironically, Oesadiningrat, who was instrumental in these modest attempts by the PKI to recruit a following in Banten, was eventually to play an important role as a spy and police agent in the suppression of the 1926 insurrection.[13]

After the complete rupture between the PKI and the Sarekat Islam in 1923, the Communist Party established its own mass organization, the Sarekat Rakyat (People's Association). Although the Sarekat Islam in Banten, or what was left of it, was hostile to the moderate leadership of Tjokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim, no attempt was made by the PKI to court the Bantenese Sarekat Islam or to establish branches of the Sarekat Rakyat in the region. Undoubtedly this reflected the weakness of the PKI in West Java at the time. In August 1924, Oesadiningrat did chair a meeting in Pandeglang organized by the VSTP apparently with the intention of establishing a branch of the Sarekat Rakyat, but from police reports it appears that nothing came of it.[14]

In October 1924 Oesadiningrat made another attempt and invited the PKI leaders Alimin and Musso to speak at inaugural meetings. The two leaders spoke on 12 October at a meeting in Pandeglang attended by 14 people. The following day a meeting at Kadomas drew a crowd of only nine. Nothing further came of the attempt to establish the Sarekat Rakyat in the region and soon after Oesadiningrat left Banten for Central Java to return only in 1926.[15]

Given such an unpromising start, the later rapid growth of the PKI in a comparatively short period of time was unexpected, and certainly took the Dutch administration completely by surprise.

Yet within 12 months, by late 1925, membership of the party was to number several thousand and was to grow even more in 1926.

This startling change in the PKI's fortunes had been brought about by a small number of men who had moved to Banten in 1925. Some were Bantenese who had joined the PKI in other areas of Java, others were itinerant artisans and a few were full-time party propagandists dispatched at the behest of the executive committee to establish a section there. For the most part, these men came from the 'new priyayi' of minor government officials or were members of Indonesia's small intelligentsia. They had attended the Dutch elementary school for Indonesians (HIS - Hollandsch-Inlandsche school) and then had left Banten to work in Batavia or elsewhere in Java. It was whilst working outside Banten that they came into contact with radical political movements and in particular with the Communist Party (PKI). This pattern of Bantenese returning from elsewhere to play an important role in radical movements in the region was to distinguish the 1926 uprising from its predecessors in the nineteenth century.

One of the Bantenese who returned to his home area in 1925 was Tubagus Alipan. Born in 1902 in Pandeglang, Tubagus Alipan was the son of a minor official and had attended the HIS in Pandeglang. In 1917 he went to live in Temanggung in Central Java and eventually found work there as a printer.[16] He became active in the printers' union (Sarekat Buruh Cetak) and in 1921 joined the PKI. Two years later he became a propagandist for the party and was responsible for trade union work in the Temanggung area. In 1925 he was requested by the PKI chairman, Darsono, to return to Banten to

assist in establishing a section of the party. As he played an important role in the development of the revolutionary movement, it is interesting to recall some of his life history in his own words.

> "My first political experience was when I was still young and living in Pandeglang. Tjokroaminoto came to the town to address a meeting of the Sarekat Islam in 1916. I remember the excitement not only of us youngsters, but throughout the town. Even though at the time I understood little of the political content of the meeting, Tjokroaminoto to us was almost a superhuman personality and symbolized the awakening of the Indonesian people . . .
>
> Temanggung was a very different place from Banten. It was much more open and I rapidly became politicised by the currents of the time. I began working in a printing press there and this became my vocation. The condition of the workers at that time was of course very poor. To try and improve matters, I established with some other comrades a mutual benefit society, 'Rukun Temanggung'. Soon after, I joined the printers' union and later the PKI."[17]

Alipan returned to Banten with Puradisastra, the future chairman of the Banten section of the PKI, in August 1925. Puradisastra was a Sundanese from Banjar, near Ciamis, in the Priangan and a former minor government official.[18] He had joined the PKI in 1923 and worked for the party in West Java and also in Bengkulu in West Sumatra, an area where many Bantenese worked as migrant labourers. Puradisastra himself had married a Bantenese woman from Menes. His younger sister, Sukaesih, was one of the few prominent women members of the PKI in the 1920s. In 1924 Puradisastra had worked closely with the PKI leader Musso in trying to reactivate the labour unions in Batavia, particularly the printers' union and the drivers' union, unions in which a number of Bantenese were active.

Puradisastra and Alipan were assisted in their work by a number of other Bantenese PKI activists, the most prominent of whom was Achmad Bassaif.[19] Bassaif was born in Serang in 1903, the son of an Arab father and a Bantenese mother. His father was a comparatively wealthy trader and Bassaif himself was educated at the Al-Irsjad school in Batavia. He was recruited into the PKI by Puradisastra. Bassaif became an enormous asset to the PKI because of his background; he was fluent in Arabic and had a deep knowledge of Islam and its scriptures, credentials which were to serve the party well. He quickly became a full-time organizer and chairman of the sub-section of the party in Jembatan Lima, a neighbourhood of Batavia heavily populated with Bantenese. In 1925 he became chairman of the PKI sub-section in Tanggerang, where he successfully allayed many local suspicions regarding the alleged hostility of the PKI towards Islam.[20] In August 1925 he returned to Banten to help with the establishment of the PKI's 37th section. Bassaif was accompanied by Tubagus Hilman, another Bantenese communist. Educated at the Serang HIS, Tubagus Hilman had worked for several years as a draughtsman in the Irrigation Department in Batavia, where he joined the PKI in 1924.[21]

Another early member of the Banten communist group was Mohammed Abdu Rachmat.[22] Like Tubagus Alipan, he was a printer by profession. Born in Ceribon, he had joined the PKI in 1923 and two years later moved to Serang where he found work on De Banten Bode, a newspaper founded in September 1924 by Charles M. Fritz.[23]

Abdu Rachmat, Atmodihardjo and Ishak, two other printers on De Banten Bode, worked in close collaboration with Djarkasih, another of the early communists to be sent by the PKI to Banten.

Like Puradisastra, Djarkasih was Sundanese and had been active in the party in the Priangan. Djarkasih moved to Serang in July 1925 and opened a cycle repair shop in the market. It was here that many of the first meetings of the small group of Serang communists were held in July and August 1925. Abdu Rachmat recalls those early days,

> "At first we worked entirely underground, partly because we wished to establish a presence without the police being aware of our existence but also because we were apprehensive about what form party work should take in Banten given that the area is a devoutly Muslim region."[24]

In this respect, the group was to experience its most serious teething problem with the behaviour of its own leader, Puradisastra. The future chairman of the Banten section of the PKI openly told those he encountered that he was an atheist and committed the cardinal sin for Banten of drinking coffee during Ramadan (fasting month) in public.[25]

Puradisastra's somewhat intemperate behaviour was curbed by the timely arrival in Banten of Achmad Bassaif and another PKI propagandist with a distinctly Islamic background, Hasanuddin, who came from West Sumatra.[26] Evidently the PKI leadership in Batavia took rather more care in selecting its propagandists than its choice of chairmen of local sections. Whatever the case, the combination of Puradisastra, Bassaif and Hasanuddin, together with the small group of Serang communists, was to prove remarkably effective in the closing months of 1925 in building the PKI's 37th section.

The PKI's Road to Revolt

By late 1925, the PKI had eclipsed the Sarekat Islam as the major political force on the Indonesian scene. From its third congress in June 1924 it had, moreover, increasingly isolated itself from other elements in the Indonesian nationalist movement. The party's experiment with a 'bloc-within' strategy inside the Sarekat Islam had long since been abandoned by the virtual expulsion of the PKI at the October 1921 Sarekat Islam conference.[27]

The difficulties the party had met in organizing labour unions led it from 1923 to turn again to expanding its work in the countryside and also in other areas of Indonesia where it had previously been inactive.[28] In Java, prior to this date, most of the PKI's activities had been concentrated in the Central and East provinces of the island. The 'capital of Indonesian Communism' had been Semarang and the PKI's organization in West Java was comparatively underdeveloped. In March 1923, a special congress of the PKI and of the Sarekat Rakyat had been held in Bandung and increased efforts were made to expand party activities in the region.[29]The same year, two men who were later to become important PKI leaders, Alimin and Musso, were released from prison having served four-year sentences for their alleged involvement in the 'Afdeling B' affair of 1919.[30]

On their release from detention, Alimin and Musso joined the PKI and began to play an important role in the increased party efforts in West Java. Alimin became active in organizing seamen and dockers in Batavia's port, Tanjung Priok, and Musso undertook a crucial role in reorganizing the Batavia PKI from March 1924.[31]

Throughout 1924 the PKI expanded in West Java and after the party congress in June that year the PKI headquarters was transferred from Semarang to Batavia.[32] At the same time, a Sundanese party official from Bandung, Winanta, became chairman of the PKI.[33]

The June 1924 congress was marked by a distinct swing to the left for the PKI and this trend was confirmed by a special conference of the party in December 1924 at Kutagede, near Yogyakarta. The conference decided to disband the Sarekat Rakyat, absorbing its membership into the PKI and virtually condemning the party to a course that could only end in insurrection.[34] Under the direction and influence of an executive now dominated by Aliarcham, the party effectively abandoned the principle of 'democratic centralism' in favour of 'federative centralism' and reached a decision to establish an illegal organization.[35]

The new direction of the party was confirmed by a meeting of the PKI leadership in Batavia in March 1925.[36] As a result of decisions taken at this meeting, there was now almost no turning away from the path of armed revolt. Local units of the party were to be granted greater autonomy and to be allowed to act independently as long as their decisions were in line with the PKI constitution and by-laws. These units were to be based on cells of five members who, when sufficiently trained, would recruit others to the organization.[37] In order to avoid the increasingly repressive measures of the authorities, the party leadership advised its branches to substitute small closed meetings for open public ones.[38] The PKI was to be divided into major territorial units that would be responsible to headquarters in Batavia. Former party branches would become sub-sections of these new units, which were to expand in number to 75.

One of the most interesting and relevant decisions to emerge from the March 1925 meeting as far as Banten was concerned was that 'adventurist elements' were to be recruited into the party. This decision was strongly argued by Alimin, whose previous involvement with the 'Afdeling B' and with Batavia labour unions we have already noted. During his work with seamen and dockers in Tanjung Priok, Alimin almost certainly came into contact with Bantenese jawara gangs who were active in labour recruitment and smuggling.[39] Alimin argued that such elements could serve the party as well as fight against it, as they had done when they were enrolled into the right-wing gangs of the Sarekat Hijau (Green Association).[40] They were at present disaffected from most political organizations, but they had a healthy contempt for authority and the law and, when it came down to it, knew how to look after themselves.

This decision was to have important repercussions in Banten as the region was notorious for its unruly elements. The Sarekat Islam, under Hasan Djajadiningrat's guidance, had sought to exclude them though not entirely with success. The PKI, on the other hand, now deliberately sought to recruit them. Although this had important repercussions and results elsewhere, the decision was of far greater significance in Banten for at the time of the March 1925 meeting, there was no party organization in the region and thus no corpus of experienced party militants who would perhaps be able to integrate the 'adventurist elements' without allowing them too much influence on party structure and tactics.

When the PKI began to establish a section in Banten in September 1925, it was already committed to a strategy that could only culminate in armed revolt. Faced with the dismal failure of the strike wave of 1925 it became even more inevitable as the labour unions, with the exception of the VSTP, simply collapsed.[41] However, as the party embarked on this disastrous course, more and more of its most capable leaders were removed from the scene. By the end of 1925, Darsono, Aliarcham and Mardjohan had been expelled from Indonesia or were under arrest.[42] The removal of the most capable PKI leaders at a time when the party was pledged to take an insurrectionary path was to have disastrous results.[43]

The final decision to organize an armed revolt was taken at a secret conference of the remaining PKI leadership at Prambanan, near Yogyakarta, in December 1925.

Rukun Asli

The PKI's early moves in Banten, Puradisastra's coffee drinking excepted, were marked by a genuine subtlety and delicacy in handling Bantenese susceptibilities and sensitivities. Yet, with the exception of Achmad Bassaif, Tubagus Alipan and Tubagus Hilman, most of the early PKI leaders in Banten were not local people. Despite this considerable handicap, in a region notorious for its distrust of outsiders, the PKI successfully implanted itself in Bantenese soil in a comparatively short period of time. It also conveyed to its Bantenese membership the not easily accepted notion that they were part of a nationwide movement against Dutch colonial oppression.

This was a significant departure from earlier protest movements in Banten. The Cilegon uprising of 1888, for example, was local both in scope and leadership. Indeed, it was limited to the Anyer district of Serang regency.[44] Even the advent of the Sarekat Islam in Banten did not mark such a distinct change as did the PKI in 1925-26. The Sarekat Islam's leadership was local in origin and, with the exception of Hasan Djajadiningrat, had few connections with the Central Sarekat Islam and only a limited awareness of being part of a national movement. The virtual rupture of relations between the Sarekat Islam in Banten and the Central Sarekat Islam after 1920 amply demonstrated the latter point. Later developments in the Sarekat Islam, such as the split between Yogyakarta and Semarang, the increasingly religious focus of the Central Sarekat Islam and the growth of new organizations like the Sarekat Rakyat and the Sarekat Hijau had almost no impact in Banten.

The growth of the PKI in Banten was effectively to break the political isolation of the region whilst at the same time developing some consciousness of being part of a national movement. One should not underestimate the significance of this point because much of the success of the insurrectionary movement that culminated in the November 1926 uprising can be attributed to the widespread feeling amongst the rebels that they were merely one front of a nationwide revolutionary struggle against colonial rule. In that sense, there was with the emergence of the PKI in Banten a perceptible development from traditional protest movements towards new forms of protest.[45]

Banten was the last residency of Java where a section of the PKI was formed. In the neighbouring Tanggerang area of Batavia residency, a PKI sub-section was set up in early 1925 under the

chairmanship of Achmad Bassaif.[46] The PKI had also developed a strong sub-section in the Batavia neighbourhood of Jembatan Lima, an area of the capital where Bantenese traditionally congregated.[47] Bassaif and Puradisastra had been instrumental in establishing the PKI in Jembatan Lima and had successfully recruited many Bantenese living there who were later to be dispatched to their home region as propagandists.

According to Bassaif, the Batavia leadership of the PKI decided in June 1925 that a rapid spread of PKI activities to Banten was an urgent priority.[48] The expedition of this task was assigned to Puradisastra and Bassaif, who enlisted as lieutenants Tubagus Alipan, Tubagus Hilman and Djarkasih. In the next two months the group moved to Serang and began establishing a network of contacts there.[49] Alipan recalled this early and difficult period of the organization,

> "It was strange for me to return to Banten after many years' absence. I had regarded myself as a Communist for several years and was no longer a practising Muslim. In Java I had not used my title (Tubagus) because such things were clearly feudal and 'kolot' (old-fashioned, conservative). In Banten, though, Bass (Bassaif) would insist on Hilman and myself using our titles. 'You know full well what the title Tubagus means for the Bantenese', he would say. 'We must adapt ourselves to the way the people think and then see what we can do from there'"[50]

Bassaif's advice to Alipan was indeed sound and, more importantly, was to pay handsome dividends in the following months.

Fortunately for the PKI leaders in Banten the executive of the party had decided in 1925 to grant considerable autonomy to local sections. Rigid doctrinaire stances, particularly on such highly sensitive issues as the relationship between Communism and Islam,

were to be avoided. Instead, considerable attention and energies were to be devoted to the matters that directly concerned the masses, their daily difficulties and grievances. Moreover, because of the great importance of personal leadership in rural society in securing a popular following, the party set much store in recruiting local notables, especially members of the old dispossessed nobility and religious leaders.[51] This was to produce problems later as those brought into the party often proved difficult to control, but at least in the short run the results were wholly beneficial to the PKI in Banten and elsewhere.

The first recruits to the PKI in Banten, however, came from a more orthodox base of support for a left-wing party, the printing workers on De Banten Bode in Serang. Three of their number, Atmodihardjo, Ishak and Abdu Rachmat, were to become important local leaders of the PKI. These men, together with seven or eight other workers from the Fritz printing works, Tubagus Hilman, Tubagus Alipan, Alirachman, an employee of Hasan Djajadiningrat's widow and Lee Eng Hock, a local Chinese trader, would meet secretly with Bassaif and Puradisastra at the cycle shop owned by Djarkasih in Serang market.[52] The meetings discussed amongst other things how best to seek the support of the Bantenese in the PKI's struggle with the colonial government.

The outcome of these early meetings was that not only did Alipan and Hilman revert to using their 'feudal' titles, but they set about contacting other descendants of the former sultans of Banten, with a view to petitioning the Governor-General to obtain pensions. Indeed, so successful were these intrepid Communists in

arguing for the rights of disinherited nobles that no fewer than 200 of them signed a petition in August 1925 asking that all bearers of the title 'tubagus' (male descendants) and 'ratu' (female descendants) be granted pensions.[53]

Soon after this novel attempt at gaining support, Tubagus Hilman and Ishak, one of the printing workers on De Banten Bode, announced the establishment of a mutual benefit and burial society, Rukun Asli (Original Harmony). The first meeting of the new association took place in the village of Kramatwatu, halfway on the road between Serang and Cilegon, on 22 August 1925. The choice of Kramatwatu as a venue for the first meeting may not have been fortuitous. Kramatwatu had been one of the villages most involved in the Cilegon uprising of 1888 and many of the descendants of the rebels still lived there.[54] Some 80 people attended the first meeting, chaired by Ishak, at which Tubagus Hilman spoke. The meeting elected as chairman of the organization Haji Achmad Noer, a clerk in Serang, who had recently secretly joined the PKI.[55]

Members of Rukun Asli were to be charged an entry fee of one guilder which could be paid in 10 monthly instalments. Ishak announced that the primary intention of the new society would be to relieve the hardship caused to members by the deaths of close relatives in meeting funeral expenses. In time it was hoped that the new society would be able to extend the range of benefits available so that they would no longer be forced to sell or pawn their belongings in times of hardship. Rukun Asli, Ishak continued, had no political objectives and intended to abide by the laws of the

land. Furthermore, the new association's intentions and aims were fully in accord with the precepts of Islam, for the prophet Mohammed had made no distinction between rich and poor.[56]

The choice of a platform such as Rukun Asli in order to promote PKI aims was not as bizarre as it might at first seem. It will be recalled that Tubagus Alipan had been instrumental, some years earlier, in establishing a similar society in Temanggung and the PKI had also used the idea in other areas.[57] Moreover, peasant societies frequently form such associations as a way of coping with the modern world and its demands. The PKI was also aware that there was a tradition of such societies in Banten, some of which were open whilst others were clandestine, such as Santewe Arjo in 1920 and Haji Nawawi's society in Cilegon in 1922.[58]

It appears that the Rukun Asli soon won popular recognition and that a number of religious leaders lent their support to the new organization.[59] Meetings were reportedly held in villages in the Serang area in mosques and langgar (village prayer houses). In September a serious fire in Batavia which left many homeless prompted a large meeting of Rukun Asli in Serang attended by more than 300 people.[60] The main speech at the meeting was delivered by Ishak, who declared that the tragedy in Batavia underlined the need for the common people to come together to cope with the many adversities that they had to face. Puradisastra himself then spoke, drawing to the attention of the audience that it was indeed only through organizing themselves that the common people of the world could overcome their difficulties. This had now been proven by the Chinese people who had formed new societies which enabled them to

grapple with problems that had troubled their society for decades. At this point, the meeting was rudely interrupted by the police, who objected to the speaker bringing political content into his speech. Two days later, the police raided the homes of Tubagus Hilman, Ishak, Atmodihardjo and Djarkasih.

Rukun Asli had now served its purpose. The local PKI leaders decided that the need for secrecy was no longer important and that Rukun Asli had fulfilled its intention of preparing the ground for the PKI. Soon afterwards, on 9 October 1925, a public meeting was called in Serang to announce the establishment of the Banten section of the PKI.[61] The meeting elected Puradisastra as chairman, Tubagus Hilman as secretary and Djarkasih as treasurer of the 37th section of the Indonesian Communist Party. Three commissioners for the party were also elected - Haji Alwan, Arman and Mohammed Ali (Mamak). An office of the PKI was opened in Serang market in a property owned by a Chinese member of the party, Lee Eng Hock. From mid-October, nightly meetings were held in the office and also in a local Chinese-owned cinema, the Banten Park.[62] Soon after, Banten witnessed its first labour strike when the printing workers on De Banten Bode staged a stoppage in a claim for higher wages, Banten's own modest contribution to the strike wave that swept Java in late 1925.[63]

Unfortunately for the Banten PKI, the beginning of the party's activities in the region coincided with growing repression throughout Indonesia as the colonial authorities reacted to the strike wave. Darsono, one of the PKI's main theoreticians, was

expelled from Indonesia in September and the same month Alimin left the country for fear of arrest.[64] Aliarcham and Mardjohan were arrested soon after.

Harassment of PKI meetings was widespread. There was a police presence at all meetings and frequently they were closed under one pretext or another. The local administration in Banten took a particularly tough stance towards the PKI after initially being taken aback by its quick and rapid development.[65] A new government regulation that no person under the age of 18 could attend political meetings was frequently used by the police to close meetings and arrest speakers who were held responsible.[66] Party members in public employ, especially in Serang regency, were dismissed.[67] Even more irksome for the local PKI was the intimidating presence of armed police who would often refuse entry to meetings to all who were not party members. The weekly PKI meeting in Serang on 22 October, for example, was attended by three assistant wedana and six armed policemen who turned away many peasants because their names did not appear on the PKI membership roll.[68] Two weeks later, a meeting that was to be addressed by a PKI leader from Surabaya, Go Soei Hoa, was closed because the speaker had not obtained individual permission from the resident.[69] Some days later, on 8 November, Puradisastra received a month's imprisonment and Tubagus Hilman and Mohammed Ali (Mamak) 10 days' each for addressing a meeting at which two 17-year-olds were present.[70] Permanent police guards were placed on the PKI office in Serang and the party books seized by the police on the pretext of examining alleged financial irregularities.[71]

Despite their constant difficulties with the police, however, by the end of 1925 the PKI had established itself on a firm basis in Banten. The meetings which the party held every Wednesday in the Banten Park cinema in Serang drew regular crowds of 300 and members were beginning to be recruited in the regencies of Pandeglang and Lebak.[72] A report by the acting Resident, de Vries, in late November estimated total PKI membership in the residency at 1,200 and noted with concern that some religious leaders were being attracted to the party.[73] The PKI leadership evidently viewed their position in Banten with satisfaction, despite the harassment experienced from the authorities. An article in the Batavia PKI daily newspaper, Njala, in December, noted,

> "Comrades will understand that Communism has many roads. Although faced with all the powers of reaction, our membership (in Banten) does not decrease, nor does the political consciousness of our members, but on the contrary it increases like fire igniting a dry field."[74]

But if there was room for some optimism at a local level, at least in Banten, the fortunes of the PKI at a national level were far less happy. The strikes engineered by the party in late 1925 had not only produced no real improvements in workers' conditions, but also seriously undermined the PKI's trade union base. Key leaders had left the country or were under arrest and in late November the Dutch authorities placed further restrictions on political meetings.[75] Henceforth, all meetings, public or party, required a police presence and five days' notice to the authorities. In practice, permission was now far more difficult to obtain, the authorities using one subterfuge or another to deny the PKI the right to hold meetings.

These measures only served to confirm the PKI in its intentions to stage an armed uprising against the government. The critical decision was taken at a secret conference of party leaders at Prambanan in Central Java on 25 December 1925.[76] A clandestine illegal organization, the so-called Dubbel or Dictatoriaal Organisatie (DO - the Double or Dictatorial Organization) was to be established to expedite the task and the uprising was tentatively fixed for 18 June 1926. Another meeting of the party executive in Batavia on 13 January 1926 decided that any further legal political activity was impossible because of the repressive attitude of the authorities and all local sections of the party were told to act accordingly by letter on 1 February.[77]

Recruitment and Leadership of the Communist Movement

Increasing government repression, however, does not seem to have diminished popular support for the PKI in Banten. On the contrary, the sense of crisis and of impending rebellion became highly contagious and the PKI executive in Batavia was to face growing difficulties in keeping the Banten section in check.[78] Achmad Bassaif recalled the PKI strategy years later as follows,

> "The keynote of our work was agitation. In Banten everything possible was done to incite the people. The PKI's work there was different from other areas. It was the last residency of Java where the party established a section and this move virtually coincided with the Prambanan decision (to launch an insurrection). Thus, in Banten, the work of building a communist base had to coincide with preparations for the coming revolt. In the process, the leadership, after some initial hesitation, naturally gave great stress to the latter rather than to developing a solid core of communist cadres.

> Of course, a most important aspect of our work was the recruitment of influential persons, especially militant ulama, but also jawara, to the revolutionary cause. Our work was enormously aided by the great chasm of mistrust that existed in Banten between the people and the government. The movement grew faster than any of us imagined."[79]

The Dutch authorities, for their part, tried to keep the contagion under control, but were clearly not fully aware of how fast the communist movement was developing in Banten.[80]

Although public meetings of the PKI were now virtually forbidden, the party in Banten continued to thrive. Propaganda was spread by means of secret meetings and elaborate ruses were resorted to in order to avoid police interference. Meetings, for example, were frequently held in woods or PKI members would give slametan or hajat (religious feasts), under cover of which a meeting would take place.[81] In fishing villages, meetings would take place at dusk whilst the men were drawing in the nets.[82] In some places local stallkeepers, who had joined the PKI, allowed their warung (stall) to be used for informal gatherings.[83] In Serang, meetings took place in the Banten Park cinema, as before, but this time under cover of films such as 'Jack Dempsey'.[84] On other occasions, football matches were used as a venue for propaganda and in Labuan the PKI chairman, Afif, formed an association allegedly to promote Arab gambus music, but in fact serving the purpose of advancing the revolutionary cause in the countryside.[85] Such was the ingenuity of the local PKI that members who found themselves the wrong side of the bars of Serang prison even organized meetings for the other prisoners.[86]

But despite the seemingly endless ploys of PKI propagandists, meetings were sometimes closed by the police and arrests made. In February, Tubagus Hilman was sentenced to one month's imprisonment for breaking the newly-imposed ban on political meetings. In Ciomas, 14 peasants were arrested for holding a secret PKI meeting and were sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment each.[87] By the end of February, 27 PKI members were in detention in Serang prison, including Puradisastra who received a two-month sentence for breaking the ban on meetings.[88] On 20 February, 35 peasants, all apparently candidate members of the PKI, were arrested in Ciruas for holding an illegal meeting and two days later a further 18 peasants of the same district were taken into custody for the same offence.[89]

The local authorities, clearly alarmed by the degree of support for the PKI, tried to cope with the situation by imposing heavier sentences. In March, Haji Aliakbar, a PKI propagandist in Serang, received six months' imprisonment and another local leader in Ciruas, Haji Mardjoek, received four months' imprisonment for breaking the ban on meetings. The chairman of the now defunct Rukun Asli, Haji Achmad Noer, was also sent to prison for five months.[90] The police, particularly in Serang regency, were reportedly becoming far rougher in their handling of those arrested and beatings of those detained were not unknown.[91] But despite the increasing severity of measures taken by the local authorities, the PKI's support continued to grow, a development which apparently caused some surprise, even in PKI circles.[92] The Banten correspondent of Njala wrote,

> "The people of Indonesia can see that Banten, the last district where Communism developed, has not been left behind. If we look at the development of the movement in our country, there is no one who would have suspected that the political struggle would develop so quickly in Banten."[93]

A measure of how far the movement had indeed advanced in Banten was the enormous increase in party membership of the PKI. A correspondent of the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad who visited the region at the end of February 1926 estimated total PKI membership at 12,000, including 500 women members,[94] a figure that was confirmed in a report on the communist movement by the Governor of West Java, W.P. Hillen, in March.[95] This was indeed a dramatic increase in the three-month period since November 1925, when membership was estimated at 1,200.

The bulk of the astonishing increase in membership registered by the PKI was provided by the local peasantry. Even the majority of those appearing before the courts in Banten charged with breaking the ban on meetings were peasants. De Banten Bode noted in March,

> "Yesterday morning when this correspondent attended the Serang district court, we were amazed to see that those accused of breaking the ban on meetings were nearly all peasants. They are simple people, illiterate and gullible, of whom it cannot be said that they have any real understanding of Communism. They had been told that if they hesitated to join the party now, they could not join it later and would, therefore, not be exempt from the capitation tax (hoofdgeld)."[96]

The background to the growth of peasant support for the PKI had its roots in economic discontent in the region and in the PKI's utilization of traditional rural powerholders as brokers between

them and the peasantry. Whether or not the peasants had any 'real' grasp of Communism, they were clearly attracted by PKI promises of the abolition of taxation for those who joined the movement. Taxation, as the acting Resident de Vries recognized in a report on the PKI in Banten in November 1925, was one of the main causes of discontent amongst the peasants.[97] Resentment against the hoofdgeld (capitation tax) was marked in Banten because it formed a large part of the taxes raised there. The tax was inflexible, unlike the land tax (landrente), payable even when harvests were bad. The hoofdgeld was a particularly heavy burden in Banten, a district where harvests were frequently bad and markedly so in the 1920s. The growth of local taxation and the increasing number of items taxes were levied on were also important causes of peasant discontent and were exploited by PKI propagandists. Most evidence would indeed seem to indicate that the Javanese peasantry was quite heavily taxed in the 1920s. In a report by the Dutch economist Huender in 1921, the author concluded that the peasants were taxed to the limit.[98]

The constant promises made by the communists in their propaganda that a successful revolt would lead to the abolition of taxation or at least to exemption for members of the PKI found a ready response amongst the Bantenese peasants.[99] Indeed, taxation is the most frequent cause advanced by those sent for internment in Boven Digul as to the reason they joined the PKI.

PKI promises of a reduction or abolition of taxes after the overthrow of the Dutch were not without their comic touch. Tubagus Emed, the son of Kiyai Asnawi of Caringin, in a statement to the police after his arrest said that Puradisastra and Hasanuddin

had told him that the revolt was a necessity because of the tax burden on the people. If a man paid f. 10 now, they had reportedly said it stood to reason that he would pay f. 50 in five years. If half that sum were 'saved' with the PKI now to buy arms, there would be no need to pay the rest as the government would soon be overthrown.[100]

The realities of the economic situation and of the taxation burden in the 1920s indicate why PKI propaganda favouring the abolition of taxes met with a willing response in Banten. The general economic conditions of the Javanese peasantry appear to have declined in the early twentieth century, although there had been some improvement during the period of the First World War. In terms of direct taxes, it is estimated that the indigenous population of Java and Madura paid 26 million guilders in taxes in 1913; by 1918, direct taxes had risen to 33 million guilders.[101] The landrent, the main agricultural tax, which stood at 19 million guilders in 1910 had risen to 23.7 million guilders by 1923.[102] Prices were also rising fast during this period and although this included crop prices, there is no indication that these increased prices necessarily benefited the peasant farmer. Certainly this does not seem to be the case for Banten.[103]

What is evident is that soon after the First World War the living standards of the peasantry began to drop quite dramatically. Between 1913 and 1920, the purchasing power of the guilder had declined in real terms by 33%.[104] The value of people's incomes also declined slightly in this period. From 1920, however, this picture changed quite considerably. The problem of balancing the

colonial budget made the Netherlands Indies government make widespread economies while at the same time increasing taxes. This led to a fall of between 5% and 10% in the real incomes of the population between 1920 and 1923 of 1913 figures. There was to be some slight recovery in 1924, although real per capita income was still less in 1924 than in 1913.[105] This fall in income coincided with a population increase of some 10% over the same period, 1913-24.

The tax burden increased considerably in the 1920s despite the fact that Huender in his investigation of 1921 had already warned that the Javanese peasant was too heavily taxed. In particular, the amount of land tax (landrente) paid by the peasant increased sharply.[106] When, in 1925, Huender conducted an inquiry with Meyer Ranneft into taxation of the Javanese peasantry, they concluded that "everywhere in recent years there has been an unmistakable decline in the welfare of the native population".[107] They were in no doubt that one of the chief causes for this decline was the increase in the land tax. In Banten, as in other residencies of Java, the years 1920-24 saw large increases in the landrent.[108]

Migration, which played an especially important role in the economy of Banten, was also curtailed in the early 1920s by the onset of the depression. Job opportunities were beginning to decline and with them relative wage levels.[109] Both in Batavia and Sumatra, jobs were becoming difficult to obtain as the economic malaise set in. The economic rewards from seasonal migration were also in decline, as is clear from the following table:

Table XVIII

Daily wage rates for unskilled labour in cents (1913 = 100)

	1913	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924
Banten	30(100)	50(166)	45(150)	47(158)	47(158)	37(125)
Batavia	33(100)	51(164)	60(182)	54(163)	54(163)	53(161)
Lampung	75(100)	75(100)	75(100)	75(100)	55(73)	55(73)
Tanjung Priok	60(100)	90(150)	106(167)	85(142)	75(125)	65(108)

Source: Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch Indie 1925 pp. 235-236

What is most striking is that the two areas where Bantenese sought and found seasonal employment traditionally, the Lampungs and Tanjung Priok, both showed large falls in wage rates between 1920 and 1924, at the same time that prices were rising fast.

Agricultural incomes were also falling in Banten in the 1920s. Because of the dependence of the wet rice fields (sawah) on rain for irrigation, and the consequent unpredictability, the rate of harvest failures was often as high as 30%.[110] Throughout the 1920s, there was a tendency for harvests to decline, as is clear from the following figures relating to the Serang regency:

Table XIX

Rate of harvest failure 1915-24 in Serang regency (in percentages)

1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924
27.5	19.5	16.8	21.9	20.2	19.7	35.0	29.3	28.3	34.7

Source: Verslag van den Economischen Toestand der Inlandsche Bevolking 1924, Vol. II, p. 5

The year before the revolt, 1925, produced a particularly bad harvest. Rainfall in that year had been limited to 112 days, compared to an average for the region of 137.1 days.[111] For Banten as a whole, in no year between 1916 and 1922 did less than 10% of the sawah harvest fail. In 1922 a staggering 20% of the sawah harvest failed compared with a Java failure rate of only 5.2%.[112]

Poor harvests, declining agricultural incomes and deteriorating work opportunities elsewhere were not the only factors that fuelled economic discontent in Banten. For the peasantry it was the burden of taxation which above all provoked discontent. Unlike poor harvests, which were clearly an act of God or the fall in incomes for which no one seemed directly responsible, peasants were very aware that taxes were the direct responsibility of the government. Even more galling was the fact that the purpose of taxation was largely lost on an unsophisticated peasantry who could only see an ever larger share of their income disappearing into the pockets of an 'infidel' government at a time when they were finding it ever more difficult to make ends meet. This was even more so when the

substantial leeway that the Bantenese peasant had enjoyed as a result of the availability of seasonal migration was coming into question.

To the colonial government, fixed head taxes and fixed land taxes were preferable to a tax on actual income. Indeed, in times of economic crisis and depression, these taxes were more valuable to the authorities than onces related to income.[113] The landrent, it is true, was tied to the annual harvest, but the capitation tax was fixed. Even for the landrent, rebates were difficult to obtain. Moreover, from the beginning of the century, both taxes were collected with a rigour and efficiency that was not possible in earlier times. With widely fluctuating harvests, the burden of taxation varied enormously. The actual tax burden therefore differed widely from one year to another. The landrent was largely blind to these variations; if half a crop was lost, taxes were in effect twice the burden they would normally have been.

Declining economic circumstances and the plethora of new taxes introduced in recent years contributed to discontent on this issue,

> "It is not so much the fact that taxes are higher than elsewhere and higher than they used to be (before the boom years), but that for various reasons they are felt more nowadays . . . what irritates the people there is especially the large variety of taxes."[114]

The total of direct taxes paid to the government had increased by almost 50% in Banten between 1913 and 1924, from 995,909 guilders to 1,474,286. It is significant that the landrent, which in 1913 accounted for about 87% of direct taxes, in 1924 only accounted for 66% of direct taxes. In the intervening period, it had increased by approximately 16% from 806,985 guilders to 945,256 guiders, but other direct taxes had increased far more. In the same 11-year period (1913-24) indirect taxes more than doubled from 409,261 guilders to 904,586 guilders.[115]

Just as striking as these increases in taxation was the evidence produced by the subsequent inquiry into the 1926 revolt which indicated that for most social groups taxation in Banten was higher than for the corresponding average for Java. According to these statistics, for example, sharecroppers in Banten paid 9.3% of their income in taxes, while the average for Java was 4.1%; agricultural workers wholly employed in native agriculture paid only 2.7% of their income in taxes on average in Java, but for Banten the figure was nearly three times higher at 7.6%.[116]

But equally important as economic causes for peasant unrest was the great impression that the PKI itself as a movement made on the peasants. The Communist Party was far more visible than the Sarekat Islam, and its organization and efficiency made a greater impact on peasant minds than the SI had done at an earlier stage. The presence of far more able leaders than the Sarekat Islam had been able to muster helped the impression that the PKI was a movement that was not only here to stay but would inevitably take over from the Dutch.[117] The comments on Puradisastra of Fritz, the editor of

De Banten Bode, although somewhat exaggerated, do nevertheless convey something of the impression PKI leaders made on the peasantry,

> "Everywhere he (Puradisastra) makes a great impact on the gullible peasants. With his spectacles and briefcase, the Bantenese consider him a man of great importance. Peasants and ulama flock to 'Rumah No. 13' where they see the bold legend 'Office of the Indonesian Communist Party - Banten Section'. Inside there are books, files and newspapers everywhere. PKI 'mantri' come and go, naturally with their own spectacles and briefcases and to the peasants give an impression of a 'shadow government'. The arrogance of the Communist officials in the face of the government has an undeniable effect on the peasants and ulama."[118]

What passed in peasant minds for the efficiency and modernity of the PKI were important for developing the image of the party as a counter-force to the government. This added strength to the communist contention that the rebellion could be successful. The PKI managed to convey the impression not only that the rebellion would be successful, but also that the pergerakan (movement) was strong, inevitable and irresistable. Even the language and idiom of the PKI helped to reinforce an image of inevitability and strength. In Banten, unlike elsewhere, every participant became a PKI member possessing the mystical red membership card. Leaders were called promotor or pemimpin. There were also kurier and mantri (junior officials). More senior leaders were appointed commissaris (commissioners).

Indeed, the structure of the PKI almost seemed to duplicate the government structure at all levels. The provision of such an elaborate structure may even have been one key to the attractiveness

of the communist movement, especially to elements such as the ulama and old nobility. These groups were excluded from the colonial regime by their own alienation from its ethos and because they did not possess that essential passport, secular education. With the establishment of an extensive communist political structure, it may well have seemed to many an opportunity to enter the political realm and, seemingly, to participate eventually in the government that would surely replace the 'infidel' Dutch and their allies, the priyayi.

The impression did indeed become widely accepted that the end of Dutch authority was fast approaching and that the PKI would soon take over from the colonial government. The fact that the movement seemed to be widespread throughout Indonesia and even to have important foreign allies only served to reinforce this impression. To some extent, the PKI served as an alternative conduit for the expression of peasant discontent and protest which had previously found expression in Javanese traditions of the Ratu Adil (the Just Prince) and in the Islamic concept of a holy war (jihad).[119]

But if it was clearly the peasants who were the foot soldiers, who were the officers of the movement? In other words, who acted as intermediaries between the small group of communist artisans and intellectuals whose progress we followed earlier and the peasants as a whole? The number of 'conscious' communists, a term actually used by the rebel leadership itself, was very small and consisted of persons who were largely, though not entirely, artisans or who had enjoyed some elementary education and had spent some time outside Banten.[120] Men like Bassaif, Tubagus Hilman, Ishak, Alipan,

Puradisastra and Djarkasih spring to mind. Alongside these men there was another small group of tradespeople who also acted as influential PKI propagandists.

There was, for example, Haji Santani, a tailor in Cilegon, who never lost an opportunity in dealing with customers to entreat them to join the pergerakan. Some tradesmen were like medieval itinerant journeymen, for example Ibing, a tailor who travelled the whole west coast of Banten urging people to join the PKI as he went along. Sometimes clerks in local government who joined the PKI managed to retain their positions. Their adherence was particularly useful for it further convinced the rank and file that the colonial regime itself was infiltrated and therefore ripe to fall. Other benefits flowed from such people. There was the clerk in the bank in Pandeglang who joined and who thereafter saw to it that only PKI members received loans from the bank. Soleiman, a PKI commissioner, was especially useful, for his work as a veterinary officer brought him into contact with a wide range of people, including not only peasants but also cattle dealers and butchers, a notoriously restless group in Banten whose activities were often tied up with the local jawara. Other tradesmen such as goldsmiths, watchmakers and stallkeepers were also enormously helpful to the success of the PKI.[121]

The groups, however, who figure most prominently in the role of 'intermediaries' between the PKI leadership and the peasantry were the old Banten nobility, the ulama and the jawara. It is highly significant that the PKI's first actions in Banten were geared to gaining the support of the dispossessed nobility, but the party was

to be equally successful in winning the support of the religious elite and of the jawara. Of course, not all ulama and jawara joined the PKI, but significant numbers did do so and their involvement was undoubtedly critical to the success of the revolutionary movement in Banten in being able to enlist such large peasant support. The PKI took great care in courting people it considered of importance and influence in local society precisely because their entry into the movement would be a signal to others of the acceptability, and indeed, the desirability, of joining the PKI.[122]

For the PKI the resentment of the ulama towards the colonial government was grist for the mill. Propagandists never ceased to point out that Islam could not be free under an infidel government but that Communism, which was rule by the people, would mean that religion would be free and would not be subject to restrictions such as those imposed by the colonial regime. Some PKI leaders, such as Achmad Bassaif and the Sumatran, Hasanuddin, came themselves from a religious background and were skilled in using dalil (quotations from the Koran) or firman (Allah's commandments) in making their points, thereby gaining easy access to religious leaders.[123]

At virtually all its meetings, the PKI made frequent appeals to parallels and precedents in Islamic history to engender amongst the ulama and the peasants the feeling that the coming revolutionary struggle was not only inevitable but would be victorious because it had God's blessing. Frequent reference was also made to more contemporary struggles such as that of the Moroccan people under Abd el Krim against infidel Spanish and French rule.[124] Indeed,

even Lenin and the Bolsheviks were portrayed as defenders of Islam and founders of a "state which was noble and just and agreed to by God" (negeri yang adil dan makmur dan diridai Allah).[125]

For their part, the ulama, regardless of any doubts that they may have entertained about Communism and the PKI, were impressed by the determination and organization of the communists which did indeed seem to lend credence to their arguments that the downfall of the Dutch was at hand. As one prominent religious leader recalled later,

> "Some of us understood that Communism was really opposed to Islam, but the important thing was that the PKI was the only organization that was willing to fight for independence. This we respected. The Sarekat Islam was as good as dead and only the PKI seemed to offer a path to religious and political freedom."[126]

To most religious leaders, the argument of the PKI that it was the successor to the Sarekat Islam was quite convincing and it is noticeable that, with few exceptions, all those who had previously been active in the Sarekat Islam unhesitatingly went over to the PKI.[127]

To many religious leaders, the PKI offered, or seemed to offer, admission to a political realm from which they had been rigidly excluded by the imposition of colonial rule. The troublesome and repressive restrictions placed on religious teaching by the Dutch would be done away with for ever. Another informant, also a religious teacher, recalled a PKI leader entreating him to join the party,

> "(Hasanuddin) said that the aim of the PKI was to do away with perintah (command, government). When Indonesia was free, there would be no need for taxes, no need for roda (compulsory village guard duty), no need to beat the beduq (drum to call the faithful to prayers). Nor would there be any need for the police. All would be felt to be responsibilities." (Semua akan dirasa kewajiban)[128]

It was indeed enticing for religious leaders to foresee an end of the restrictions imposed by the infidel government such as the need for a teaching licence and the necessity to keep registers of students.[129] These regulations were seen as a check on their freedom. Tabligh (public sermon) were always watched by the authorities, especially where they dealt with such delicate items as jihad (holy war), the struggles of the prophet Mohammed or of Islamic heroes. In April 1926, the passage of article 153 of the Dutch colonial legal code, which made any statement that was likely to disturb the public order punishable by a prison sentence, although not intended for application to the utterances of religious teachers, was skillfully used by the PKI to persuade ulama in Banten into joining the revolutionary movement.[130]

The relationship between the PKI and those religious leaders who joined the revolutionary movement was to some extent mutually beneficial. The adherence of important ulama to the PKI meant for the communist leadership in Banten that a much larger audience was reached than otherwise would have been the case. For the ulama, entry into the PKI seemed to give them a recognition that the colonial government refused to acknowledge. Moreover, it also seemed to reinforce their position in local society and to assure them of their continued prominence at a time when the continuing

advances of the 'Great Tradition' on the 'Little Tradition' of which they were an important part seemed ever threatening. The PKI offered a chance to redress the balance.

One of the most important religious leaders to join the PKI was Haji Tubagus Achmad Chatib, President of the Sarekat Islam in Labuan and son-in-law of Kiyai Haji Asnawi of Caringin, the most influential ulama in Banten at the time. Chatib brought with him an enormous number of his followers in the Labuan-Caringin area, including all the former Sarekat Islam members and his close companion, Tubagus Haji Emed, the son of Kiyai Asnawi. Haji Emed later recalled to the police their first meeting with Puradisastra, the PKI chairman, in Caringin in October 1925,

> "Puradisastra came to visit us around Djamadi'l-awal 1344. He praised my brother-in-law for the work he had done in the Sarekat Islam, but said the time of the Sarekat Islam was now past. The aim of the PKI was to obtain independence for Indonesia. In the struggle to obtain this aim, the people of Banten had been left behind. Soon the PKI would take over the government from the Dutch. As I remember, the conversation proceeded as follows:
>
> 'Puradisastra: What is the basis of the Sarekat Islam?
>
> Chatib: Islam.
>
> P: I too am a Muslim, but I am also chairman of the PKI in Banten.
>
> C: What sort of organization is the PKI?
>
> P: It is a section of the International.
>
> C: What do you mean by International?
>
> P: Well, an International is an organization that makes no distinction of race nor religion. Anyone can be a member whether he is Indonesian, Chinese or European.

> C: But what is the purpose of the organization?
>
> P: The granting of mutual help in both worldly and religious matters. Members must consider each other as brothers and comrades.
>
> C: If the protection of religion is one of the aims of the PKI, then I am of accord. Of worldly affairs, however, I have little understanding.'
>
> Puradisastra then said that he had no wish to pressure anyone to join the PKI, he only requested help and support."[131]

It is interesting to note that, whatever other promises it made, and certainly PKI propagandists were extravagant, the PKI did not claim that it was an Islamic organization, unlike the Sarekat Islam, merely that it would respect and protect religion. This comes over strikingly in another comment of a kiyai who had participated in the revolt,

> "The communist movement did not consider religion or race of importance. Everyone was the same, for it was said if we paid attention to race and religion, this would weaken our cause and our aims would not be achieved."[132]

As the insurrectionary movement gathered momentum, however, this distinction was frequently lost, especially on the rank and file.

The recruitment of Haji Tubagus Achmad Chatib and Tubagus Emed to the PKI led to many other ulama joining and also their followers.[133] Of all the ulama who participated in the PKI, Haji Chatib had the most political experience, gained from his years in the Sarekat Islam. Moreover, he was a fiery speaker and a man of considerable charisma. Although only 30 years old in 1926, he already had a small pesantren of his own and possessed wide influence because of his position as son-in-law of Kiyai Asnawi.

This latter fact was widely interpreted in Banten as a signal that the Kiyai of Caringin was at least neutral or even well-disposed to the revolutionaries. The PKI certainly did not seek to disabuse people of this impression.

Other ulama soon followed the lead of Haji Chatib. Kiyai Moekri of Labuan, together with Kiyai Madoen and Kiyai Tubagus Ichyar brought with them a considerable number of their santri (students). In Petir, in Serang regency, Kiyai Emed and Kiyai Yachya were recruited to the communist cause. When Kiyai Abdoelhadi of the village of Bangko, near Menes, joined he brought with him almost the entire local population.[134]

The adherence of these influential ulama to the PKI was a masterstroke on the part of the PKI leadership because it meant that not only would large numbers of peasants be far more likely to join the insurrection, but it also opened up to the communists new channels of communication at a time when public agitation was becoming impossible because of harassment by the authorities. Henceforth, meetings were held in langgar (village prayer houses), mosques and pesantren and the santri of the ulama often became couriers for the rebels. It is of interest to note, though, that there is no evidence of tarekat (mystical brotherhoods) being involved in the organization of the insurrection in the way that they were with the Cilegon revolt of 1888.[135] Several religious leaders, it seems, simply ordered their following to join the PKI. Djarman, a fisherman from Caringin, recalled the following conversation with Haji Chatib to the police,

> "In the month of Rowah (March 1926), Haji Chatib approached me several times to join the PKI. One day I was about to go to Labuan. Haji Chatib, who was sitting at the warung of Tubagus Emed, called me over and said 'Djarman, you must join the PKI soon (mesti lekas jadi lid communist) because its purpose is to achieve independence (kemerdekaan) for all.' I asked Haji Chatib what was meant by this. He replied that after independence all would be freed from taxation. Because Haji Chatib is influential, I trusted him (orang yang ternama di Caringin saya percaya kepada dia). When I went to Labuan that day, I went to see Afif, bought a membership card and became a communist."[136]

As Djarman was remarkably frank in his testimony to the police about other matters, there is no reason to doubt his account. Djarman, who was also a former santri of Haji Chatib, entered the PKI in a manner which was not at all unique, indeed it was fairly typical of hundreds of others who followed the lead set by their religious teachers.

Of course, not all ulama joined the PKI. On the contrary, the majority of religious leaders in Banten probably abstained from any direct involvement in the insurrectionary movement waiting to see how things developed or, like Kiyai Asnawi, they abjured getting entangled in worldly affairs confining their hostility to the kafir (unbeliever) to the spiritual realm. However, what was remarkable is that very few religious leaders in Banten were willing to speak out against the PKI.[137] One of the few who did was Kiyai Jasin of Menes, the only prominent figure of the Sarekat Islam in Banten not to go over to the PKI.[138] Kiyai Jasin did warn people against the incompatibilities of the PKI and Islam, but found little response, it seems. In February 1926, he organized a meeting at Labuan at which Tjokroaminoto himself was the main speaker. But it was

perhaps an indication of which way the wind was blowing that it was Puradisastra, who arrived to denounce the veteran Sarekat Islam leader as a lackey of the Dutch, who was better received by the crowd.[139] Thereafter, Kiyai Jasin took a back seat and made no further forays against the PKI.

Second only in importance to the ulama in the revolutionary alliance shaped by the PKI for the uprising in Banten was the recruitment of jawara, the local men of violence. The jawara often dominated the markets and cattle auctions of the region and they alone were able to offer effective protection in the countryside. Skilled in the martial arts and the use of the golok (machete) and parang (short sword), they also played an active part in managing labour recruitment for Batavia and Sumatra. Indeed, it is probable that it was in this latter context that the PKI first came into touch with them, for they were very prominent in Tanjung Priok. Like the mafioso of nineteenth century Sicily, the jawara of Banten exploited the gaps in communication between the peasant village and the larger society. They thrived on these gaps and reinforced their position by the systematic threat and use of violence.[140]

In sharp contrast to the Sarekat Islam, the PKI actively sought the assistance of jawara. In February 1926, the correspondent of Njala in Banten, 'Roodebril' (Puradisastra), noted approvingly the great change that had taken place amongst the jawara of Banten and how they were now firmly committed to the people's cause.[141] Pandeglang prison, which had been full of jawara elements in 1925, contained only three prisoners by March 1926. The implication was not that the jawara had radically mended their ways, but that their

energies had been channelled elsewhere (disalurkan ke PKI).[142] The success of the PKI in recruiting large numbers of jawara played a vital part in the eventual outbreak of insurrection.

Preparations for Insurrection

The enlistment of both the ulama and jawara into the PKI and the support lent it by prominent notables had an enormous impact on the local peasantry, for the acceptability of these 'intermediary' groups of the Communist Party ensured too that large numbers of peasants also joined the preparations for revolt. The peasants, of course, had their own grievances, particularly regarding taxes. But the absence of any specific peasant program in the PKI strategy meant that the peasants could only have been won to what was an essentially Jacobin appeal through the mediation of groups such as the ulama and jawara.[143] The participation of these intermediary groups secured for the revolutionary movement a mass character through their hold and influence on Bantenese society.

Revolutionary fervour was mounting throughout Banten in the first six months of 1926. Evidence of the spread of PKI activity seemed to appear everywhere. The authorities, alarmed by the number of ulama joining the movement, began withdrawing the teaching licences of those it was certain were members of the PKI.[144] But many ulama joined secretly and the PKI itself had now become largely an underground organization. In Serang, three prison warders at the local jail were found to have joined the PKI, one of them promising his comrades at a PKI hajat (religious feast) that they need fear no discomfort if they should end up in prison.[145]

Initially PKI activities were largely centered in Serang regency, the most populous region of Banten, but by March and April 1926, they were spreading rapidly into Pandeglang regency and also into the Rangkasbitung area of Lebak regency. To observers, the situation seemed to be rapidly getting out of hand. A local Dutch commentator noted,

> "Whole villages, whole districts of our previously quiet region have become restless. A restlessness that has been imported by a small group of arrogant agitators who call themselves Communists. There is almost no village in our region from which at least one man is in prison or has been in prison. Men who earlier never came into contact with the law can now be seen every Monday and Friday sitting in the Serang district court. They have been promised everything and such is their lot in life they have believed it."[146]

Although the observer of De Banten Bode may have been prone to panic at the spread of the PKI, it was nevertheless clear that a considerable degree of solidarity was forged in many Bantenese villages as whole populations went over to the PKI. This solidarity was further proof to members of the invincibility of the revolutionary movement. Much of the solidarity was probably enforced with rigorous boycotts being employed in some desa komunis (communist villages) against non-members.[147] The refusal of assistance and the threat of maltreatment, particularly in villages where jawara were active, were powerful incentives to join the PKI. In Bangkayung village, Cening sub-district, Pandeglang regency, peasants who refused to join had their trees cut down and found themselves boycotted at desa feasts.[148] Those who rejected the solidarity of their fellow peasants ran high risks, in some cases being physically molested.

The possession of the red membership card signified that one belonged to the new society and was assured of a place in the new revolutionary order. To some, possession of the membership card assumed a mystical character, endowing them with properties of invulnerability and invincibility normally associated with jimat (amulets). To others, it meant more practical things such as freedom from taxation after the revolt.

The restlessness in the villages manifested itself in some cases in a fundamental rejection of the existing order. In villages near Labuan, marriages took place without the presence of the penghulu.[149] In other villages, peasants refused to celebrate Lebaran (the feast following Ramadan, the fasting month) on the day stipulated but prolonged their fasting.[150] Officials who investigated villages which reportedly were under PKI influence met with a wall of silence. In Labuan regency, the Regent himself, R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, held meetings in villages in the Caringin and Cening areas calling on the peasants not to support the PKI,[151] but with the PKI now underground the extent of the support for the revolutionary conspiracy remained largely hidden.

In the village of Taktakan, near Serang, which was a PKI stronghold, the local PKI propagandist was said to be endowed with magical powers and if any government official passed the village he would be immediately paralysed.[152] In some areas, large sales of red cloth were reported as peasants made red trousers for themselves to denote their loyalty to the PKI.[153] In another village, the peasants refused to elect a new jaro (headman). When the wedana of the area visited the village, he was abused and addressed

contemptuously in low Javanese. One villager told him bluntly, "The government may well need a jaro, but we do not. If we are not afraid of death, why should we be of a jaro."[154]

The unrest in the countryside sometimes showed signs of breaking out in premature violence. In April, a policeman was badly beaten up at night in the village of Bojong, near Menes. The same week a Chinese trader in the village of Tanjangdalang, near Caringin, was beaten and robbed.[155] Some weeks later, when a Dutchman travelling near Menes was involved in a car accident, he was attacked by a hostile crowd.[156] Elsewhere Chinese traders and moneylenders were forced to contribute to PKI coffers.[157]

By the end of May 1926, revolutionary expectations were high in Banten. The seeming inability of the government to counteract the growth of the PKI strengthened the feeling of invincibility amongst the membership. The alliance that the PKI had managed to forge with a considerable number of local ulama and with the jawara, coupled with peasant grievances, were already proving an explosive mixture.

Although the Prambanan conference of the PKI leadership had taken the decision to stage an insurrection in 1926, effective measures to implement this were not taken until the middle of the year because of the lack of preparedness of the party and the need to develop the illegal organization, the DO. News of the Prambanan decision was communicated to the PKI section in Banten by Sukrawinata, one of the leaders of the Batavia PKI in early 1926.[158] Sukrawinata met with all the important leaders of the Banten PKI

including Bassaif, Puradisastra, Haji Chatib, Kiyai Moekri and Entol Enoh.[159] At the same time, other participants of the Prambanan meeting circulated Indonesia informing party sections of the fateful decision.[160]

Such was the state of disorganization amongst the PKI leadership, however, that having communicated this fateful decision, local sections were left entirely to their own devices regarding its implementation.[161] Sections were instructed to establish their own DO and encouraged to collect funds for the purchase of arms from abroad. Apart from this, they were to await further orders from the PKI executive. Given the considerable autonomy already granted to local sections in 1925 under the rubric of federal centralism, it was not a recipe for the creation of a tight and disciplined revolutionary organization but had all the makings of a 'putschist' adventure, as the exiled PKI leader Tan Malaka pointed out.[162]

With local sections of the PKI in Banten and elsewhere already creating the illegal DO organization, the leadership of the party was rapidly descending into complete disarray. The trade unions had virtually collapsed after the 1925 strike wave and between January and April 1926 almost the entire leadership of the PKI left Indonesia, mostly to Singapore.[163] At the same time, the Dutch authorities were becoming increasingly severe in their clampdown on the party, making legal activity impossible. In April, the PKI daily, Njala, instructed all units of the party not to communicate with the executive because of continual police raids on the Batavia headquarters office and interception of the mail.[164] At

the end of April, the Dutch colonial government delivered the coup de grace to legal activity by the PKI by adding two new regulations to the legal code, Article 153 bis and ter, effectively prohibiting revolutionary literature and organization.[165] As a result, all party newspapers and journals were forced to close on 30 April and three days later the PKI leadership formally disbanded all units of the party and the Sarekat Rakyat. In May, the rump of the PKI leadership, faced with police harassment in Batavia and the whittling away of local support, decided to move to Bandung.[166]

The authorization to local sections to establish illegal underground organizations to prepare for the insurrection seems to have been given in early 1926. These proceeded largely independent of the PKI leadership and only in April and May did the latter make some attempt to coordinate and control the local DOs. The PKI was, as a result, faced with the problem in some areas not of developing a revolutionary potential but of keeping local hotheads and militants from taking premature action.[167] This was exemplified in Banten where the DO, once set up, was soon thirsting for action.

In Banten, a major part of the PKI's appeal had lain precisely in the fact that it seemed an organization geared for action. The pergerakan had been formed for a definite purpose, namely the overthrow of the existing order. At a later stage, the fervent words jihad and perang sabil began to spread amongst the revolutionary movement in Banten and increasingly as the revolt approached, victory was to become associated with the establishment of an Islamic state, sometimes even in the form of the restoration of the sultanate of Banten. This tendency for the planned

revolutionary action to become increasingly identified with Islamic millenarian traditions was exacerbated by two circumstances. Firstly, the PKI's development in Banten almost from the beginning coincided with plans for the uprising and secondly, well before that uprising got under way, the majority of the secular leaders of the PKI in Banten were already behind bars.

The early organization of the DO in Banten seems to have been entrusted to a committee that consisted of Puradisastra, Tubagus Hilman, Bassaif, Haji Chatib, Kiyai Moekri, Entol Enoh, Tubagus Alipan and Soleiman.[168] Two of its members, Entol Enoh and Soleiman, had extensive contacts with Banten jawara, which they used to good effect in shaping the DO. One of its first meetings was arranged by Haji Mohammed Arif, the jaro of Dalung, near Serang, who fortunately provided the police with a very full account of the meeting during his interrogation after the revolt. Arif had been recruited to the PKI in March 1926 by Tubagus Hilman, who told him the purpose of the PKI was to force the government to make concessions to the people over taxation. Later, Hilman impressed upon him that he had joined a powerful, awe-inspiring organization, whose eventual aim was to replace the Dutch colonial government.[169] The final outcome of this struggle was without doubt, for the PKI had infiltrated the police and army to ensure victory.

In the month of Silih Sawal (May), Hilman visited Arif and told him he wished he would organize a meeting in Dalung at which many ulama and jawara would be present and important decisions would have to be taken regarding the future of the PKI.[170] The meeting in Dalung elected a new executive for the Banten PKI. In

part this was prompted by the departure from Banten of Puradisastra and of Achmad Bassaif, who was to continue as a linkman between the Batavia PKI and Banten, and partly because of the need to accommodate the new DO. In future, there was to be an executive of the PKI and a separate executive for the DO. As president of the PKI Banten section, the meeting elected Ishak, with Haji Mohammed Noer as secretary and Arman as treasurer. For the executive of the new DO, which was also called the golongan jawara (jawara section), Hasanuddin was appointed president, with Soleiman as vice-president. Two commissioners of the DO were also selected, Tubagus Hilman and Alirachman. In addition, Haji Achmad Chatib was given leadership of the golongan ulama (religious section) with the title Presiden Agama PKI Sectie Banten (Religious President).[171]

In practice, of the two new executives that of the DO was increasingly to become the more important as any legal activity by the PKI was now impossible. In the weeks and months after the May meeting in Dalung, however, even the DO executive was to face difficulties as more and more leaders of the Banten PKI were taken into police custody. This allowed leadership of the revolutionary movement to fall into the hands of an ad hoc committee, led by Haji Chatib, which was composed almost entirely of ulama and jawara.

Already before the May meeting, the PKI in Banten had begun collecting money from its membership for the purchase of arms. An extensive network of contacts was established for this purpose which seems to have been particularly effective in Serang and Pandeglang regencies. Tubagus Haji Emed was appointed treasurer of

the DO in Pandeglang regency and proved an efficient and capable administrator of the finances of the revolutionary organization. Undoubtedly Tubagus Emed's prestige as the son of Kiyai Asnawi of Caringin greatly assisted the PKI in its fundraising activities.

Often the collection of monies for arms was accompanied by the spread of fantastic rumours regarding the coming revolt. Djarman, a fisherman in Caringin, later told the police that he collected money for the purchase of arms because Haji Chatib had told him that Japan was ready to assist with the forthcoming revolt.[172] Others gave because they were told that the money was to pay for the transportation of soldiers from Soviet Russia who would arrive in the bay of Banten in a giant fleet.[173] In the village of Ciomas, Serang regency, the local PKI leader, a peasant called Martadjani, proclaimed that those who did not contribute would not be considered as true Muslims by the sultan of Banten after the revolt and would have their property confiscated.[174] In a neighbouring village to Ciomas, Barugbug, Haji Mumin, a PKI propagandist, said that all who did not contribute to the revolutionary coffers would be robbed and killed after the revolt.[175]

Rumour of aid from overseas and intimidation clearly played a role in the monies that began flowing into the PKI coffers. But there is also little doubt that in many cases peasants gave freely, sometimes even going to the length of pawning coconut trees, land and buffalo or giving the money they had saved to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.[176] The fact that they did so generously and in large numbers indicates the growing millenarian atmosphere that

accompanied the preparations for revolt. Members of the DO, which both in the popular mind and in practice became indistinguishable from the PKI, were henceforth to be regarded as soldiers of the party. Villages where the PKI commanded overwhelming support either developed a counter administration, with PKI-appointed 'civil servants' and 'military officials' (penghubung desa or penghubung militair), or the existing village administration with the headman (jaro) at its apex went over to the PKI.[177] As this new 'administration' promised to abolish taxation, to institute an Islamic state and even to provide free cigarettes and train rides, the willingness of peasants to contribute to an organization that had the support of many influential ulama and jawara becomes understandable.[178]

But if preparations for insurrection were proceeding apace in Banten, the local leaders found to their consternation that developments elsewhere left much to be desired. In May, after the meeting to establish the DO in Dalung, Haji Chatib and Hasanuddin left Banten for Bandung where the PKI executive had recently moved from Batavia. The two leaders went to discuss the purchase of arms and the coordination of the various sections of the PKI for the planned insurrection. They discovered, however, that the leadership in Bandung had done nothing to implement the Prambanan decision of December 1925 and were even unable to help with the arms shipments. Hermawan, a leader of the PKI in the Priangan, told Haji Chatib and Hasanuddin that there was considerable dissension amongst the PKI leadership regarding the planned revolt. There was no chance of an uprising in June or for some months to come, as the illegal DO was

insufficiently developed. Hermawan told the two Bantenese leaders that confidence in the PKI executive amongst many local sections was minimal because of the indecisiveness at the top. The Priangan leader concluded by advising Haji Chatib and Hasanuddin that every section must make its own preparations for the revolt.[179]

Dismayed by their reception, Haji Chatib and Hasanuddin returned to Banten to decide on their next step. Hasanuddin now apparently tried to procure arms from Malaya through contacts in the PKI in West Sumatra. Little seems to have come of this, but it did unfortunately come to the attention of the Dutch authorities. On 19 May, the recently-appointed Resident of Banten, F.C. Putman-Cramer, informed the Regent of Pandeglang, R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, that intelligence reports from Medan indicated that weapons were to be sent from Sumatra to Java via Labuan and that the family of Kiyai Asnawi were involved.[180] Kartadiningrat replied to Putman-Cramer by arguing that there was no evidence of the involvement of Kiyai Asnawi of Caringin in the PKI, or of his son-in-law Haji Chatib.[181] Kiyai Asnawi had personally assured him that no one in his family was a member of the PKI. Kartadiningrat was prepared to accept this assurance as the Kiyai had abstained from involvement in worldly affairs for many years and had refused to join or approve of the Sarekat Islam. Indeed, the only danger Kartadiningrat feared from the family of the Kiyai was if they were plagued by police spies or agents provocateurs.[182]

Protected from immediate arrest by the assurances of the regent, Haji Chatib continued energetically to raise support for the coming revolt. Meetings of the rebels now took place in mosques or langgar

to avoid police spies or at nights in woods with jawara posted to look out for spies. The rebel leaders, thwarted in their attempts to procure arms through Bandung (the PKI headquarters) now looked to assistance from Batavia. The PKI leadership in the capital was, like that in Banten, firmly committed to the Prambanan decision to stage an armed revolt and was also growing increasingly impatient with the executive's postponement of revolt. In late May, a meeting of the DO executive in Banten took place in Caringin. Those present at the meeting, who included Haji Chatib, Tubagus Emed, Hasanuddin and Afif, the chairman of the PKI in Labuan, decided that the Banten PKI should coordinate its actions more closely with the Batavia section. The revolt should proceed as soon as possible, one date that was suggested being 31 August, the birthday of the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina.[183] Afif and Hasanuddin were dispatched to Batavia to meet with PKI leaders there. They took with them 250 guilders to buy arms from Djojopranoto, a PKI leader who Bassaif had promised could obtain guns. The Batavia meeting was evidently more promising than the earlier trip to Bandung, for in early June Afif and Hasanuddin returned to Batavia with a further 1,865 guilders for the purchase of arms.[184]

In the meantime, a meeting of senior PKI leaders had taken place in Singapore in April and had decided to proceed with the implementation of the Prambanan decision. Alimin and Musso were dispatched to Moscow to secure the approval of the Comintern for the revolt, whilst the other PKI leaders - Sardjono, the chairman, Budisutjitro, Winata and Sutan Said Ali - returned to Java to prepare the party for the revolt.[185] On their return after several

months' absence, the PKI leaders were alarmed to discover that whilst some sections were ready for immediate revolt and were growing impatient with what they regarded as indecisive leadership, other sections were unprepared or were even opposed to the idea.

To try and bring some overall coordination and leadership to the party, Sardjono, the PKI chairman, called a meeting to discuss the Prambanan decision in Bandung in late June. Prior to the meeting, Sardjono hurried to Banten to meet with local PKI leaders. The meeting took place in Caringin and was attended by Haji Chatib, Tubagus Emed, Soleiman, Hasanuddin, Tubagus Hilman, Ishak and Sardjono. The PKI chairman appears to have visited Banten with two purposes in mind. Firstly, Sardjono was concerned to prevent any precipitate action by the Banten PKI and seems to have assured the Bantenese that the PKI leadership was determined to implement the Prambanan decision. Secondly, Sardjono went to Banten to raise more money for the PKI. Here too he was not to be disappointed and he returned to Bandung with a further 1,000 guilders raised from the Banten PKI.[186]

Because of Sardjono's trip to Banten, the start of the Bandung meeting was delayed and the meeting did not finally begin until 22 June. The meeting took place in a pondok in a rice field at Andir, on the outskirts of the city. Thirteen PKI leaders were present including Sardjono, Budisutjitro, the PKI secretary-general, Kusnogunoko from Batavia, Marsudi from Surabaya, Djamaluddin Tamin from West Sumatra, Magas from South Sumatra and Gunawan, also from Batavia. The conference lasted for four days until 26 June and

despite the fact that only four of the PKI's 37 sections - Banten, Batavia, Priangan and South Sumatra - pronounced themselves ready for revolutionary action, Sardjono managed to persuade the other delegates present that there was no future for the PKI except by resorting to armed revolt.[187]

The Arrest of the Serang PKI Leaders

The visit of Sardjono to Caringin in June and the outcome of the Bandung conference seem to have satisfied the Banten PKI leaders, at least temporarily, of the necessity of coordinating any revolutionary activity in Banten with action elsewhere. In July, when Djojopranto of the Batavia PKI visited Caringin to request money from Haji Chatib and Tubagus Emed, he was met with a frosty reception and the reply that the Banten PKI now only recognized the PKI executive (hoofdbestuur) in Bandung as the sole source of authority in the party.[188] A similar reply awaited two PKI delegates from Bogor, Mochtar and Haji Sintang, who visited Haji Chatib in the first few days of August and apparently asked him to consider launching an insurrection on 31 August. Haji Chatib refused, pleading that while the Banten section of the PKI were ready and willing to participate in the coming revolt, they would loyally await instructions from the Bandung executive before taking such action.[189]

However, Haji Chatib and the Banten PKI's trust and loyalty in the PKI executive under Sardjono in Bandung was to be shaken by events in August. Throughout 1925 and 1926, as the PKI drifted inexorably towards staging an armed revolt, the movement found

itself increasingly weakened by the removal of key leaders through arrest or exile. This process was also at work on a local level in Banten. Already in May Puradisastra left Banten for Garut in order to evade arrest by the police. At the same time, Achmad Bassaif also left Banten and became preoccupied with the preparations for revolt in Batavia. In July, Hasanuddin, who had replaced Puradisastra and Bassaif as the most effective leader of the PKI in Banten, was arrested by the police in Batavia.[190] The loss of these three leaders was only the prelude to a more disastrous series of arrests in August.

Throughout the month of July, tension had been mounting in Banten. Peasants in many areas who had joined the PKI eagerly awaited the expected day of retribution when all Dutchmen and servants of the infidel government were to be killed. The leadership of the revolutionary movement found it increasingly difficult to keep a grip on events. Zealous propagandists had recruited peasants to the PKI on the expectation that the revolt would not be long in coming.[191] Postponement ran the risk that either this support would be dissipated or the revolutionary movement would be weakened through arrests or premature moves by the rebels.

The tension was heightened by rumours which seemed to indicate the day of revolt was fast approaching. Foreign troops were widely expected to arrive from Soviet Russia or from Turkey. A pronouncement by Kiyai Asnawi of Caringin that prospective pilgrims should not undertake the haj to Mecca in 1926 because of the uncertain political situation in Arabia was widely interpreted as a

sign from the Kiyai that Bantenese should remain at home to witness a great event.[192] The mounting unrest gave rise in some villages to fasting by the rebels and to several incidents of violence. On 16 July, roadblocks were placed on the road near the village of Kaduhejo, Menes, and several days later a wealthy haji and moneylender was robbed and shot dead in Petir.[193] The authorities began to receive alarming reports of fasting and the purchase of white cloth that were said to herald the imminence of a general uprising in Banten.[194] Even more alarming was a report received from the police in Semarang who had intercepted a letter between two PKI leaders in the city and which indicated that Kiyai Asnawi would support the PKI in any uprising against the Dutch.[195]

The reports caused sufficient concern to the Dutch authorities for them to decide that preventive action was urgently needed. On 13 August, the police raided a house in Serang of a PKI member called Michnar and uncovered plans for fomenting unrest, including the sabotage of the railway lines between Batavia and Banten. The Resident, Putman-Cramer, requested additional assistance from the authorities in Batavia and on 15 August police reinforcements arrived. The following day, a company of Menadonese troops were sent to Banten under the command of Captain Becking to carry out military exercises.[196]

In the days after the raid on Michnar's house, most of the leaders of the PKI in Serang regency were arrested. First to be arrested were Soleiman, Atmodihardjo and Alirachman, who were holding a meeting at Michnar's house at the time of the raid. To

the alarm of the authorities, an officer of the field-police, Mohammed Saleh, was also present and was found to be involved in the PKI. They were soon followed into custody by other leading members of the Serang PKI including Djarkasih, the cycle shopowner, Haji Ayip Achmad, known as 'the jago of Serang', Arman and Haji Achmad Noer, the former chairman of Rukun Asli and secretary of the DO. Several arms caches were also discovered by the police. In the village of Dalung, where Haji Mohammed Arif, the headman, was a member of the PKI, six revolvers were found hidden in a well. In the village of Ciruas, also in Serang regency and likewise a PKI stronghold, 800 goloks were discovered that had been forged especially for the forthcoming revolt. In the villages of Pabuaran, Pancur and Gunungsari, all in Serang regency, Mauser pistols, Beaumont rifles and considerable quantities of white clothing were unearthed in police searches. The police also discovered that some 10,000 guilders had been reportedly collected in Banten for the purchase of arms and the funding of the revolt.[197]

The wave of arrests and the seizure of rebel arms supplies left the PKI in Banten severely exposed and weakened. This was particularly the case in Serang regency. Two key leaders who escaped the first police dragnet, Tubagus Hilman and Ishak, were arrested in September, Tubagus Hilman having been tracked down by the turncoat Raden Oesadiningrat, who was now in the service of the police in Banten.[198] Puradisastra, 'the father of Bantenese Communism' was arrested by the police in Garut and brought back to Serang for questioning.[199] By the end of September, some 200 arrests had been made, nearly all of them in Serang regency, although

arrests were also taking place elsewhere in Banten now. In Rangkasbitung, in Lebak regency, the four main leaders of the local PKI - Tjondroseputro, Atjim, Salihun and Tju Tong Hin - were arrested in late September.[200]

For their part, the Dutch authorities were confident by the middle of September 1926 that they had averted a serious threat of political unrest in Banten through the timely arrest of nearly all the known PKI leaders in the area. The troops who had been sent to Banten in August were withdrawn in September after having carried out military exercises in the Serang regency.[201] Clearly, the PKI in Banten had suffered a critical reverse. Of the leaders elected to executive positions in the PKI and the DO at the meeting in Dalung in May, all were in police custody by the end of September with the exception of Haji Achmad Chatib. Those arrested included all the original band of communists who had established the Banten PKI a year earlier in August and September 1925. Of that group, only Bassaif remained at large, feverishly making plans for the insurrection in Batavia. Thus, what might be termed the 'secular communists' were now all behind the bars of Serang prison. The leadership of the PKI was now left entirely in the hands of ulama and jawara and it was they who were to lead the peasants in revolt in November.

FOOTNOTES

1. Memorie van Overgave (hereafter MvO) van den afgetreden Resident van Bantam, J.C. Bedding, March 1925, p. 68. "The population of Banten is extremely devout and staunchly conservative, so that communism will find no scope for development here."

2. "Opgave van Ambtenaren en Beambten in Nederlandsch-Indischen Staatsdienst", Mailrapport $651^{x}/24$ in Verbaal 5 January 1925/F3.

3. On the early years of the ISDV, see Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965, pp. 7-75; Harry Poeze, Tan Malaka Levensloop van 1897 tot 1945: Strijder voor Indonesie's Vrijheid, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 114-166; Djamaluddin Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, n.p., n.d., mimeo, passim; Djamaluddin Tamin, Speech to Persatuan Pemuda Indonesia, Tokyo: mimeo, April 1967, passim; Max Perthus, Henk Sneevliet: Revolutionair Socialist in Europa en Azie, Nijmegen: Sun, 1976, pp. 89-201; Fritjof Tichelman, Henk Sneevliet: Een Politike Biografie, Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1974, pp. 22-26; Jeanne S. Mintz, "Marxism in Indonesia", in Frank N. Trager, Marxism in Southeast Asia, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959, pp. 176-180; Lembaga Sedjarah PKI, Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1961, pp. 34-50; Michael Williams, "Sneevliet - A Comintern Odyssey", New Left Review, 123, September-October 1980, pp. 81-90.

4. On Hasan Djajadiningrat's political views, see McVey, Rise, pp. 302, 370, n. 17; see also Hasan Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen in Banten", De Taak, 28 January, 4, 11, 18 and 25 February, 25 March and 8 April 1922; Robert van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1960, p. 128; D.M.G. Koch, Verantwoording: Een Halve Eeuw in Indonesie, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1956, p. 101.

5. On Stam, see Perthus, op. cit., pp. 165, 172, 176, 188, 193, 207, 479 and 483; see also the documents in Mailrapport $490^{X}/19$ in Verbaal 22 October 1921 $Z^{11/62}$.

6. Stam left Indonesia in 1921. The following year, he attended the Third Congress of the Comintern in Moscow representing the PKI. See Perthus, op. cit., p. 483, n. 175; Verbaal 17 February 1922 T1/10.

7. Perthus, op. cit., p. 165; see also Verbaal 21 April 1921 P5. Although Stam seems to have had little contact with religious leaders in Banten, it was later reported that whilst teaching in Banjermasin he had been working with local haji to convince them the PKI was not opposed to Islam or the SI. See Mailrapport 80^{X}/ in Verbaal 5 November 1925 B16; also Mailrapport $595^{X}/1922$.

8. Mailrapport $789^{X}/24$ in Verbaal 22 December 1924 T17; interview with Haji Gogo Sanjadirdja, Serang, May 1976. The informant was a former pupil of van Munster at the Serang OSVIA.

9. Besluit 1x 1 October 1924, Mailrapport 789^{X}/24 in Verbaal 22 December 1924 T17. See also Verbaal 13 May 1922, Verbaal 1 May 1923 W5; De Banten Bode, 4 October 1924; McVey, Rise, pp. 253, 454, n. 5, 471, n. 70. Van Munster was the former Director of the Teachers' Training College in Blitar, then Adjunct Inspector of Native Education in Aceh. His post in Serang was his last before his expulsion from Indonesia.

10. Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, eds., The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960. "The Bantam Report", p. 29, gives the membership of the VSTP in Banten as 240 (hereafter referred to as "The Bantam Report").

11. Letter of Procureur-General to Governor General, 2 March 1923, Mailrapport 216^{X}/23 in Verbaal 1 October 1923 E14.

12. McVey, Rise, pp. 146-154; Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, pp. 39-40. See also John Ingleson, "'Bound hand and foot': railway workers and the 1923 strike in Java", Indonesia, No. 31, April 1981, pp. 53-87.

13. Report of Governor of West Java, W.P. Hillen, to Governor-General Fock, 8 March 1926, G5/7/10, Mailrapport 296^{X}/26.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid. Interview with Agus Sirad, Jakarta, 12 November 1975. Agus Sirad was a mantri politie in Pandeglang in 1924. In 1975, he recalled, "I was detailed to follow Alimin and Musso

on their arrival at Pandeglang. They arrived on the evening train. I thought at first they were well-dressed merchants. Alimin was short and Musso was fat; they reminded me of Laurel and Hardy."

16. Interview with Tubagus Alipan, Pandeglang, 18 and 25 February and 10 March 1976; Tubagus Alipan "Riwayat singkat pribadi", notes in my possession. Temanggung seems to have been a particularly active PKI area, see McVey, Rise, p. 332.

17. Interview with Tubagus Alipan.

18. Interviews with Tje Mamat, Serang, May-June 1976.

19. Interviews with Achmad Bassaif, Kutoarjo, 14 April, 6 and 16 June 1976.

20. Ibid. See also Njala, 6 September and 7 November 1925.

21. Biographical details in unnumbered report, Mailrapport 1013^{x}/27.

22. Interviews with Mohammed Abdu Rachmat, Serang, 14 December 1975 and 5 January 1976.

23. Ibid. The first issue of De Banten Bode appeared on 17 September 1924. The paper was a weekly with articles in Dutch and Indonesian and appeared up to 1942. A full run of the newspaper is kept in the National Museum in Jakarta.

24. Interview with Abdu Rachmat, Serang, 5 January 1976.

25. "The Bantam Report", p. 45.

26. Interview with Tje Mamat, Serang, 14 June 1976.

27. McVey, Rise, pp. 103-104; J.Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie, Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1928, p. 29; J.Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie, Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1931, p. 73.

28. McVey, Rise, pp. 181-183.

29. Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, p. 45; Poeze, op. cit., p. 235; McVey, Rise, p. 168.

30. Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, p. 3; McVey, Rise, pp. 41, 50. Interview with Tje Mamat.

31. Interviews with Achmad Bassaif and Tubagus Alipan; McVey, Rise, p. 168.

32. Lembaga Sedjarah PKI, 40 Tahun PKI, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1960, pp. 20-23; see also the reports in "Communisme. Negende PKI - Congres", in R.C. Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie, Vol. 2, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1978, pp. 151-168; Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, pp. 14-15; Sudijono Djojoprajitno, PKI - SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, Djakarta: Jajasan Massa, 1962, p. 18.

33. McVey, Rise, p. 193.

34. Ibid., p. 262; Djojoprajitno, op. cit., p. 19; Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, p. 15. See also report by R.A. Kern, Adviser

for Native and Islamic Affairs to Governor-General Fock, 3 January 1925, in Kwantes, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 264-267; S. Dingley, The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia, Berlin: R.L. Prager, 1926, pp. 42-43; and reports on this conference in Mailrapport 74[x]/25. There were no representatives from Banten at the conference.

35. McVey, Rise, p. 274; Poeze, op. cit., pp. 265-267.

36. Interview with Achmad Bassaif; McVey, Rise, pp. 298-299;

37. Interviews with Achmad Bassaif and Tje Mamat; McVey, Rise, p. 274.

38. Report of Procureur-General, D.G. Wolterbeek Muller, to Governor-General Fock, 14 August 1925 and report of Procureur-General, H.G.P. Duyfjes, to Governor-General De Graeff, 27 November 1926, in Kwantes, op cit., Vol. 2, pp. 330-346 and 480-494; McVey, Rise, p. 291. Many reports on PKI strategy and tactics in 1925 are contained in Mailrapport 7[x] in Verbaal 21 June 1927 A10. PKI strategy after the Kutagede conference of December 1924 was vehemently criticized by Tan Malaka, inter alia in his "Semangat Moeda", pp. 57-65, cited by Poeze, op. cit., p. 296; see also McVey, Rise, pp. 305, 316-319.

39. Interviews with Tubagus Alipan and Haji Solichin, Serang, 14 April 1976.

40. See Blumberger, Communist, p. 49; McVey, Rise, p. 295. On the utilization of lawless elements by the Sarekat Hijau, see Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite,

Singapore: Heinemann, 1979, p. 95. The Sarekat Hijau was an organization formed by priyayi in the Priangan to combat the growth of the PKI.

41. McVey, Rise, p. 310; Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, pp. 46-47.

42. Kwantes, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 365-381; Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, pp. 12, 21. See also Tamin, Speech to Persatuan Pemuda Indonesia, p. 2.

43. McVey, Rise, p. 308.

44. Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888. Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia, Verhandelingen KITLV, No. 50, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 233, 237.

45. Shelton Stromquist, "The Communist Uprising of 1926 in Indonesia: A Reinterpretation", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 8, no. 2, September 1967, pp. 189-200.

46. Interview with Achmad Bassaif.

47. Njala, the newspaper of the Batavia PKI, reported meetings of 600 party members in Jembatan Lima in October 1925. See the issue of 23 October 1925. Njala was published between September 1925 and 30 April 1926. A complete run of the newspaper is kept in the National Museum in Jakarta.

48. Interview with Achmad Bassaif.

49. Interviews with Tubagus Alipan and Mohammed Abdu Rachmat. Tubagus Hilman was already living in Serang at the time of PKI activities.

50. Interview with Tubagus Alipan.

51. See McVey, Rise, p. 277; interview with Achmad Bassaif.

52. According to Haji Solichin, interview, Serang, 6 March 1976, Djarkasih's bicycle repair shop was the venue for the first secret meetings of the PKI in Banten. Most of the early members were workers at the Fritz Printing Works, the publisher of the local newspaper, De Banten Bode. The original members appear to have been, besides Djarkasih, Ishak, Atmodihardjo, Solichin, Arman, Tubagus Alipan, Alirachman, Abdu Rachmat and Lee Eng Hock. After a requisite number of cadres were trained, Rukun Asli was established. Rukun Asli was variously described by ex-PKI members to the writer as a kedok (mask) or batu loncaton (stepping-stone). Two other early members of the secret PKI in Banten, Tubagus Hilman and Tubagus Arif, put themselves forward as candidates for the regency council of Serang in August 1925. See De Banten Bode, 22 August and 26 September 1925. See also Njala, 14 September 1925.

53. De Banten Bode, 15 August 1925. On the origins of the titles Tubagus, Ratu and other Bantenese titles, see L.W.C. van den Berg, De Inlandsche Rangen en Titels op Java en Madoera, 2nd ed., 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1902, pp. 17-21.

54. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 233-234. On Rukun Asli, see also the report of W.P. Hillen to Governor-General Fock, 8 March 1926, G5/7/10 Mailrapport 296^{x}/26. To party members, the importance of the initials RAB (Rukun Asli

Banten) was said to mean Revolusi Anak Negeri Banten (Revolt of the People of Banten).

55. Interview with Tubagus Alipan; De Banten Bode, 29 August 1925.

56. De Banten Bode, 29 August 1925.

57. See McVey, Rise, p. 291.

58. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java. A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 136-140. See also report by Achmad Djajadiningrat, 11 November 1922, 70/ZG, Mailrapport 252^{x}/1923.

59. De Banten Bode, 12 September 1925.

60. One of the first issues of the Batavia PKI newspaper, Njala (Spark) featured an article on Rukun Asli; see its number of 11 September 1925; see also De Banten Bode, 12 September 1925.

61. Njala, 14 October 1925.

62. Njala, 21 October 1925.

63. De Banten Bode, 24 and 31 October 1925; Njala, 26 October 1925; On the 1925 strikes, see McVey, Rise, pp. 309-310; Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, pp. 45-46; Poeze, op. cit., p. 300.

64. McVey, Rise, p. 307. Alimin, like many Indonesian revolutionaries in the 1920s, left Indonesia via Banten proceeding by boat to the Lampungs and thence being smuggled via Palembang to Malaya. Interview with Tje Mamat.

65. See report of W.P. Hillen, Governor of West Java, 8 March 1926, 65/7/10, Mailrapport 296^{x}/26.

66. McVey, Rise, p. 292.

67. See Njala, 7 November 1925.

68. De Banten Bode, 7 November 1925.

69. De Banten Bode, 14 November 1925.

70. Njala, 10 November 1925; De Banten Bode, 14 and 21 November 1925.

71. De Banten Bode, 28 November 1925; Njala, 16 December 1925.

72. Report of Resident (of Banten) de Vries to Procureur-General, No. 55, 24 November 1925 in Mailrapport 1245^{x}/25. See also "The Bantam Report", pp. 26, 37-38.

73. Ibid. At the same time, key recruits were sent by the PKI to Batavia for training.

74. Njala, 16 December 1925.

75. De Banten Bode, 5 December 1925.

76. See McVey, Rise, pp. 309,311, 320, 324; Sudijono Djojoprajitno, op. cit., pp. 6-42; Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, pp. 20-21, 49; Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, pp. 50-53.

77. McVey, Rise, p. 323. Tan Malaka was opposed to the projected uprising, considering it to be 'putschist' and doomed to failure. See McVey, Rise, pp. 316-322; Poeze, op. cit., pp. 307-311; Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, pp. 22-25.

78. Interviews with Achmad Bassaif, Tubagus Alipan, Afif, chairman of Labuan PKI in 1926.

79. Interview with Achmad Bassaif.

80. Interview with Professor G.F. Pijper, Amsterdam, 27 May 1974. In 1926, Professor Pijper worked at the Office of the Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs. In this capacity he visited Banten on two occasions before the revolt and was frequently told by the Resident, Putman-Cramer, that the PKI in Banten posed no real threat to the colonial authorities.

81. Interviews with Ajot Satriawidjaya, former secretary of the PKI in Pandeglang, Menes, 18 January 1976.

82. Interview with Haji Solichin.

83. Njala, 14 January 1926.

84. Njala, 29 January 1926.

85. De Banten Bode, 12 June 1926; interview with Afif.

86. Njala, 1 March 1926.

87. De Banten Bode, 20 February 1926. The others sent to prison were Haji Mu'min, Abdulmoeti, Nawawi, Kama, Rasidi al Saidi, Haji Oemar, Asmail, Srendawiri, Ahmed, Mad Salah, Asnawi, Alikoesim, Ibrahim and Alioesoep.

88. De Banten Bode, 27 February 1926; Njala, 19 and 23 February 1926. Puradisastra used his trial to denounce the court as "unfit to sit in an abattoir" and said the Governor-General had robbed the

Indonesian people of their rights and therefore had no qualifications to pass judgment on Indonesian Communists. See "Optreden tegen eenige leden der Communistische Beweging in Bantam", No. 750 AP, 24 April 1926, Mailrapport 464^{x} in Verbaal 1 July 1927 Q10.

89. Njala, 26 February 1926.

90. Njala, 10 and 22 March 1926.

91. Njala, 4 March 1926.

92. Interview with Achmad Bassaif.

93. Njala, 1 March 1926.

94. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 23 February 1926.

95. This estimate was confirmed by Hillen in his report of 8 March 1926, G5/7/10, Mailrapport 296^{x}/26.

96. De Banten Bode, 20 March 1926.

97. See report of Resident de Vries, 24 November 1925, No. 55 in Mailrapport 1245^{x}/25.

98. W. Huender, "Survey of the Economic Conditions of the Indigenous Peoples of Java and Madoera in 1921", in C.L.M. Penders, ed., Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977, p. 96, ". . . it is impossible to maintain that the indigenous population is not taxed heavily enough. Taking account of the low capacity of the people to pay, the contrary is rather the case; present plans to have

the people pay more can only make one shudder. In fact, the most difficult and pressing problem in Java and Madoera is that the people have been taxed to the utmost limit and are 'minimum sufferers', apparently the various government measures taken to improve the situation have not been effective."

99. See my Sickle and Crescent: The Communist Revolt of 1926 in Banten, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982, p. 68. The burden of taxation is the most frequent cause advanced by those sent for internment to Boven Digul.

100. Statement of Tubagus Emed to the police, 15 September 1927, Mailrapport $868^{X}/27$ in Verbaal 13 April 1928 O^{6}.

101. G. Gonggrijp, Schets eener Economische Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie, Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn, 1938, 2nd ed., p. 201. See also J.W. Meyer Ranneft and W. Huender, Onderzoek naar de Belastingdruk op de Inlandsche Bevolking, Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1926, pp. 5-6, 160-166.

102. W. Huender, Overzicht van den Economischen Toestand der Inheemsche Bevolking van Java en Madoera, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1921, p. 172.

103. On price rises during this period, see Gonggrijp, op. cit., p. 201. For indications that middlemen were benefiting at the expense of the peasantry in Banten, see MvO, W.G. Thieme, June 1920, p. 13.

104. Gonggrijp, op. cit., pp. 192-193.

105. Meyer Ranneft and Huender, op. cit., pp. 6, 166; Gonggrijp, op. cit., pp. 202-203. See also Dingley, op. cit., pp. 9, 19.

106. A.D.A. de Kat Angelino, Colonial Policy, II, p. 291, trans. by G.J. Renier, Chicago: 1931, cited by George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952, p. 26.

107. Meyer Ranneft, op. cit., p. 89.

108. "The Bantam Report", pp. 78-79.

109. Gonggrijp, op. cit., pp. 195-196; J. van Gelderen, Indie, De Sociaal Democratie en de Onlusten op Java, Amsterdam: N.V. Ontwikkeling, 1926, p. 10.

110. MvO, B.L. van Bijlevelt, March 1918, p. 17.

111. Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie Jaargang 1925, Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1926, pp. 7-8; "The Bantam Report", p. 26, notes, "it is the general complaint that the padi harvests are deteriorating in the whole of Banten".

112. Statistische Gegevens nopens de Geoogste en Beplante Uitgestrektheden der Voornaamste Inlandsche Landbouwproducten 1916-1922, Weltevreden: Department van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, 1924, p. 130.

113. On taxation and its effects on peasant unrest, see the discussion in James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976, pp. 8, 92-111.

114. "The Bantam Report", p. 37; see also pp. 37-38, 61-62.

115. Ibid., pp. 74-75.

116. Ibid., p. 78.

117. Ibid., p. 50.

118. De Banten Bode, 6 March 1926.

119. G.W.F. Drewes, Drie Javaansche Goeroes: Hun Leven, Onderrichten en Messiasprediking, Leiden: A. Vros, 1925, p. 192.

120. "The Bantam Report", p. 46; interviews with Achmad Bassaif and Ajot Satriawijaya.

121. Interview with Achmad Bassaif.

122. "The Bantam Report", p. 41.

123. Interview with Achmad Bassaif. Bassaif, we have have noted, had a modernist education at the Al-Irsjad school in Batavia but tactfully emphasized his Arabic heritage rather than his modernist education in his propaganda work in Banten.

124. Interviews with Achmad Bassaif and Tubagus Alipan. See also McVey, Rise, p. 315.

125. Interview with Haji Solichin, Serang, 8 May 1976.

126. Interview with Haji Mohammed Tahir, Serang, 9 May 1976. The informant was a former leader of the PKI in Serang in 1926.

127. "The Bantam Report", p. 28.

128. Interview with Haji Solichin.

129. See Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 175-176; G.F. Pijper, "De Penghulu op Java", Studien over de Geschiedenis van de Islam op Java, 1900-1950, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977, p. 77.

130. Interview with Kiyai Haji Abdulhalim, Pandeglang, 14 December 1975. See also Makmum Salim, "Suatu Tindjauan tentang peranan adjaran Islam dalam Pemberontakan 1926 di Banten", Seminar Sedjarah Nasional II, Yogyakarta, 1970.

131. Police interrogation report of Haji Tubagus Emed, 23 October 1926 in Mailrapport 786^{x}/1927.

132. Interview with Kiyai Haji Abdulhalim.

133. Interview with Ajot Satriawijaya; see also Njala, 20 and 23 March 1926.

134. Interview with Haji Afif.

135. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants' Revolt, pp. 94ff, 165, 168-169, 172-174, 315-317. Although, as Sartono notes, p. 317, n.8, with the exception of the Djajakusuma case in 1869 there are no indications that previous rebellious movements were making use of religious institutions like the tarekat. There are also indications that the influence of the tarekat was declining, see "The Bantam Report", p. 84.

136. Police interrogation report of Djarman, 4 January 1927, Mailrapport 868^{x}/27 in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

137. "The Bantam Report", pp. 48-49.

138. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

139. Njala, 8, 9 and 26 February 1926.

140. For Sicily, see Anton Blok, Mafia of a Sicilian Village. A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974, passim.

141. Njala, 9 February 1926; see also "The Bantam Report", pp. 23, 29.

142. Interview with Tubagus Alipan. Achmad Bassaif, who temporarily replaced Puradisastra as the leader of the PKI in Banten, frequently dressed as a jawara himself, clothed in black and carrying a golok.

143. On the absence of any specific PKI peasant program, see the critique of Dingley, op. cit., pp. 33-50; McVey, Rise, pp. 269, 278, 288.

144. De Banten Bode, 3 April and 1 May 1926.

145. De Banten Bode, 8 May 1926.

146. De Banten Bode, 20 March 1926; interview with Haji Solichin, former PKI member, who estimated membership of the PKI in Banten by June 1926 as in excess of 20,000.

147. "The Bantam Report", p. 47.

148. De Banten Bode, 10 April 1926; see also my Sickle and Crescent, p. 32 for other evidence of intimidation.

149. De Banten Bode, 1 May 1926.

150. Interview with Haji Gogo Sanjadirdja, Serang, 27 October 1975.

151. De Banten Bode, 26 June 1926.

152. De Banten Bode, 27 February 1926.

153. "The Bantam Report", p. 47.

154. De Banten Bode, 9 August 1926.

155. De Banten Bode, 1 and 8 May 1926.

156. De Banten Bode, 12 June 1926. The village near which the Dutchman was attacked was a stronghold of the PKI.

157. De Banten Bode, 8 and 29 May 1926; interview with Haji Afif. In Cilegon, many Chinese traders seem to have contributed to PKI funds.

158. Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, p. 53; interview with Achmad Bassaif.

159. Entol Enoh was a former leader of the Sarekat Islam in Banten. He was jaro of the village of Tegalwangi, near Menes, for 22 years but was dismissed in 1925 after a dispute with the local wedana. When he joined the PKI, it seems he took the majority of the membership of Sarekat Islam in the district with him. Entol Enoh had a wide influence in the Menes area, comparable

with that of Haji Chatib in Labuan. He had close ties with local jawara and would appear to have used them to maintain order in the area. He gave the lead to many other village heads, particularly it seems regarding such matters as tax collection. The circumstances of his dismissal in 1925 as jaro are not clear, but apparently it related to large sums of overdue taxes for his district which he had tried to discharge in some cases from his own pocket. See letter of Achmad Djajadiningrat, undated, appendix 7, in Verbaal 4 July 1939/19; see also reports in Mailrapport $172^{x}/27$, Verbaal 1 September 1927 T10; "The Bantam Report", pp. 28, 42, 48.

160. Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, p. 53.

161. Interviews with Achmad Bassaif and Tubagus Alipan.

162. See Tan Malaka, Massa Actie, Jakarta: Pustaka Moerba, 1947, (originally published in 1926), passim; see also Poeze, op. cit., pp. 313-314; McVey, Rise, pp. 316-322.

163. McVey, Rise, p. 474, n. 95.

164. Njala, 6 April 1926.

165. Njala, 13 April 1926; 40 Tahun PKI, p. 25; McVey, Rise, pp. 326-327; interview with Professor G.F. Pijper.

166. McVey, Rise, pp. 326-328.

167. According to Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, p. 27, the executive of the PKI in April 1926 consisted of Suprodjo, Kusnogunoko and

Gunawan. The DO was set up in April with Suprodjo as chairman. Dutch archival sources also indicate that the DO was set up in this period, with Banten as one of its first bases. See "Beknopt Overzicht van de Communistische Ongeregeldheden in Ned. Indie", Verbaal 13 December 1926 D19.

168. Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, p. 60; interviews with Achmad Bassaif and Tubagus Alipan.

169. Police interrogation report of Haji Mohammed Arif, 25 October 1926, Mailrapport 67^{x}/1927 in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

170. Ibid. For a full account of the meeting, see my Sickle and Crescent, pp. 37-38.

171. Ibid.

172. Police interrogation report of Djarman, 6 October 1926, Mailrapport 67^{x}/1927 in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06. Djarman was instructed by Tubagus Emed to collect f.1.20 from each party member. The sum could be paid in instalments of 12 cents per month for 10 months. Elsewhere PKI collectors instituted a sliding scale of payments of contributions for the revolt according to the means of the party member.

173. De Banten Bode, 5 June 1926.

174. Report of Resident of Banten, Putman-Cramer, 29 August 1927, in Mailrapport 523^{x}/27.

175. Ibid.

176. Interviews with Tubagus Alipan and Achmad Rasyidi, Serang, 18 February 1976.

177. "The Bantam Report", pp. 42-43.

178. Ibid.

179. Report of Resident of East Priangan to Hillen, Governor of West Java, 21 December 1926, No. 486/ZG, Verbaal 1 July 1927 T10; interview with Achmad Bassaif.

180. Hillen to Governor-General, unnumbered, 26 November 1926, Mailrapport $1181^{X}/26$, Verbaal 1 July 1927 S10.

181. Ibid. It was fortuitous for Haji Chatib that he had joined the PKI after it had gone underground.

182. Ibid.

183. Interview with Afif. Statement of Djarman to the police, 6 October 1926, Mailrapport $67^{X}/1927$ in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

184. Ibid; statement of Tubagus Emed to the police, 13 September 1926, Mailrapport $868^{X}/27$ in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

185. Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, p. 54; see also "The Governor-General's Report of 1927" in Benda and McVey, op. cit., p. 8.

186. Statement of Djarman to the police of 6 October 1926, Mailrapport $67^{X}/1927$ in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06. Banten seems to have been one of the chief sources of funds for PKI arms purchases. See also 'testimony' of Ongko D., in

Djojoprajitno, op. cit., p. 65; Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, p. 30.

187. Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, pp. 30, 49; McVey, Rise, pp. 328-329, 481, n. 31. See also "Beknopt Overzicht van de Communistische Ongeregeldheden in Ned. Indie", Verbaal 13 December 1926 D19.

188. Interview with Haji Afif, Cilegon, 18 April 1976.

189. Ibid.; statement to the police of Djarman, 6 October 1926, Mailrapport 67^{X}/1927 in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

190. De Banten Bode, 10 July 1926.

191. Interviews with Achmad Bassaif, Afif and Achmad Rasyidi and Ajot Satriawijaya.

192. Letter of W.P. Hillen, Governor of West Java, to Governor-General De Graeff, 31 December 1926 G5/48/3, Mailrapport 868^{X}/27 in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

193. De Banten Bode, 17, 24 and 31 July 1926.

194. "Verhoogde Communistische Actie in het Bantamsche", report of Governor of West Java, Hillen, to Governor-General Fock, 16 August 1926, G/5/25/17, Mailrapport 808^{X}/26 in Verbaal 1 July 1927 Q10; see also Blumberger, Communist, p. 59; Nieuwe Soerabajasche Courant, 21 August 1926.

195. Report of Hillen to Governor-General, 31 December 1926, G5/48/3, Mailrapport 868^{X}/27 in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

196. Interview with M. Padmadisastra, Rangkasbitung, 23 December 1975; the informant was a mantri politie in Serang in August 1926.

See also Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 17 August 1926; De Banten Bode, 21 and 28 August and 4 September 1926.

197. Algemeen Indische Dagblad, 17 August 1926; Nieuwe Soerabaaische Courant, 1 September 1926; "Verklaring Mas Wiria di Koesoema", De Landsdienaar, Vol. 3, no. 9, September 1927, pp. 459-461. The arrests apparently took place as a result of the PKI being infiltrated by another agent of the field-police, Harunadjaja. The latter was murdered in 1946. Interview with Haji Solichin, Serang, 6 March 1976; De Banten Bode, 4 September 1926.

198. De Banten Bode, 25 September 1926.

199. Java Bode, 18 September 1926; De Banten Bode, 18 September 1926.

200. De Banten Bode, 25 September 1926.

201. See report of Governor of West Java, Hillen to Governor- General, 8 September 1926, G5/27/19, Mailrapport 1059^{X} in Verbaal 1 July 1927 S10; report of Hillen to Governor-General, 26 October 1926, G5/33/18, Mailrapport 1059^{X}/26 in Verbaal 1 July 1927 S10. See also report of Gobee, Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs, "Politieke Toestand in het Gewest Bantam", H60 29 October 1926, Mailrapport 1053^{X}/26 in Verbaal 1 July 1927 S10.

CHAPTER 6

THE OUTBREAK OF REVOLT

The Eve of the Revolt

Although the PKI executive at its meeting in Bandung in June had decided to proceed with plans for an armed revolt, the party leadership remained hesitant. It still faced difficulties in controlling local sections many of which, like Tegal, were in favour of immediate insurrection. The Banten PKI, which had supported Sardjono and the executive in June, was, by August, becoming sharply critical of the lack of leadership from Bandung.[1] At the end of July, one of the executive leaders in favour of a revolt, Winanta, was detained by the police in Bandung.[2] Many of the leaders remaining at large, such as Subakat, Suprodjo, Kusnogunoko and Djamaluddin Tamin, were beset by doubts and were increasingly won over to the position of Tan Malaka who, from his exile in the Philippines and Singapore, had delivered a trenchant critique of the PKI's planned revolt.[3] The militant local sections, led by Tegal and Pekalongan, used the pretext of the replacement of Governor-General Fock by the reportedly more liberal A.C. De Graeff as an excuse for the immediacy of revolt. On 22 August, in a now rather desperate attempt to control the situation, the executive sent representatives to local sections to consult on the proposed revolutionary action. They were warned not to go over to immediate revolutionary action and that 'federative centralism' was to be replaced by democratic centralism in strict Leninist fashion.[4]

These belated moves on the part of the PKI executive were, however, doomed to failure. In August, three sections in Central

Java refused to support postponement of revolutionary action any longer.[5] The PKI leader in Ceribon, Abdulmuntalib, sought support for this position in Banten where he was received by Haji Chatib. Haji Chatib's arguments against revolt when he had met with Sardjono in June had receded and he now favoured revolt at the earliest date. Indeed, the Banten PKI had seen its strength seriously dissipated as a result of the wave of arrests in August. To delay any longer might see the total collapse of the PKI in Banten.

At the beginning of September, Bassaif and Sukrawinata, the vice-chairman of the Batavia PKI held further discussions with Haji Chatib, Kiyai Moekri, Tubagus Haji Emed and Afif in Caringin. It was agreed that the Banten PKI would support the initiative of the Batavia section in forming a committee to coordinate the insurrection.[6] Afif followed Bassaif and Sukrawinata back to Batavia a few days later with the news that the situation was deteriorating in Banten with daily arrests increasing. It was feared that Haji Chatib and other leaders in Labuan and Menes would soon be arrested. Meeting with the Batavia PKI leaders in the Hotel Borneo in Weltevreden, Afif promised the support of the Banten PKI in the revolt, but pleaded that no further delays should take place. The revolutionaries in Banten could still muster substantial support, particularly in Pandeglang regency, but to wait much longer might prove fatal.[7]

Soon after Afif's departure from Batavia, the leaders of the PKI in the capital formed a committee to coordinate the insurrection. The committee formed on 13 September and called the Komite

Pemberontak (Insurrectionary Committee) or the Komite Penggalang Republik Indonesia (Committee of Support for the Indonesian Republic) sent out messengers to all sections to get them to support the Komite Pemberontak as the organizing committee to prepare the revolt. Despite the fact that only five sections were willing to do this - Padang, Tegal, Priangan, Batavia and Banten - the committee proceeded in its intention and fixed the day of the revolt for 12 November.[8]

As the day of the revolt approached, the rebels in Banten began to make feverish last-minute preparations despite the effects of further debilitating arrests and some desertions from the revolutionary cause, ironically often amongst those who had been longest in the PKI.[9] Afif, returning from his meeting in Batavia with PKI leaders, was startled to see at Tanah Abang railway station a police officer from Menes, Mangoendikaria. Realizing he was probably being followed, he became anxious about communicating the results of the Batavia meeting to Haji Chatib,

> "I got back to my house at 2 pm. My wife had food prepared, but I couldn't eat a thing because I was too nervous. About 2.30 pm the assistant wedana (Mas Wiriadikusumah) called. We had known each other since school days. He warned me that the field-police from Pandeglang would probably arrest me that day. After he left I hurriedly wrote a note to Haji Chatib and destroyed some papers I did not want to fall into police hands. About 4 pm the police arrived and I was taken to Pandeglang for questioning."[10]

Unluckily for Afif, he was less circumspect about disposing of ammunition he had hidden in his house.

The arrest of Afif, the chairman of the PKI in Labuan, was prompted by the renewed attention of the field-police in PKI activities in Pandeglang regency. The Veldpolitie, unlike the local administrative police, were commanded by Dutch officers and were directly responsible to the Dutch resident and not to the regents. Created in 1920, the field-police decisively altered the balance of power between the pangreh praja and the Binnenlands Bestuur (the European Civil Service), strengthening the latter and weakening the Javanese administrative corps. The field-police were now not only ultimately responsible for the maintenance of law and order, but also provided the Dutch administration with information on political matters, side-stepping the pangreh praja. The Binnenlands Bestuur could now use the field-police to intervene directly in local affairs independent of the regents, as in the Haji Nawawi affair of 1922. Not surprisingly, the advent of the field-police was to be a major grievance of the pangreh praja and especially of the regents throughout the 1920s.[11] The field-police were a well-armed and motorised force that in the politically charged atmosphere of the 1920s found much of their time absorbed with checking the activities of the Sarekat Islam and the PKI. Frequently it seems they aroused the resentment of regents because of what was seen as their encroachment on one of the traditional preserves of Java's priyayi, the maintenance of law and order in 'native' society. This is amply illustrated in the dispute which developed between the Regent of Pandeglang, R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, and the Resident of Banten, F.C. Putman-Cramer, over the danger posed by the PKI in Banten.

On 6 September at a monthly serba (meeting of the resident with the three local regents), Putman-Cramer told Kartadiningrat that the field-police had received intelligence reports of increased PKI activity in Pandeglang regency, including fasting (pati geni) and the purchase of white cloth. Kartadiningrat replied that he had instructed his subordinates to keep strict watch for such activities, but he himself felt that there was a risk that the threat of the PKI was being magnified.[12] In Kartadiningrat's view too many arrests were taking place and it was this and the activities of police spies that were fuelling social discontent in Banten and not the PKI. The frequent appearance of the heavily-armed field-police on their motor-bikes in the countryside was having a disturbing effect on the peasants. Two days after the meeting, when Afif was arrested in Labuan, Kartadiningrat judged this action of the Veldpolitie to be unnecessary, despite the discovery of ammunition in Afif's house.[13]

The ill-feeling that developed between Kartadiningrat and Putman-Cramer undoubtedly protected the underground PKI and it was notable that when revolt broke out in November 1926, resistance was concentrated in the Pandeglang regency. On 13 September, for example, Kartadiningrat received a report from the wedana of Pandeglang of unrest in the village of Cadasari. Fasting was alleged to have taken place and a local kiyai, Haji Soegiri, was said to have imposed a levy on villagers for the purchase of arms. Kartadiningrat himself questioned Haji Soegiri about the reports and when the kiyai steadfastly denied the allegations decided that there was no need to send him to Serang for further questioning by the field-police

there. As was to become evident later, the regent gravely underestimated the strength of the PKI. To a warning from the ill-fated wedana of Menes about the deteriorating position in his area, Kartadiningrat was reported to have replied scornfully, "You are as frightened as a woman."[14]

Kartadiningrat did not seek to hide his views on the Resident and what he saw as the undermining of his own authority by the activities of the field-police from visiting Dutch officials who he felt might be sympathetic. In September, when G.F. Pijper, an official of the Office for Native and Islamic Affairs, visited Banten to meet local ulama, he was surprised to hear Kartadiningrat speak so freely and outspokenly about Putman-Cramer and Lucardie, the commander of the field-police in Banten. Two weeks later, Pijper received a letter from the Regent in which he complained bitterly of the "latest outrage of the Veldpolitie".[15] In his letter, Kartadiningrat recounted the arrest of Ishak, the communist printer on De Banten Bode, in the pendopo (front verandah) of the kabupaten in Pandeglang without the Regent even being informed. Clearly the incident revealed again that the Resident and the police officers directly responsible were singularly lacking at times in the respect and tact that a man like Kartadiningrat felt that he deserved. Yet at the same time the incident illustrates strikingly the rift that had developed between the Regent and the populace that he administered and his almost blind inability to detect the widespread social and political unrest that was prevalent in Banten. The Regent's remark to Pijper that "the man is well known to me for he is the son of my former magang. I am sure Ishak would have

reported to me voluntarily had I so requested" demonstrates how Kartadiningrat's perception of events in Pandeglang regency was dramatically out of touch with reality.[11]

The rift that had occurred between the Resident and the Regent enabled the underground PKI in Pandeglang to survive more or less intact up to the November revolt. In Serang and Lebak, where the PKI was anyway largely limited to the town of Rangkasbitung, the rebels suffered crippling blows through the arrests in August and September. There were arrests in Pandeglang but not on the scale of those in the other two Bantenese regencies. To a great extent, the social composition of the underground PKI in Pandeglang assisted the party. In Serang regency, the leadership of the PKI tended to consist of artisans and clerks and some skilled workers, although there were of course ulama and jawara as well. The same was largely true for the PKI in Rangkasbitung. Such people made easily identifiable targets for the police to follow and eventually to pick up. In Pandeglang regency, on the other hand, leadership of the PKI was almost wholly in the hands of ulama and jawara who were far more able to play the role of 'fish in water' than some of the Serang PKI leaders. The police faced enormous difficulties in unearthing the PKI underground in Pandeglang precisely because of the hold of the ulama and jawara on local villages.

Following the arrests, however, in Serang regency in August and September and that of Afif in Labuan, the field-police were increasingly turning their attention to Pandeglang and making arrests over the heads of the local priyayi, who were largely afraid of stepping out of line with Kartadiningrat. In late September, the

police arrested Haji Barahim of the village of Bangkujung, Cening, and two other important ulama who had joined the PKI, Kiyai Haji Atje and Kiyai Haji Ilyas of the village of Torogong, near Labuan.[17] Other leaders that were wanted managed to go underground and evade arrest, such as Haji Doelhadi of the village of Bangko, who was one of the key leaders of the DO.[18]

In the meantime, Haji Chatib, satisfied that the PKI was at last determined to lead a revolt under the leadership of the Batavia Komite Pemberontak, worked frantically to prepare the PKI/DO in Pandeglang and also to salvage something of the organization in Serang. This he accomplished, though not without arousing increasing police suspicion of his involvement. Partly to deflect police attention away from them, on 15 September Haji Chatib and his brother-in-law Tubagus Haji Emed reported voluntarily to the police in Serang. They were both released after questioning, having disclaimed any continuing connection with the underground PKI.[19]

Haji Chatib and Tubagus Haji Emed enjoyed, to some extent, a greater freedom because of their relationship to Kiyai Asnawi. At the time one of the most influential religious teachers in West Java, it was an abiding concern of Kartadiningrat that everything possible should be done to avoid alienating the Kiyai from the government. Indeed, this was a concern shared by even senior Dutch officials. The Governor of West Java, W.P. Hillen, had once written to Putman-Cramer that "great care must be taken that nothing should be done to upset the Kiyai (Asnawi) and his family".[20] By October, however, the Resident increasingly felt that there was sufficient evidence to justify the arrest of Haji Chatib and Tubagus Emed.

Under questioning in September, Tubagus Emed had admitted that he had collected money earlier in the year knowing that it was destined for the PKI and at the monthly serba on 6 October Putman-Cramer asked Kartadiningrat whether he would agree to proceed with the arrest of the two men. The Regent, however, resisted, saying that he feared this would provoke widespread social unrest in Banten.[21] Several days later, Putman-Cramer complained of the Regent's obstructive attitude in a letter to the West Java Governor, Hillen.[22] Kartadiningrat had a formidable ally, though, in the Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs in Batavia, E. Gobée.

At the end of October, Gobée wrote a report on the political situation in Banten which strongly criticized the actions of Putman-Cramer and of the field-police.[23] A dangerous lack of cooperation had arisen between the Dutch and Indonesian administrations in Banten which was not the responsibility of the latter. The knowledge of the priyayi on the local situation had to be respected, he argued, if public order was to be maintained in the area.

The Resident, however, had already decided that there was now more than sufficient reason why Haji Chatib should be detained and on 23 October a large contingent of field-police was sent to Caringin to arrest Haji Chatib. Tubagus Emed, who was not taken into custody, hurried to Batavia where he saw Gobée. In a clever ploy to try and take advantage of the differences in the colonial administration, Tubagus Emed admitted to Gobée that he and Haji Chatib had joined the PKI, but that this was only because they felt the PKI was the best organization to promote and protect

Islam.[24] The Adviser for Islamic and Native Affairs was unable, however, to intervene. In any case, Gobée's report was soon to be rudely overtaken by events. The Batavia Komite Pemberontak was now making last-minute preparations for revolt and on 6 November the final green light was given.[25]

The Insurrection[26]

The last few days before the revolt were marked by frantic activity on both sides. Haji Achmad Chatib's arrest on 23 October had been a bitter blow for the rebels, depriving the PKI in Banten of its most important leader remaining at liberty, while at the same time giving the police fresh leads for their inquiries into the underground PKI in Pandeglang regency. In pursuit of the latter, an officer of the Serang field-police, Mangoendiwiria, and five policemen were dispatched to Labuan in early November to assist the local police.[27] Several arrests were made and on the morning of 12 November four suspects were sent back to Serang accompanied by the former PKI leader Oesadiningrat and another policeman, Djaimoen. Only the hapless Djaimoen returned to Labuan that night, Oesadiningrat remaining in Serang and thereby escaping an almost certain death.[28]

Meanwhile, on the rebel side, Haji Hasan returned from a meeting with the Batavia PKI leader, Sukrawinata, in the capital on the evening of 9 November. On the way back to Labuan, he broke his journey in Serang and Pandeglang to give final instructions to rebel leaders there. The day after his return, Haji Hasan visited Tubagus Emed in Caringin. Since the arrest of his brother-in-law, Haji Chatib, it appears that Tubagus Emed had grown increasingly

apprehensive about the approaching revolt. On 9 November, he had been summoned to Serang once again for questioning by the police and now feared he would soon follow Haji Chatib into prison. Sensing Tubagus Emed's growing unease over the planned insurrection, Haji Hasan dispatched another rebel leader, Haji Saleh, to visit him on the morning of 11 November. Haji Saleh's revolutionary credentials were impeccable: his grandfather had been killed in the Haji Wachia revolt of 1850 and his father was killed in the Cilegon revolt of 1888. Haji Saleh outlined the rebel plans to seize first Labuan, Pandeglang and Serang and then, in order to counter the PKI's numerical weakness in Rangkasbitung, to ferry rebels there by train to take the town. All priyayi and Europeans were to be arrested and those that resisted killed. Once Banten was freed from Dutch rule, the rebels would gather in Caringin, because Kiyai Asnawi was the most influential and important religious leader in the region, and await further instructions from the PKI insurrectionary committee in Batavia.[29] Despite these last-minute attempts, however, to try and secure his participation, Tubagus Emed refused to take any further active role in the imminent revolt.

On the morning of 12 November, the Labuan market was exceptionally busy as local people stockpiled provisions in anticipation of unrest. For days increased sales of salt and white cloth had been reported throughout Banten and widespread fasting was also noted. That evening several hundred peasants gathered at the village of Bama led by Kiyai Moekri and Kiyai Ilyas. Arms, which had been stored for months, were distributed and duties

allocated for the attack on Labuan. The meeting concluded with a sembahyang perang (war prayer) before the rebels set off for Labuan.[30]

Another large meeting, attended by more than 700 people, took place in the village of Pasirlama, near Caringin. The rebels from here, led by Haji Moestapha, were detailed to attack the residence of the assistant wedana of Cening.[31] The attack on Menes was to be led by Haji Hasan and Entol Enoh with apparently almost total support from the villages in the area.[32]

Meanwhile in Serang and Pandeglang rebel bands were also gathering, though not with the same degree of cohesion and planning as in Menes and Labuan. In the former towns, PKI strength had been fatally weakened in the months preceding the revolt and it was to be Menes and Labuan that were to be the centre of insurrectionary activity in 1926.

In Labuan, the revolt began just after midnight with an attack by several hundred armed men on the assistant wedana's residence. The Assistant Wedana, Mas Wiriadikoesoemah, and his family were taken prisoner by the rebels. A policeman guarding the residence was killed and two others seriously wounded in a gun battle with the rebels.

Following their successful attack, the rebels split into two groups. The first supervised the removal of Mas Wiriadikoesoemah to Caringin whilst the second searched the streets of Labuan for policemen. They went first to the house of Haji Ramal, where three policemen from the Serang field-police were lodging. The men,

however, had been alerted by the sound of gunfire in the street and escaped to the beach where they hid until morning. Three other policemen who had just returned from Serang were less fortunate. Arriving just after midnight, they ran straight into a large rebel band which killed two of them, Djaimoen and Haji Entjeh, and severely wounded the third, Koesen. The same rebel band attacked the house of Mas Mohammed Dahlan, a clerk who had provided information on the underground PKI to the police, leaving him seriously wounded.

In Menes, the night of revolt claimed even more victims than in Labuan. The main targets of the rebels were the Wedana, Raden Partadinata, the local railway supervisor, Benjamins and the police. The attack on the wedana's residence began about one o'clock in the morning and involved some 300 to 400 men. The wedana and a solitary policeman on duty shot several rebels before they were overwhelmed and killed. Another group of rebels had meanwhile seized the railway station and captured Benjamins, the only Dutchman living in the town. Although Benjamins tried to save his life by indicating his willingness to convert to Islam, the mob, after some debate, decided to take his life and his severely mutilated body was later found near the railway track.[33] Two policemen were also killed that night and an attack made on a retired patih. In the village of Cening, midway between Menes and Labuan, another policeman was killed and the assistant wedana shot and wounded.

Following the attacks on the authorities in Menes and Labuan, the initiative in the revolt was to pass from the hands of the

rebels. In the subsequent hours and days, while the rebels remained in control of much of west Banten, their resistance was to assume an increasingly reactive character. Although the PKI leadership left at large in Banten in November 1926 had given considerable thought at attempting to coordinate their attacks on the police and local government, they had made few plans with regard to what they would do once these actions were completed.

In some cases, even the initial attacks by the rebels were thwarted by timely action on the part of the authorities. For example, in the villages of Cadasari and Baros, from where rebel bands were to launch an assault on Pandeglang, the arrival of a large police force at 10 pm on 12 November prompted local rebel leaders to postpone their action. Even more damaging to the rebels' chance of success was their failure to sever immediately all telephone lines from Labuan and Menes, which resulted in the Regent of Pandeglang being informed soon after 1 am of the uprising. Ironically, soon after the critical call to Pandeglang had been made, the telephone lines were cut. The authorities in Batavia had, however, been alerted already and before 4 am a preliminary force of 100 soldiers under Captain Becking left for Banten.

In the meantime, Kartadiningrat, the Regent of Pandeglang, together with the local field-police commander, Martens, and nine policemen had departed for Menes and Labuan. Arriving in Menes they found the wedana's residence gutted and the bodies of Raden Partadinata and three policemen. The Regent's party now split into two, with Kartadiningrat and Martens and four policemen proceeding to Labuan. There they made contact with the wedana,

who had managed to escape from his residence prior to the rebel attack, and the three police officers who had spent the night hiding on the beach. Despite some cursory skirmishes with rebel bands throughout the morning, no major engagement took place; indeed, Kartadiningrat's small group was even able to carry out some arrests. Around midday, the Assistant Resident of Serang, Westenberg, arrived in Labuan together with a force of 20 soldiers. The rebels, led by Kiyai Moekri, who had been grouping throughout the morning for an attack on the Regent's party, now found themselves faced with a more substantial force. The attack was beaten off, with the rebels leaving many dead.

Late on the afternoon of 13 November, further military reinforcements led by Captain Becking arrived in Labuan. One of his first acts was to dispatch a patrol to Caringin to locate Mas Wiriadikoesoemah, and to arrest Tubagus Emed. The patrol, led by Lieutenant van der Vinne, found the assistant wedana guarded by only one man who offered no resistance. As the patrol approached the house of Tubagus Emed, however, they came under heavy gunfire from a neighbouring warung. In the ensuing gun battle, seven rebels inside the hut were shot dead by the soldiers. One rebel surrendered but as he approached the patrol suddenly attacked them with a long parang (short sword). The man, who was shot dead by van der Vinne, was later discovered to be the rebel leader Haji Saleh. The troops left Caringin soon after the engagement, returning to Labuan without Tubagus Emed whom they had failed to find.[34]

The centre of rebel activities from the morning of 14 November was the mosque of the village of Bama on the outskirts of Labuan. Hundreds of rebels from neighbouring villages congregated there from midday on 14 November in expectation of the attack on the Dutch military encampment in Labuan. In speeches to rally their peasant supporters, Kiyai Moekri and other leaders argued that an attack had to be launched on the Dutch in Labuan to avenge the deaths of those who had already fallen in battle.

Throughout the day of 14 November, the rebels made desperate efforts to rally their remaining forces. Kiyai Moekri, who had emerged as the principal rebel leader after the arrest of Haji Chatib, visited Caringin in the morning in an attempt to meet with Tubagus Emed. However, this final effort to secure Tubagus Emed's adherence to the rebel cause was doomed to failure. Kiyai Asnawi had ordered all his family to remain within his own home and had strictly forbidden Tubagus Emed to have any further dealings with the rebels.[35]

The rebel leaders also tried to enlist support for the revolt in villages where it had thus far been lukewarm. Haji Sirad, for example, delivered a letter to a prominent local ulama in the village of Palembang, indicating that the revolt was being led by Kiyai Asnawi.[36] Haji Soebari, to whom the letter had been delivered, refused, however, retorting that the villagers had no weapons and the Dutch could not simply be blown away. Elsewhere rebel envoys met with more success. In the village of Pagelaran, peasants joined the revolt and two local policemen were killed.

In the village of Kadugadung, a local ulama, Haji Lambri, told his peasant followers that it was their duty to support the uprising for now was not the time to think who was a communist and who was not, but the rebels must be assisted because they are "our people and Muslims".[37]

Despite the arrival of Dutch soldiers in Banten, the rebels still hoped to overrun the detachments led by Becking in Labuan and to march on to take Pandeglang. During the day of 14 November, plans were made for an attack on the Dutch military position in Labuan. In the afternoon, a motorised brigade travelling from Pandeglang was successfully delayed by the rebels as it attempted to enter Labuan. A fierce gun battle ensued but, fortuitously for the Dutch, a patrol arrived from Labuan. Attacking the rebels from behind, it succeeded in dislodging them.

That night the rebels prepared for their second attack on Labuan. The bridge over the river Bama was destroyed and barricades built on either side of the river. Telephone lines out of Labuan were once again cut and the roads out of the town, east via Menes and north over the Caringin river, were blocked by midday on 15 November. The rebels also made attempts to block the railway line.

Despite their preparations, however, the rebels were caught off guard in the afternoon of the 15th, when a patrol led by Becking himself ran into the main group of 500 rebels as they were on their way to link up with other bands. The rebels were dressed entirely in white with the exception of a black-clothed flag carrier, a man called Djapar from the village of Bama. Over 70 years of age,

Djapar bore a flag with a quotation from the Koran reading "With God's help everything can be achieved".[38] The rebels had only a few firearms and were no match for the Dutch soldiers with their fast-firing carbines. Despite heavy losses, the rebels made a futile attempt to surround the military patrol and attack it from two sides, a manoeuvre which failed due to the soldiers tactics of picking off rebel leaders and those carrying firearms. The rebels were forced to retreat after some 25 minutes.[39] They were now completely exhausted and dispirited, having failed in their attack and with many of their leaders dead.

Late the following day, 16 November, the Dutch lifted the siege of Labuan when the Governor of West Java, W.P. Hillen, arrived with two more brigades of troops. Further reinforcements came the next day, including an engineering section to repair the bridges. At the same time, a gunboat from Batavia with a detachment of marines anchored in Labuan harbour. It spent the subsequent days patrolling the Sunda Straits to prevent the rebels fleeing to Sumatra, an effort which was not entirely successful.

Although the uprising of November 1926 was largely confined to the Pandeglang regency, the rebels had also planned attacks on the town of Serang. Despite the arrests of the Serang PKI leadership in August/September 1926, there was still widespread unrest around the residency capital in November. On the night of 12 November, several hundred peasants gathered on the outskirts of the town. The rebels were led by Haji Solichin, Mohammed Tohir and two well-known jawara, Abdullah and Ayub Achmad. The rebels intended to seize the resident's office, the police barracks and railway

station. Although poorly armed, many of the rebels wore jimat (amulets) and had carried out invulnerability rites. The rebels were to await a signal which was to be carried by a messenger on a train from Rangkasbitung. The messenger, however, never arrived and after waiting until early morning the rebels dispersed. Some 50 men, under the leadership of Mohammed Tohir, left for Labuan but only got as far as Cimauk before hiding in the woods to avoid the troops who had arrived from Batavia.[40]

The most serious incident in Serang regency was to occur on the night of 13 November at Petir.[41] The PKI was strong in the area and had been relatively unaffected by the earlier arrests in Serang regency. As in Pandeglang regency, the local PKI leaders were nearly all ulama. Most important among them were Kiyai Emed, Haji Soeeb, Haji Artasik and Haji Satra. The Petir leaders postponed their action for two days because of the failure of the attack on Serang, but they now decided to proceed with an attack on the residence of the assistant wedana of Petir before marching on to Serang. Unknown to them, however, a Dutch military patrol acting on a tipoff had already taken up positions in Petir and it fought off the attack after a gun battle in which four of the rebels were killed.

After the street fighting in Labuan on 15 November, there was no further serious engagement between the rebels and the Dutch forces and by 17 November it was clear that the attempt by the rebels to besiege and overrun the Dutch forces in Labuan had failed. By that date, too, no serious resistance was being offered by the PKI elsewhere in Java. Nevertheless, for several days in Banten some of the rebel groups remained at large, evading arrest and

spreading alarming reports in an attempt to maintain some sort of momentum. On the night of 17 November, Pandeglang was put on full-scale alert because of widespread rumours of an imminent attack. But the Dutch had now received fresh reinforcements while the rebels had suffered heavy defeats and lost many of their important leaders.

Four brigades of troops left Labuan on 18 November to sweep the territory south of the town in a search for remaining rebel bands. A brigade of Menadonese troops, which had arrived that day, came under fire near the Bama river bridge. The fire was returned and the rebel group was pursued by the troops into a nearby village. Most of the rebels escaped, but some took refuge in a mosque which the Menadonese troops stormed. Mopping-up operations continued in the area for the next two weeks, but at the end of the month two armed rebel bands were still apparently in existence, one west of the Pandeglang-Menes road and the second to the east of the road. On the night of 4 December, the first of these bands was responsible for setting fire to and destroying the house of the headman in the village of Cidolas, near Caringin, and for beating up a policeman in Cening. Some nights earlier, the residences of the assistant wedana and of the headman of Pagelaran were burnt down whilst their occupants were on patrol outside the village. No further incidents of violence occurred after this.

The revolt of 1926 was more protracted and assumed a more popular character in Banten than in any other region of Indonesia, with the exception of West Sumatra.[42] In other areas of West and Central Java, isolated incidents of violence occurred on the night

of 12 November and for a few days thereafter, but nowhere did resistance assume the proportions it did in Banten. Even in the Tegal area of Central Java, where local militants had been virulent in their advocacy of armed revolt, arrests by the authorities and the absence of any real plan by the rebels meant that the PKI organization was easily broken and resistance was minimal.[43] In the East Priangan residency of West Java, the PKI mounted a number of attacks on local priyayi and policemen, but on a minor scale compared to the actions in Banten.[44]

Apart from Banten and West Sumatra, the revolt was most serious in the capital, Batavia. Indeed, it was only in these three areas that the rebels appear to have acted on the basis of a concerted plan.[45] It is also apparent that many Bantenese played an active role in the revolt in Batavia. Leadership of the rebels was in the hands of Sukrawinata, Dahlan, Ibu Sukaesih and Achmad Bassaif. Bassaif had succeeded in recruiting many jawara and jago elements into the PKI from the districts of Jembatan Lima, Tanah Abang and Kampung Karet, traditional haunts of Bantenese in the capital. The rebels' main targets were in the Kota area of the city and consisted of Glokok prison and the city telephone exchange, both of which were subjected to a sustained assault. Several policemen were also killed by the rebels in clashes near Tanah Abang railway station and in Mangga Dua. The rebels also captured the telephone exchange for several hours, later escaping by means of the city sewers.[46] However, even in Batavia resistance was crushed by late on 14 November and a period of arrests and repression ensued.

Significant Features of the 1926 Revolt in Banten

The revolt in Banten was part of a comprehensive design, however mismanaged, by the PKI for a concerted attack on the colonial government throughout the Dutch East Indies. The PKI had succeeded in Banten in establishing an extensive underground organization that encompassed the regencies of Serang and Pandeglang and the Rangkasbitung area of Lebak regency. This was no mean feat. The degree of revolutionary organization in Banten was more widespread geographically and more encompassing socially than in any other area that participated in the 1926 revolt, with the possible exception of West Sumatra. If we compare the degree and extent of organization in 1926 with the Cilegon revolt of 1888, that of 1926 was far more extensive. In the Cilegon uprising, by far the most serious in Banten in the nineteenth century, the rebel organization was confined to the western half of Serang regency, and the rest of the region was completely unaffected.[47] By contrast, the revolutionary organization in 1926 enveloped almost the whole of the residency of Banten, with the exception of the regency of Lebak. Lebak was the most sparsely populated regency in Java, and outside the environs of Rangkasbitung itself where the PKI was well entrenched, the peasantry were engaged almost wholly in slash and burn (huma) rice production. The rubber plantations that existed in the regency were worked by a labour force that was almost entirely from Central Java. Even in Lebak, though, the insurrectionaries intended to make good their lack of strength by transporting rebels by train from Labuan to Rangkasbitung after the former town had been captured.

The area of the actual revolt was largely limited to the regency of Pandeglang, and in particular to the Menes-Labuan area, and to the Petir district of Serang regency. But it is clear that a serious insurrection would have occurred in Serang regency had it not been for the crippling wave of arrests that took place in August and September. Most of those recommended for internment without trial in Boven Digul were arrested before the revolt and in most cases came from Serang regency. The Dutch authorities themselves were very clear about this. The Governor of West Java, W.P. Hillen, wrote to the Governor-General, A.C.D. de Graeff, in April 1927,

> "If one thinks (of the situation) in North Banten, the inclination and propensity to revolt was much greater than in Pandeglang, and if it were not for the timely and strong reaction of the administration, the results would have been much worse than now in Pandeglang."[48]

It is evident then that the social and political unrest in 1926 was far more widespread than the acts of rebellion in which it eventually manifested itself. As the Committee of Inquiry into the revolt noted, the important fact about the unrest of 1926 was not so much in the revolt in Labuan, Menes and Petir, but in the fact that in a far greater number of places a large number of people were prepared to revolt.[49] Indeed, it is striking that there were fewer members of the PKI in the rebellious areas of Labuan, Menes and Petir than in the region of Serang, Taktakan and Gunungsari which did not join the uprising. Anyer and Cilegon were also important centres of PKI activity which did not participate in the final uprising.

The loss at a late stage of the single most important rebel leader, Haji Achmad Chatib, also probably limited the extent of rebel violence. Chatib's arrest, together with the last-minute faint-heartedness of Tubagus Emed, seriously weakened the PKI leadership in Banten. Haji Chatib's participation, he himself was from Serang, might have still galvanised the rebel ranks in that regency into joining with the Pandeglang rebels. As a commentator noted after the revolt,

> "No one can have any doubt that the rebellion would have had a much more serious character had it not been for the arrests that took place before 12 November. This is particularly so when one looks at Haji Chatib. If, as the rebels planned, he had led the revolt, it would have had a much more extensive character and would have probably spread over all of Banten."[50]

With Haji Chatib's presence, the original rebel plans which called for the seizure of Labuan and Menes and then a joint march on Pandeglang, where they would be assisted in an attack on the town by rebels led by Kiyai Madun of Petir advancing from the north and north-east and others led by Kiyai Achmad of Pancur (Serang), might well have succeeded.

It is virtually impossible to ascertain the total number of those who adhered to the rebel cause. The police estimated that there was a total of approximately four thousand PKI members in Banten, but this figure was far smaller than the number of people who had bought membership cards and who considered themselves to be part of the revolutionary organization.[51] As early as February 1926, Dutch intelligence reports estimated PKI support in Banten at more than twelve thousand. Indeed, Captain Becking, the military

commander during the revolt, estimated that as many as fifteen thousand rebels were active in the Menes-Labuan region alone. It is true that the number of rebels involved in the attacks on the residences of civil servants was in fact never more than several hundred, a feature that was common in 1888 too, but this had as much to do with poor mobilisation of the rebel supporters than anything else. It is clear from other sources that the total number of peasants who considered themselves to be members of the PKI may have been in excess of fifty thousand throughout Banten.[52]

An examination of the social composition of the rebel forces reveals a number of interesting points. Firstly, the group of artisans and clerks who had so much to do with bringing the PKI to Banten, and who provided the first cadres for the party in the region, did not participate in the November insurrection. This group, small in number and probably the only group with any serious understanding of the aims and ideology of the PKI, had almost all been arrested in August and September 1926. The few individuals who escaped arrest, for example Achmad Bassaif, left Banten for Batavia. Although this group of secular communists had been instrumental in establishing the PKI, and also the illegal DO organization, in Banten, the leadership of both passed to the traditional leaders of rebellion in the region, namely the ulama, jawara and old nobility. In that sense, the leaders of the final revolt in November 1926 were not markedly different from the leaders of rebellions in Banten in the nineteenth century. What was different was that the religious leaders were coopted into a revolutionary organization that was not of their making or design and which, for

the first time, not only encompassed the whole of Banten but also had wide-reaching connections throughout Java and Sumatra.

It is evident that besides the ulama an important role in the revolt was played by jawara. Indeed, the large number of policemen who died in the November uprising may well have been due, in part, to a settling of old scores by some of the jawara. Their participation in the revolt, given their scant regard for the authorities and the laws of the land, is perhaps not suprising. What is noteworthy, however, is that the PKI had been able to coopt them into the revolutionary organization, when in other contexts and in other countries such elements have proven far too individualistic to be drawn into political or social movements. There was in Banten a long tradition of brigandage and social banditry, which although it contributed to the unruliness of the region did not lend itself easily to participation in acts of rebellion. Although, for example, the 1880s was a decade in which banditry appears to have been quite widespread in Banten, there is almost no evidence that persons involved in this activity were drawn into the Cilegon uprising of 1888. The majority of participants in the revolt were, of course, ordinary peasants. Visitors to Banten after the revolt were struck by the fact that whole villages in the Menes and Labuan areas had simply been deserted by their peasant dwellers.

The most obvious targets of the rebels were the pangreh praja. In particular, it was police officials who were killed unsparingly by the rebels. Against civil servants as a whole, the rebels were more selective. The Wedana of Menes, Raden Partadinata, who was not

Bantenese and who had a reputation for being repressive, was killed by the rebels as almost surely would have been the assistant wedana of Menes, another non-Bantenese, if he had been apprehended. In Labuan, however, the assistant wedana was merely kidnapped and held captive. A number of factors were probably involved in the sparing of Mas Wiriadikusamah's life. He was a local man and seemingly widely respected. Moreover, as we noted earlier, in September he had warned one of the local PKI leaders, Afif, of his impending arrest. Popular resentment against the civil service also found expression in the course of the revolt in the destruction of government archives and the houses of officials.

The only Dutchman to be killed in the course of the revolt was Benjamins, the railway supervisor in Menes. Benjamins was one of the few Europeans living in the Menes-Labuan area and was unpopular locally for an allegedly hostile attitude towards the PKI and also earlier towards the Sarekat Islam. Additionally, he upset local values by living openly with a Bantenese woman to whom he was not married. Against local Chinese there was no visible hostility in the course of the insurrection. Although there had been some attacks on Chinese in August and September, this was not repeated in the actual rebellion of November. As in the Cilegon uprising of 1888, local Chinese were not targets of peasant rebels. In this respect, social unrest in the Banten region was markedly different from peasant unrest in neighbouring Tanggerang, where were was a far larger Chinese population.[53] On the morning of 13 November, when the rebels were gathering their forces for an assault on the Dutch military position in Labuan, the small Chinese population left the town en masse, indicating that they may well have been

forewarned by the rebels. There was much evidence that Chinese traders in Banten, and particularly in Menes and in Labuan, had sold arms and ammunition to the rebels, in some cases knowing to what purposes it would be put. There were also at least two local Chinese who were prominent members of the PKI. One of them, Tju Tong Hin, had been a leading member of the PKI in Rangkasbitung and was later exiled to Boven Digul.

The absence of any attacks on the Chinese, who monopolised much of local trade, especially in the coconut-growing area of Labuan, would seem to indicate the absence of class conflict as a specific theme of the revolt. Many of the rebels themselves reportedly belonged to the ranks of rich peasants and others were traders. This did not prevent them from participating in the rebellion or from considering their objectives to be one and the same as the other participants in the revolt. But it should be noted, however, that in August and September there had been pressure, and in some cases attacks, on Chinese and wealthy haji, and in Petir at least one murder of a well-to-do trader, by the underground PKI.

Temporary and short-lived though the insurrection was, the rebels, at least for a few days, effectively held the Menes-Labuan area. In Labuan, they successfully isolated troops sent to suppress the revolt and almost succeeded in overrunning their positions. The rebel forces, however, were almost entirely composed of ordinary peasants who were not prepared to see a long campaign through. Moreover, the peasants' leaders had no far-reaching plans of what to do next. The most they hoped for were

instructions from the executive revolutionary leadership in Batavia. Only as long as no effective armed force stood against them could the rebels maintain their position. When actual armed clashes took place, the rebels inevitably conceded defeat, often after a desultory exchange. To some extent, the rebels were undoubtedly blinded by the conviction that they were invulnerable in waging the jihad against the infidel Dutch. They were fortified in this conviction by the consideration that they were part of a nationwide insurrection against colonial rule. For the first time Banten had risen in revolt, not in isolation, but as part of a much wider movement against colonial oppression.

FOOTNOTES

1. Interview with Achmad Bassaif, Kutoardjo, 18 April 1976.

2. Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965, pp. 329, 485, n. 31; Harry Poeze, Tan Malaka Levensloop van 1897 tot 1945: Strijder voor Indonesie's Vrijheid, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 318.

3. Poeze, op. cit., pp. 317-322.

4. Ibid., p. 323; McVey, Rise, p. 330; interview with Achmad Bassaif.

5. Poeze, op. cit., p. 325; McVey, Rise, pp. 331-333; 340.

6. Interviews with Achmad Bassaif and Haji Afif, Cilegon, 17 May 1976.

7. Ibid.

8. McVey, Rise, pp. 340-344; Poeze, op. cit., p. 327; Lembaga Sedjarah PKI, Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1961, p. 53; interview with Achmad Bassaif. Bassaif is the unidentified person in the photograph on p. 52 of Pemberontakan. The members of the Komite included Sukrawinata, Baharuddin Saleh, Mahmud Sitjin alias Mohammed Jusuf, Samudro, Hamid Sutan and Herojuwono.

9. A number of PKI members went underground in Batavia or fled to Sumatra. In some cases, they left the PKI altogether, whilst

in others they left Banten sometimes fearing their own ability to control the rebel movement there. Interview with Achmad Rifai, chairman of the PKI sub-section in Pandeglang in 1926, Serang, 12 February 1976. Others who left for Batavia included Mohammed Ali (Mamak), an important Bantenese communist in the revolution of 1945.

10. Interview with Afif, Cilegon, 10 May 1976.

11. On police generally, see A. Neytzell de Wilde, "De Nederlandsch-Indie Politie", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, Vol. 13, 1924, pp. 113-180; see also the discussion in Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite. The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi, Singapore: Heinemann, 1979, pp. 92-94.

12. Report of Hillen to Governor-General, unnumbered, 26 November 1926, Mailrapport 1181^{x} in Verbaal 1 July 1927 T10.

13. Ibid.

14. Report of Hillen to Governor-General, No. G 13/9/12, 29 December 1926, Mailrapport 172^{x}/27 in Verbaal 1 July 1927 T10.

15. Interview with Professor G.F. Pijper, Amsterdam, 17 May 1976. Kartadiningrat's letter is included as an appendix to his letter of 7 February 1939 to the Governor-General, Verbaal 4 July 1939/19.

16. Ibid.

17. De Banten Bode, 2 October 1926. See also "De Onrust in het Bantamsche", Java Bode, 20 October 1926.

18. Haji Doelhadi was eventually arrested in early November in Batavia, De Banten Bode, 6 November 1926.

19. "Verklaring Mas Wiria di Koesoema", De Landsdienaar, Vol. 3, no. 9, September 1927, pp. 459-461.

20. Report of Hillen to Governor-General, G 13/1/21, 24 January 1927, Mailrapport 172^{x} in Verbaal 1 July 1927 T10.

21. Statement of R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, 3 April 1927, Mailrapport $705^{x}/27$ in Verbaal 4 July 1939.

22. Report of Hillen, 24 January 1927, G 13/1/21, Mailrapport 172^{x}, in Verbaal 1 July 1927 T10.

23. "Politieke Toestand in het Gewest Bantam", H60, 29 October 1926, Mailrapport $786^{x}/27$.

24. See report of Gobée, "Klachten over het optreden van de politie in het Bantamsche", H61, 31 October 1926, Mailrapport $786^{x}/27$.

25. McVey, Rise, p. 341; Poeze, op. cit., p. 328. The executive of the PKI in Bandung did make one last desperate attempt in November to regain its control over the local sections. It sent a circular at the beginning of the month to all branches calling for purification of the party and a return to centralized leadership by the executive. This initiative was only supported by the Priangan section. See McVey, p. 342 and Poeze, p. 328.

26. For the course of the 1926 uprising in Banten, I have used the following written sources besides interviews: report by Resident of Banten, Putman-Cramer, "Communisten Relletjes in Banten", 17 December 1926, No. 412/G, Mailrapport $45^{x}/27$ in Verbaal 21 June 1927 A10; see also the account written by Captain Becking in Memorie van Overgave, J.S. de Kanter, May 1934, pp. 67-108; "Verslag over de Relletjes in Menes en Labuan", report of Regent of Pandeglang, 14 November 1926, appendix 6 to letter of Governor-General to Minister of Colonies, No. 395/2, 22 May 1939, Verbaal 4 July 1939/19; "Vervolg van het verslag over Relletjes in Menes en Labuan", 29 November 1926, report of Regent of Pandeglang, appendix 9 to preceding document; Mailrapporten $1101^{x}/26$ and $1110^{x}/26$ in Verbaal 1 July 1927 S10 also contain reports by the Governor of West Java, W.P. Hillen, on the 1926 uprising. Of the press coverage of the time, I have relied heavily on reports that appeared in De Banten Bode, Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad and De Courant (Bandung). Where I have used other newspapers, I have indicated in the footnotes. An invaluable series of articles appeared in the journal De Landsdienaar throughout 1927 under the heading "Zaak Mas Wiria di Koesoema". The relevant articles appeared in Vol. 3, no. 2, February 1927, p. 129; no. 6, June 1927, pp. 319-329; no. 7/8, July/August 1927, pp. 375, 377, 387-390; no. 9, September 1927, pp. 456-463; no. 10, October 1927, pp. 505-506; no. 11/12, November/December 1927, pp. 541-542. Other written sources that are useful include "The Bantam Report" in Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927: Key Documents, Ithaca, NY: Cornell

Modern Indonesia Project, 1960, pp. 19-96; J.Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie, Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1928, pp. 74-77; Sudijono Djojoprajitno, PKI-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, Djakarta: Jajasan Massa, 1962, pp. 45-49.

A number of articles of interest also appeared in the international Communist press of the time. See inter alia "L'insurrection sur Java et ses causes profondes", Le Drapeau Rouge (Bruxelles), 18, 19 and 20 December 1926; Semoan, "International Imperialism and the Communist Party of Indonesia", Communist International, No. 17, 1926; Gerard Vanter (van Munster), "The Insurrection in Java", International Press Correspondence (Inprecorr), 25 November 1926, Vol. 6, no. 80; G.J. van Munster, "The Background and History of the Insurrection in Java", Inprecorr, 16 December 1926, Vol. 6, no. 87; Gerard Vanter, "The Revolts in Indonesia", Inprecorr, 13 January 1927, Vol. 7, no. 5; P. Bergsma, "The Persecution of Revolutionaries in Indonesia", Inprecorr, 29 September 1927, Vol. 7, no. 55; Samim, "The Situation in Indonesia", Inprecorr, 4 October 1928, Vol. 8, no. 68; Kiyai Samim, "Dutch Imperialist Terror in Indonesia", Inprecorr, 31 August 1928, Vol. 8, no. 57.

27. Interview with Mohammed Djen, one of the policemen referred to in the text, Jakarta, 20 August 1975. Report of Resident of Banten, Putman-Cramer, to Hillen, Governor of West Java, 27 June 1927, No. 205/G, Mailrapport $832^{x}/27$ in Verbaal 2 September 1927 N14.

28. Report of Hillen to Governor-General de Graeff, 24 January 1927, G 13/1/21, Mailrapport 172[X] in Verbaal 1 July 1927 T10.

29. Report of Gobée to Governor-General, 23 December 1927, No. 1/500, Mailrapport 1484[X]/27; see also statement of Tubagus Emed to police in same report.

30. De Courant, 6 January 1927; "Beknopt Overzicht van den actueelen toestand in Bantam", 9 December 1926, G 5/41/15, Mailrapport 1235[X] in Verbaal 1 July 1927 R10.

31. Interview with Kiyai Abdulhalim; Makmun Salim, "Suatu Tindjauan tentang peranan adjaran Islam dalam Pemberontakan 1926 di Banten", Seminar Sedjarah Nasional II, Yogyakarta, n.p., 1970, pp. 20-21.

32. Interview with Mohammed Djen.

33. Interview with M. Padmadisastra, Rangkasbitung, 23 December 1975.

34. Police interrogation report of Haji Fadil, son of Kiyai Asnawi, 20 November 1926, Mailrapport 868[X]. See also "De Relletjes te Labuan", De Landsdienaar, Vol. 3, no. 6, June 1927, pp. 319-320.

35. Police interrogation report of Haji Fadil.

36. Police interrogation reports of Saingga, 19 November 1926, Kandani, 22 November 1926, Haji Isa, 19 November 1926, and Sapiri, 22 November 1926, all of the village of Palembang, in Mailrapport 868[X]/27.

37. Police interrogation reports of Mirdja, 14 April 1927 and Soedira, 5 December 1926, of the village of Kadugadung, in Mailrapport 868^{x}/27.

38. Becking, op. cit., in de Kanter, MvO, pp. 91-94. Interestingly, a communist commentator noting the fact that the rebels were dressed in white ascribed this to their dedication until death to the cause of the international proletariat, Gerard Vanter, "The Insurrection on Java", Inprecorr, 25 November 1926, Vol. 6, no. 80.

On 15 November, there were strong rumours of an impending attack on the town of Cilegon. One brigade was sent there, together with a heavy machine-gun unit. See report of Hillen to Governor-General, 16 November 1926, No. G1, Mailrapport 1110^{x} in Verbaal 1 July 1927 S10.

39. Becking op. cit., p. 94.

40. Interview with Haji Mohammed Tahir, one of the PKI leaders in Serang in 1926, Serang, 9 December 1975.

41. Police interrogation report of Moekri of the village of Petir, undated, Mailrapport 868^{x} in Verbaal 13 April 1928 O6. Petir was a former stronghold of the Sarekat Islam in Banten at an earlier period; see Neratja, 1 August 1918 and Hasan Djajadiningrat, "Politieke Stroomingen in Banten", De Taak, 25 March 1922.

42. On West Sumatra, see "The Causes and Effects of Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra", B. Schrieke, Indonesian

Sociological Studies, Part One, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, pp. 83-167; "Political Section on the West Coast of Sumatra Report", in Benda and McVey, op. cit., pp. 97-177.

43. On Tegal, see "Communistische onlusten te Tegal", Mailrapport 122^{x}/27 in Verbaal 21 June 1927 A10; Djojoprajitno, PKI-SIBAR, pp. 49-56.

44. On the disturbances in the Priangan, see "Beknopt overzicht van de Communistische Ongeregeldheden", in Verbaal 13 December 1926 D19; "Communistische Ongeregeldheden", in Verbaal 13 November 1926 X17.

45. For Batavia, see A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, Amsterdam and Batavia: G.A. Kolff, 1936, pp. 332-341; interview with Achmad Bassaif, who led the attack on Glodok prison.

46. See the account of the trials of the leaders of this attack in Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27 and 28 January 1927.

47. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888. Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia, Verhandelingen, KITLV, Vol. 50, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, p. 233.

48. Hillen to Governor-General, 8 April 1927, G 13/3/8, Mailrapport 705^{x} in Verbaal 4 July 1939.

49. "The Bantam Report", p. 40.

50. De Courant, 5 January 1927.

51. "The Bantam Report", p. 40.

52. Interviews with former members of the PKI as well as with local priyayi.

53. See Rapport over de Tangerangsche Ratoe Adil Beweging, 1924, passim (in my possession).

CHAPTER 7

THE SEQUEL TO THE REVOLT

Retribution - Arrest and Exile

By the middle of December 1926, life was beginning to return to normal in Banten, except in the area most troubled by the revolt, Menes-Labuan-Caringin. Schools and markets had reopened and a semblance of normality had appeared once more. The Chinese population, who had evacuated the area in November, had begun to return and commercial life gradually resumed itself. In Labuan and Menes, however, many Chinese shops had still not reopened by late December. It was also impossible for any undertaking to find labourers, indicating that there may have been a high percentage of such people participating in the revolt or that they had fled the area because of the arrival of Dutch troops.[1] Roads and bridges had been repaired and all barricades and ambuscades on the Menes-Labuan road removed. Military barracks had been hastily erected in the two towns affected most by the riots and government offices and railway stations were provided with constant military guards.[2]

Nor were the military idle. Acting on information supplied by prisoners under interrogation and by spies, every day soldiers accompanied the police on raids into villages to make new arrests of those allegedly involved in the insurrection. Soon, local prisons were full to capacity and in Labuan resort was made to imprisoning suspected rebels in disused railway wagons.[3] By the end of November, more than thirteen hundred suspected rebels had been imprisoned in Banten.[4] On a typical day in early December, the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad reported the arrest of 11 rebels in

Pagelaran, the arrest of nine rebels together with 37 rifles and five revolvers in the Gunung Pulosari area north of Menes and the arrest of 73 rebel suspects by Captain Benjamins, the nephew of the murdered railway inspector, in Anyer.[5] The same day the bodies of two missing police agents, who had been killed on 13 November, were found buried near the village of Bojong between Labuan and Menes. Two days later, on 5 December, 32 more rebel suspects were arrested in the village of Bangko. To cope with the influx of arrests, the authorities hastily appointed retired civil servants and students as jaksa.[6]

On 8 December, soldiers arrested a number of the leaders of the attack on Petir who were hiding near the village of Wado (Serang regency), including Haji Saidi, Haji Kariman, Haji Machmoed and Haji Artasik.[7] Cavalry patrols combed the south of Banten to drive remaining rebels north where they could be picked up by infantry patrols. These patrols also had the desired effect of intimidating the local population. On 22 December, one of these patrols arrested Haji Hassan, one of the leaders of the Labuan insurrection. He was detained in the village of Pasir Tengah at the house of the widow of Kiyai Ilyas, another of the rebel leaders in Labuan who had been killed in the first days of the revolt.[8]

Tension remained high throughout the region because of the wave of arrests and rumours of a new revolt. Fresh insurrection was supposed to break out on the night of 6 December; other rumours suggested that the pangreh praja would not have sufficient money to pay the soldiers and that the latter would then withdraw to Batavia leaving the priyayi once again exposed to new murderous

assaults.[9] Despite the arrests and the rumours, by the end of the first week of December most of the villages in the Menes-Labuan area were re-populated though still with a significant absence of men, many having fled apparently to Batavia or across the Sunda Straits to the Lampungs, either because of their participation in the revolt or out of fear of arrest.

Up to 13 November, the eve of the revolt, the authorities in Banten had made 67 arrests in connection with the underground PKI, 56 in Serang regency, five in Lebak and five in Pandeglang. Between 13 November and 8 December, a further 916 arrests were made, 134 in Serang regency, one in Lebak and 781 in Pandeglang. These figures, however, do not include many hundreds more detained for interrogation and released after several days or in some cases weeks.[10] As the total number of arrests throughout Indonesia in connection with the 1926 revolt was thirteen thousand, the final Banten figure of approximately thirteen hundred accounted for 10% of these. Even given that Banten was one of the main centres of the revolt, this was a very high percentage when it is remembered that the total population of the district at the time was less than a million out of a total Indonesian population of some sixty million. Indeed, if we look at the total number of arrests in West Java - three thousand - the proportion in Banten is extremely high. By contrast, the number of arrests in West Sumatra was two thousand over a much larger area.

The large-scale arrests and police and army raids on the villages had a chilling effect on the population of Banten that is remembered to this day,

> "I was only a boy at the time but I could not forget those days. We were living in Pandeglang where my father was a jaksa. I remember quite clearly seeing hundreds of prisoners on the public square (alun-alun) roped together like animals by the neck. One day a Dutch lieutenant on horseback with several Ambonese soldiers came to our house with about 50 prisoners from the village of Kadupendek. There were women and children amongst them. My father was very angry and upset that so many were being taken into custody simply because there were some suspected communists in the village."[11]

A mood of fear swept Banten. Many haji reportedly even forsook the wearing of the white turban because so many of those who were arrested by Dutch soldiers seemed to be haji.[12] The uneasiness and fear was increased by the handling of the aftermath of the revolt by the Dutch authorities. In a number of cases, mosques had been desecrated and innocent people killed. An example of the latter was the fatal wounding of Kiyai Mohammed Saleh of the village of Kenanga, near Menes. Kiyai Saleh was one of the most respected and influential ulama in Banten. During the course of the revolt he had tried to dissuade rebels from destroying a bridge in the neighbourhood of the village of Bama. Despite his age - he was over 70 - and the fact that there was no evidence that he was at all involved in the revolt, orders were given to arrest him on 17 November, as it was held that he had not done enough to dissuade the peasants of Kenanga from participating in the revolt. Kiyai Saleh was arrested while he was praying in the village mosque. As a result of injuries sustained during his arrest, he became totally lame. Kiyai Saleh was left in the sick wing of the prison where he was found two months later by J.W. Meyer Ranneft, a member of the Commission of Inquiry into the revolt, who demanded his immediate release. He was allowed to go home, but died within days of returning to his native village.[13]

Although the death of Kiyai Saleh was one of the most serious incidents, other excesses by Dutch soldiers were common. During an attack on the mosque in the village of Bama, one of the rebels who was killed in a fight with a soldier had his head cut off and his blood was ritually drunk by an Ambonese soldier.[14] Another death was that of Raden Affandi, one of the PKI leaders in Menes. Raden Affandi died in prison in Rangkasbitung in January 1927, reportedly as a result of wounds incurred during his capture and subsequent imprisonment and which had been inadequately treated. There were several other incidents which contributed to widespread unease throughout Banten. Spies were widely reported to be using their influence to settle old grudges and extort money. A police agent in Cening was suspended because of such actions, but elsewhere many policemen went unapprehended. Persons who had caused difficulties in the past for local officials were an obvious target for arrest in this time of retribution by the authorities. Some peasants were arrested because of allegations by village heads who coveted their land.[15]

This unease and fear was most marked in the centre of the revolt, the Menes-Labuan area, where even by late January 1927 there was a marked absence of men in many villages.[16] In Menes alone, more than five hundred men had been arrested, of whom three hundred remained in a barbed-wire stockade hastily erected in the centre of the town where they could be seen from the street, half-naked and in insanitary conditions.[17] The conditions of prisoners in Labuan held in disused railway carriages was even worse. Many of those arrested had been detained on the flimsiest of evidence and then imprisoned for months before their cases were processed.[18]

In one village, a retired assistant wedana was arrested simply because he had run out of the back entrance of his house when soldiers arrived. Nor was this state of affairs confined to the Labuan-Menes area; throughout Banten waves of arrests continued apace and as late as May 1927 there were seven hundred political prisoners in Serang jail alone. Peace was largely restored, as one Dutch commentator aptly noted, "at the point of a bayonet".[19]

Most of the leadership of the PKI in Banten had been arrested prior to the uprising. Those who led the insurrection were arrested in the following weeks, although some managed to evade capture for a while. A number of the important participants in the attack on Petir were arrested in January 1927, amongst them Haji Salgari who had long been sought by the police.[20] Haji Adung, the younger brother of Haji Chatib, was also arrested in January 1927.[21] Four other rebel leaders were arrested in Palembang on Sumatra's east coast whilst trying to escape to Malaya.[22]

There were others, however, who were more fortunate. Many who had simply been ordinary party members or who had participated in the revolt managed to escape arrest provided they were not betrayed by spies or by comrades under interrogation.[23] Of important figures in the insurrectionary movement, there are three whose escape we should note. Kiyai Moekri, who, after the arrest of Haji Chatib, assumed leadership of the revolutionary movement in the Labuan area, fled to Ciruas, east of Serang, where he was sheltered by another ulama who had taken no direct part in the revolt, Kiyai Rafiuddin. From there he made his way to Surabaya in

East Java and eventually, disguised as a prospective pilgrim, fled to Mecca where he adopted the name Sech Kabir. He returned to Banten only in the 1960s at the invitation of President Sukarno.[24]

Another group of Bantenese rebels, about 10 in number, fled via Palembang to Malaya where they lived for many years.[25] The most prominent members of this group were Tje Mamat, chairman of the Anyer PKI sub-section, and Tubagus Alipan, one of the founders of the PKI in Banten. Tje Mamat was from a family of Palembang origins and had a network of contacts between Anyer, the Lampungs, Palembang and Malaya amongst fishermen and Bantenese migrants. This network had already smuggled several PKI leaders out of the country earlier. In Malaya Tje Mamat and Alipan eventually established contact with Subakat and Djamaluddin Tamin, two prominent PKI leaders who had also managed to flee arrest.

Apart from Kiyai Moekri and a small group who escaped to Malaya, the other leaders of the rebel movement faced retribution from the colonial authorities. Many were brought before the courts to receive long prison sentences and in four cases the death penalty. Another group, 99 in number, against whom there was not sufficient evidence to prefer charges in open court were interned indefinitely in the notorious prison camp at Boven Digul in New Guinea. Some would never leave there alive and others had to wait for nearly 20 years, to 1945, before they were able to return to their homes and families in Banten.

First to appear in court was, appropriately, Puradisastra, who came before the magistrates in Pandeglang in January 1927.

The 'father of Bantenese Communism' was charged with distributing seditious literature in March 1926 and attempting to subvert two officers of the field-police. He received a sentence of four years' imprisonment after refusing to answer any of the court's charges. In May, he again appeared before the courts and received a further sentence of one year and 10 months' for insulting the name of the Governor-General. This total of five years and 10 months' imprisonment was to be followed by banishment to Boven Digul.[26] Meanwhile, in Batavia, Achmad Bassaif received an eight-year prison sentence, likewise to be followed by banishment to Boven Digul for his part in the attack on Glodok prison in November.[27]

The first trial of rebels directly involved in the uprising followed in February in Serang. It concerned those who had participated in the attack on Petir on the night of 13/14 November. The first accused to be brought before the court were six peasants, Haji Satria alias Machmud, Damiri, Haji Dulsalam, Haji Dojok, Haji Abubakar and Oemar. They were charged with conducting armed resistance against the government of the Netherlands Indies.[28] All six denied the charges. Witnesses, however, testified that they had seen the accused on the night armed and urging others to join the attack on the residence of the assistant wedana. Eight hundred peasants gathered for the attack after which the group intended to join with other rebel bands and attack Serang itself. In the assault on the residency capital, all Europeans and priyayi were to be killed.[29] All the accused denied that they were members of the PKI, but admitted they supported the organization because its aim was the abolition of taxation. A number of the accused, it seems,

were former pupils of Kiyai Emed of Petir, one of the most important ulama to join the PKI.

Sentences were handed down in mid-February. Haji Satria and Damiri both received 15 years', Haji Dojok, Haji Dulsalam and Oemar 13 years' and Haji Abubakar 12 years' imprisonment. The accused, despite their heavy sentences, left the court laughing and did not exercise their right to appeal. Some weeks later, Haji Satria, when he was about to be transferred to Batavia to serve his sentence, met a village head known to him at Serang station and called out, "Just wait! Fifteen years for us is the same as 15 days and then we will return. At that time we will have no need to worry about the soldiers for they will all be on our side."[30]

Over the next few weeks, a further 52 peasants were sentenced for their part in the Petir riot. Twenty-one were sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. Ten received sentences of 12 years' imprisonment[31] and 21 were sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment each.[32]

In all, some 52 men, all peasants, were imprisoned for more than 10 years for their part in the Petir affair. Many others were to receive lighter sentences of between two and 10 years' imprisonment. What was clear to all observers was that all who had participated in the attack were peasants. As the local newspaper observed,

> "In Europe there stand at the head of the communist movement lawyers, doctors, engineers as well as other intellectuals supported by a well-educated working class. Here in Banten the communist movement consists of nothing but peasants.[33]

In May, the trials opened of the accused in the Menes riot. In the first trial, four peasants were accused, Haji Asikin, Satia, Haji Rasiman and Kadiman. They were charged with the attempted murder of the assistant wedana of Menes, the murder of two of his orderlies and with the attempted killing of van den Broek, telephone chief of Banten. The four were found guilty and two, Haji Asikin and Satia, were sentenced to death, Kadiman to life imprisonment and Haji Rasiman to 20 years' imprisonment.[34]

For the murder of the Dutch railway supervisor, Benjamins, three peasants were accused, Doelsalam, Jamin and Santani. Doelsalam and Jamin both received the death penalty, while Santani received life imprisonment. Seven other peasants were charged with the attempted murder of the assistant wedana of Cening and all were sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. A peasant called Jas'a alias Emed was charged with the murder of the wedana of Menes, for which he too received the death penalty.[35] Four peasants charged with an attack on Captain Becking in Labuan on 15 November, including Haji Hasan, one of the chief rebel leaders, were sentenced in June. Haji Hasan received the death sentence, Haji Soeria was sentenced to life imprisonment, Idik was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment and Haji Saroedin was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

Of the death sentences, four were carried out. Those executed were Haji Asikin, Doelsalam, Jamin and Jas'a. The sentences were carried out in Pandeglang prison on the morning of 16 September 1927.[36] On the day of the execution, the town was provided with a heavy military guard. All apparently faced death

with resolution and showed no emotion. Another detainee in Pandeglang prison at the time recalled the situation vividly,

> "For days there was a silence throughout the jail. The night before the executions many of the prisoners were nervous and unable to sleep. They spent the time motionless or in prayer. When, just before dawn, the news reached the cells that the executions had been carried out we all began saying prayers for the souls of the dead men. That night tahlil (recitation of the confession of faith) were performed."[37]

Others sentenced to death were to fare better and to have their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. Haji Hasan, for example, who had been found guilty of participating in the attack on Captain Becking, was granted clemency in September.[38] Likewise, Samba, a peasant sentenced to death for his involvement in the murder of two policemen, was also granted clemency. Two others, Saleh and Salman, were also spared the death penalty.[39] Besides the executions, some seven hundred men in total were sentenced to imprisonment ranging from two years to life.[40]

Boven Digul

As well as the many hundreds of Bantenese who passed through the courts in 1927, another group of 99 men were to be sent without charge or trial for indefinite imprisonment in the Dutch internment camp at Boven Digul in New Guinea. The camp, which was opened to receive prisoners in 1927, was used to intern political detainees, at first only members of the Communist Party but afterwards other nationalists also, right up to 1942. It is not surprising, given Banten's important role in the 1926 revolt, that Bantenese were one of the largest single groups in the camp that was to become a symbol of Dutch colonial oppression.

The decision to resort to mass internment of PKI leaders, against whom there was insufficient evidence to press charges in open court, was taken within days of the outbreak of the revolt.[41] A week after the revolt, all Dutch residents received a telegram from the Procureur General informing them of the government's decision and requesting them to recommend for internment PKI leaders whom they regarded as dangerous for the maintenance of colonial order.[42] It was stressed to the residents that they should recommend for internment not only those who had played a prominent role in the PKI but also those who might do so in the foreseeable future.[43]

The Resident of Banten, F.C. Putman-Cramer, wasted no time in drawing up lists of candidates for internment. Indeed, such was his zeal that even the Governor of West Java, Hillen, felt that in many cases the grounds for internment were inadequate or too vague.[44] The Procureur General, H.G.P. Duyfjes, also raised doubts about 38 of the persons recommended for internment in Banten and feared that the size of the penal colony at Boven Digul would become too large.[45]

The first four persons recommended for internment from Banten were the principal PKI leaders from the region, Puradisastra, Tubagus Hilman, Agus Soleman and Haji Achmad Chatib.[46] Amongst the first to be recommended for Boven Digul in Batavia was the former linkman between the Batavia PKI and the Banten section, Achmad Bassaif. These five were soon followed by a recommendation that many others from Banten be interned and in all some 99 persons from the region were sent for indefinite imprisonment in Boven Digul. All those to be interned were questioned according to a schedule

drawn up by the Procureur General's Office. On the basis of their answers to these questions and of existing police records, the local Dutch resident would decide whether to recommend internment.[47] These schedules provide an invaluable guide to the character of the Banten communist movement and to its social composition.

The first to be questioned was Puradisastra, the former chairman of the Banten section of the PKI and without whose indefatigable efforts the PKI almost certainly would not have been able to establish its 37th section. Puradisastra's background was perhaps typical of middle-level leadership in the PKI in the 1920s. Brought up in the East Priangan district of West Java, he had received no formal education but in 1907 became a magang (apprentice clerk) with the assistant resident of Tasikmalaya, who had adopted him. Thereafter he had worked for many years as a clerk and book-keeper, both in government service and for plantation companies in Tasikmalaya, Palembang, Bengkulu and Batavia. From August 1923, when he joined the PKI, he had supported himself by journalism and by acting as a pokrol bambu (untrained attorney). He had worked with Musso in 1924 in the Batavia labour movement, in particular with the drivers' union (Chaffeurs Bond) and the printers' union (Sarekat Buruh Cetak).[48]

The second Bantenese recommended for internment was Tubagus Hilman, son of a minor Bantenese official. He had attended a Dutch language school (HIS) in Serang, afterwards finding work as a trainee draughtsman with the Irrigation Department. Dissatisfied with working for the government, he left to find work as a clerk in various private undertakings in Batavia for several

years. In the capital, like many young Indonesians of his background, he had become involved in a wider political world and soon became attracted to the PKI. In 1925, he was one of the first small group of communists who returned to Banten to establish Rukun Asli.[49]

Agus Soleman, the third PKI leader from Banten recommended for internment, was, like Hilman, a native of Banten. He had attended a local school and had thereafter spent long spells outside the region working as a clerk in central Java and then in Sukabumi between 1906 and 1920. It seems that it was in Sukabumi that he first joined the PKI. Returning to Banten, he found employment as a clerk with the government veterinary service, a position which enabled him to travel throughout the whole region and to come into contact with many of the more lawless elements of local society that were to prove extremely useful to the PKI.

Haji Achmad Chatib, the fourth Bantenese to be deported to Boven Digul, was by far the single most important recruit of Puradisastra to the PKI in Banten. The son-in-law of the most influential Bantense religious teacher, Kiyai Asnawi, he was also president of the Sarekat Islam in Labuan and a man of considerable charisma and oratorical skill. Haji Chatib became assistant chairman of the PKI and religious adviser to the section in Banten. Since his return from Mecca in 1916, Haji Chatib had earned his living by giving religious education to children and young persons and also for three years, from 1919 to 1922, by trading in cloth and wood. In 1922, however, he went bankrupt but tried to resume

his trading activities in 1924, this time dealing in hides, but apparently with little more success.[50]

What is perhaps most striking in examining the list of 99 Bantenese (see Appendix) who were exiled to Boven Digul is the close identity between the communist movement in Banten and religion, or perhaps put another way between religion and revolt. Eleven out of the 99 to be interned were religious teachers, whilst 27 out of the 99, nearly one-third, were haji (pilgrims to Mecca). This was a very high proportion, particularly when we bear in mind that out of the first one thousand persons exiled to Boven Digul from all over Indonesia, only 59 were haji.[51] Even more relevant is that out of the 27 Bantenese haji, no fewer than 17 had spent at least one year in the Holy Land and, in some cases, two or three. This group included Haji Achmad Chatib, who had spent three years in Mecca, Haji Abdulhadi (Adung), Haji Asgari, Haji Artadjaja, Haji Emed, Haji Sooeb, Haji Abdulhadi, Haji Achjar, Haji Mohammed Arif, Haji Mu'min, Haji Aliasgar, Haji Mardjuk, Haji Santani, Haji Mustapha, Haji Achmad and Haji Enggus. Haji Mustapha had spent seven years in Mecca and Haji Mohammed Arif a total of five years. Achmad Chatib's younger brother, Haji Abdulhadi (Adung) had in addition to spending two years in Mecca spent a further year at the Al-Azhar school in Cairo. While this was already not so unusual in many parts of Sumatra, Haji Abdulhadi was one of the very first Bantenese to go to the famous Islamic education centre in Egypt. It is interesting to compare this identification of religion with revolt with the Cilegon uprising of 1888. In that revolt too a similar number of Bantenese (94) were exiled. Of

this number, 19 were religious teachers, compared with 11 in 1926, and 43 were haji, compared with 27 in 1926. These numbers are not so radically different and indicate a continuing high participation of the religious elite in revolt.

Nearly all of the 99 to be interned were local people; only eight came from outside the region of Banten. Of this group, three were important PKI leaders: Puradisastra (no. 14), Hasanuddin (no.51) and Atmodihardjo (no. 87), who was from Yogyakarta in central Java. The other five outsiders were Mohammed Ali (no. 21), who had been born in Banjarmasin (Kalimantan); Tju Tong Hin (no. 37), the only Chinese to be interned from Banten and who, despite his ethnic background, had been an important PKI leader in Rangkasbitung; Tjondrosaputro (no. 70), a trader from central Java, who had been chairman of the PKI sub-section in Rangkasbitung; Salihun (no. 73), a shoemaker from Batavia, who had been an important PKI propagandist in Banten; and Mohammed Saleh (no. 86), a policeman from Purworejo in central Java, whose arrest in August had sparked off a purge of the Serang PKI leaders. At the time of their arrest, 79 were resident in Serang regency, 13 in Pandeglang regency and five in Lebak regency. A further two internees had already fled to Batavia. The disproportionately high number of internees from Serang regency reflects two things. Firstly, because the revolt was centred in Pandeglang regency, many of the PKI leaders there were tried in open court rather than sent for indefinite detention to Boven Digul. Secondly, the high number of detainees from Serang reflects the sweeping wave of arrests carried out by the police in August and September 1926.

What is very clear, however, is the widespread character of PKI support in the Banten region. Nearly all districts of the residency are represented in the list of persons exiled to Boven Digul. The only districts conspicuous by their absence are the sparsely populated southern regions of Lebak and Pandeglang. It is evident from the list then that the PKI underground was well established throughout Banten and not limited to those districts where an actual armed revolt occurred on the night of 12 November 1926. Indeed, it is of interest to note that more than half of the 99 interned in Boven Digul were arrested by the authorities before 12 November.[52]

What sort of picture of the social composition of the communist movement in Banten does the list of internees present us with? We have already noted the close ties between the PKI in Banten and local religious leaders. It is not surprising then that 11 of those to be interned were prominent local ulama. There are also present on the list a significant number of artisans, some of whom had joined the PKI outside Banten. This group is represented by five clerks, two printers, three tailors, a shoemaker, a bricklayer, a barber and an auctioneer. The most numerous occupation groupings, however, are peasants (54) and traders (13).

These occupational categories, however, are often rather deceptive. This is especially the case with the traders. If we look more closely at the police interview records, we come across lives that were precarious and that involved shifting from one area to another and from one job to another. Haji Enggus (no. 9), for example, was a small-time trader in copra yet at the same time

also ran a retail shop and gave religious education to youngsters in his village. Surabaita (no. 64), who, although only a young man of 20, had already worked as a clerk in Ceribon and then moved to Bogor where he found work as an apprentice mechanic, and had finally turned to opening a small tobacco store in Pandeglang. Dulah (no. 16), aged 35, had spent the larger part of his working life as a peasant but had apparently been forced to sell his lands and had then worked successively as a sharecropper, a hawker and a bricklayer. As with many of the others, however, Dulah often moved back and forth between these occupations. Arman (no. 15) had attended a local school in Serang and then taught as a village schoolteacher in Pontang, worked as a clerk in Telukbetung and then as a tobacconist in Serang. This occupational mobility seems to have been as marked amongst the educated PKI leaders as amongst their peasant following and may also have indicated the greater opportunities that presented themselves in the boom years up to 1920.

Thirteen of the internees list their profession as trader. This term, "handelaar" in the Dutch police record, tells us unfortunately little of the wealth of the person, the success of his enterprise and to what degree he was engaged in commercial activity. Many of the 'traders' in fact would not have been as wealthy as some of the haji and ulama who participated in the revolt. For some of the group we have somewhat more detailed information. Ibing (no. 24), for example, who was a PKI propagandist in Menes, had earned his living first as a sailor, then as a fisherman and finally as a tailor. His final occupation made him a 'tradesman' in the Dutch records yet, as with many of

the others, it should not be taken as indicating that the PKI in Banten reflected the emergence of a commercialised section of the peasantry, as has been argued for West Sumatra.[53] On the contrary, the 'traders' often seem to have been landless peasants who had moved to Batavia or Sumatra and entered a trade there which they later tried to pursue in Banten. Mohammed Nur Fas Nani (no. 36), who owned no land, left Banten as a young man to work as a labourer in Batavia. Finding times hard in the early 1920s, he returned home to work with his father who owned a small tobacco stall in Serang. The stall, however, did not make sufficient money to keep both Nani and his father and so he returned once again to Batavia to seek work as a coolie; after a few months, he came back to Banten once again and this time found employment as a servant in Serang. Even the one Chinese to be interned from Banten, Tju Tong Hin, seems to have become a trader only when he could find no other employment. Tju Tong Hin had worked previously as a labourer in the railway workshops in Meester Cornelis, then as a small trader in Tanggerang before returning to Batavia to find work as a tinsmith. After a few years in the capital, he moved to Banten earning his living as a fisherman. But it seems that this occupation also brought him little more success than his previous jobs and taking advantage of a loan from a relative in Rangkasbitung, he opened a small stall in the market town.

The impression that once has of many of the Bantenese traders who joined the PKI is that many of these individuals had engaged in trade at a time when economic expectations were rising caused by the post-World War I boom. When economic conditions began to

deteriorate, as they did markedly after 1920, many of the newcomers to trading activities found themselves exposed to the cold wind of depression. Haji Achmad Chatib, for example, had earned his living by trading in cloth and timber between 1919 and 1922. It seems, however, that he had always had great difficulty in making ends meet and in 1922 he went bankrupt. Two years later, he tried to resume trading activities, this time dealing in hides, apparently with no more success. A similar picture is revealed by the story of the life of Abdul Kahal bin Haji Osman, a Bantenese communist arrested in West Sumatra. At the age of 14 he had followed his brother to Muara Amin in West Sumatra. At the age of 16, he became a small trader in the Lampungs but after nine months he gave up, returning first to Banten and then, unable to find work, came back to Menggani on Sumatra's west coast. He stayed there for one year working as a sharecropper and then moved back to Banten where he lived with relatives for a further two years. In 1923, he returned to West Sumatra and began trading in cloth. Because he could not make a reasonable living from this, he eventually gave up trade once again to become a peasant near Muara Amin.[54]

Peasants, however, formed the largest single occupational group amongst the internees. This was a cause of concern to senior Dutch officials. Hillen, Governor of West Java, wrote in September 1927 of his misgivings to the Governor-General,

> "What is most striking is the majority of the rebels belong to the mass of the population. There are few intellectuals or semi-intellectuals. More than half of the rebels have received no education . . . most noticeable is the very large number of peasants."[55]

Hillen noted that out of the 99 internees from Banten, only 22 had enjoyed any form of secular education. Of this number, only seven had attended the elementary school in Dutch (HIS). Hillen feared the large number of Bantenese peasants would be too easily influenced by the 'Batavia and Bandung intellectuals' in Boven Digul. As the 99 detainees had already spent almost a year in prison, the Governor felt that some of their number might be sentenced to some form of conditional or suspended internment. This idea, however, was firmly opposed by the Resident of Banten, Putman-Cramer.[56] The Resident argued that the internees must be measured not by their education but by their degree of influence in their native villages. Many, for example, were local jawara. Although Hillen still had strong misgivings, which were supported by Gobée, the Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs, they were overruled by the objections of Putman-Cramer who was energetically supported by the powerful Director of Justice, Rutgers.[57]

The 54 peasants who were eventually interned were nearly all illiterate in the Latin alphabet or Arabic script. It seems from the police records of their interviews that most had worked on their fathers' fields, sometimes until they were quite old. It was this that accounted for the fact that at least eight of them had never been outside their village. Others, whose parents were perhaps too poor to support an extra hand on the fields, had moved as young men to Batavia, seeking labouring work. They returned when they had amassed a little money and then sought land to buy or engaged in sharecropping.

The peasants were all asked during their interrogation why they in fact had joined the Communist Party. Although one must treat their answers with a certain degree of reservation, given the circumstances of their interrogation, it is striking how many refer to the burden of taxation and/or to the examples set by others in their village. Thus Bakri (no. 95) joined "because most of my neighbours had done so".[58] Haji Mohammed Jaisin of Anyer joined the PKI because "many of my fellow villagers had bought cards and I didn't want to be left out". Another joined the party as he otherwise "feared that some calamity would overcome me", whilst another plaintively confessed that he had become a member of the PKI "because life was so difficult and I hoped in this way to get myself out of difficulties".[59]

From elsewhere in Indonesia few peasants were interned. Indeed, one of the main conclusions that Mansvelt drew in his study of the social origins of the detainees was that the internees had enjoyed better education and came from comparatively affluent backgrounds.[60]

> "The communist leaders", he wrote "belong not only to the thin upper layer (of Indonesian society) who have received some education, but more specifically to the even smaller group who have attended the second class school and enjoyed western lower education. If there is a certain connection between a definite education and political militancy, then it is the native second class school which was attended by 447 of the communists (of the one thousand examined)."[61]

In Banten, as we have seen, only a tiny minority of the communist movement fitted the picture described by Mansvelt.

The detainees from Banten were, on the whole, less well educated and from lower class backgrounds than those from other areas of Indonesia. Indeed, the majority of internees from Banten were ordinary peasants. This finding is consistent with the fact that the revolt of November 1926 had a more popular base in Banten than any other region, with the exception of West Sumatra. In other areas of Java and Sumatra, the PKI mass base had been progressively whittled away throughout 1925 and 1926, leaving it a thoroughly emaciated but relatively elite body. The events of November 1926-January 1927 showed convicningly the party no longer possessed any degree of mass support, except in those two areas most tested by revolt, Banten and West Sumatra.

The Dismissal of R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, Regent of Pandeglang

The 1926 revolt was a severe shock to the Dutch colonial government and in the aftermath of the uprising it was not slow in looking for scapegoats, on whom to hand some of the blame at least for this severe challenge to its rule. In Dutch eyes, outside the immediate circle of rebel leaders, two individuals above all bore responsibility for the most serious challenge to colonial authority on the island of Java since the Cilegon revolt of 1888. These were R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, Regent of Pandeglang, and Kiyai Haji Asnawi of Caringin.

Raden Adipati Aria Kartadiningrat had been Regent of Pandeglang since 1914. He came from an old Bantenese family and was the second cousin of Achmad Djajadiningrat, Regent of Serang (1901-1924) and later Regent of Batavia (1924-1929).[62] Djajadiningrat's removal from Serang in 1924 followed a period of acrimonious exchanges between him and successive Dutch residents.[63]

Such were the emotions engendered that senior officials in the Dutch colonial civil service, the Binnenlands Bestuur, determined that he would not be replaced by a regent from Banten, despite the fact that there was a long tradition in Banten that the regent of Pandeglang replaced that of Serang.[64] Kartadiningrat was passed over in favour of a Sundanese priyayi from the Priangan, Raden Prawirakusumah (Regent of Serang 1924-1931). Prawirakusumah's appointment meant that two of the three Bantenese regencies were now occupied by non-Bantenese regents, for in Lebak the Regent was Raden Gondosaputro, also from the Priangan. The bitterness felt by Kartadiningrat over this decision and the sharp deterioration of his relations with the Resident of Banten, F.C. Putman-Cramer, throughout 1926 over the Regent's handling of the PKI provided the background to his dismissal after the 1926 revolt.

Although Kartadiningrat had conducted himself with considerable courage on the night of 12 November in going to Menes and Labuan when those towns were in rebel hands, he was soon to fall under a cloud of Dutch suspicion. A week after the revolt, Kartadiningrat was called to Serang by the Resident who questioned him about events leading up to the revolt. The Governor of West Java, W.P. Hillen, was present for much of this interrogation. On 25 November, Kartadiningrat was formally requested to take two months' 'sick leave' so that matters regarding the uprising could be satisfactorily investigated. Kartadiningrat refused to take this option and the Resident then informed him that he would be suspended for two months and that he must leave Pandeglang within three days for Bogor. His position was temporarily filled by the Regent of Bogor, Raden Tumenggung Soeriadjanegara.[65]

The main charge against Kartadiningrat was that he had let events slide in his regency and grossly underestimated the strength of the PKI.[66] Several specific allegations were also made against him, of ignoring reports and hampering the work of the field-police (Veldpolitie). Even more damning for Kartadiningrat was the charge that he had accepted at face value declarations made by persons who had later been proven to be heavily involved in the revolt, such as Haji Achmad Chatib and Haji Soegiri. Moreover, he was held to live in great awe of Kiyai Asnawi of Caringin, in the atmosphere of suspicion following the revolt almost a crime in itself in Dutch eyes.

One of the greatest fears of the Dutch with regard to Banten was precisely that local priyayi were indecisive and even fearful of the enormous influence wielded by prominent ulama such as Kiyai Asnawi. Indeed, many Dutch officials now recalled the case of R.A.P. Gondokusumo, Regent of Serang (1874-1888), who was dismissed after the Cilegon revolt of 1888.[67] Putman-Cramer, supported by the Governor of West Java, W.P. Hillen, strongly recommended that Kartadiningrat be dismissed from his post.[68] Kartadiningrat, Hillen argued, must bear full responsibility for the revolt in his regency,

> "Nowhere has the resistance against the government had such a wide extent as in the regency of Pandeglang, nowhere has fanaticism played such a role and nowhere have there been so many victims amongst the administration and police."[69]

It was even more disturbing, as Hillen pointed out, that the classic terrain of peasant disorders in the area had been north

Banten and in particular the regency of Serang and not Pandeglang. Kartadiningrat had completely misread the situation, failed to send on to the Resident alarming reports from his subordinates and despite repeated warnings did not recognize the danger presented by Haji Achmad Chatib. However, the most damning charge that Hillen levelled against Kartadiningrat was that he had neglected repeated warnings from the murdered Wedana of Menes, Raden Partadinata, a priyayi from the Priangan, for whom Hillen had the highest respect,

> "This ignorance (of Partadinata's warnings) borders on the criminal and I do not hesitate to hold the Regent responsible for the deaths of the Wedana and the others."[70]

The Governor-General, A.C. de Graeff, decided to postpone a decision on Kartadiningrat's future until the Commission of Inquiry that had been set up into the Banten revolt reported.[71] Kartadiningrat himself used the time bought to write a rather desperate defence pleading for his reinstatement and mustering the few allies he had in high places.[72] The latter, however, were limited to his cousin, Achmad Djajadiningrat, Regent of Batavia, and to Gobée, the Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs, whose own influence with the Governor-General was itself waning because of the November uprising. As far as Achmad Djajadiningrat was concerned, there was little he could do to help his hapless relation. A regent could rarely influence the course of events concerning a regency other than his own. Indeed, such was the degree of suspicion surrounding the whole Kartadiningrat affair that Djajadiningrat was even afraid to visit his cousin in Bogor. Influential newspapers hinted that perhaps the Regent of Batavia

himself was partly to blame for the tragic course of events that had taken place in November. Djajadiningrat wrote to his cousin, "I have been told that it would be unwise and even dangerous to visit you, although I have been informed in principle that there would be no objection."[73]

On 3 April 1927, Kartadiningrat was formally questioned by the Resident of Bogor, H. Kool.[74] Kartadiningrat admitted he had received reports from his patih concerning the underground PKI which he had failed to pass on to the resident in Serang. He also admitted that he had made a great oversight in failing to send to Serang Kiyai Haji Ilyas, one of the suspected rebel leaders, for questioning by the field-police. When asked why he had failed to do so, Kartadiningrat replied, "There was no reason why I should do so. I only sent to Serang those who were specifically requested for questioning."[75] The background to his refusal to pass on the information about Kiyai Ilyas was Kartadiningrat's deteriorating relationship with the Resident and with Lucardie, the commander of the field-police in Banten.[76]

Although Kartadiningrat had many justified grievances against the Resident, particularly with regard to the conduct of the field-police, the plain facts were that the communist organizational network and leadership in Serang regency had effectively been broken before the November 1926 uprising, resulting in little trouble in that regency with the exception of the Petir district. In Pandeglang, on the other hand, the rebels had for a few days effectively held Labuan and Menes and posed a serious threat to Pandeglang itself. The two Dutch members of the

Commission of Inquiry into the revolt, Gobée and J.W. Meyer Ranneft, the Assistant Resident of Pati, felt that Kartadiningrat should be dismissed from government service 'honourably'. They concluded that Kartadiningrat had undoubtedly shown unpardonable short-sightedness with regard to the underground PKI and especially towards the family of Kiyai Asnawi and his son-in-law Haji Achmad Chatib, the rebel leader. Nevertheless, Meyer Ranneft and Gobée felt that two facts should not be lost sight of. Firstly, Kartadiningrat's courage on the night of 12 November and secondly, no matter how short-sighted and vain, the Regent had tried to combat the PKI in his own way, "that he thereby had much less influence than he thought is a fact that should not detract from his diligence".[77]

It is interesting to note that the sole Indonesian member of the Commission of Inquiry, Soemitro Kolopaking, the Regent of Bandjarnegara, entered a dissenting opinion.[78] He thought that other regents would have acted in much the same way as Kartadiningrat and he recommended therefore that Kartadiningrat be transferred from Pandeglang and be appointed Regent of Kuningan (Ceribon).

The Governor of West Java, Hillen, disagreed violently with Soemitro Kolopaking's suggestion. Indeed, it was only with considerable reluctance that he could accept the recommendation of the two Dutch members of the Commission that Kartadiningrat be dismissed 'honourably'. Hillen argued that serious doubts had been raised concerning Kartadiningrat's loyalty to the Dutch crown. Kartadiningrat had repeatedly given assurances to his superiors that nothing untoward would happen in Pandeglang. It was difficult

in the circumstances, Hillen argued, other than to come to one conclusion, namely that "the Regent wilfully withheld ominous reports".[79] Hillen concluded that an honourable dismissal was the most lenient treatment that could be meted out to Kartadiningrat and he recommended this course of action to the Governor-General. Kartadiningrat's fate was now sealed. On 3 June 1927, the Governor-General, A.C. de Graeff, formally announced his honourable dismissal from government service.[80]

The Kartadiningrat affair demonstrates the enormous gulf that existed between pangreh praja and the people in Banten. A striking illustration of this was the dismal failure of the meetings organized by Kartadiningrat in the villages of Pandeglang. Whereas in the Priangan such meetings met with considerable success and led to hundreds of PKI sympathisers renouncing their past, in Banten such meetings succeeded only in deluding the priyayi as to the depth of the people's animosity towards the colonial regime and its servants. Only a few days before the uprising, Kartadiningrat addressed a large meeting in Menes and had afterwards told a relative that it was impossible for any communist disturbances to take place in Pandeglang, such were the warm feelings of the people towards him.[81] Kartadiningrat's self-complacency drove him to make serious political errors and grossly to overestimate his influence on the population.

In the past, it had often been the argument of priyayi from Banten that the responsibility for many of the disorders and uprisings that had taken place in the region could be laid at the door of Dutch decisions to appoint non-Bantenese as regents. Yet

here was a regent from a long-standing Bantenese family who was plainly out of touch with events in his domain. To some extent, this indicated a growing distrust of all members of the colonial regime which the PKI had adroitly tapped in 1926. The revolt pointed to a declining faith in all officials regardless of their origins. Increasingly, the pangreh praja was seen as the tool of an oppressive colonial regime which should be swept away once and for all. This identification of all officials as hostile to the 'people' may well have been one of the main consequences of PKI propaganda in Banten.

Kartadiningrat was not the only priyayi in Banten to fall victim to a purge after the November uprising. The Patih of Pandeglang, Raden Gondosisworo, also came under question. It was to the Patih, also a Bantenese, that Kiyai Ilyas had acknowledged in September 1926 that he was involved in the PKI. The Resident, Putman-Cramer, felt that the matter was of such importance that the Patih should have reported straight to him. He concluded, therefore, that grounds existed for the Patih's dismissal.[82] But the Governor of West Java, Hillen, was keen that the axe should not fall on too many priyayi because he feared the demoralising effect this might have on the local government in Banten,

> ". . . local conditions and relationships generally, but particularly those in Pandeglang, would not have allowed the Patih to act outside the Regent's influence. This would have demanded a man of more than ordinary character, which is not present in the vast majority of local civil servants."[83]

Hillen therefore recommended that the Patih should be transferred outside Banten, and in June 1927 he was appointed Patih of Garut in the East Priangan.[84]

Less fortunate was Mas Wiriadikusumah, the Assistant Wedana of Labuan, also a Bantenese, who had been kidnapped by the rebels on the night of the revolt. He was moved first to Serang and in April 1927 was dismissed from government service. Mas Wiriadikusumah died on 7 November 1927, almost 12 months to the day of the revolt. Four days after his death, the government decided that his dismissal could in fact be 'honourable' as inquiries had revealed nothing that would justify dishonourable dismissal.[85]

The Removal of Kiyai Asnawi from Banten

The extraordinary influence that Kiyai Asnawi exercised in Banten and his seeming neutrality towards the PKI led to a considerable clamour after the November uprising for his removal and internment. Although it was acknowledged that he himself took no direct part in the revolt, suspicion surrounded his person because of the involvement of his son-in-law, Haji Achmad Chatib, and his son, Tubagus Emed. Moreover, many of Kiyai Asnawi's former santri (pupils), such as Haji Saleh of Blagendong who had led the rebels in the shoot-out with the soldiers in Caringin on 14 November, had participated in the revolt. Even Kiyai Asnawi's chauffeur, Ali, had been involved in the uprising, driving rebels around Labuan and Menes in the stolen car of Mas Wiriadikusumah, the Assistant Wedana of Labuan.[86]

On 16 November, three days after the revolt, Hillen, the Governor of West Java, visited Caringin accompanied by Kartadiningrat.[87] When the Governor's party arrived at the residence of the Kiyai, they found the house completely boarded and locked up. Kartadiningrat called on the Kiyai to come outside

and Haji Asnawi emerged accompanied by his wife and some members of his family. Kartadiningrat asked the Kiyai the whereabouts of his sons, Tubagus Emed and Haji Fadil, who was also suspected of being a PKI member. Kiyai Asnawi replied that both sons were present with him in the house and had been there since the outbreak of the revolt on 12 November. The Governor assured Kiyai Asnawi that the government meant him no harm and that they had only come to Caringin to arrest those guilty of armed insurrection.

The Governor's initial moderation towards Kiyai Asnawi changed, however, several days later once the situation had settled down and resistance had been crushed. On 21 November, Kiyai Asnawi was taken into custody and removed under heavy military guard to Batavia, where he was placed under house arrest in the Tanah Abang district while the government decided what to do with him.[88]

The Resident of Banten, Putman-Cramer, together with Hillen, was firmly in favour of his internment, arguing that the Kiyai had, if only for lack of speaking out, been involved in the revolutionary movement,

> "Not a single Indonesian given the prominence of the Kiyai of Caringin would dare use his name in the course of the rebellion if the Kiyai had not given his approval to the revolt. If the Kiyai had given one sign of disapproval, then it is improbable that the revolt would have occurred."[89]

Undoubtedly, Haji Achmad Chatib had taken advantage of his father-in-law's considerable prestige to advance the rebel cause. Furthermore, the fact that Kiyai Moekri had gone to see Kiyai Asnawi on the morning of 13 November could have no other

meaning than that he sought the blessing of Kiyai Asnawi for the revolt. Kiyai Asnawi had also been told on several occasions that his son and son-in-law were suspected of involvement in the PKI. Yet, according to Hillen and Putman-Cramer, he had chosen to ignore these warnings.

As with Kartadiningrat, much depended on the findings of the Commission of Inquiry into the revolt. In May 1927, Meyer Ranneft had written to Hillen to say that he felt it politically impossible to allow Kiyai Asnawi to return to Banten.[90] To do so, given the Kiyai's failure to condemn the PKI and the continued high esteem in which he was held by the population would, according to Meyer Ranneft, be to court disaster. Hillen himself believed there was no possibility for Kiyai Asnawi to return to Banten, "if the Kiyai were permitted to return, then I would not be able to guarantee the course of events".[91] There was now a general feeling amongst the higher echelons of the colonial administration that if Kiyai Asnawi was not suitably punished, then the aura in which he was held by the people of Banten would not be diminished. Even in Batavia, Kiyai Asnawi's presence was the cause of some disquiet amongst Dutch officials. The Kiyai's attendance at the Friday service in the mosque in Tanah Abang was rapidly turning into a demonstration and unprecedented numbers were reported attending Friday prayer.[92] Hillen therefore concluded that the only option was for Kiyai Asnawi to be banned to a Christian area of the Dutch East Indies.

It was left to Gobée, the Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs, to argue a more cautious course, pointing out that his removal from

Banten might well provoke the very unrest that the authorities were attempting to safeguard against.[93] Gobée felt that many local officials in Banten, both Dutch and Indonesian, held grudges against Kiyai Asnawi and were fearful of the influence that he had with the people. This was particularly so of many of the penghulu. Gobée argued that Kiyai Asnawi had not denounced the PKI, "as it is entirely outside his nature to involve himself in affairs that do not concern him".[94] Kiyai Asnawi was an extremely reticent man who abjured worldly affairs and who almost never spoke on general matters. His answers to questions put to him were for the most part extremely brief. Although it was true that five of the 64 PKI propagandists in the Labuan area were santri of Kiyai Asnawi, a larger number, 16, were pupils of Haji Achmad Chatib.[95]

Gobée felt that there was a danger of overestimating Kiyai Asnawi's influence. Haji Chatib had attempted to use his father-in-law's prestige, but he had also acted outside his father-in-law's wishes. Haji Chatib was a forceful and charismatic leader in his own right and had many years' political experience from his appointment as chairman of the Labuan Sarekat Islam. Gobée concluded by arguing strongly against Kiyai Asnawi's removal from Banten. Furthermore, he felt that his internment in a distant Christian area was absolutely indefensible.

To Gobée's superiors, however, the conclusive points were that although there was no evidence to indicate the Kiyai's direct involvement in the revolt, there was considerable feeling that he must have been aware of the plotting around him, "and certainly the people of Banten will not believe that he was unaware of this".[96]

An element of post facto justification crept into the calculations of senior Dutch officials. In May 1927, the Procureur General, H.G.P. Duyfjes, wrote to the Governor-General,

> "The fact of the matter is that he (the Kiyai) has been removed from his residence and robbed of his freedom. In connection with this, if he is allowed to return this will only indicate a triumph to the population and will strengthen his influence in Banten. For the people, the Kiyai represents the soul of the resistance. To allow him to return would be convincing evidence to them of his inviolability . . ."[97]

In June, the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indie) advised that the Kiyai should not be formally interned but that he should "voluntarily go into exile".[98] Kiyai Asnawi, however, showed no intention of heeding the advice of the Council. Indeed, the government itself had growing doubts as to the wisdom of this decision and to the possibility that its actions might look like weakness in the public's eyes. The Kiyai was more than 70 years old and had four wives and 15 children. Furthermore, no clear proof had come to light of his direct involvement in the uprising. In August, the Council decided to modify its decision, seeking only to deny the Kiyai permission to live in Banten and the neighbouring areas.[99] Finally, in November 1927, the Governor-General, A.C. de Graeff, decided that if the Kiyai was prepared to sign an order undertaking not to reside in the residencies of Banten, Batavia, Bogor and the Lampungs, he could be spared the ignominy of a formal internment order.[100] The Kiyai finally agreed to this proposal, and in January 1928 he moved to Cianjur in the Priangan where he was to remain until 1934 when he was finally allowed to return to Banten.[101] He died in 1937.

By the end of 1927, at least in Dutch eyes, Banten had returned to normal and 'rust en orde' (peace and order) had been restored. The cost to Bantenese society had been high, however, and profound wounds were left to fester. The most immediate cost had been the four men hanged, nine sentenced to life imprisonment, 700 others sent to prison and 99 to internment in Boven Digul. In addition, two of the most important figures in local society, R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, the Regent of Pandeglang, and Kiyai Asnawi had been summarily exiled from Banten. An enforced political quiescence descended on the region that was to last until 1945.

FOOTNOTES

1. De Banten Bode, 4 and 18 December 1926.

2. De Banten Bode, 18 December 1926.

3. Interviews with Achmad Rasyidi, Haji Sadikin and Muhidin Hadi, prisoners detained in Labuan in December 1926, Labuan, 14 June 1976.

4. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 4 December 1926. See also reports in Mailrapport 231^{x}/27 in Verbaal 21 June 1927 A10.

5. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 4 December 1926.

6. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 6 December 1926.

7. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 9 December 1926.

8. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 22 and 23 December 1926. On the situation in Banten in the weeks after the report, see also report of the Governor of West Java, W.P. Hillen, "Beknopt verslag van den actueelen toestand in Bantam", 9 December 1926, G5/41/15, Mailrapport 1235^{x}/26 in Verbaal 1 July 1927 R10. Hereafter referred to as "Beknopt verslag".

9. "Beknopt verslag"; Bataviaasch Niewsblad, 4 December 1926. These rumours persisted into 1927. In May of that year, police received reports of a new underground PKI emerging in Banten. See "Maandlijksche Politieke Overzicht", April-May 1927, Mailrapport 677^{x} and 930^{x} in Verbaal 24 August 1928 H14.

10. "Beknopt verslag".

11. Interview with General Tjadradipura, Jakarta, 5 September 1975.

12. Makmun Salim, "Suatu Tindjauan tentang peranan adjaran Islam dalam Pemberontakan 1926 di Banten", Seminar Sedjarah Nasional II, n.p. Yogyakarta, 1970.

13. Report of E. Gobée, Adviser for Native and Islamic Affairs to Governor-General de Graeff, 30 April 1927, No. I/145, Mailrapport 686^{x}/27 in Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

14. Memorie van Overgave (hereafter MvO) van den afgetreden Resident van Bantam, J.C. Putman-Cramer, March 1931, p. 34.

15. De Courant, 25 January 1927; De Banten Bode, 12 March 1927. For indications of widespread intimidation by the police, see letter of Gobée to Governor-General, 24 December 1927, No. I/50, Mailrapport 343^{x}/28. Interview with Afif, former PKI chairman of Labuan who cited many cases of wrongful arrest and even banishment to Boven Digul, Cilegon, 4 March 1976. Such occurences were also frequent elsewhere after the 1926 revolt, see I.F.M. Salim, Vijftien Jaar Boven-Digoel. Bakermat van de Indonesische Onafhankelijkheid, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Contact, 1973, pp. 20-21.

16. De Courant, 25 January 1927; De Banten Bode, 19 and 26 March 1927.

17. De Courant, 25 January 1927.

18. De Courant, 7 May 1927; De Banten Bode, 14 May 1927.

19. De Courant, 7 May 1927.

20. De Banten Bode, 22 January 1927.

21. De Courant, 18 and 19 January 1927.

22. De Banten Bode, 15 January 1927.

23. Interview with Haji Solichin, Serang, 14 March 1976.

24. Interview with Kiyai Turmudi, son of Kiyai Rafiuddin, Serang, 11 May 1976. Kiyai Moekri was reported in Jeddah in October 1927 together with another Bantenese rebel, Haji Tajib, by the Dutch Consul van der Meulen. The Netherlands Indies authorities contemplated seeking their extradition, but Gobée advised against this. See his report, No. I/457a, 21 November 1927, Mailrapport $1377^{x}/27$.

25. Interviews with Tje Mamat and Tubagus Alipan. See also Djamaluddin Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, mimeo, n.p., n.d., pp. 43, 52.

26. De Banten Bode, 15 January and 21 May 1927; De Courant, 14 January 1927.

27. Interview with Achmad Bassaif. For the trial of those involved in the attack on Glodok prison, see Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27 and 28 January 1927. For the trial of those involved in the Tanah Abang disturbances, see Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 1, 3 and 5 February 1927.

28. De Banten Bode, 5, 12, 19 and 26 February 1927; Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 4, 7 and 23 February 1927. The defendants were charged under Article 109 of the Wetboek van Strafrecht and Article 240c of the Inlandsch Reglement.

29. De Banten Bode, 12 February 1927; Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 23 February 1927.

30. De Banten Bode, 23 April 1927.

31. De Banten Bode, 12 and 19 February 1927.

32. De Banten Bode, 19 and 26 February and 23 April 1927.

33. De Banten Bode, 19 February 1927.

34. De Banten Bode, 21 May 1927.

35. De Banten Bode, 28 May, 4, 11 and 18 June 1927.

36. Makmun Salim, op. cit., pp. 24-25; De Banten Bode, 17 September 1927.

37. Interview with Haji Solichin.

38. De Banten Bode, 10 September 1927.

39. De Banten Bode, 1 and 22 October 1927.

40. See report of Gobée to the Director of Justice, 8 February 1928, No. 5/49 G, Mailrapport 868^{x}/1928; J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie, Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1928, p. 111; George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1952, p. 86. In May 1927, some 300 detainees in Banten were released for lack of evidence against them, see De Banten Bode, 21 May 1927.

41. See Dossier A 7622, "Verslag bg. vergadering van de Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie, 18 November 1926", also reprinted in part in R.C. Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie, Vol. 2, Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff, 1978, pp. 475-480; it was ironic that it was A.C.D. de Graeff, as Governor-General, who introduced internment. He was a man of liberal sympathy for the 'Ethical' reformers. See I.F.M. Salim, op. cit., p. 23.

42. Telegram of 19 November 1926, Verbaal 1 July 1927 Ir. S19. The Procureur-General sent an official circular regarding the decision to resort to mass internment to all residents on 29 December 1926, No. 43/6374 AP in Mailrapport 420^{x}/27, Verbaal 24 August 1928. See also Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 4 December 1927. The first internees left Tanjung Priok on 1 February 1927 for Boven Digul, see "Maandelijksche Politieke Overzichten over January-Februari 1927".

43. See missive of Procureur-General, H.G.P. Duyfjes, unnumbered, 30 December 1927 in Kwantes, op. cit., pp. 520-521.

44. Hillen to Procureur-General, G 5/42/5, 21 June 1927, Mailrapport 1066^{x}/27 and again his letter of 1 July 1927, G 5/44/21, Mailrapport 1066^{x}/1927. Also his letter to same of 17 September 1927, G 5/72/14, Mailrapport 113^{x}/28.

45. Procureur-General to Governor of West Java, 17 September 1927, Mailrapport 113^{x}/28.

46. Procureur-General to Governor-General, 7 December 1926, No. 2175 AP, Mailrapport 1227^{X}/26, Verbaal 1 July 1927 R10. The interrogation schedules of the first Bantenese internees are held in Mailrapport 1137^{X}/26 and Mailrapport 1150^{X}/26 in Verbaal 1 July 1927 S10. Others, of later internees, are to be found in Mailrapport 713^{X}/27, Mailrapport 1013^{X}/27, Mailrapport 1066^{X}/27, Mailrapport 1105^{X}/27, Mailrapport 1424^{X}/27, Mailrapport 113^{X} and Mailrapport 637^{X}/27.

47. The questions put to the internees were as follows: 1) Name; 2) Age; 3) Place of birth; 4) Place of residence and occupation; 5) Did you know that the PKI, as a member of the Third International, has as its aim the overthrow of the existing government by any means necessary, including violence? 6) Did you know of the existence of the DO? 7) Do you acknowledge playing a role in this organization? 8) Do you recognize that one of the aims of this organization (the DO) was to recruit criminal elements and to use them against the government? 9) Do you admit to being a member of the PKI and/or of the DO? 10) Do you acknowledge being a member of an organization which was a serious threat to the public order? 11) Have you anything to say in your defence? 12) Do you wish to make a written statement?

Nearly all the Bantenese internees answered the questions with a simple negative or pleas of ignorance. The same schedule was used throughout Indonesia for internees at Boven Digul. I.F.M. Salim, op. cit., p. 25 and interview, Rijswijk, Netherlands, 27 September 1974, felt that many of the internees

were either simply caught up in the revolt or had been ordinary party members. This was especially true for those from Banten and West Sumatra. "It is clear that after reading the document, the detainee had little option but to sign. There was no question of a reasonable hearing. Any answers or statement outside the schedule of questions was simply not allowed. The whole thing was a farce because the detainee was told in advance that any denial from our side would not be accepted. Few detainees exercised their right to a written defence", ibid., p. 25. The future nationalist leader, Mohammed Hatta, made a scathing attack of the internment procedure in Indonesia Merdeka, No. 4/5, 1927, p. 100; also in his Indonesia Vrij, Den Haag: Perhimpoenan Indonesia, 1928.

48. Mailrapport 1013^{X}/27.

49. Mailrapport 1013^{X}/27.

50. Mailrapport 713^{X}/27, Mailrapport 1066^{X}/27, Mailrapport 1105^{X}/27.

51. W.M.F. Mansvelt, "Onderwijs en Communisme", Koloniale Studien, Vol. 12, no. 2, April 1928, p. 218.

52. See Appendix.

53. See the Introduction by Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey to The Communist Revolts of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960, pp. xi-xiii; B. Schrieke, "The Causes and Effects of

Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra", Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part One, The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955, pp. 83-167.

54. Mailrapport 1051[X]/27.

55. Hillen to Governor-General, 24 September 1927, G 5/74/14, Mailrapport 637[X]/28.

56. Putman-Cramer to Hillen, 21 October 1927, No. 555/G, Mailrapport 637[X]/28; Hillen to Governor-General, 1 November 1927, G 5/85/14, Mailrapport 637[X]/28.

57. In October, the Procureur-General advised against any conditional or suspended internment order but felt there was a strong case for some of the Bantenese to be released on the grounds they were not an immediate danger to the public order. See Procureur-General to Governor of West Java, 7 October 1927, No. 2349 AP. This proposal was supported by Gobée in a letter of 8 February 1928 to the Director of Justice, Rutgers, No. 5/49 G. Both letters in Mailrapport 637[X]/28.

58. Mailrapport 1105[X]/27 and Mailrapport 623[X]/27.

59. Ibid.

60. Mansvelt, op. cit., pp. 203-225. Mansvelt's study was conducted on the basis of 1,000 of the detainees, of whom 88 were Bantenese. By the end of 1927, some 1,300 political prisoners had been interned in Boven Digul because of their alleged involvement in the 1926-27 uprisings, 99 of them Bantenese.

61. Ibid., pp. 211-212. See also reports in Mailrapport 359^{X}/27.

62. Kartadiningrat's father was Raden Tumenggung Soera Adiningrat, Regent of Pandeglang (1898-1907), who was retired because of suspicion of fraud, see MvO, C.W.A. van Rinsum, April 1913, p. 18. Kartadiningrat's grandfather was Raden Tumenggung Sutadiningrat, Regent of Serang (1888-1893). The main source for the Kartadiningrat affair is the large collection of documents held in Verbaal 4 July 1939 19.

63. A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, Batavia and Amsterdam: G.A. Kolff, 1936, pp. 323-324; J.C. Bedding, "Man en Paard", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, Vol. 26, 1937, pp. 376-384.

64. Report of R.A. Kern, 14 January 1924, No. 52/G, Mailrapport 456^{X}/24.

65. For the government decision, see letter of Hillen to Kartadiningrat, 27 November 1926, G 13/8/22, Mailrapport 1237^{X}/26. For Kartadiningrat's own story see "Vervolg van het verslag over de relletjes in Menes en Laboean", 29 November 1926, Appendix 9 to letter of Governor-General to Minister of Colonies, No. 395/Z, 22 May 1939, Verbaal 4 July 1939 19.

66. Report of Hillen to Governor-General, unnumbered, 26 November 1926, Mailrapport 1181^{X}/26, Verbaal 1 July 1927 S10. See also Hillen's report of 3 January 1927, G 13/1/2, Mailrapport 172^{X}/27, Verbaal 1 July 1927 T10.

67. Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888. Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia, Verhandelingen, KITLV, No. 50, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, p. 290.

68. Putman-Cramer to Hillen, 20 December 1926, 465/G, Mailrapport 172^{x}/27, Verbaal 1 July 1927 T10.

69. Hillen to Governor-General, 29 December 1926, G 13/9/12, Mailrapport 172^{x}/27, Verbaal 1 July 1927 T10.

70. Ibid.

71. W.A. Helb, First Government Secretary to Hillen, 24 January 1927, 45^{x}/G, Mailrapport 172^{x}/27.

72. Hillen to Governor-General, 24 January 1927, G 13/1/21, Mailrapport 172^{x}/27.

73. Private letter of Achmad Djajadiningrat to Kartadiningrat, 4 March 1927, Appendix 1, Kartadiningrat to Governor-General, 7 February 1939, Verbaal 4 July 1939 19. For hostile comment on the relationship between the Regent of Batavia and Kartadiningrat, see Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, 12 December 1926; also Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 1926.

74. Statement and questioning of R.A.A. Kartadiningrat, 3 April 1927, Mailrapport 705^{x}/27, Verbaal 4 July 1939 19.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid. As Kartadiningrat told his interrogator,

> "I received very little collaboration from the commander of the Veldpolitie who had become the right arm of the Resident and not the Regent's. I paid no particular attention to Kiyai Ilyas because it did not seem to me to merit special attention. I had sent many similar declarations and confessions to the Resident. As I have already said, I do not understand why I did not send Kiyai Ilyas's declaration to the Resident . . . The Resident thinks that if I had sent on the Patih's report regarding Kiyai Ilyas, this may well have prevented the uprising. But it is also possible that the revolt might have been prevented if the Resident would only come to Banten in January 1926, had listened to my repeated warnings that he should place no great trust in the Veldpolitie agent in Serang, Raden Oesadiningrat. He had earlier urged people to join the communists and then later changed sides and betrayed them to the Veldpolitie for financial gain. If the Resident had conceded to my request not to let the Veldpolitie continue with arrests in my regency without informing me or my administration, then later events might have been prevented."

77. Commission of Inquiry to Governor-General, No. 1/1100, 31 March 1927, Mailrapport 705^{x}/27, Verbaal 4 July 1939 19.

78. Ibid.

79. Hillen to Governor-General, 23 May 1927, G 13/3/13, Mailrapport 705^{x}/27, Verbaal 4 July 1939 19.

80. Uittreksel uit het Register der Besluiten van den Gouvernor-General van Nederlandsch-Indie, 3 June 1927, No. 2x, in ibid.

81. Commission of Inquiry to Governor-General, 16 May 1927, No. 1/155, ibid.

82. Putman-Cramer to Hillen, 31 March 1927, No. 152/G, ibid.

83. Hillen to Governor-General, 26 April 1927, G 13/5/3, ibid.

84. Besluit 2x, 1 June 1927, Mailrapport 701^{x}/27.

85. De Courant, 11 November 1927; "Zaak Mas Wiria di Koesoema", De Landsdienaar, 1927, p. 462; interviews with the widow and daughter of Mas Wiriadikusuma, Jakarta, 18 August 1975.

86. Interview with Professor G.F. Pijper, Amsterdam, 10 September 1974; see also MvO, F.K. Overduyn, May 1911, p. 33.

87. Kartadiningrat, "Vervolg van het verslag over de relletjes in Menes en Laboean", 29 November 1926, Appendix 9 to letter of Governor-General to Minister of Colonies, No. 395/Z, 22 May 1939, Verbaal 4 July 1939 19.

88. De Banten Bode, 27 November 1926; De Courant, 5 January 1927. When the train carrying Kiyai Asnawi passed through Pandeglang, the station personnel reportedly fell to the ground as a mark of respect.

89. Putman-Cramer to Hillen, 23 December 1926, 434 G, Mailrapport 868^{x}/27, Verbaal 13 April 1928 06; also Hillen to Governor-General, 31 December 1926, G 5/48/3, also in ibid.

90. J.W. Meyer Ranneft to Hillen, 7 May 1927, unnumbered, Mailrapport 868^{x}/27, Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

91. Hillen to Governor-General, 10 May 1927, G 5/32/10, ibid.

92. Hillen to Governor-General, 23 May 1927, G 5/35/6, ibid.

93. Report of Gobée to Governor-General, No. I/145, 30 April 1927, ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid. Among Kiyai Asnawi's pupils in the rebel ranks were Haji Ibrahim of Bangkujang, Haji Dulhadi of Bama and Haji Soeria of Bama.

96. Procureur-General, H.G.P. Duyfjes, to Governor-General, 20 May 1927, No. 1144 AP, Mailrapport $868^{X}/27$. See also letter of D. Rutgers, Director of Justice, to Governor-General, 7 June 1927, X/16/21, Mailrapport $868^{X}/27$.

97. Duyfjes' letter above.

98. Advice of the Raad van Indie, 1 July 1927, Mailrapport $868^{X}/27$.

99. Advice of the Raad van Indie, 12 August 1927, No. XVIII, Mailrapport $1058^{X}/27$, Verbaal 13 April 1928 06.

100. Hillen to Governor-General, 11 October 1927, G 5/79/17; Advice of the Raad van Indie, No. 1x, 18 November 1927, 481^{X} G; all three documents in Mailrapport $1384^{X}/27$.

101. Hillen to Governor-General, 31 December 1927, G 5/105/14; Kiyai Asnawi was granted an allowance by the government of f.250 a month to maintain himself in Cianjur, Mailrapport $202^{X}/28$.

CHAPTER 8

SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Depression and Occupation

The revolts of 1926-27 in Java and Sumatra were a severe jolt to the Dutch colonial administration and within a short period of time led to an openly hostile attitude towards the nationalist movement and radical political organizations generally. The reformism of the Ethical Era rapidly came to an end. Those political parties that were sanctioned, if only for short periods, such as Sukarno's Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI - Indonesian National Party), founded in 1927, tended on the whole to be based on urban intellectuals. There was to be no further development of mass parties such as the PKI or the Sarekat Islam.[1] Moreover, as time went by, increasing Dutch repression forced political parties to adopt more moderate political programs in an attempt to prevent them being banned. One of the main results of this was that Indonesian politics in the 1930s became a far more elite and urban affair than it had been earlier. To a greater or lesser degree too, most political parties gradually dropped their non-cooperative stance towards the government. At the same time, the increasing efficiency of the secret police, PID (Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst - Political Intelligence Service) made underground activity more difficult than ever.

Reactionary colonial policies were strengthened by the onset of the world depression in 1930. Government, industry and the plantations were soon hard hit by the crisis and were forced to retrench. Despite optimistic assumptions on the part of the Dutch,

the effect on the Indonesian population was little short of devastating. Even before the Great Depression, the evidence indicates that the general level of economic welfare of the Indonesian population was declining, while at the same time it was being asked to shoulder a heavier burden of taxes.[2] The boom years following World War I had been followed by a steady decline in per capita income which continued through the 1920s. But the decline was to be far more marked with the enormous sacrifices the population, and especially the peasantry, had to make after 1930.

The effects of the depression were particularly evident in the cities, where opportunities for employment diminished greatly, as well as in those areas of the countryside heavily dependent on commercial crops, the prices for which collapsed after 1930. Most effected were those parts of the countryside where there was little diversification in the local economy.[3] Banten's economy was profoundly subject to outside pressure and influence because of the importance of the coconut crop and of migration as the main sources of income. Leaving aside rice, other crops were not of substantial importance.

The great expansion of coconut cultivation and of job opportunities in the cities, especially Batavia, which had occurred in the period 1890-1920 made Banten all the more vulnerable. Coconut production, which was cultivated on a swathe of coastal land from Labuan in the west to Cilegon in the north of the residency, was savagely hit. From the 1890s on, peasants had largely moved away from cultivation of other second crops to coconut cultivation which was very profitable in the first quarter

of the century when prices were generally rising. In some areas, especially in Anyer and Caringin, rice and other foodstuffs were being imported and paid for out of the proceeds of the coconut harvest.[4] In these areas, some 70% of agricultural land was by 1930 given over to coconut cultivation.[5] Prices in 1930, which still averaged 4.00 to 4.80 guilders per 100 nuts fell in 1931 to 60 to 80 cents and even by 1936 had only recovered to 1.35 guilders per 100.[6] In 1920 prices had been as high as f.12.50 per 100. The effects of this dramatic decrease in prices were little short of catastrophic on the individual producer and the consequent results were a marked pauperization and growing indebtedness.

The government was concerned enough about possible food shortages resulting from this situation to set up an inquiry in 1932.[7] The inquiry, conducted by E.P. Wellenstein, found the situation in the coconut growing regions serious because it coincided with the collapse of job opportunities in the cities. At the same time, the pepper growing districts of Lampung, which had previously offered seasonal employment to Bantenese peasants, had been badly hit by the fall in pepper prices. As a result, the wages now paid were scarcely enough to cover the cost of passage and maintenance in the Lampungs. Moreover, the inquiry was concerned that the fall in income from migration and coconut production led inevitably to great difficulties locally in meeting tax demands.[8] As Wellenstein noted, a category of individual farmers was slowly coming into the position where they obtained little or no income from their land, yet remained responsible for the land tax (landrente).

Wellenstein's report did have the immediate effect of contributing to a decision by the government to lower the land tax levy in Banten in 1932 by 20% and in some areas by 30%.[9] As elsewhere, however, little else was done to alleviate the peasantry's position and when another inquiry was conducted in 1936 into economic conditions in Banten, they were found to have deteriorated even further.[10] Widespread pawning of land was found to be the norm throughout the coastal coconut growing areas. In most cases, in order to repay the loan to moneylenders, peasants were forced to deliver their produce at prices even lower than those prevailing at market rates.[11]

Other indications of the straitened circumstances of the time were all too evident. The number of pilgrims to Mecca which, in 1930, had still been 2,157 from Banten, had fallen to 58 in 1934 and was only to reach 157 in 1936, an indication perhaps that the effects of the depression were being felt by all social groups and not just by the poorer peasants.[12] There was at the same time a marked increase in pawning of belongings and sale of livestock. The number of goats in the region decreased by almost a quarter between 1931 and 1933, from 96,000 to 76,000 and the number of sheep from 70,000 to 49,000.[13] Wage rates everywhere fell to all time lows. In Banten itself a labourer on the fields who could still earn 45 cents a day in 1930 found the wages had dropped to 15 cents a day by 1935. Nor were better wages necessarily to be obtained elsewhere. Day wages for a labourer in the Lampungs, which had averaged 75 cents in the early 1920s, had fallen to 15 to 20 cents by 1934.[14]

Despite the real and substantial fall in income suffered by the peasantry in the 1930s, reaction was muted and covert. Memory of the failure of the 1926 revolt and of its human cost was all too near. Large detachments of field-police stationed in Serang, Cilegon, Pandeglang, Menes and Rangkasbitung, together with regular military exercises held in the region, were all too bitter a reminder of the penalties another revolt might have to pay. The peasantry was disorganized, isolated in villages and at most organized around the small power structure of the local ulama and jawara. Moreover, the nature of political parties in the 1930s, most of whom with the exception of the conservative Nahdatul Ulama (Association of Islamic Scholars) were without any representation in Banten, militated against any mass involvement in politics. The majority of the nationalist parties adopted an attitude of disdain towards Islam and envisaged a secular modern state which was hardly likely to win much support in Banten. The absence of any overt channels for manifestation of political and social grievances in the highly repressive political atmosphere which prevailed in the 1930s made covert resistance the only option.

The peasants reacted in many ways to the circumstances of the depression. Some observers noted a marked increase in mutual help in the villages.[15] Many of those returning from Batavia or Sumatra often held small plots of land and this, to some extent, cushioned them and provided food at least for the immediate family. There was also a notable shift of peasants moving to the sparsely populated southern region of Banten, where it was still possible to reclaim land and practise swidden cultivation (huma).[16]

Resistance to tax collection was widespread, with the administration alternating between writing off some tax debts and issuing warrants for the seizure of goods and land. In 1934, the Resident, J.S. de Kanter, wrote that there was an increasing unwillingness and inability on the part of most peasants to meet the land tax, a situation which could only be coped with by the issuing of tens of thousands of distress warrants. The execution of these warrants was put in the hands of local pangreh praja who were assisted by the field-police.[17] Despite these drastic measures, however, the land tax arrears mounted steadily, as is clear from the following table:

Table XX

Land tax arrears in Banten in guilders

	1930	1931	1932	1933
Serang	4,082	13,779	38,725	140,241
Pandeglang	982	3,786	20,639	106,108
Lebak	599	375	1,812	10,306

Source: MvO, de Kanter, 1934, p. 191

By the late 1930s, arrears had grown even further, with the administration having no alternative in many cases to writing off the debts.[18]

The most marked reaction to the effects of the depression, however, was an increase in banditry and the reemergence of several

jawara bands in the late 1930s. These operated throughout Banten, especially in Serang regency, but their activities spread also across into the Tanggerang regency of Batavia and even east of the capital into Krawang regency.[19] In the Menes area, the groups were known as orok lanjang (lit. unattached young men).[20] Originally a mutual aid society, the orok lanjang had its own administration, treasurer and local branches. Some branches had their own president and secretary with members paying monthly contributions. Many jawara and entol (a local Menes noble term) appear to have joined it and the group reportedly dominated village society in the region. Local officials of the pangreh praja were often forced to turn a blind eye to its activities for fear of reprisals on themselves or their families. As with the jawara groups in north Banten, many orok lanjang members appear to have been involved in the PKI in 1926.

In Serang regency, the jawara bands had a more violent reputation than the orok lanjang in Menes.[21] Within the jawara community itself, there seems to have been a hierarchy of groups, with two groups in particular being especially notorious, that of Seniin Gedé (Seniin the Great) and Haji Armana's Amprak (lit. follower, pupil). Below these two main groups were a host of smaller jawara bands which dominated particular villages or areas, frequently organizing protection rackets.[22] Smaller groups often paid tribute to the larger ones. These groups extracted money from local Chinese or merchants in return for guarding their property. It seems they particularly made a target of moneylenders and owners of large coconut groves. Such was their

power that the Assistant Resident of Serang in 1940, D.H. Meyer, described them as having formed "a state within a state and paralysed the village and local administration".[23]

The two main groups, those of Saniin and Haji Armana, had a wide range of influence and operation that extended outside the Banten area. Saniin styled himself the 'Prince of the thieves' (Mandahé jawara) and both groups frequently referred to themselves as 'children of the Sultan of Banten'.[24] Leadership of these two groups and of some of the smaller ones had good connections with local haji, especially sech haji (haji who organized the pilgrimage to Mecca) and with pokrol bambu (unqualified lawyers). Dozens of village heads, jaro and even some district officials were said to be under their control and these were given a special name in the jawara terminology, uler endas loro (snake with two heads).[25] Officials or headmen who stepped out of line would be threatened with bales (reprisals). Disputes between the two main groups were not uncommon, with destruction of each other's property and animals and even killings frequently the result.[26] In 1939 alone, there was an average of 18 cases of murder and attempted murder per month, most of them attributed to those two groups. Cases of theft of property and especially of livestock ran into the hundreds.[27] Meyer estimated the hard core of these jawara bands to have numbered around 600 men with 2,000 to 3,000 younger followers.[28]

In the absence of overt political activity, the jawara groups presented the main challenge and problem for the colonial government in Banten in the late 1930s. The organized political parties of the cities found little response in Banten, where they were viewed

with deep suspicion by the conservative ulama. The only opposition to colonial rust en orde (peace and order) came from the jawara who, in some cases, maintained links with former Digulists, who began to return to Banten from 1938, and with clandestine leftist groups. The most significant of these groups was that led by Tje Mamat and Tubagus Alipan and included several ex-Digulists and other former PKI members who had fled to Malaya following the collapse of the 1926 revolt. Through their association in exile with Djamaluddin Tamin and Subakat, they became members of PARI (Partai Republik Indonesia - Indonesian Republic Party), the party established by Tan Malaka following his break with the Comintern in 1927.[29]

Tje Mamat, the former secretary of the PKI branch in Anyer in 1926, returned to Indonesia in 1930 and set up a political study club in Palembang with Mohammad Arif Siregar.[30] In 1932, following the arrest of Tan Malaka's aide, Djamaluddin Tamin, the Palembang PARI cell was broken up. Although Tje Mamat was detained for several weeks, he was eventually released for lack of evidence. He returned to Banten in the mid-1930s, where he earned a living as a pokrol bambu, frequently appearing before local courts on behalf of jawara. By the late 1930s, Tje Mamat had formed a clandestine group which had contact with local jawara and also with Batavia-based labour unions such as Persi (Persatuan Sopir Indonesia - Indonesian Drivers' Union). More ex-Digulists returned home in 1939-40, amongst them Haji Achmad Chatib, and became loosely associated with this group and its leader, Tje Mamat. Whilst the operation of this clandestine grouping seemingly escaped Dutch

attention, the actions of the jawara bands and the threat they posed to law and order increasingly called for decisive action. Moving extra field-police units into the region, the Dutch succeeded between February and May 1940 in breaking seven jawara bands, arresting 175 people including Seniin Gede and Haji Armana.[31]

The Japanese occupation of 1942-45 brought important changes in its wake. Although the existing administrative structure was kept intact, the Japanese sought to mobilize the Indonesian people directly for the war effort. To this end, unlike the Dutch, they recognized nationalist and Muslim leaders as legitimate brokers between the government and the people. A variety of political organizations were set up to further Japanese war aims, some of which, such as the Seinendan (Youth Organization) and the Keibodan (Auxiliary Police), gave their members a quasi-military training.

An even more important development was the establishment in 1943 of an Indonesian auxiliary army, the PETA (Pembela Tanah Air - Defenders of the Fatherland).[32] Equipped with light arms, the PETA was commanded by Indonesian officers up to the level of battalion commander (daidancho). The PETA was organized regionally and battalion commanders were usually prominent local figures able to provide a focus of loyalty but, importantly, not involved in actual military command. This was left to lower ranking officers such as the company commanders (chudancho) and to the platoon commanders (shodancho). The strongest ties were forged therefore at the lower levels of the army. At the same time that the Japanese organized auxiliary Indonesian military formations, they also sought

to develop a popular nationalist consciousness, although one which did not in any way challenge their rule.

The period of the Japanese occupation is identified in the popular consciousness of most Indonesians as a time of appalling economic and social deprivation. This was especially so in Banten. The Japanese made heavy demands on the peasantry for produce and labour which, during the latter part of the occupation, were not paid for. Romusha (labourers) were recruited on a large scale in Banten for projects not only in Java, but also in Sumatra and Malaya. Economic conditions generally declined markedly, with widespread malnutrition developing in many parts of the region.

During the occupation, the position of the two dominant social groups, the ulama and the pangreh praja, changed markedly. For the ulama, the war years brought to Islam an official importance that had been systematically denied it during the Dutch colonial period. Almost certainly, this awakened expectations amongst the ulama when, for the first time, a limited political recognition was accorded to them by the government. The most dramatic expression of their changed position was the appointment of Haji Achmad Chatib and Kiyai Sjamaun as commanders of two of the four battalions of PETA in the region.[33] The other two battalion commanders in Banten were pangreh praja officials, including one, Entol Ternaja, who had been a field-police officer at the time of the 1926 revolt. Other ulama were awarded other official positions, although these were largely to nominal bodies dealing with religious or social affairs.

Control of the administration, however, remained firmly in the hands of the Japanese and the pangreh praja. Even in the PETA, with the exception of the appointment of a few ulama, officers were drawn almost exclusively from priyayi rather than orthodox Islamic backgrounds. The appointment of a few ulama seems largely to have been designed to appease local sentiment, but the all-important recruitment to the PETA was organized through local government. Officers were overwhelmingly young men with at least Western elementary education, whilst care seems to have been taken even with recruitment of the lower ranks. There was thus no question of ulama entering en masse with their santri.

The position of the pangreh praja in Banten was substantially eroded during the occupation years. Strictly speaking, their control of local administration, political status and rank remained intact, but it was precisely because of the former that they became closely identified with the worst hardships of the occupation. The police, most of whose senior officers in Banten were from outside the region, were given the task of hunting down suspected Allied or leftist sympathisers and of curbing the restless jawara. Bands of jawara had begun to reemerge in 1944-45, the most active being that of Soleiman Gunungsari in the Ciomas area.

During the war years, the group around Tje Mamat maintained contacts with radical groups outside of Banten, including the 'Joyoboyo' movement of Mr Jusuf, a radical lawyer who had headed the Persi union and was to revive the PKI in October 1945.[34] Although on the whole Tje Mamat and his associates abjured any contact with groups or individuals that were markedly pro-Japanese, they maintained links with Haji Achmad Chatib, who was appointed

daidancho (battalion commander) in the PETA, and with some pemuda who had been drawn into Japanese-sponsored youth groups.[35] Tje Mamat himself and many of the group around him were arrested in 1944 by the Kempeitai, the Japanese Security Police. Two leading figures of the group, Hidayat and Haji Sinting, an ex-Digulist, died in detention, while others, including Tje Mamat, were imprisoned and tortured.[36] The experiences of this group during the war left them with a hatred not only of the Japanese but also of the Indonesian officials and police who they saw as willing collaborators.

Relations with the Japanese were not entirely negative, however. Special note has to be made of the wartime activities of the office of the Kaigun Bukanfu Daisangka (Japanese Naval Counter-Intelligence) in Banten.[37] The head of this office was Tomegoro Yoshizumi, a correspondent in Batavia for the To Hindo Nippō before the war. Yoshizumi appears to have been a frequent visitor to Banten before 1942, and during the occupation several Bantenese were recruited to his office.[38] Of a younger generation from the veterans of 1926, most of these Bantenese had been working in Batavia in 1942. After 1945, all of them became closely associated with Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan (Struggle Union). Some contact seems to have existed between the Kaigun group and the PKI/PARI group of Tje Mamat, and on at least two occasions the former made interventions with the Kempeitai to secure the release of ex-Digulists from prison.

Towards the end of 1944, the Kaigun Bukanfu Daisangka began to take an increasing interest in Banten, despite the fact that formally Kaigun (the Japanese Navy) had no authority in Java.

Rudimentary guerrilla training was given in Jakarta under the auspices of Yoshizumi's office to jawara leaders from West Java, including Jaro Karis and Jaro Kamid from Banten. In May 1945, Yoshizumi followed this up by visiting Banten with Entol Chaeruddin, a Bantenese aide and later bodyguard to Tan Malaka. The two men appear to have met with several prominent ulama and jawara, and as a result of their visit 400 young men were trained for one month in Serang in June by the Bukanfu Daisangka.[39] Most of those trained appear to have been nominated by jawara leaders.

The situation in Banten began to deteriorate markedly in 1945. Shortages of food and clothing became particularly acute. Already at the end of 1944, rice shortages in the Menes region had begun to produce considerable unrest, with peasants refusing to make deliveries of rice to the authorities and even denying them permission to visit villages.[40] Allegations of widespread official corruption in the collection of the rice harvest and in the distribution of cloth increased the resentment and bitterness of the peasantry towards the priyayi. By mid-1945, unrest had spread even into the ranks of the PETA, with desertions reported from the Labuan and Cilegon battalions.

The first sign that the simmering social tensions were likely to give way to widespread disorders occurred in August 1945 when rioting broke out in the Anyer district of Serang regency. A former PKI stronghold in the 1920s, Anyer's local economy had been sharply hit during the war years by the complete standstill in the copra industry. The immediate cause of the rioting appears to have been food shortages caused by the rice delivery system and the

failure of the assistant wedana of Cinangka to distribute cloth in exchange for rice. New methods for rice deliveries introduced in 1945 meant that peasants had to surrender between 66% and 75% of their crop.[41]

On 16 August, peasants in Cinangka approached the assistant wedana, Tubagus Mohammed Arsad, demanding that cloth in his possession be turned over to them. When he refused, his residence was promptly ransacked and the assistant wedana fled to Anyer to seek help. The Wedana of Anyer, Raden Soekrawardi, returned to Cinangka with the assistant wedana and two policemen, but when they entered the village they were attacked by peasants armed with goloks. In the mêlée that followed, Raden Soekrawardi was killed, whilst the other officials managed to escape.[42] The rioting was only suppressed on 18 August, when 30 policemen together with Japanese soldiers entered the village. In the fighting that followed, one policeman and seven peasants were killed.

The Collapse of Traditional Government

The Cinangka incident was in many ways the opening shot in the struggle that was soon to develop between the pangreh praja and the perjuangan (revolutionary movement). Although the disturbances were over in a few days, the repercussions were widespread. Nervousness and unease increased amongst the Japanese and Indonesian administrations in August and September. The Kempeitai tried to keep matters under control by making arrests and showing their presence in the region, but further indications of unrest were not long in coming. In late August, an Indonesian police

patrol was attacked and fired on near the village of Taktakan, just outside Serang, a senior officer, Tjokrosuwiryo, losing an eye in the engagement.

In the weeks after the Cinangka incident, it was to be the ulama and jawara, together with the small underground communist groups, that were to seize the initiative rather than the pemuda (youth), who were so active in the main cities of Java. The absence of any large towns in Banten, and also of a significant intelligentsia or middle class, meant that pemuda did not become the critical revolutionary group there that they did in many other areas. PETA had been disbanded prior to the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945 and former PETA officers in the region were reluctant to assume a leadership role in the struggle that soon ensued, some even leaving the region for Jakarta and Bandung. In some quarters, the PETA were already being denounced as collaborators and the group as a whole became the open targets of a whispering campaign because of their 'treachery' during the occupation. There was strong resentment towards the PETA because of their privileged access to food and clothing and also because of their close personal relationships with Japanese.[43] The priyayi backgrounds of most of the PETA officers also made them fearful of the unknown outcome of any reenactment of the 1926 revolt in the region.

September 1945 was marked by growing tension throughout Banten. The violence of the events in Cinangka had an unsettling influence on pangreh praja and local police officials throughout the region. Jawara bands began to emerge into the open and

authority was more and more flouted. The ulama, local communists and jawara became convinced that in the absence of any pro-Republican leadership at the top of the residency and with the lack of any initiative from the former PETA, they would have to act. The conviction was also spreading that a complete overthrow of the existing system of government in the region would be necessary as the Japanese were removed. Increasingly, as in 1926, a loose alliance of groups coalesced that included ulama, jawara and local communists. The ease with which they did so was assisted by two factors. Firstly, that in many cases key leaders of the 1926 revolt were once again involved, such as Haji Achmad Chatib, Tubagus Alipan, Tubagus Hilman and Tje Mamat. Their past revolutionary experience gave these men a tremendous aura of respect and prestige in Bantenese eyes. Secondly, all these groups shared a profound hatred of the existing Indonesian administration and were united in a determination to see it overthrown.

Undoubtedly too the small leftist group around Tje Mamat were fortified in their convictions by their increasing awareness of the presence of Tan Malaka in Banten. Using the pseudonym 'Ilyas Husen', the veteran Indonesian communist had lived for more than two years, from 1943, in Banten, working in the offices of the Mitsubishi coal mine in Bayah in south Banten.[44] But Tan Malaka's connections with Banten went back even earlier. It is probable that in the years after 1926 he had met several Bantenese who had fled Indonesia in the aftermath of the revolt of that year.[45] During the occupation years, he had made contact with a number of young Indonesians active in Japanese youth organizations in the region, including the son-in-law of Haji Achmad Chatib. Whether he had any direct contact

with the local underground communists is more difficult to assess. What is certain is that on 9 August 1945 Tan Malaka was asked by a small meeting in Rangkasbitung to represent Banten at a forthcoming pemuda meeting in Jakarta.

In late September, Tan Malaka returned to Banten and spent several days in the region before leaving for central Java. He travelled to Labuan to meet Haji Chatib, increasingly seen as the most important revolutionary figure in Banten.[46] There followed a series of meetings in Serang of core revolutionary leaders, many of them ex-PKI and former Digulists, which were addressed by Tan Malaka. One of those present at these meetings recalled the atmosphere,

> "In late September I attended a secret meeting in Serang at which Tan Malaka and Tje Mamat were the main speakers. There were about 40 people present, including many from Tanggerang such as Kiyai Achmad. There were many ex-Digulists. Tan Malaka made a passionate speech advocating the early transfer of power from the Japanese and the creation of genuine people's organs. Some of those present advocated the execution of all pangreh praja and the feudal class in order to complete the aims of 1926."[47]

How much direct influence Tan Malaka had, however, on the events that followed is not so clear and on 5 October he left Banten.

The hesitant and extremely cautious approach to the declaration of independence in Jakarta adopted by the pangreh praja increased the militancy of revolutionary groups. The administrative corps was demoralized and feared the consequences of widespread social unrest. While the Jakarta government promoted the Indonesian vice residents (fuku-shuchokan) to full Resident in most areas on 5 September, the Vice Resident in Banten, Raden T.R. Tirtasujatna,

was not officially appointed Resident of Banten until 29 September.[48] The suspicions of local revolutionaries were aroused and it was widely assumed that Tirtasujatna, who was not Bantenese, was guilty of serious shortcomings and suspected of pro-Dutch sympathies. Rightly or wrongly, Tirtasujatna was held to have doubted the wisdom of the proclamation of independence and it was for this reason that his appointment was delayed.

But by now the polarization between the loose coalition of local communists, ulama and jawara on the one hand and the local administration on the other was far advanced. The revolutionaries were further emboldened by the obvious demoralization and increasing reluctance of the Japanese to support the Indonesian administration. On 6 October, a mass meeting of several thousand people took place in Serang and selected Haji Achmad Chatib as Resident. At the same time, the Regent in Pandeglang, Raden Djumhana Wiriaatmadja, a non-Bantenese, refused to fly the Indonesian flag and after an argument with local revolutionaries left Banten.[49]

In an attempt to avoid direct clashes, the Japanese, who had remained in formal control until late September, withdrew their remaining forces to Serang. In the process, however, a clash occurred at Warunggunung, near Rangkasbitung, when four Japanese soldiers were attacked and killed by several hundred peasants. The remaining 200 Japanese soldiers in Serang rejected any further negotiations about the surrender of arms and on 9 October a battle ensued that pitted the jawara, peasants and a handful of PETA soldiers against the Japanese garrison. The jawara were led by Soleiman Gunungsari, Haji Mu'min, Jaro Kamid, Kiyai Abdulhadi, a

former Digulist, and Salim Nonong, a former PETA officer who, before the war, had been active in the drivers' union, Persi.[50] The fighting was concluded the following day when the Japanese broke out of the town.

The withdrawal of the Japanese from Banten, the immediate object of the perjuangan, was a symbolic victory of great significance for the revolutionaries. For the first time in the history of social and political unrest in Banten, the rebels, at least in their own eyes, had inflicted on the colonial power not a temporary defeat but a complete and lasting victory that was to leave the Bantenese in charge of their own house. How to manage that house became the principal issue on the revolutionaries' agenda.

The traditional hatred of the pangreh praja and the police, and the preponderance of jawara among the revolutionaries, determined the choice of the former as the next target of the struggle. In the first place, an attack was mounted on the main prison in Serang, which was largely undefended. Many jawara imprisoned there, including Achmad Sadeli, Mad Duding and Wadut, were released. Later, on the night of 13 October, six Europeans detained in the jail were killed by the rebels, including a former KNIL Captain Faber, who had arrived in Banten only a few days earlier from Sumatra. At the same time, the almost deserted kabupaten was seized by the rebels and the Regent, Hilman Djajadiningrat, imprisoned in the jail where he was held for several months. Several other priyayi, including the Wedana of Ciomas, Raden Sastradikaria, were arrested and imprisoned.

In the next few days, there followed an almost total disintegration of local government and police in the region.[51] Throughout the residency, all pangreh praja from assistant wedana to regent were replaced by ulama, often after popular demonstrations and attacks on their residences. In some instances, this appeared to take place spontaneously, whilst elsewhere revolutionary bands appeared claiming to be acting on the orders of the Resident, Haji Chatib. In a number of places, the changeover was accompanied by violence. Policemen were killed in Pandeglang, Mancak and in Menes. In Pabuaran, near Ciomas, the assistant wedana, Entik Surawijaja, was killed when a large band led by a certain Haji Saldi, a veteran of 1926 and a former Digulist, attacked the assistant wedana's residence. Invoking the memories and aims of the 1926 revolt, Haji Saldi intended to proceed to the neighbouring villages of Baros, Petir and Ciruas to dispense with other officials. The timely intervention of an emissary personally dispatched by Haji Chatib prevented the violence spreading.

The pattern of revolt that ensued followed in many respects the uprisings of 1888 and especially that of 1926. The targets of revolutionary violence, as on those occasions, were officials and policemen. In addition, the Dutch prisoners in Serang jail, as we have noted, were also killed. Had there been any other Europeans or Eurasians in the region, they too would probably have been attacked. There were also attacks on the property of Chinese, but most of the Chinese community fled in early October to Jakarta. The social composition of the rebel groups for the most part consisted of peasants, whilst the revolutionary leadership

mirrored that of 1926 - a loose alliance of ulama, communists and jawara. Within the alliance, it was the ulama, led by Haji Chatib, who were preponderant both in number and influence in Bantenese society. The main feature that separated the social revolution of 1945 from the revolts of 1888 and 1926, however, was that there was virtually no resistance or reaction from the authorities, at least not for several months.

The atmosphere in which officials were replaced is graphically recalled by one senior police officer in Cilegon at the time,

> "The confusion increased greatly in October, particularly around the 15th. Leaflets and posters began to appear everywhere with the hammer and sickle. After Natadiredja, the head of the police in Banten, had fled, the prisoners were freed and the police station was looted of its arms . . . Because we did not feel safe in our own house, from the 20th I took refuge in the house of a friend. Many people were pouring into Cilegon from the surrounding villages - Kramatwatu, Merak and Anyer. Meetings of thousands were held on the alun-alun. It was decided to share all looted goods (from the houses of officials and Chinese). The question also arose of what to do with me and the Wedana. Most of those who had come into Cilegon were in favour of executions, while the townspeople wanted us detained. A decision on the matter was finally taken at a secret meeting on 20 October. Some of my own police agents were present at the meeting. The majority view propounded by Kiyai Suhaimi prevailed. We were to be spared and expelled from Banten. I eventually left Cilegon on 27 October for Bandung."[52]

For the most part, the revolutionary upheaval took place without violence, if only because most officials and senior police officers had taken the wise precaution of leaving Banten in early October for the comparative safety of Jakarta or Bandung. Public meetings were held at which new officials were elected and

overwhelmingly these posts went to ulama.[53] Local communists did not oppose this, indeed to do so might have promoted the early break up of their alliance. Instead, they concentrated their efforts on the establishment of the Dewan Rakyat (People's Council) which was set up alongside the ulama-dominated civil administration, under the self-appointed chairmanship of Tje Mamat. In ceding control of the local administration, at least nominally, to the ulama, the PKI/PARI group in the Dewan tacitly acknowledged the dominant social position of the ulama in Banten. The revolutionaries grouped around Tje Mamat clearly hoped, however, that real political control would be vested in the Dewan. In this division of responsibility lay the seeds of future conflict.

In the aftermath of the Japanese withdrawal from Banten and in the absence of any countervailing structures, the Dewan rapidly assumed the function of the main executive body. It had only tenuous links with the Republican Government in Jakarta, which at least until December 1945 seems to have despaired of the situation in Banten.[54] The Dewan, for its part, was strongly under the influence of former PKI/PARI cadres such as Tje Mamat, Alirachman, Tubagus Hilman, Haji Moes, as well as prominent jawara such as Soleiman Gunungsari and Jaro Kamid, who were at best sceptical of the Republican leadership or even openly hostile. A striking illustration of this was the Dewan's refusal to countenance the existence in Banten of the officially sanctioned Komite Nasional Indonesia (KNI - Indonesian National Committee) because it was not considered to be sufficiently revolutionary.

The dominant figure within the Dewan was Tje Mamat, often referred to at the time as 'Bapak Rakyat' (Father of the People). He appears to have worked closely with Haji Chatib, the Resident. Chatib's authority and influence was based above all on his leadership of the 1926 revolt and the fact that he was the son-in-law of Kiyai Asnawi, the most famous Bantenese ulama of this century. The deputy chairman of the Dewan was Alirachman, also a former Digulist and member of the wartime underground 'Joyoboyo'.

The Dewan's chief political and social constituency was rooted in the jawara of the region. It successfully marshalled its most fervent supporters into various lasykar (popular militia) and even into a reconstituted police force. With their traditional antipathy to the pangreh praja, the jawara were natural allies of the Dewan. But their indiscipline and easy resort to violence were later to prove a disadvantage.

Amongst the peasantry, the Dewan made an immediate impression. Its revolutionary and populist slogans - 'the people will become judge', 'one for all and all for one', 'rice debts will be repaid with rice, blood debts with blood' - became popular maxims which seemed aptly to synthesize the essence of the revolutionary struggle. No one, however, was quite sure what the revolution meant other than the complete overthrow of the pangreh praja and the tacit rejection of the Republic in Jakarta for being insufficiently revolutionary. The Dewan was never to produce a political program of its own. The proliferation of revolutionary emblems and insignia - the red flag, the hammer and sickle and the Dewan's own red triangle on a white background - further

contributed to the heady and insurrectionary atmosphere of October 1945. The Dewan soon formed its own police force, known at first as the Polisi Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Police), and subsequently as the Polisi Istimewa (Special Police), under a well known jawara recently released from Serang prison, Achmad Sadeli. Most important, the Dewan successfully managed the task of food distribution through a body known as the Badan Perekonomian Rakyat (People's Economic Council). The Dewan took over Japanese stocks of rice, salt, sugar and tapioca and distributed them through a primitive rationing system until December 1945, when the supplies simply ran out. Significantly, it was at about this time that public opinion was to begin to shift against the Dewan and Tje Mamat. The Dewan also organized raids on the homes of priyayi and organized distribution of food and clothing found there.

Whilst the Dewan frequently spoke of the need to institute 'revolutionary taxes', in practice little was done to implement this other than crude requisitioning of the property of priyayi and Chinese. Indeed, many of the supporters of the Dewan argued that part of the purpose of the 'revolution' was, on the contrary, to abolish taxation.

The period of the Dewan's ascendancy in Banten was, however, comparatively short, almost exactly three months. Having seized power, the Dewan had great difficulty in consolidating its hold on the region. The absence of any favourable social revolutionary developments at a national level, in particular the slowness with which both Tan Malaka and the PKI regrouped themeselves into coherent political factions, was particularly frustrating and

undermining to a social revolutionary movement such as the Dewan in Banten. After the initial revolutionary euphoria, internal factors also began to work against the Dewan. This was reflected in a decline of its authority and by November former PETA officers and men who had not left the region had begun to regroup themselves as a unit of the new Indonesian Army, the TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat), choosing as their leader the former daidancho and now Regent of Serang, Kiyai Sjamaun. Similar moves also occurred in Rangkasbitung and Pandeglang, with former PETA units trying to reconstitute themselves and seeking contact with the more conservative ulama.

These moves came at a time when the difficulties of the Dewan were increasing. The Dewan had few trained officials at its disposal. Many prominent figures in the Dewan rejected entirely the need for tax collection or education as running directly contrary to the revolution. The ulama themselves were singularly inexperienced in administration. Some lower level office personnel had been retained by the Dewan, but it seems that these adopted an obstructive attitude to the new administration and demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate with it.[55]

Most damaging for the Dewan were the strains that had been allowed to develop in its relations with the ulama. In this respect, Tje Mamat and his associates had been far less circumspect and subtle than had Puradisastra, the PKI leader in 1926. Haji Chatib and a handful of other ulama who were veterans of 1926 may have had a wider social revolutionary vision and definite leftist sympathies, but for most of the religious leaders, their

long cherished goal had been achieved once local government was transferred from the pangreh praja to the ulama. Beyond that, few wanted to venture. Rumours of land distribution and of black lists of persons to be tried before the Dewan, as well as charges that some ulama were indulging in shows of luxury (kelihatan mewah), alienated the religious leaders. The lead given by Kiyai Sjamaun in siding with the TKR was soon followed by other religious leaders. A wave of kidnappings and killings in December was finally to rupture the links between most ulama and the Dewan.

But it was not only with the ulama and the TKR that the Dewan experienced growing difficulties; divisions were also beginning to arise amongst the revolutionary left. Whilst councils similar to the Dewan, and under its tutelage, had been formed in Labuan and Rangkasbitung, in Pandeglang events had taken another course. Mohammed Ali (Mamak), a former Digulist, had formed a Komite Revolusioner Indonesia (KRI - Indonesian Revolutionary Committee) which, although cooperating with the Dewan, increasingly found itself at odds with the drift of its policies and actions. A similar attitude was taken by the veteran communist and ex-Digulist, Achmad Bassaif, who returned to Serang from Australia in November 1945. This group, along with others such as Tubagus Hilman and Agus Soleiman, both ex-Digulists, increasingly saw a policy of outright opposition to the Republic as futile. They saw it as more realistic to attempt to consolidate a communist hold within the Republican administration.

This withdrawal of support for the Dewan by the moderate PKI groups left the faction of Tje Mamat and Alirachman dangerously

exposed. At the same time, national differences between the orthodox PKI and Tan Malaka were increasingly beginning to be reflected in Banten. They were still supported by important jawara leaders such as Soleiman Gunungsari, Jaro Kamid and Jaro Angling, but in terms of political leadership the Dewan was, by December 1945, fatally weakened. Many of the jawara bands proved difficult to control and killings and robberies continued unabated. Most critical for the Dewan was the wavering attitude of the Resident, Haji Chatib, who was not prepared by January 1946 to accompany the Dewan on another bout of fratricidal killings.

Difficulties for the Dewan in Banten coincided with mounting opposition to local social revolutions from the Republican Government in Jakarta. There was concern amongst the Jakarta leadership, particularly after the formation of the Sjahrir Government in November, that revolutionary unrest in Banten and Tanggerang might spill over into the Jakarta hinterland. Almost certainly, if such an outcome were to occur, the British and Dutch would react unfavourably and would use it as an opportunity to demonstrate the inability of the Republic to keep its own house in order. It was in the Republic's own interest that developments in regions such as Banten be brought into line.

The Republic's concern about events in Banten were enhanced by the spread of rumours, sometimes bordering on the fantastic, brought by travellers from the region, that Banten intended to declare itself independent, that the Dewan intended to challenge the legitimacy of the rule of President Sukarno and even that it was intended to restore the sultanate. Already by late October these

rumours began to reach the Jakarta press.[56] The stories about social revolution and impending anarchy were fed by the steady stream of former officials, policemen and even PETA officers leaving Banten. Most members of the large and influential Djajadiningrat family, for example, had left the region following the killing of Raden Soekrawardi in August and the imprisonment of Hilman Djajadiningrat in October.

However, if the tactical advantage had been overwhelmingly with the Dewan in October, within weeks the tide was beginning to flow in the other direction. One of the most decisive factors here was the absence of any 'social-revolutionary' element to the Indonesian independence struggle on the national plane. The leaders of the Dewan did not accept the legitimacy of the Sukarno-Hatta leadership of the Republic, and indeed openly derided it. Yet until the formation of the Persatuan Perjuangan (Struggle Union) in late January 1946, there was no countervailing national revolutionary force. The Republican Government was, of course, militarily weak and had only a limited ability to impose its own will, yet it did possess political clout for faute de mieux it was leading the struggle for independence. In the absence of any contending national force, this gradually became accepted, even in Banten, an acceptance that was accelerated by growing disillusionment with the Dewan and its inability to control the jawara bands.

The visit of Sukarno and Hatta to Banten in December 1945 played an important part in changing the situation for the Dewan. By this time, the TKR was determined to curb the Dewan and hoped

that support from the Republic would enable them to turn the tables in Banten. The presidential visit took place against a background of growing concessions by the Republic to the Allies in Jakarta. On 19 November, the Sjahrir cabinet had declared the capital a 'diplomatic city' and formally withdrawn all Republican Army units. These moves aroused great suspicion in Banten, where the Dewan saw the Republic as opposed not only to social revolution but also to a fight with the Dutch.

The Republican Government, and especially senior army officers, some of whom had family connections in Banten, had become extremely disturbed by December at the unwillingness of the Dewan to accept the Republic's authority. The presidential visit provided an opportunity to gauge the extent of local support for the Dewan and led to talks with the region's army leaders. But more importantly the visit underlined for local people the presence and importance of the central government, previously an almost unknown entity.

Sukarno and Hatta, accompanied by Kasman Singodimedjo, the attorney general, visited Banten between 9 and 12 December.[57] In speeches in Serang and Rangkasbitung, the Republican leaders warned their audiences that the notion of kedaulatan rakyat (people's sovereignty) was not to be interpreted literally but on the contrary the people must remember their responsibilities to the state. They also emphasized the need for national unity in the struggle against the Dutch. Hatta in particular appears to have gone out of his way to describe the Dewan as meaningless and to call for its dissolution.

In public, Tje Mamat replied that the Dewan represented the only true 'people's democracy', while the Republic owed too much to the Japanese and too little to the people. Elements within the Dewan now sought to use the occasion of the presidential visit to demonstrate their revolutionary militancy. Whilst Sukarno and Hatta were staying in Rangkasbitung, R.T. Hardiwinangun, Regent of Lebak until 1945, was kidnapped and killed by Dewan supporters.[58] This incident now made a showdown with the army almost inevitable.

Before the presidential visit and Hardiwinangun's death, the TKR had been afraid to take action against the Dewan because of fear of reaction by local ulama and the peasants. The murder of Hardiwinangun lost the Dewan considerable support, in particular from the ulama, who were increasingly perturbed by the course of events. Former PETA and priyayi elements were equally determined now to put an end to the Dewan. The urgency of the situation for the army was dramatically underlined on 31 December, when Dewan lasykars in Serang arrested Entol Ternaja, a senior TKR officer, and Oskandar Kusumuningrat, the former police chief of the regency.[59] The two men were taken to Ciomas, a Dewan stronghold, where they were apparently to be put on trial for 'crimes' committed under the Dutch. The same day, a clash took place in Pandeglang when Dewan supporters tried to seize arms from the local TKR unit. On 2 January 1946, the Dewan in Rangaksbitung demanded the replacement of the Regent, Kiyai Abuya Hassan, and the appointment of a directorate to supervise all branches of the government and all revolutionary armed forces.

The TKR in Rangkasbitung replied with an ultimatum of their own in which they demanded the dissolution of the Dewan; when this attempt failed, fighting took place in the town. The Dewan forces, poorly armed and ill trained, were quickly routed. Sensing that events had now turned in their favour, TKR forces in Banten's three main towns moved against the Dewan lasykar in Ciomas on 8 January. The fighting lasted for more than 24 hours, leaving at least 15 dead on the Dewan side, and was stopped only by the personal intervention of the Resident, Haji Chatib.

The ceasefire that followed led to the dismemberment of the Dewan. Several Dewan leaders, including Tje Mamat, Alirachman and Achmad Bassaif, were arrested, whilst Hilman Djajadiningrat and other priyayi still imprisoned were freed and taken to Sukabumi. The position of the Resident, Haji Chatib, remained unchallenged, however, and ulama continued to occupy all the administrative posts of importance.

Politically and organizationally, the Dewan had been unable to develop structures and programs capable of sustaining it in the face of local and national opposition. The Dewan's elimination meant that the social revolutionary strand in Banten's history in the revolution was eclipsed but not extinguished. Regionalism and anti-colonialism became the more important elements of the revolutionary struggle in Banten and contributed to continuing tensions with the Republican Government in Yogyakarta. The regionalist strand demonstrated itself in the desire of Banten's leaders for a meaningful degree of autonomy for the region, the

anti-colonialism in their constant distrust of the diplomatic manoeuverings of the government.

The Dewan may have been removed, but there was no counter-revolution. There was, for example, no immediate restoration of the old pangreh praja to their former posts. For the moment, the ulama continued to occupy all administrative positions, although later, between 1947 and 1950, they were gradually to be eased out. Haji Chatib, despite his earlier sympathies with the Dewan, remained Resident, thanks largely to the enormous influence he exercised throughout the region. More orthodox communists, who had distanced themselves from the Dewan, remained in influential positions. In Pandeglang, Mohammed Ali dissolved his Revolutionary Committee soon after the fall of the Dewan and formed instead a Komite Nasional Indonesia (KNI - Indonesian National Committee) in conformity with the structure of Republican administration elsewhere. In Serang, three key PKI figures, all ex-Digulists, Agus Soleman, Achmad Noer and Tubagus Hilman, set up a Badan Penerangan Rakyat (People's Information Bureau) designed to develop and consolidate PKI influence and support in the region. Agus Soleman and Mohammed Ali also became members of the five-man executive of the KNI Banten.[61] Many former PKI leaders also continued to occupy important positions in the administration: Haji Afif became wedana of Cilegon, Tubagus Emed, Achmad Chatib's brother-in-law, was appointed wedana of Labuan and Achmad Rifai held the position of political secretary to Kiyai Abdulhalim, the Regent of Pandeglang.[62]

Nevertheless, conservative tendencies and forces had been strengthened by the fall of the Dewan. Most notably, the former PETA forces, now regrouped in the TKR as the 'Division 1,000' had achieved an absolute military superiority in the region. At the same time, the second year of the revolution saw a renewal of regionalism and a return of the 'banditry' that disturbed law and order in the late 1930s. Large jawara bands such as those of Soleiman Gunungsari, Jaro Kamid and Haji Armana took to the hills once again and renewed their contacts with the Jakarta underworld.[63]

The Republican Government in Yogyakarta remained concerned at the situation in the region, especially when regionalist desires seemed to be reemerging. The main cause of the government's alarm was a program launched in September 1946 by Haji Chatib to restore the old town of Banten, together with its harbour, destroyed by the Dutch in 1832. Rumours spread rapidly that this effort was but the preliminary to a full restoration of the old sultanate, with Chatib himself, a descendant of the last sultans, first in line to inherit the title. Such was the alarm felt in Yogyakarta that Hatta returned to Banten in October to meet with the Resident.[64]

Hatta was sufficiently disturbed by what he learnt about the position in Banten to decide that decisive action had to be taken on both the political and military fronts. Earlier, in May 1946, following the formation of the Siliwangi Division in West Java, Colonel A.H. Nasution, its first commander, had visited the region to try and bring the 'Division 1,000' into line with other Siliwangi units. As a result, the TNI units in Banten became

Brigade I of the Siliwangi, with Kiyai Sjamaun remaining as figurehead commander and Lieutenant Colonel Sutalaksana as chief of staff.[65] The brigade, however, remained far weaker than its counterparts elsewhere, poorly armed and above all with a critical shortage of officers due to the exodus of many former PETA officers from the region in October 1945. In order further to consolidate the brigade, in December 1946 Nasution sent Lieutenant Colonel Sukanda Bratamenggala to Banten, together with several hundred troops from the East Priangan, to take command. Several key appointments were made on the political level. Whilst the government recognized, albeit reluctantly, that the position of Haji Chatib as Resident was unassailable, it tried to limit his room for manoeuvre by appointing Joesoep Adiwinata Governor of West Java, based in Serang, and Semaun Bakri, Sukarno's wartime secretary, as Deputy Resident.[66]

Beginning in 1947, the Republican Government made a determined attempt to put the clock back to 1945 and to curtail and limit the powers of both the ulama and of the irregular lasykar. In February, the Regent of Pandeglang, Kiyai Abdul Halim, was replaced by Mas Sudibja, the former Patih of Serang.[67] Increasingly, the government resorted to drafting in officials from the Priangan to serve in Banten, a move which had always aroused intense resentment in the colonial period. In March 1947, the Majelis Ulama (Council of Ulama) in Banten reacted by urging the government to review its policy of appointments in the region.[68]

These political changes were coupled with an increasing militarization of the local administration. In order to supplement

and neutralize the ulama, who continued to occupy most posts, the central government appointed civil and military wedana. Military courts were also established and a crack unit, of Priangan troops, the 'Garuda Company' formed to deal with the problem of irregular lasykar and 'banditry'. The complaint was frequently heard, and not without justification, that more effort was expended on controlling unruly elements in Banten than on fighting the Dutch. The Siliwangi was referred to derisively as 'Tentara Wilhelmina' ((Queen) Wilhelmina's Army) and the cry was often heard 'Banten dijajah lagi oleh Priangan' (Banten is colonized again by Priangan) because of the preponderance once more in Banten of officials and police drawn from the Priangan. Resentment and tension in Banten at the changes imposed by the Republican Government in the name of order led at times to open conflict with the Siliwangi troops. Armed clashes occurred in October 1947 and again in February and March 1948.[69] The latter, prompted in part by the humiliating Renville agreement of January 1948 negotiated between the Republic and the Dutch, left Banten the only unoccupied area of West Java. The army's ability to contain the threat posed by this renewed unrest in Banten was due in no small measure to the failure of the ulama, jawara and communists to reunite under one political flag, as they had temporarily under the Dewan in 1945, and earlier in 1926.

Increasingly from 1947 Banten, despite its physical separation from the Republic in Yogyakarta, became more integrated into its political and military structure. Two more attempts were to be made by radical elements to challenge this, but these found little

support outside the ranks of some jawara bands.[70] The latter, who had united with ulama and communists in 1926 and again in 1945, decided for the most part that all governments were inimical to them and persisted in their traditional banditry into the 1950s. The ulama, who had been vital to the success of the attempts at revolution in 1926 and 1945, gradually tired of holding on to the reins of administrative power. When, beginning in 1947, the Republic attempted to reestablish a civil administration in Banten, many ulama were glad to relinquish their political power. Infidel rule had at least disappeared and the legitimacy of the Republic was increasingly accepted. Local communists and leftwingers, who had successfully managed to forge an alliance with ulama and jawara in 1945, as in 1926, became divided as to the strategy and tactics once the old administration had been overthrown. National divisions amongst the left between the PKI and Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan compounded local difficulties in Banten. This division of the leftwing forces undermined the revolutionary impulse in Banten. The 'social revolution' of 1945 demonstrated once again the close linkage between communism, religion and revolt in Banten's history, but the overthrow of the colonial government and of the pangreh praja spelt the end of any hope of a continuing alliance between sickle and crescent.

FOOTNOTES

1. J.M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesie in de jaren 1930 tot 1942, The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1952, passim; George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952, pp. 87-100.

2. J.W. Meyer Ranneft and W. Huender, Onderzoek naar de Belastingkruk op de Inlandsche Bevolking, Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1926, pp. 5-6, 160-166; Kahin, op. cit., pp. 24-27.

3. G. Gonggrijp, Schets eener Economische Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indie, Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn N.V., 1938 pp. 212-235.

4. Memorie van Overgave (hereafter MvO) van den afgetreden Resident van Bantam, F.G. Putman-Cramer, March 1931, p. 209.

5. MvO, A.M. van der Elst, August 1937, p. 140.

6. Ibid.; see also Soekasno "Het particuliere crediet in den klapper en coprahandel in Bantam", Volkscredietwezen, Vol. 24, July-August 1936, p. 465.

7. The inquiry report is contained in Mailrapport 365/1932. Comments are contained in Mailrapport 440/1932.

8. "Wellenstein Report", Mailrapport 365/1932.

9. Governor of West Java, Schnitzler, to Governor-General, 20 April 1932, A 67/2/2, Mailrapport 440/1932.

10. Soekasno, op. cit., pp. 393-446.

11. See also the account of the plight of the coconut grove farmers by the journalist Parada Harahap, who visited Banten in 1939-40, in his Indonesia Sekarang, Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952, pp. 32-47.

12. MvO, Putman-Cramer, 1931, p. 72; MvO, van der Elst, 1937, p. 61.

13. MvO, J.S. de Kanter, May 1934, pp. 43, 129.

14. MvO, Putman-Cramer, 1931, p. 75; MvO, de Kanter, 1934, p. 45.

15. MvO, de Kanter, 1934, p. 44.

16. Ibid., p. 88; MvO, van der Elst, 1937, pp. 112-114.

17. MvO, de Kanter, 1934, p. 148.

18. MvO, van der Elst, 1937, p. 144.

19. See P.M. van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian Problem, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949, p. 27; D.H. Meyer, "Over het Bendewezen op Java", Indonesie, Vol. 3, no. 2, September 1949, pp. 178-189; R.B. Cribb, Jakarta in the Indonesian Revolution, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1984, pp. 50-53.

20. See "The Bantam Report", pp. 24, 29, in Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, eds., The Communist Uprisings of 1926-27 in Indonesia: Key Documents, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960; Th.H.M. Loze, "Iets over eenige

typisch Bantamsche Instituten", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, Vol. 23, no. 2, March 1934, pp. 171-173.

21. D.H. Meyer, "Over het Bendewezen", pp. 178-189.

22. See De Banten Bode, 8 January 1938; Djasa jang ta' diloepakan, Djakarta: Gunseikanbu Kokumin Tosyokyoku, 2604 (1944), passim.

23. D.H. Meyer, "Over het Bendewezen", p. 180; see also his Japan wint den Oorlog: Documenten over Java, Maastricht: Leiter-Nypels, 1946, pp. 17-33.

24. D.H. Meyer, "Over het Bendewezen", pp. 180-181. Seniin and Haji Armana were also known as kepala rampok (chief robber) and were assisted by a dewan pemimpin (leadership council). See also the series of articles by R.M. Slamet Sudibio, "Perampokan", Asia Raya, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19 and 22 June 2602 (1942); De Banten Bode, 8 January 1938; interview with Jaro Kamid, Serang, 4 June 1976.

25. D.H. Meyer, "Over het Bendewezen", pp. 180-181; Djasa jang ta' diloepakan, p. 8.

26. De Banten Bode, 5 November and 3 December 1938.

27. D.H. Meyer, Japan wint den Oorlog, p. 22.

28. Ibid., p. 23.

29. Interviews with Tje Mamat, Serang, 14 June 1976 and Tubagus Alipan, Pandeglang, 4 April 1976. See also Harry A. Poeze, Tan Malaka: Levensloop van 1897 tot 1945.

Strijder voor Indonesie's Vrijheid, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 411, 418-419. PARI had a double meaning: Partai Republik Indonesia and Proletar Aslia Raya, the second clandestine meaning referring to social revolutionary aims.

30. Djamaluddin Tamin, Sedjarah PKI, mimeo, n.d., p. 52; see also reports on PARI in Mailrapport 446^{x}/1936.

31. D.H. Meyer, Japan wint den Oorlog, p. 30. Meyer reports that a village head said to him after the arrests, "Our fathers and grandfathers have not done anything against the band leaders and their supporters, yet since they have been arrested, the peasants again listen to our advice." "Over het Bendewezen", p. 180.

32. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 108-112; Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 20-26.

33. The fourth daidancho in Banten was Raden Sutalaksana, who had been a wedana before the war. Haji Chatib had earlier been detained for 20 days by the Kempeitai in 1942.

34. Sidik Kertapati, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, third ed., 1964, pp. 27-29.

35. One such group was associated with the Jakarta-based BIMA, (Barisan Indonesia Merdeka), a clandestine successor to the Barisan Banteng organization, dissolved by the Japanese.

See "Zaman Menteng 31" in Galanggang Repolusi Kenangan 10 Tahun Proklamasi, Djakarta: Badan Penerbit Nasional (UPMI), n.d., pp. 107-116; Soepardo et al., Manusia dan Masjarakat Baru Indonesia, Djakarta: Dinas Penerbitan Balai Pustaka, 1962, pp. 24-25.

36. Interviews with Tje Mamat and Tubagus Alipan.

37. Entol Chaerudin, Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 dan Pemindahan Kekuasaan, n.p., 1974, in my possession. See also the article on Kaigun Bukanfu Daisangka in Het Dagblad, 14 March 1946. Interviews with Mohammed Chusnun, Bogor, 19 April 1976 and Entol Mohammed Mansjur, Menes, 19 March 1976. Both worked for the Kaigun Bukanfu Daisangka.

38. Ibid., and interviews above.

39. Chaerudin, op. cit., p. 15. See also Warsa Djajakusumah, Api'45 Dari Masa ke Masa. Kisah Pengalaman Perjoangan Kemerdekaan R.I. 1945-1950, mimeo, 1975, pp. 3-7, in my possession.

40. Interview with Amanan Satiahardja, Bogor, 14 March 1976, who was assistant wedana in Menes in 1944.

41. "'The Problem of Rice', Notes of Sanyo Kaigi (Council of Advisers), 8 January 1945", trans. by Benedict R.O'G. Anderson in Indonesia, No. 4, 1966, p. 88.

42. For biographical details on Raden Soekrawardi, see Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa, Jakarta: Gunseikanbu,

2604 (1944), p. 80. Soekrawardi was the son of Raden Mohammed Isa, chief penghulu of Serang, 1920-1938, and first President of the Court for Islamic Affairs (Hof voor Islamische Zaken) and nephew of Achmad Djajadiningrat. Also interviews with Oma Natadiredja, Serang police chief in 1945, Bandung, 23 October 1975.

43. Interviews with several ex-PETA officers in Banten. One former Muslim leader in the region described the PETA officer group as "anak ambtenaren, senang pakaian, ideologis kosong" (children of officials, happy in their uniforms and ideologically empty).

44. See Poeze, op. cit., pp. 516-533; also Tan Malaka, Dari Penjara ke Penjara, Vol. II, Djogjakarta: Pustaka Murba, n.d., pp. 146-183.

45. Tan Malaka, op. cit., pp. 128-132, where he refers to a meeting with 'Mang Mamat', an alias of Tje Mamat. Also interviews in Banten.

46. See H. Ayip Dzukri, "Proklamasi dimulaidari Banten", Warta Harian, 16, 18 and 19 Aguust 1969; Tan Malaka, Dari Penjara ke Penjara, Vol. III, mimeo, p. 62.

47. Interview with Haji Mohammed Tahir, Serang, 9 December 1975; also interview with Maruto Nitimihardjo, Jakarta, 10 June 1976.

48. For biographical details, see Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka, p. 104.

49. See Kami Perkenalkan, Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1954, p. 63.

50. For a report on the fighting, see Berita Indonesia, 16 October 1945.

51. Most of this account of the Dewan is based on interviews. There are few written sources, but see "Verslag, Ontwikkeling Situatie in Bantam tot 11 Maartz 1946", Archief Algemeen Secretaris, 1e zending, Kist I, Bundel 36, Rijksarchief, The Hague; also "De Ongeregeldheden binnen de Republiek Indonesia", Archief Procureur Generaal, No. 35, inv. no. 157, Rijksarchief; Laporan Politik, Ekonomi, Social, Keamanan d.s.b. dari Daerah Banten, 10 pp., in my possession, pp. 1-2; document written in 1949 by Indonesian officials. See also Republik Indonesia Propinsi Djawa Barat, Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953, pp. 54-55, 150-151 and Ra'jat, 29 December 1945.

52. Interview with former police chief in Cilegon.

53. In Serang Kiyai Sjamaun, the grandson of Kiyai Wasid, one of the principal leaders of the 1888 revolt, was elected Regent. Kiyai Sjamaun was the former daidancho of the Cilegon battalion of PETA. He had spent many years in Mecca and had studied at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the latter being most unusual for Bantenese ulama. Kiyai Sjamaun was also one of the few appointees who was not of the 1926 generation. In Pandeglang, the new Regent was Kiyai Abdulhalim, a former

Digulist. In Lebak, Kiyai Abuya Hassan was appointed Regent.

54. Interview with Kasman Singgodimedjo, Attorney General in 1945, Jakarta, 6 June 1976.

55. See Laporan Politik, pp. 1-2.

56. See Sin Po, 29 and 30 October 1945; Berita Indonesia, 1 November 1945; Het Dagblad, 9 and 11 December 1945.

57. For press reports, see Ra'jat, 13 December 1945; Boeroeh, 14 December 1945.

58. For biographical details of Hardiwinangun, see Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka, p. 40. R.T. Hardiwinangun was born in Pandeglang in 1897. In 1926 he was appointed Wedana of Menes and replaced the murdered Wedana Raden Partadinata. From 1934 to 1939, Hardiwinangun was Patih of Indramayu at a time when Ch. van der Plas was Resident of Ceribon. In November 1945, Hardiwinangun went to the Hotel des Indes in Jakarta for a meeting with van der Plas, then the most senior Dutch official in Jakarta. It is probable that the fact of this visit became known to the Dewan.

59. Entol Ternaya had been assistant wedana of Menes in 1926.

60. The BKR forces were far better armed than the Dewan, having received most of the former PETA arms. It also seems that the BKR received arms from Indonesian army units elsewhere in West Java after the presidential visit in December.

61. The other members were Kiyai Sjadeli Hassan, Haji Fathoni and Gogo Sanjadirdja.

62. All three were ex-Digulists.

63. Some of the bands even went so far as to announce that in future they would rob only from the rich, who were denounced for not having fulfilled their responsibilities in regard to fitrah and jakat. See Ra'jat, 23 February 1946.

64. Berita Indonesia, 30 October and 30 December 1946. Haji Chatib defended his actions in a long report in February 1947, Laporan tentang Pembangunan Banten, 21 pp., handwritten, in my possession, in which he estimated that up to 320,000 people had been involved in the restoration work! He denied the restoration work formed part of a plan for a new Bantenese sultanate. The numbers involved in the work certainly ran into the tens of thousands, all voluntary labour, with wood and stone being brought from south Banten. The work was regarded as waqaf - religious obligation. In some quarters, it was even regarded that participation in the work was comparable with the pilgrimage to Mecca.

65. "Nefis weekelijksche Militair Overzicht, 8 Juli 1946", FYS/33507/G, Bundel 1074, Ministry of Defence Archives, The Hague; also "Nefis Verkort Politiek Situatie-Overzicht van Nederlandsch Indie, 18 Januari 1947", No. 1103/xAG, Kist 42, Bundel 16, Ministry of Defence Archives, The Hague. See also Siliwangi dari Masa ke Masa, Sedjarah Militer Kodam VI Siliwangi, Djakarta: Fakhta Mahjuma, 1969, p. 81.

66. Sukanda Bratamenggala had led the youth section of Pagujuban Pasundan before the war. During the war, he was head of the Bandung Seinendan. For further details, see Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 25, 337, 430, 445-446. On Adiwinata, see Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka, p. 7.

67. Antara, 11 February 1947. On Sudibja, see Orang Indonesia, p. 81.

68. Antara, 10 March 1947.

69. "Overzicht en Ontwikkeling van het Toestand, 26 Maart 1948", no. 50, Terr. Tpn. Commandant West Java, Archive of the Headquarters of the General Staff, Ministry of Defence, Kist 20, Bundel 25 and "Toestand Bantam - April 1948", Nefis GG 39, Bundel 9907, Ministry of Defence Archives, The Hague. See also Sin Po, 15 September 1948.

70. I deal with these in some detail in "The Social Revolution of 1945 in Banten" in Audrey Kahin, ed., Roots of the Revolution: Indonesia's Regions 1945-1950, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, forthcoming. See also Propinsi Djawa Barat, pp. 212-245; Sin Po, 25 August, 17 November and 24 December 1949; Siliwangi dari Masa ke Masa, pp. 354-358, 370-373; "Rapport betreffende de Politieke Ontwikkeling en de Algemene Veiligheidstoestand T.B.A. Gebied Bantam sedert de Wapenstilstandsovereenkomst", Archive Procureur General, inv. no. 186, Rijksarchief.

CONCLUSION

The social revolution of 1945, like the 1926 revolt in Banten, brought together a coalition of ulama, jawara, elements of the old nobility and communists, pitting them all against the existing order. Unlike 1926, however, the demoralization of the colonial power, Japan, following its surrender to the Allies on 15 August, meant that resistance to revolt was at best half-hearted. The Indonesian administration, the pangreh praja, was left exposed and with no effective political allies. The Dutch were unable to reassert their authority in Banten until December 1948. In these circumstances, revolt triumphed in Banten for the first time.

The alienation of the pangreh praja from Bantense society, a constant thread throughout the region's history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, allowed for the unification of a revolutionary alliance opposed to their continued rule. By 1945, hostility to the Indonesian administration had increased because of its identification with the Japanese occupation government and had become so profoundly entrenched as to be total. Indeed, one of the most notable features of the 1945 revolt, when comparing it with the insurrections of 1888 or 1926, is the deep antipathy to the pangreh praja as a whole. In all earlier revolts, the rebels had distinguished between Bantenese and non-Bantenese priyayi and there are remarkably few instances of Bantenese officials being killed. By 1945 this picture had changed. Amongst the most notable victims of violence were the Regent of Lebak, Hardiwinangun, and Soekrawardi, the Wedana of Anyer and nephew of Achmad Djajadiningrat. The Regent of Serang, Hilman Djajadiningrat, was extremely fortunate

in escaping with his life in the social revolution of October 1945. Social divisions in Banten were basically not between lord and peasant but rather between government and rural society generally. By 1945, this division had become so deep that nothing short of a complete overthrow of the pangreh praja was acceptable to the revolutionaries, whether they were communists, ulama or jawara.

Communists, Muslims and bandits are not natural bedfellows. Yet the distinguishing feature of the two major revolts in Banten in the early twentieth century is the close working relationship that existed between the three in pursuit of a common revolutionary goal, the overthrow of the existing order. This unique configuration of social forces, whilst it occurred to some extent elsewhere, for example in West Sumatra in 1927 and in the Tiga Daerah movement in Pekalongan in 1945, was striking in Banten both in its intensity and strength but also in its durability. The same elements which had rebelled in 1926 came together again in the last months of the Japanese occupation. It was only in the aftermath of the social revolution of 1945, when political power had to be exercised by the revolutionary forces, that differences of strategy, tactics and ideology began to separate elements within the coalition. Even after 1945, there remained a tradition in Banten of some religious leaders, amongst whom Haji Achmad Chatib was most notable, continuing to embrace radical and leftist political ideals and movements.

Several factors contributed to the intertwining of communist and Islamic radicalism in revolutionary movements in Banten. Foremost amongst these was the existence of rural powerholders -

the religious elite, dispossessed nobles and bandits - with great influence and prestige in peasant society but who felt intense resentment at the loss of privilege and collective humiliation suffered as a result of colonial rule. The sense of the past was profound in Bantenese society. It was kept alive by the remnants of the old nobility, by the ulama, many of whom were also descendants of the sultans and even by the jawara who, on occasion, referred to themselves as 'children of the Sultan of Banten'. These traditional powerholders had fought a long and successful battle to preserve their influence in Bantenese rural society, but found no reflection of it in government. The alienation of these groups from the existing political order, already acute in the nineteenth century, increased in the twentieth century with the westernization of the priyayi and growing colonial repression. The tradition of revolt in Banten made resort to rebellion an avenue more likely to be pursued than elsewhere in Java. Furthermore, the growing impact of the colonial economy with its widely fluctuating oscillations, booms and crises in the twentieth century had a profoundly unsettling effect on Bantenese society which made the likelihood of social and political unrest far greater.

The advent of national political forces such as the Sarekat Islam and the PKI broke the isolation of traditional Bantenese rebellious movements and afforded new organizational channels for these movements to follow. National political movements such as the Sarekat Islam and the PKI more or less accepted the peculiarity and specificity of Bantenese society. To do otherwise would have cut them off from any local constituency. Ironically, the Sarekat Islam was rather more discerning in its choice of local allies than

the PKI. Under the original distinctly priyayi leadership of Hasan Djajadiningrat, the SI eschewed the involvement of jawara and the existence of secret societies within its ranks and kept a watchful eye on branches that were wholly under the control of ulama. Nevertheless, the Sarekat Islam did not prove impermeable to local traditions of protest as was amply illustrated by the Haji Nawawi affair of 1922. The PKI, less inhibited by concerns of legality and already pledged to an insurrectionary course, sought purposefully to recruit to its cause all who were opposed to the colonial order. Moreover, Islam had traditionally been a rallying point for social forces opposing colonial domination not only in Banten but in many areas of the Netherlands Indies. To ignore this and seek to recruit in the countryside on other bases was simply not on the political agenda in the 1920s, a point the PKI easily and willingly accepted. But not only did the PKI accept de facto existing rebellious traditions in Banten and implicitly the leadership of the ulama locally, they studiously avoided the adoption of any rigid stance on the relationship between Communism and Islam. Indeed, the PKI sought above all to recognise local autonomy and the special role of Islam in Banten, whilst stressing the need for a wider basis for nationwide political action.

The revolt of 1926 in Banten, whilst sharing many common features with the Cilegon uprising of 1888 and especially the close identification between religion and revolt, was notable too for other novel features. In the first place, the revolutionary movement, even in its lower ranks, was conscious of being one front of a nationwide assault on Dutch colonial rule. This indeed

had been one of the most successful points continually made by PKI propagandists. Whilst the reality of PKI organization elsewhere was hidden even from local communist leaders in Banten, the idea of nationwide organization proved to be a powerful revolutionary symbol and one that helped galvanize the movement. It was one of the factors which enabled, for the first time, the establishment of an insurrectionary organization that encompassed virtually all of Banten. It is important to note too that the social composition of the revolutionary forces was, at least in part, different from the insurrectionary forces of 1888. This reflected the great social changes that had occurred in Indonesian society in the intervening 40 years. The rapid expansion of government and the economy brought a demand for a better educated native population. At least in its early development, we find in the communist movement schoolteachers, journalists, printers and artisans, both Bantenese and non-Bantenese. The acceptance of outsiders in the revolutionary movement in 1926 was again a significant departure from Bantenese revolts in the nineteenth century, which were wholly led by local people.

At the same time, the Sarekat Islam and even more so the PKI introduced to Banten the tools of modern politics such as newspapers, public meetings, strikes, demonstrations and petitions. All this was radically new and finds no ready parallel in the nineteenth century. To some extent, this led, if only briefly, to a better articulation of local grievances. Yet the uses of these modern political devices often illustrate strikingly how the new political forces blended with local realities. Thus, the first petition the PKI organized was in favour of the granting of pension rights to the descendants of the sultans. Finally, it is important to remember the nature of the revolutionary objectives in 1926, and

again in 1945, differed from 1888. In the case of the Cilegon affair, Islamic ideologies were the real objectives which the chief rebels envisaged, whilst in the twentieth century the rebels fought for the overthrow of the Dutch colonial order nationwide and for a loosely-defined kemerdekaan (independence), which of course encompassed religious freedom.

Revolt when it finally came in November 1926 was principally led by the ulama because of the arrest by the authorities of the 'conscious communists' at an earlier stage. The prominence of the ulama in the actual insurrection, and earlier in the establishment of the Sarekat Islam and the PKI, displayed not only the hostility of the religious elite to the existing order, but more importantly a political agility and responsiveness on their part. Constantly denigrated by the Dutch for their narrowness and conservatism the ulama in pursuit of their own goals demonstrated a sure adeptness in entering tactical political alliances not only with other local elites such as jawara, but also with broader political forces such as the Sarekat Islam and the PKI. There was a definite realization on their part of the need for wider political mobilization than a purely Bantenese insurrection in 1926. Again in 1945, one of the major reasons for the ulama turning against the communists grouped in the Dewan Rakyat was their genuine fear of the political isolation of Banten otherwise. This is not to deny their strong sense of regional identity and constant desire throughout the revolution of 1945-1949 to seek as great a political autonomy for Banten as possible. Nevertheless, sooner than the radical elements grouped in the Dewan, they recognized the reality of the Republic and its importance as the only instrument whereby the Indonesian people could preserve their independence.

APPENDIX

LIST OF PERSONS FROM BANTEN EXILED TO BOVEN DIGUL

	NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	PLACE OF BIRTH	RESIDENCE
1.	Tb. K. H. Achmad Chatib	31	Religious teacher	Gajam, Pandeglang	Caringin
2.	Tb. K. H. Abdulhamid (Adung)	23	Religious teacher	Gajam, Pandeglang	Cikondang, Pandeglang
3.	K.H. Mohammed Gozali	38	Religious teacher	Sanding, Pamarayan	Sanding, Pamarayan
4.	Tb. K. H. Abdulhadi	39	Religious teacher	Sidangsari, Pamarayan	Bangko, Caringin
5.	K.H. Alijasin	40	Religious teacher	Pabuaran, Ciomas	Pabuaran, Ciomas
6.	H. Abdullah	32	Peasant	Koranji, Serang	Koranji, Serang
7.	H. Mohammed Arif	30	Village head	Karundang, Serang	Dalung, Serang
8.	H. Mohammed Jaisin	35	Peasant	Labuan, Anyer	Labuan, Anyer
9.	H. Enggus	48	Trader	Baru, Cilegon	Warnasari, Cilegon
10.	H. Santani	25	Tailor	Jombangwetan, Cilegon	Kebonsari, Cilegon
11.	H. Soeeb	35	Peasant	Petir, Pamarayan	Petir, Pamarayan
12.	H. Artadjaja	25	Peasant	Pancaregang, Ciomas	Pancaregang, Ciomas
13.	H. Ayip Achmad	26	Small trader	Lontar, Serang	Lontar, Serang
14.	Puradisastra	35	Clerk, journalist	Cisompet, Negara (East Priangan)	Serang
15.	Arman	30	Clerk/ trader	Karegnen, Serang	Sopeng, Serang

16. Alirachman	28	Auctioneer	Karegnen, Serang	Serang
17. Tb. Hilman	27	Clerk - Landrent Office	Mengger, Pandeglang	Kaujon, Serang
18. (Agus) Soleiman	36	Clerk	Rancapare, Serang	Kaujon, Serang
19. H. Radi	40	Peasant	Kepuh, Anyer	Kasambironjok, Anyer
20. Dulhamid	45	Peasant	Pabuaran, Ciomas	Pabuaran, Ciomas
21. Mohammed Ali	38	Peasant	Banjarmasin (Kalimantan)	Bandulu, Anyer
22. Sentot	24	Peasant	Sudimampir, Anyer	Sudimampir, Anyer
23. Wajut	32	Peasant and trader	Sudimampir, Anyer	Sudimampir, Anyer
24. Ibing	30	Tailor	Murui, Menes	Murui, Menes
25. Kasan	40	Peasant ex-village head	Kosambironjok, Anyer	Gunungsih, Anyer
26. Haji Moechamad Noer	30	Clerk	Sudimampir, Anyer	Sudimampir, Anyer
27. Daud	50	Peasant and trader	Petir, Pamarayan	Petir, Pamarayan
28. Abdulmalik	56	Trader	Petir, Pamarayan	Petir, Pamarayan
29. Ibrahim	40	Peasant	Pancaregang, Ciomas	Pancaregang, Ciomas
30. Dulmuin	45	Peasant	Pancaregang, Ciomas	Pancaregang, Ciomas
31. Durakim	40	Peasant	Gunungsari, Ciomas	Gunungsari, Ciomas
32. Soleman	28	Peasant	Ciomas	Gunungsari, Ciomas
33. Umar	39	Peasant ex-village head	Kaduagung Ciomas	Kaduagung Ciomas

34. Kasiman	23	Peasant	Sindangmandi, Ciomas	Sindangmandi, Ciomas
35. Martadjani	25	Peasant	Pabuaran, Ciomas	Kadubeureum, Ciomas
36. (Mohammed Nur Fas) Nani	35	Tobacco stallkeeper	Kagunungan, Serang	Kagunungan, Serang
37. Tju Tong Hin	35	Trader	Pasar Baru, Batavia	Ciunjung, Rangkasbitung
38. Sawiri	25	Peasant	Labuan, Anyer	Waringin, Anyer
39. Ali Achmad	36	Peasant	Labuan, Anyer	Labuan, Anyer
40. Ali	45	Peasant	Sangiang, Anyer	Sangiang, Anyer
41. Tohir	20	Peasant	Labuan, Anyer	Labuan, Anyer
42. Djakaria	40	Peasant	Sigedang, Anyer	Labuan, Anyer
43. Samaden	50	Peasant	Sangiang, Anyer	Pasirbatang, Anyer
44. Moeslik	20	Peasant	Pabuaran, Ciomas	Pabuaran, Ciomas
45. Mohammed Amin	45	Peasant	Sindangmandi, Ciomas	Sindangmandi, Ciomas
46. H. Usman	50	Peasant	Silebu, Ciruas	Silebu, Ciruas
47. Salikin	38	Religious teacher	Pancur, Serang	Pancur, Serang
48. Djari	42	Trader	Jalupang, Ciruas	Pancur, Serang
49. H. Asgari	26	Religious teacher	Gunungsari, Ciomas	Gunungsari, Ciomas
50. Afif	27	Village clerk	Jombang, Cilegon	Labuan Caringin
51. Hasanuddin	26	-	Maninjau, West Sumatra	Jambatan Lima, Batavia
52. Tb. H. Emed	30	Religious teacher	Caringin	Caringin

53. Tb. H. Arifin	55	Peasant	Cikeusal, Pamarayan	Cikeusal, Pamarayan
54. Tb. Moh. Isa	35	Peasant	Petir, Pamarayan	Petir, Pamarayan
55. H. Jahja	42	Religious teacher	Petir, Pamarayan	Petir, Pamarayan
56. Mohammed Isa	32	Trader	Sumurpecing, Serang	Sumurpecing, Serang
57. Tb. Mardjuk	36	Trader	Cikeusal, Pamarayan	Cikeusal, Pamarayan
58. Mad Saleh	35	Peasant	Pabuaran, Ciomas	Pabuaran, Ciomas
59. Abdullah	55	Peasant	Sumurpecing, Serang	Serang
60. Dulah	35	Bricklayer	Batavia	Serang
61. Alikasim	18	Peasant	Cirangkong, Pamarayan	Cirangkong, Pamarayan
62. Mohammed Jusuf	25	Foreman, Public Works Department	Pabuaran, Ciomas	Kadubeureum, Ciomas
63. Mohammed Sis	48	Trader	Kaujon, Serang	Ciberang, Pandeglang
64. Surabaita	20	Trader	Keboncau, Pandeglang	Keboncau, Pandeglang
65. Achmad Rifai	20	Clerk	Pandeglang	Sawah Besar, Batavia
66. Mu'min	35	Peasant	Barugbug, Ciomas	Barugbug, Ciomas
67. Umar	39	Peasant, ex-village head	Kaduagung, Ciomas	Kaduagung, Ciomas
68. H. Akjar	28	Peasant	Tejamari, Ciomas	Tejamari, Ciomas
69. Ishak	26	Typesetter, printing worker	Pandeglang	Serang
70. Tjondrosaputro	40	Trader	Central Java	Rangkasbitung
71. Tb. Mohammed Hasjim alias Entjim	32	Agent, Singer Sewing-Machine Co.	Ciujung, Rangkasbitung	Ciujung, Rangkasbitung

72. Kamim	35	Peasant	Pabuaran, Ciomas	Pabuaran, Ciomas
73. Salihun	35	Shoemaker	Cililitan, Batavia	Ciujung, Rangkasbitung
74. Sera	35	Peasant	Malangkarsa, Ciruas	Malangkarsa, Ciruas
75. H. Mardjuk	36	Peasant	Silebu, Ciruas	Kubang, Serang
76. H. Hasan	27	Peasant	Sajar, Serang	Pancur, Serang
77. Ayot Satriawidjaja	26	Peasant	Kadugadung, Pandeglang	Kadugadung, Pandeglang
78. Mohammed Toha	23	Trader	Palanjar, Pandeglang	Palanjar, Pandeglang
79. Tb. Saleh	30	Peasant	Kudahandap, Pandeglang	Kudahandap, Pandeglang
80. K.H. Achmad	46	Religious teacher	Kaujon, Serang	Pancur, Serang
81. Entol Enoh	40	Peasant, ex-village head	Nyamplong, Menes	Tegalwangi, Menes
82. Nawi	35	Peasant	Sukalaba, Ciomas	Sukalaba, Ciomas
83. Mohammed Arif	39	Peasant	Kapandean, Serang	Kapandean, Serang
84. Amir	32	Barber	Sumurpecung, Serang	Sumurpecung, Serang
85. Achmad Bassaif	23	-	Kaloran, Serang	Batavia
86. Mohammed Saleh	-	Policeman	Purworejo, Central Java	Serang
87. Atmodihardjo	-	Printing worker, journalist	Yogyakarta	Serang
88. Asmail	32	Peasant	Pabuaran, Ciomas	Kadubeureum, Ciomas
89. H. Mohammed Salim	30	Penghulu (religious official)	Babakanlor, Caringin	Babakanlor, Caringin

90. Karis	29	Peasant	Rancapare, Serang	Rancapare, Serang
91. Aliakbar	36	Labourer	Passar, Serang	Passar, Serang
92. Rujani	28	Tailor	Rancapare, Serang	Kagunungan, Serang
93. H. Aliasgar	36	Peasant	Pancangan, Serang	Silebu, Ciruas
94. Entjang	32	Peasant	Cilanggawe, Caringin	Cilanggawe, Caringin
95. Mohammed Bakri	35	Peasant	Karunang, Ciomas	Karunang, Ciomas
96. Abdulkarim	30	Peasant	Pancur, Serang	Ciliwong, Serang
97. H. Achmed	40	Peasant	Rancapare, Serang	Rancapare, Serang
98. Andung	35	Peasant	Pabuaran, Ciomas	Pabuaran, Ciomas
99. Hardjosuparto	22	Trader	Rangkasbitung	Rangkasbitung

Abbreviations: K. - Kiyai
H. - Haji
Tb. - Tubagus

Sources: Verbaal 4 March 1927; report of Resident of Banten, 29 August 1927 in Mailrapport 523^{x}/1927; Mailrapport 1966^{x}/1927; report of Resident of Banten, 23 December 1927 in Mailrapport 1074^{x}/28; Mailrapport 113^{x}/1928; Mailrapport 637^{x}/1928.

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For fuller details and biographical information on the Bantenese exiled to Boven Digul, see my Sickle and Crescent: The Communist Revolt of Banten in 1926, pp. 69-79.

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113. Tan Soen Wee, Serang

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